Book 1, Chapter 6
Providence
From everything which is or happens in the world, it is easy to praise Providence, if a man possesses these two qualities, the faculty of seeing what belongs and happens to all persons and things, and a grateful disposition. If he does not possess these two qualities, one man will not see the use of things which are and which happen; another will not be thankful for them, even if he does know them. If God had made colours, but had not made the faculty of seeing them, what would have been their use? None at all. On the other hand, if He had made the faculty of vision, but had not made objects such as to fall under the faculty, what in that case also would have been the use of it? None at all. Well, suppose that He had made both, but had not made light? In that case, also, they would have been of no use. Who is it then who has fitted this to that and that to this? And who is it that has fitted the knife to the case and the case to the knife? Is it no one? And, indeed, from the very structure of things which have attained their completion, we are accustomed to show that the work is certainly the act of some artificer, and that it has not been constructed without a purpose. Does then each of these things demonstrate the workman, and do not visible things and the faculty of seeing and light demonstrate Him? And the existence of male and female, and the desire of each for conjunction, and the power of using the parts which are constructed, do not even these declare the workman? If they do not, let us consider the constitution of our understanding according to which, when we meet with sensible objects, we do not simply receive impressions from them, but we also select something from them, and subtract something, and add, and compound by means of them these things or those, and, in fact, pass from some to other things which, in a manner, resemble them: is not even this sufficient to move some men, and to induce them not to forget the workman? If not so, let them explain to us what it is that makes each several thing, or how it is possible that things so wonderful and like the contrivances of art should exist by chance and from their own proper motion?
It is easy to praise Providence for everything that exists or happens in the world, if a person has two qualities. First, they must be able to see what belongs to and happens to all people and things. Second, they must have a grateful disposition. Without these qualities, one person will not see the purpose of what exists and happens. Another will not be grateful, even if they do see its purpose. If God had made colors but had not given us the ability to see them, what use would they be? None at all. On the other hand, suppose he had given us sight but had not made objects that could be seen. What use would sight be then? None at all. Now suppose he had made both, but had not made light. In that case, too, they would have been useless. Who, then, fitted each of these to the others? And who fitted the knife to its case and the case to the knife? No one? When we look at the structure of completed things, we usually conclude that a craftsman made them. We conclude, too, that they were not made without a purpose. Does each of these things show that a craftsman made it? Then do visible things, sight, and light not also show that he exists? And what about the existence of male and female, and their desire to join with each other? What about their ability to use the parts made for that purpose? Do these not also reveal the craftsman? If not, let us consider how our understanding works. When we encounter things we can perceive, we do not merely receive impressions from them. We also select something from those impressions, subtract something, and add to them. We use them to combine things in different ways. In fact, we move from some things to others that resemble them in some way. Is even this not enough to move some people and lead them to remember the craftsman? If not, let them explain to us what makes each individual thing. Or how can things so wonderful and so like works of craft exist by chance and through their own motion?
Goethe has a short poem titled Gleich und Gleich (Like and Like):
See Schweig.'s note. I think I have captured the meaning of the passage.
Cicero, De Off. i. c. 4, on the difference between humans and animals.
What, then, are these things done in us only? Many, indeed, in us only, of which the rational animal had peculiarly need; but you will find many common to us with irrational animals. Do they then understand what is done? By no means. For use is one thing, and understanding is another: God had need of irrational animals to make use of appearances, but of us to understand the use of appearances. It is therefore enough for them to eat and to drink, and to sleep and to copulate, and to do all the other things which they severally do. But for us, to whom He has given also the intellectual faculty, these things are not sufficient; for unless we act in a proper and orderly manner, and conformably to the nature and constitution of each thing, we shall never attain our true end. For where the constitutions of living beings are different, there also the acts and the ends are different. In those animals then whose constitution is adapted only to use, use alone is enough: but in an animal (man), which has also the power of understanding the use, unless thero be the due exercise of the understanding, he will never attain his proper end. Well then God constitutes every animal, one to be eaten, another to serve for agriculture, another to supply cheese, and another for some like use; for which purposes what need is there to understand appearances and to be able to distinguish them? But God has introduced man to be a spectator of God and of His [5] works; and not only a spectator of them, but an interpreter. For this reason it is shameful for man to begin and to end where irrational animals do; but rather he ought to begin where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us; and nature ends in contemplation and understanding, and in a way of life conformable to nature. Take care then, not to die without having been spectators of these things.
Are these things, then, done only in us? Many are, indeed, done only in us, because rational animals have a special need for them. But you will find that we share many others with irrational animals. Do irrational animals understand what is done? Not at all. Using appearances is one thing, and understanding them is another. God needed irrational animals to use appearances, but he needed us to understand their use. So it is enough for animals to eat, drink, sleep, mate, and do everything else each kind does. But these things are not enough for us, since God has also given us the power to reason. Unless we act properly and in an orderly way, in keeping with each thing's nature and constitution, we will never reach our true end. Living beings have different constitutions, so their actions and ends are different too. For animals whose constitution is suited only to using appearances, use alone is enough. But a human being also has the power to understand that use. Unless a person exercises this understanding properly, they will never reach their proper end. God makes each animal for a purpose. One is to be eaten, another to work in agriculture, another to provide cheese, and another for some similar use. For these purposes, what need is there to understand appearances and distinguish between them? But God has brought human beings into the world to observe God and his [5] works, and not only to observe them, but also to interpret them. For this reason, it is shameful for human beings to begin and end where irrational animals do. Instead, they should begin where those animals begin, but end where nature ends in us. And nature ends in contemplation and understanding, and in a way of life that follows nature. Take care, then, not to die without having observed these things.
See Schweig.'s note, tom. ii. p. 84.
But you take a journey to Olympia to see the work of Phidias, and all of you think it a misfortune to die without having seen such things. But when there is no need to take a journey, and where a man is, there he has the works (of God) before him, will you not desire to see and understand them? Will you not perceive either what you are, or what you were born for, or what this is for which you have received the faculty of sight? But you may say, there are some things disagreeable and troublesome in life. And are there none at Olympia? Are you not scorched? Are you not pressed by a crowd? Are you not without comfortable means of bathing? Are you not wet when it rains? Have you not abundance of noise, clamour, and other disagreeable things? But I suppose that setting all these things off against the magnificence of the spectacle, you bear and endure. Well then and have you not received faculties by which you will be able to bear all that happens? Have you not received greatness of soul? Have you not received manliness? Have you not received endurance? And why do I trouble myself about anything that can happen if I possess greatness of soul? What shall distract my mind or disturb me, or appear painful? Shall I not use the power for the purposes for which I received it, and shall I grieve and lament over what happens?
You travel to Olympia to see the work of Phidias, and all of you think it a misfortune to die without seeing such things. But God’s works are before you wherever you are, and you need not travel to see them. Will you not desire to see and understand them? Will you not recognize what you are, what you were born for, or why you were given sight? But you may say that some things in life are unpleasant and troublesome. Are there none at Olympia? Are you not scorched by the sun? Are you not pressed by the crowd? Do you not lack comfortable places to bathe? Do you not get wet when it rains? Is there not plenty of noise, shouting, and other unpleasantness? Yet I suppose you put up with all these things because the spectacle is so magnificent. Well then, have you not been given abilities that will help you bear whatever happens? Have you not been given greatness of soul? Have you not been given manliness? Have you not been given endurance? If I possess greatness of soul, why should I trouble myself about anything that can happen? What could distract or disturb me, or seem painful? Should I not use my power for the purpose for which I received it? Should I instead grieve and lament over what happens?
This work was Phidias’s colossal statue of Zeus (Jupiter) at Olympia, made of gold and ivory. Pausanias describes this wonderful work (Eliaca, A, 11).
Compare Persius, Sat. iii. 66:
Yes, but my nose runs. For what purpose then, slave, have you hands? Is it not that you may wipe your nose?—Is it then consistent with reason that there should be running of noses in the world?—Nay, how much better it is to wipe your nose than to find fault. What do you think that Hercules would have been if there had not been such a lion, and hydra, and stag, and boar, and certain unjust and bestial men, whom Hercules used to drive away and clear out? And what would he have been doing if there had been nothing of the kind? Is it not plain that he would have wrapped himself up and have slept? In the first place then he would not have been a Hercules, when he was dreaming away all his life in such luxury and ease; and even if he had been one, what would have been the use of him? and what the use of his arms, and of the strength of the other parts of his body, and his endurance and noble spirit, if such circumstances and occasions had not roused and exercised him? Well then must a man provide for himself such means of exercise, and seek to introduce a lion from some place into his country, and a boar, and a hydra? This would be folly and madness: but as they did exist, and were found, they were useful for showing what Hercules was and for exercising him. Come then do you also having observed these things look to the faculties which you have, and when you have looked at them, say: Bring now, Zeus, any difficulty that thou pleasest, for I have means given to me by thee and powers for honouring myself through the things which happen. You do not so: but you sit still, trembling for fear that some things will happen, and weeping, and lamenting, and groaning for what does happen: and then you blame the gods. For what is the consequence of such meanness of spirit but impiety? And yet God has not only given us these faculties; by which we shall be able to bear everything that happens without being depressed or broken by it; but, like a good king and a true father, He has given us these faculties free from hindrance, subject to no compulsion, unimpeded, and has put them entirely in our own power, without even having reserved to Himself any power of hindering or impeding. You, who have received these powers free and as your own, use them not: you do not even see what you have received, and from whom; some of you being blinded to the giver, and not even acknowledging your benefactor, and others, through meanness of spirit, betaking yourselves to fault-finding and making charges against God. Yet I will show to you that you have powers and means for greatness of soul and manliness: but what powers you have for finding fault and making accusations, do you show me.
Yes, but my nose runs. Then what do you have hands for, slave? Aren't they for wiping your nose? But is it reasonable that there should be runny noses in the world? Well, isn't it much better to wipe your nose than to complain? What do you think Hercules would have been without that lion, hydra, stag, and boar? What would he have been without the unjust and savage men he used to drive away and clear out? And what would he have done if there had been nothing of the kind? Clearly, he would have wrapped himself up and gone to sleep. First of all, he would not have been a Hercules if he had dreamed away his life in luxury and ease. And even if he had been one, what use would he have been? What use would his arms and bodily strength have been? What use would his endurance and noble spirit have been? None, if those circumstances and challenges had not stirred him to action and tested him. Then should a man provide himself with such challenges? Should he look for a lion somewhere and bring it into his country, along with a boar and a hydra? That would be foolish and mad. But since those creatures did exist and were encountered, they helped show what Hercules was and put him to the test. Come then, consider these things and look at the abilities you have. Once you have looked at them, say: Bring any difficulty you please, Zeus. You have given me the means and powers to bring honor to myself through whatever happens. But you do not do this. Instead, you sit still, trembling for fear of what might happen. You weep, lament, and groan over what does happen. Then you blame the gods. For what can such a small spirit lead to but disrespect for the gods? Yet God has not only given us these abilities so that we can bear everything that happens without being depressed or broken. Like a good king and a true father, he has also given them to us free from hindrance and compulsion. He has put them entirely in our power. He has not even kept for himself any power to hinder or obstruct them. You have received these powers freely and as your own, yet you do not use them. You do not even see what you have received or from whom. Some of you are blind to the giver and do not even acknowledge your benefactor. Others, through smallness of spirit, turn to fault-finding and make accusations against God. Yet I will show you that you have the powers and means for greatness of soul and courage. But you show me what powers you have for finding fault and making accusations.
Compare Antoninus, viii. 50, and Epictetus, ii. 16, 13.
ἀφορμὰς. Here this word has a different meaning from the one it has when contrasted with ὁρμή. See Gataker, Antoninus, ix. 1 (Upton). Epictetus says that God gave humans their powers. Antoninus says those powers come from nature. They mean the same thing. See Schweighaeuser's note.
Compare Antoninus, ix. 1.
"Ein Blumenglöckchen Vom Boden hervor War früh gesprosset In lieblichem Flor; Da kam ein Bienchen Und naschte fein:— Die müssen wohl beyde Für einander seyn."
"A little bellflower sprang up from the ground early, blooming beautifully. Then a little bee came and sipped its nectar. The two must be meant for each other."
"Discite, io, miseri et causas cognoscite rerum, Quid sumus aut quidnam victuri gignimur.
"Learn, you poor souls, and understand the causes of things. Learn what we are and what we are born to live for.