Book 1, Chapter 1

What Is and Is Not in Our Control

5 min

Of all the faculties (except that which I shall soon mention), you will find not one which is capable of contemplating itself, and, consequently, not capable either of approving or disapproving. How far does the grammatic art possess the contemplating power? As far as forming a judgment about what is written and spoken. And how far music? As far as judging about melody. Does either of them then contemplate itself? By no means. But when you must write something to your friend, grammar will tell you what words you should write; but whether you should write or not, grammar will not tell you. And so it is with music as to musical sounds; but whether you should sing at the present time and play on the lute, or do neither, music will not tell you. What faculty then will tell you? That which contemplates both itself and all other things. And what is this faculty? The rational faculty; for this is the only faculty that we have received which examines itself, what it is, and what power it has, and what is the value of this gift, and examines all other faculties: for what else is there which tells us that golden things are beautiful, for they do not say so themselves? Evidently it is the faculty which is capable of judging of appearances. What else judges of music, grammar, and the other faculties, proves their uses, and points out the occasions for using them? Nothing else.

Of all our faculties, except one I will mention shortly, none can examine itself. Consequently, none can approve or disapprove of itself. How far can grammar examine things? It can judge what is written and spoken. And how far can music examine things? It can judge melody. Can either of them examine itself? Not at all. When you need to write to a friend, grammar tells you what words to write. But it cannot tell you whether you should write at all. Likewise, music can guide you in matters of musical sound. But it cannot tell you whether to sing and play the lute now, or to do neither. What faculty, then, will tell you? The faculty that examines both itself and everything else. And what is this faculty? The rational faculty. It is the only faculty we have been given that examines itself. It asks what it is, what power it has, and what this gift is worth. It also examines all the other faculties. What else tells us that golden things are beautiful? They do not say so themselves. Clearly, it is the faculty that can judge appearances. What else judges music, grammar, and the other faculties? What else tests their uses and tells us when to use them? Nothing else.

“This moral approving and disapproving faculty” is Bp. Butler's translation of Epictetus’s δοκιμαστική and ἀποδοκιμαστική (i. 1, 1). Butler uses it in his dissertation, Of the Nature of Virtue. See his note.

The rational faculty is what Epictetus and Antoninus call the λογική ψυχή. Antoninus says of it (xi. 1): “These are the properties of the rational soul: it sees itself, analyses itself, and makes itself such as it chooses; the fruit which it bears, itself enjoys.”

This is what he has just called the rational faculty. The Stoics called all impressions received through the senses “appearances” (φαντασίαι). They also used this name for all emotions caused by external things. Chrysippus said: φαντασία ἐστἰ πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον ἑαυτό τε καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός (Plutarch, iv. c. 12, De Placit. Philosoph.)

As then it was fit to be so, that which is best of all and supreme over all is the only thing which the gods have placed in our power, the right use of appearances; but all other things they have not placed in our power. Was it because they did not choose? I indeed think that, if they had been able, they would have put these other things also in our power, but they certainly could not. For as we exist on the earth, and are bound to such a body and to such companions, how was it possible for us not to be hindered as to these things by externals?

As was fitting, the gods placed only one thing in our power: the right use of appearances. This is the best thing of all, and supreme over all. They did not place anything else in our power. Was that because they chose not to? I believe that, if they could have, they would have placed these other things in our power too. But they certainly could not. We live on earth, tied to such a body and such companions. How, then, could we avoid being hindered by external things in these matters?

Compare Antoninus, ii. 3. Epictetus does not mean to limit the power of the gods. He means that, given the way things are, they cannot make contradictions possible. They have arranged things so that external circumstances hinder people. How then could they give people the power to be free from such hindrances? Seneca (De Providentia, c. 6) says: “But it may be said, many things happen which cause sadness, fear, and are hard to bear. Because (God says) I could not save you from them, I have armed your minds against all.” This answers those who imagine they have disproved the common claim that God is omnipotent. They ask whether he can combine inherent contradictions, or make two and two equal five. This is indeed an absurd way to talk.

But what says Zeus? Epictetus, if it were possible, I would have made both your little body and your little property free and not exposed to hindrance. But now be not ignorant of this: this body is not yours, but it is clay finely tempered. And since I was not able to do for you what I have mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us, this faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it, and the faculty of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the faculty of using the appearances of things; and if you will take care of this faculty and consider it your only possession, you will never be hindered, never meet with impediments; you will not lament, you will not blame, you will not flatter any person.

But what does Zeus say? Epictetus, if it were possible, I would have made your little body and your little property free from interference. But understand this: your body is not yours. It is finely tempered clay. Since I could not give you what I have described, I have given you a small portion of us, the ability to pursue or avoid something, to desire or reject it, and, in short, to use the impressions you receive of things. If you take care of this ability and regard it as your only possession, you will never be hindered. You will never meet with obstacles. You will not lament, blame, or flatter anyone.

Schweighaeuser notes that animals, like humans, have the faculties of pursuit and avoidance, desire and aversion, and using appearances. But animals are driven only by passion when they use appearances. They do not understand what they are doing, while humans can control these passions. Salmasius proposed changing ἡμέτερον to ὑμέτερον. This would remove the difficulty of calling these animal passions “a small portion of us (the gods).” Schweighaeuser recognizes the difficulty but does not accept the proposed change. Perhaps Arrian did not fully represent what his master said here, and perhaps he did.

Well, do these seem to you small matters? I hope not. Be content with them then and pray to the gods. But now when it is in our power to look after one thing, and to attach ourselves to it, we prefer to look after many things, and to be bound to many things, to the body and to property, and to brother and to friend, and to child and to slave. Since then we are bound to many things, we are depressed by them and dragged down. For this reason, when the weather is not fit for sailing, we sit down and torment ourselves, and continually look out to see what wind is blowing. It is north. What is that to us? When will the west wind blow? When it shall choose, my good man, or when it shall please Aeolus; for God has not made you the manager of the winds, but Aeolus. What then? We must make the best use that we can of the things which are in our power, and use the rest according to their nature. What is their nature then? As God may please.

Well, do these seem like small matters to you? I hope not. Then be content with them and pray to the gods. But although we can attend to one thing and devote ourselves to it, we prefer to attend to many things. We bind ourselves to the body and to property, to brother and friend, to child and slave. Because we are bound to so many things, they weigh us down and depress us. That is why, when the weather is not suitable for sailing, we sit and torment ourselves. We keep looking outside to see which way the wind is blowing. It is blowing from the north. What does that matter to us? When will the west wind blow? When it chooses, my good man, or when Aeolus pleases. God has not put you in charge of the winds. He has put Aeolus in charge. What should we do, then? We must make the best use we can of what is in our power. We must use everything else according to its nature. And what is its nature? Whatever God pleases.

He refers to the Odyssey, X. 21:

Must I then alone have my head cut off? What, would you have all men lose their heads that you may be consoled? Will you not stretch out your neck as Lateranus did at Rome when Nero ordered him to be beheaded? For when he had stretched out his neck, and received a feeble blow, which made him draw it in for a moment, he stretched it out again. And a little before, when he was visited by Epaphroditus, Nero's freedman, who asked him about the cause of offence which he had given, he said, “If I choose to tell anything, I will tell your master.”

Must I be the only one to have my head cut off? What, would you have all men lose their heads just to console you? Won't you stretch out your neck as Lateranus did in Rome when Nero ordered him beheaded? When Lateranus stretched out his neck, he received a weak blow that made him pull it back for a moment. Then he stretched it out again. Shortly before this, Epaphroditus, Nero's freedman, visited him and asked what he had done to cause offense. Lateranus said, “If I choose to say anything, I will tell your master.”

Plautius Lateranus, consul-elect, was charged with taking part in Piso's conspiracy against Nero. He was rushed to execution without being allowed to see his children. Although the tribune who executed him knew about the plot, Lateranus said nothing. (Tacit. Ann. xv. 49, 60.)

Epaphroditus was a freedman of Nero and had once been Epictetus’s master. He was Nero’s secretary. One good deed is recorded of him: he helped Nero kill himself. Domitian had him killed for this act (Suetonius, Domitian, c. 14).

What then should a man have in readiness in such circumstances? What else than this? What is mine, and what is not mine; and what is permitted to me, and what is not permitted to me. I must die. Must I then die lamenting? I must be put in chains. Must I then also lament? I must go into exile. Does any man then hinder me from going with smiles and cheerfulness and contentment? Tell me the secret which you possess. I will not, for this is in my power. But I will put you in chains. Man, what are you talking about? Me in chains? You may fetter my leg, but my will not even Zeus himself can overpower. I will throw you into prison. My poor body, you mean. I will cut your head off. When then have I told you that my head alone cannot be cut off? These are the things which philosophers should meditate on, which they should write daily, in which they should exercise themselves.

What should a person have ready in such circumstances? What else but this: what is mine and what is not mine, and what I am allowed to do and what I am not allowed to do? I must die. But must I die lamenting? I must be put in chains. But must I lament as well? I must go into exile. Can anyone stop me from going with a smile, cheerfully and contentedly? Tell me the secret you know. I will not, because that is within my power. But I will put you in chains. Man, what are you talking about? Me in chains? You can chain my leg, but not even Zeus himself can overpower my will. I will throw you into prison. You mean my poor body. I will cut off your head. When did I ever tell you that my head alone could not be cut off? These are the things philosophers should reflect on, write about daily, and practice.

This imitates a passage in the Bacchae of Euripides (v. 492, &c.). Horace also imitates the passage (Epp. i. 16).

ἡ προαίρεσίς. It is sometimes translated into Latin as propositum or voluntas, meaning “the will.”

Thrasea used to say, I would rather be killed to-day [11] than banished to-morrow. What then did Rufus say to him? If you choose death as the heavier misfortune, how great is the folly of your choice? But if, as the lighter, who has given you the choice? Will you not study to be content with that which has been given to you?

Thrasea used to say, I would rather be killed today [11] than banished tomorrow. What did Rufus say to him? If you choose death as the greater misfortune, how foolish your choice is! But if you choose it as the lesser misfortune, who has given you the choice? Won't you learn to be content with what you have been given?

C. Musonius Rufus was a Tuscan by birth, of equestrian rank, and a Stoic philosopher (Tacit. Hist. iii. 81).

What then did Agrippinus say? He said, “I am not a hindrance to myself.” When it was reported to him that his trial was going on in the Senate, he said, “I hope it may turn out well; but it is the fifth hour of the day”—this was the time when he was used to exercise himself and then take the cold bath—“let us go and take our exercise.” After he had taken his exercise, one comes and tells him, You have been condemned. To banishment, he replies, or to death? To banishment. What about my property? It is not taken from you. Let us go to Aricia then, he said, and dine.

What did Agrippinus say, then? He said, “I do not stand in my own way.” He was told that his trial was underway in the Senate. He said, “I hope it turns out well, but it is the fifth hour of the day.” This was when he usually exercised and then took a cold bath. “Let us go and exercise.” After he had exercised, someone came and told him, You have been condemned. To banishment, he replied, or to death? To banishment. What about my property? It has not been taken from you. Let us go to Aricia then, he said, and dine.

Paconius Agrippinus was condemned during Nero's reign. He was accused of inheriting his father's hatred of the head of the Roman state (Tacit. Ann. xvi. 28). Agrippinus's father had been executed under Tiberius (Suetonius, Tib. c. 61).

Aricia is on the Via Appia, about twenty Roman miles from Rome (Horace, Sat. i. 5, 1):

This it is to have studied what a man ought to study; to have made desire, aversion, free from hindrance, and free from all that a man would avoid. I must die. If now, I am ready to die. If, after a short time, I now dine because it is the dinner-hour; after this I will then die. How? Like a man who gives up what belongs to another.

This is what it means to have studied what one ought to study: to have made desire free from obstacles and aversion free from everything one would avoid. I must die. If it is now, I am ready to die. If it is a little later, I will eat now because it is dinnertime. After that, I will die. How? Like someone giving up what belongs to another.

Epictetus, Encheiridion, c. 11: “Never say on the occasion of anything, ‘I have lost it,’ but say, ‘I have returned it.’”

“Egressum magna me excepit Aricia Roma.”

“After I left great Rome, Aricia welcomed me.”