How to Maintain Your Character in Every Situation

To the rational animal only is the irrational intolerable; but that which is rational is tolerable. Blows are not naturally intolerable. How is that? See how the Lacedaemonians²⁹ endure whipping when they have learned that whipping is consistent with reason. To hang yourself is not in tolerable. When then you have the opinion that it is rational, you go and hang yourself. In short, if we observe, we shall find that the animal man is pained by nothing so much as by that which is irrational; and, on the contrary, attracted to nothing so much as to that which is rational.

Only a rational animal finds what is irrational unbearable. What is rational is bearable. Blows are not naturally unbearable. How do we know? Look at how the Lacedaemonians²⁹ endure whipping once they have learned that it is reasonable. Hanging yourself is not unbearable either. Once you believe it is reasonable, you go and hang yourself. In short, if we observe human beings, we will find that nothing pains them more than what is irrational. On the contrary, nothing attracts them more than what is rational.

But the rational and the irrational appear such in a different way to different persons, just as the good and the bad, the profitable and the unprofitable. For this reason, particularly, we need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the preconception³⁰ of the rational and the irrational to the several things conformably to nature. But in order to determine the rational and the irrational, we use not only the estimates of external things, but we consider also what is appropriate to each person. For to one man it is consistent with reason to hold a chamber pot for another, and to look to this only, that if he does not hold it, he will receive stripes, and he will not receive his food: but if he shall hold the pot, he will not suffer anything hard or disagreeable. But to another man not only does the holding of a chamber pot appear intolerable for himself, but intolerable also for him to allow another to do this office for him. If then you ask me whether you should hold the chamber pot or not, I shall say to you that the receiving of food is worth more than the not receiving of it, and the being scourged is a greater indignity than not being scourged; so that if you measure your interests by these things, go and hold the chamber pot. “But this,” you say, “would not be worthy of me.” Well then, it is you who must introduce this consideration into the inquiry, not I; for it is you who know yourself, how much you are worth to yourself, and at what price you sell yourself; for men sell themselves at various prices.

But what seems rational or irrational differs from person to person, just as views of good and bad, profit and loss, differ. This is why we especially need discipline. We must learn to apply our preconception³⁰ of the rational and irrational to particular situations in accordance with nature. To decide what is rational or irrational, we consider more than the value of external things. We also consider what is appropriate for each person. For one man, it is reasonable to hold a chamber pot for another. He considers only that if he refuses, he will be beaten and denied food. But if he holds the pot, he will suffer nothing harsh or unpleasant. For another man, holding a chamber pot himself is unbearable. So is allowing someone else to do it for him. If you ask me whether you should hold the chamber pot, I will say this: getting food is better than going without it. Being whipped is a greater indignity than not being whipped. So if you measure your interests by these things, go and hold the chamber pot. “But that,” you say, “would not be worthy of me.” Well, you must bring that consideration into the question, not I. You know yourself, and you know how much you value yourself and at what price you sell yourself. For people sell themselves at different prices.

For this reason, when Florus was deliberating whether he should go down to Nero's³¹ spectacles, and also perform in them himself, Agrippinus said to him, Go down: and when Florus asked Agrippinus, Why do not you go down? Agrippinus replied, Because I do not even deliberate about the matter. For he who has once brought himself to deliberate about such matters, and to calculate the value of external things, comes very near to those who have forgotten their own character. For why do you ask me the question, whether death is preferable or life? I say life. Pain or pleasure? I say pleasure. But if I do not take a part in the tragic acting, I shall have my head struck off. Go then and take a part, but I will not. Why? Because you consider yourself to be only one thread of those which are in the tunic. Well then it was fitting for you to take care how you should be like the rest of men, just as the thread has no design to be anything superior to the other threads. But I wish to be purple,³² that small part which is bright, and makes all the rest appear graceful and beautiful. Why then do you tell me to make myself like the many? and if I do, how shall I still be purple?

For this reason, Florus was considering whether to attend Nero's³¹ spectacles and perform in them himself. Agrippinus said to him, Go. Florus asked Agrippinus, Why don't you go? Agrippinus replied, Because I don't even consider it. Anyone who has begun to consider such matters and weigh the value of external things comes close to forgetting his own character. Why do you ask me whether death or life is preferable? I say life. Pain or pleasure? I say pleasure. But if I don't take part in the tragic play, my head will be cut off. Then go and take part, but I will not. Why? Because you think of yourself as just one thread in a tunic. So it was right for you to concern yourself with being like everyone else. A thread, too, has no desire to be better than the other threads. But I wish to be purple,³² the small, bright part that makes all the rest look graceful and beautiful. Why, then, do you tell me to make myself like the many? If I do, how can I still be purple?

Priscus Helvidius³³ also saw this, and acted conformably. For when Vespasian sent and commanded him not to go into the senate, he replied, “It is in your power not to allow me to be a member of the senate, but so long as I am, I must go in.” Well, go in then, says the emperor, but say nothing. Do not ask my opinion, and I will be silent. But I must ask your opinion. And I must say what I think right. But if you do, I shall put you to death. When then did I tell you that I am immortal? You will do your part, and I will do mine: it is your part to kill; it is mine to die, but not in fear: yours to banish me; mine to depart without sorrow.

Priscus Helvidius³³ also saw this and acted accordingly. When Vespasian sent him an order not to enter the senate, he replied, “You can prevent me from being a member of the senate, but as long as I am one, I must attend.” Well, then, said the emperor, attend, but say nothing. Do not ask my opinion, and I will be silent. But I must ask your opinion. And I must say what I think is right. But if you do, I will put you to death. When did I tell you that I am immortal? You will do your part, and I will do mine. Your part is to kill. Mine is to die, but not in fear. Your part is to banish me. Mine is to leave without sorrow.

What good then did Priscus do, who was only a single person? And what good does the purple do for the toga? Why, what else than this, that it is conspicuous in the toga as purple, and is displayed also as a fine example to all other things? But in such circumstances another would have replied to Caesar who forbade him to enter the senate, I thank you for sparing me. But such a man Vespasian would not even have forbidden to enter the senate, for he knew that he would either sit there like an earthen vessel, or, if he spoke, he would say what Caesar wished, and add even more.

What good did Priscus do, then, being only one person? And what good does the purple do for the toga? It stands out as purple in the toga and sets a fine example for everything else. But in the same circumstances, another man would have thanked Caesar for sparing him when Caesar forbade him to enter the senate. Vespasian would not even have forbidden such a man to enter. He knew the man would either sit there like a clay pot or, if he spoke, say what Caesar wanted and even more.

In this way an athlete also acted who was in danger of dying unless his private parts were amputated. His brother came to the athlete, who was a philosopher, and said, Come, brother, what are you going to do? Shall we amputate this member and return to the gymnasium? But the athlete persisted in his resolution and died. When some one asked Epictetus, How he did this, as an athlete or a philosopher? As a man, Epictetus replied, and a man who had been proclaimed among the athletes at the Olympic games and had contended in them, a man who had been familiar with such a place, and not merely anointed in Baton's school.³⁴ Another would have allowed even his head to be cut off, if he could have lived without it. Such is that regard to character which is so strong in those who have been accustomed to introduce it of themselves and conjoined with other things into their deliberations.

An athlete once acted in this way. He would die unless his private parts were amputated. His brother came to him and said, “Come, brother, what are you going to do? Shall we amputate it and go back to the gymnasium?” But the athlete, who was a philosopher, held to his decision and died. Someone asked Epictetus, “Did he do this as an athlete or as a philosopher?” Epictetus replied, “As a man. He was a man who had been announced among the athletes at the Olympic games and had competed there. He was familiar with that place and had not merely been anointed in Baton's school.”³⁴ Another man would have allowed even his head to be cut off, if he could have lived without it. Such is the strength of concern for character in those accustomed to bringing it into their own deliberations, alongside other considerations.

Come then, Epictetus, shave³⁵ yourself. If I am a philosopher, I answer, I will not shave myself. But I will take off your head? If that will do you any good, take it off.

Come on, Epictetus, shave³⁵ yourself. If I am a philosopher, I answer, I will not shave. But I will cut off your head. If that will do you any good, cut it off.

Some person asked, how then shall every man among us perceive what is suitable to his character? How, he replied, does the bull alone, when the lion has attacked, discover his own powers and put himself forward in defence of the whole herd? It is plain that with the powers the perception of having them is immediately conjoined: and, therefore, whoever of us has such powers will not be ignorant of them. Now a bull is not made suddenly, nor a brave man; but we must discipline ourselves in the winter for the summer campaign, and not rashly run upon that which does not concern us.

Someone asked how each of us can know what suits our character. Epictetus replied: How does the bull alone recognize his own strength when a lion attacks? How does he step forward to defend the whole herd? Clearly, the awareness of such strength comes with the strength itself. So anyone among us who has such strength will know it. But a bull is not made in a day, and neither is a brave man. We must train ourselves in winter for the summer campaign. We should not rush recklessly into matters that do not concern us.

Only consider at what price you sell your own will: if for no other reason, at least for this, that you sell it not for a small sum. But that which is great and superior per haps belongs to Socrates and such as are like him. Why then, if we are naturally such, are not a very great number of us like him? Is it true then that all horses become swift, that all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints? What then, since I am naturally dull, shall I, for this reason, take no pains? I hope not. Epictetus is not superior to Socrates; but if he is not inferior,³⁶ this is enough for me; for I shall never be a Milo,³⁷ and yet I do not neglect my body; nor shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property; nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything because we despair of reaching the highest degree.

Consider the price at which you sell your own will. If for no other reason, consider it so that you do not sell your will cheaply. But perhaps greatness and superiority belong to Socrates and people like him. If we are naturally capable of such greatness, why are so few of us like him? Do all horses become swift? Do all dogs become skilled at tracking footprints? So, because I am naturally dull, should I make no effort? I hope not. Epictetus is not superior to Socrates. But if he is not inferior,³⁶ that is enough for me. I will never be a Milo,³⁷ yet I do not neglect my body. Nor will I be a Croesus, yet I do not neglect my property. In short, we do not neglect anything just because we despair of reaching the highest degree.