Sect. 169. THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of these separately before, yet the great mistakes of late about government, having, as I suppose, arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another, it may not, perhaps, be amiss to consider them here together.
169. I have spoken of these separately before. Lately serious mistakes about government seem to come from confusing these distinct powers. It may therefore be useful to consider them together here.
Sect. 170. First, then, Paternal or parental power is nothing but that which parents have over their children, to govern them for the children’s good, till they come to the use of reason, or a state of knowledge, wherein they may be supposed capable to understand that rule, whether it be the law of nature, or the municipal law of their country, they are to govern themselves by: capable, I say, to know it, as well as several others, who live as freemen under that law. The affection and tenderness which God hath planted in the breast of parents towards their children, makes it evident, that this is not intended to be a severe arbitrary government, but only for the help, instruction, and preservation of their offspring. But happen it as it will, there is, as I have proved, no reason why it should be thought to extend to life and death, at any time, over their children, more than over any body else; neither can there be any pretence why this parental power should keep the child, when grown to a man, in subjection to the will of his parents, any farther than having received life and education from his parents, obliges him to respect, honour, gratitude, assistance and support, all his life, to both father and mother. And thus, ’tis true, the paternal is a natural government, but not at all extending itself to the ends and jurisdictions of that which is political. The power of the father doth not reach at all to the property of the child, which is only in his own disposing.
170. First, then, paternal or parental power is simply what parents have over their children. It exists to govern them for the children's good until they reach the use of reason or a state of knowledge. At that point they can be expected to understand the rule by which they must govern themselves. That rule may be the law of nature or the municipal law of their country. I mean capable of knowing it as well as many others who live as free people under that law. The affection and tenderness God has placed in parents toward their children shows this power is not meant to be a harsh, arbitrary rule. It is only for the help, instruction, and preservation of their offspring. However it happens, and as I have shown, there is no reason to think it extends to life and death. Parents do not have that power over their children any more than over anyone else. Nor can there be any claim that parental power should keep a grown child under his parents' will. The obligation a grown child owes his parents comes from having received life and education from them. That obligation requires respect, honor, gratitude, assistance, and support for both father and mother throughout life. Thus paternal power is a form of natural government. It does not extend to the ends and jurisdictions of political government. A father's power does not reach the child's property. The child alone may dispose of their property.
Sect. 171. Secondly, Political power is that power, which every man having in the state of nature, has given up into the hands of the society, and therein to the governors, whom the society hath set over itself, with this express or tacit trust, that it shall be employed for their good, and the preservation of their property: now this power, which every man has in the state of nature, and which he parts with to the society in all such cases where the society can secure him, is to use such means, for the preserving of his own property, as he thinks good, and nature allows him; and to punish the breach of the law of nature in others, so as (according to the best of his reason) may most conduce to the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind. So that the end and measure of this power, when in every man’s hands in the state of nature, being the preservation of all of his society, that is, all mankind in general, it can have no other end or measure, when in the hands of the magistrate, but to preserve the members of that society in their lives, liberties, and possessions; and so cannot be an absolute, arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes, which are as much as possible to be preserved; but a power to make laws, and annex such penalties to them, as may tend to the preservation of the whole, by cutting off those parts, and those only, which are so corrupt, that they threaten the sound and healthy, without which no severity is lawful. And this power has its original only from compact and agreement, and the mutual consent of those who make up the community.
171. Secondly, political power is the power that every man had in the state of nature and has given up into the hands of the society. Through the society it passes to the governors whom the society has set over itself. It is given with this express or tacit trust: that it shall be used for their good and the preservation of their property. Now this power, which every man has in the state of nature, and which he gives up to the society in all cases where the society can secure him, is this. It is the power to use such means as he thinks good, and nature allows him, to preserve his own property. It is also the power to punish breaches of the law of nature in others, in the way that, by the best of his reason, will most serve the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind. So the end and measure of this power, when in every man's hands in the state of nature, is the preservation of all of his society, that is, all mankind in general. Therefore it can have no other end or measure in the hands of the magistrate than to preserve the members of that society in their lives, liberties, and possessions. So it cannot be an absolute, arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes, which are to be preserved as much as possible. It is a power to make laws, and attach such penalties to them as may tend to preserve the whole. It does this by cutting off those parts, and those only, which are so corrupt that they threaten the sound and healthy parts. Without that threat, no severity is lawful. And this power has its origin only from compact and agreement, and the mutual consent of those who make up the community.
Sect. 172. Thirdly, Despotical power is an absolute, arbitrary power one man has over another, to take away his life, whenever he pleases. This is a power, which neither nature gives, for it has made no such distinction between one man and another; nor compact can convey: for man not having such an arbitrary power over his own life, cannot give another man such a power over it; but it is the effect only of forfeiture, which the aggressor makes of his own life, when he puts himself into the state of war with another: for having quitted reason, which God hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the common bond whereby human kind is united into one fellowship and society; and having renounced the way of peace which that teaches, and made use of the force of war, to compass his unjust ends upon another, where he has no right; and so revolting from his own kind to that of beasts, by making force, which is their’s, to be his rule of right, he renders himself liable to be destroyed by the injured person, and the rest of mankind, that will join with him in the execution of justice, as any other wild beast, or noxious brute, with whom mankind can have neither society nor security*. And thus captives, taken in a just and lawful war, and such only, are subject to a despotical power, which, as it arises not from compact, so neither is it capable of any, but is the state of war continued: for what compact can be made with a man that is not master of his own life? what condition can he perform? and if he be once allowed to be master of his own life, the despotical, arbitrary power of his master ceases. He that is master of himself, and his own life, has a right too to the means of preserving it; so that as soon as compact enters, slavery ceases, and he so far quits his absolute power, and puts an end to the state of war, who enters into conditions with his captive.
172. Thirdly, despotical power is an absolute, arbitrary power one man has over another, to take away his life whenever he pleases. Nature does not give this power, for it has made no such distinction between one man and another. Nor can compact convey it. For a man does not have such an arbitrary power over his own life, so he cannot give another man such a power over it. It is the effect only of forfeiture, which the aggressor makes of his own life when he puts himself into the state of war with another. For the aggressor has abandoned reason, which God has given to be the rule between man and man, and the common bond by which humankind is united into one fellowship and society. He has renounced the way of peace that reason teaches. He has used the force of war against another to achieve his unjust ends, where he himself has no right. And so he revolts from his own kind to that of beasts, by making force, which is theirs, his rule of right. In this way he makes himself liable to be destroyed by the injured person, and by the rest of mankind who will join with the injured person in executing justice. He may be destroyed like any other wild beast or harmful brute, with whom mankind can have neither society nor security*. And so captives taken in a just and lawful war, and such only, are subject to a despotical power. This power does not arise from compact, nor is it capable of any compact. It is the state of war continued. For what compact can be made with a man who is not master of his own life? What condition can he perform? And if he is once allowed to be master of his own life, the despotical, arbitrary power of his master ceases. He who is master of himself and his own life has a right also to the means of preserving it. So as soon as compact enters, slavery ceases. And whoever enters into conditions with his captive gives up his absolute power so far, and puts an end to the state of war.
(*Another copy corrected by Mr. Locke, has it thus, Noxious brute that is destructive to their being.)
(*Another copy, corrected by Mr. Locke, reads: Noxious brute that is destructive to their being.)
Sect. 173. Nature gives the first of these, viz. paternal power to parents for the benefit of their children during their minority, to supply their want of ability, and understanding how to manage their property. (By property I must be understood here, as in other places, to mean that property which men have in their persons as well as goods.) Voluntary agreement gives the second, viz. political power to governors for the benefit of their subjects, to secure them in the possession and use of their properties. And forfeiture gives the third despotical power to lords for their own benefit, over those who are stripped of all property.
173. Nature gives the first of these. It gives paternal power to parents for the benefit of their children while they are minors. This power supplies the children's lack of ability and understanding about how to manage their property. (By "property" here, as elsewhere, I mean the property people have in their persons as well as in their goods.) Voluntary agreement gives the second. It gives political power to governors for the benefit of their subjects. Its purpose is to secure them in the possession and use of their property. Forfeiture gives the third. It gives despotic power to lords for their own benefit over those who are stripped of all property.
Sect. 174. He, that shall consider the distinct rise and extent, and the different ends of these several powers, will plainly see, that paternal power comes as far short of that of the magistrate, as despotical exceeds it; and that absolute dominion, however placed, is so far from being one kind of civil society, that it is as inconsistent with it, as slavery is with property. Paternal power is only where minority makes the child incapable to manage his property; political, where men have property in their own disposal; and despotical, over such as have no property at all.
174. Anyone who considers how these powers arise, how far they reach, and what they aim for will see this clearly. Paternal power falls far short of the magistrate's power, while despotical power exceeds it. Absolute dominion, no matter where it exists, is not a form of civil society. It is as incompatible with civil society as slavery is with property. Paternal power exists only when a child's minority makes them unable to manage their property. Political power exists where people have property under their own control. Despotical power applies to those who have no property at all.