Sect. 175. THOUGH governments can originally have no other rise than that before mentioned, nor polities be founded on any thing but the consent of the people; yet such have been the disorders ambition has filled the world with, that in the noise of war, which makes so great a part of the history of mankind, this consent is little taken notice of: and therefore many have mistaken the force of arms for the consent of the people, and reckon conquest as one of the originals of government. But conquest is as far from setting up any government, as demolishing an house is from building a new one in the place. Indeed, it often makes way for a new frame of a commonwealth, by destroying the former; but, without the consent of the people, can never erect a new one.
175. Governments can originate only as described earlier. Political systems are founded only on the consent of the people. But ambition has caused so much disorder that people often ignore this consent. They overlook it amid the noise of war. War makes up a large part of human history. Many have mistaken the force of arms for the people's consent. They regard conquest as an original source of government. But conquest does not create a government. Demolishing a house is not the same as building a new one in its place. Indeed, conquest can clear the way for a new commonwealth by destroying the old one. But without the people's consent, it can never establish a new government.
Sect. 176. That the aggressor, who puts himself into the state of war with another, and unjustly invades another man’s right, can, by such an unjust war, never come to have a right over the conquered, will be easily agreed by all men, who will not think, that robbers and pyrates have a right of empire over whomsoever they have force enough to master; or that men are bound by promises, which unlawful force extorts from them. Should a robber break into my house, and with a dagger at my throat make me seal deeds to convey my estate to him, would this give him any title? Just such a title, by his sword, has an unjust conqueror, who forces me into submission. The injury and the crime is equal, whether committed by the wearer of a crown, or some petty villain. The title of the offender, and the number of his followers, make no difference in the offence, unless it be to aggravate it. The only difference is, great robbers punish little ones, to keep them in their obedience; but the great ones are rewarded with laurels and triumphs, because they are too big for the weak hands of justice in this world, and have the power in their own possession, which should punish offenders. What is my remedy against a robber, that so broke into my house? Appeal to the law for justice. But perhaps justice is denied, or I am crippled and cannot stir, robbed and have not the means to do it. If God has taken away all means of seeking remedy, there is nothing left but patience. But my son, when able, may seek the relief of the law, which I am denied: he or his son may renew his appeal, till he recover his right. But the conquered, or their children, have no court, no arbitrator on earth to appeal to. Then they may appeal, as Jephtha did, to heaven, and repeat their appeal till they have recovered the native right of their ancestors, which was, to have such a legislative over them, as the majority should approve, and freely acquiesce in. If it be objected, This would cause endless trouble; I answer, no more than justice does, where she lies open to all that appeal to her. He that troubles his neighbour without a cause, is punished for it by the justice of the court he appeals to: and he that appeals to heaven must be sure he has right on his side; and a right too that is worth the trouble and cost of the appeal, as he will answer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived, and will be sure to retribute to every one according to the mischiefs he hath created to his fellow subjects; that is, any part of mankind: from whence it is plain, that he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the subjection and obedience of the conquered.
176. Everyone will agree that an aggressor who begins a war and unjustly invades another's rights cannot gain a lawful title. He cannot claim authority over those he conquers. No one thinks robbers or pirates gain a right to rule those they overpower. Nor are people bound by promises secured by unlawful force. Suppose a robber breaks into my house and, dagger at my throat, forces me to sign deeds giving him my estate. Would that give him any title? An unjust conqueror gets just such a title by the sword when he forces me to submit. The injury and the crime are the same whether done by a crowned ruler or a petty villain. The offender's rank and the number of his followers do not change the offense. They only make it worse. The practical difference is that large robbers punish small ones to keep them obedient. The large robbers are often praised with laurels and triumphs. This happens because they are too powerful for the weak hands of earthly justice. They possess the very power that should punish offenders. What is my remedy against a robber who broke into my house? I must appeal to the law for justice. But perhaps justice is denied, or I am disabled and cannot act. I have been robbed and lack the means to seek relief. If God has taken away all means of seeking a remedy, nothing remains but patience. But my son, when able, may seek the legal relief I cannot. He or his son can renew the appeal until they recover the right. The conquered, and their children, have no court or arbitrator on earth to appeal to. Then they may appeal, as Jephtha did, to heaven. They can repeat their appeal until they recover their ancestors' original right. That right was to have a legislature approved by the majority and freely accepted. If someone objects that this would cause endless trouble, I answer that it would cause no more than the trouble of open access to justice. Justice is open to all who appeal to her. He who troubles his neighbor without cause is punished by the court he appeals to. Anyone who appeals to heaven must be sure he is right. His right must be worth the trouble and cost of the appeal. He will answer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived. That tribunal will repay each person according to the harm they have caused their fellow subjects. By "fellow subjects" I mean any part of mankind. From this it is clear that someone who conquers in an unjust war gains no title to the subjection or obedience of the conquered.
Sect. 177. But supposing victory favours the right side, let us consider a conqueror in a lawful war, and see what power he gets, and over whom.
177. But suppose victory favors the rightful side. Consider a conqueror in a lawful war. See what power he gains, and over whom.
First, It is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that conquered with him. They that fought on his side cannot suffer by the conquest, but must at least be as much freemen as they were before. And most commonly they serve upon terms, and on condition to share with their leader, and enjoy a part of the spoil, and other advantages that attend the conquering sword; or at least have a part of the subdued country bestowed upon them. And the conquering people are not, I hope, to be slaves by conquest, and wear their laurels only to shew they are sacrifices to their leaders triumph. They that found absolute monarchy upon the title of the sword, make their heroes, who are the founders of such monarchies, arrant Draw-can-sirs, and forget they had any officers and soldiers that fought on their side in the battles they won, or assisted them in the subduing, or shared in possessing, the countries they mastered. We are told by some, that the English monarchy is founded in the Norman conquest, and that our princes have thereby a title to absolute dominion: which if it were true, (as by the history it appears otherwise) and that William had a right to make war on this island; yet his dominion by conquest could reach no farther than to the Saxons and Britons, that were then inhabitants of this country. The Normans that came with him, and helped to conquer, and all descended from them, are freemen, and no subjects by conquest; let that give what dominion it will. And if I, or any body else, shall claim freedom, as derived from them, it will be very hard to prove the contrary: and it is plain, the law, that has made no distinction between the one and the other, intends not there should be any difference in their freedom or privileges.
First, it is clear he gains no power over those who conquered with him. Those who fought on his side cannot be harmed by the conquest. They must at least be as free as they were before. Most often they serve on terms. They share with their leader and enjoy part of the spoil and other benefits of victory. Or they at least receive a portion of the conquered land. I hope the conquering people are not to become slaves by conquest. They should not wear their laurels only to show they are sacrifices to their leader’s triumph. Those who base absolute monarchy on the title of the sword turn their heroes, the founders of such monarchies, into arrant Draw-can-sirs. They forget these leaders had officers and soldiers who fought with them. Those men helped subdue the land and shared in occupying the territories they conquered. Some say the English monarchy is founded on the Norman conquest and that our princes therefore have a title to absolute dominion. If that were true, although history suggests otherwise, and if William had a right to wage war on this island, his dominion by conquest could reach no further than the Saxons and Britons who then inhabited the country. The Normans who came with him and helped conquer, and all their descendants, are freemen. They are not subjects by conquest, no matter what dominion that conquest claims. If I or anyone else claims freedom derived from them, it will be hard to prove otherwise. The law makes no distinction between the two. That shows the law does not intend any difference in their freedom or privileges.
Sect. 178. But supposing, which seldom happens, that the conquerors and conquered never incorporate into one people, under the same laws and freedom; let us see next what power a lawful conqueror has over the subdued: and that I say is purely despotical. He has an absolute power over the lives of those who by an unjust war have forfeited them; but not over the lives or fortunes of those who engaged not in the war, nor over the possessions even of those who were actually engaged in it.
178. But suppose, as rarely happens, the conquerors and the conquered never become one people. They do not live under the same laws and freedom. Next, let us consider what power a lawful conqueror has over those he has subdued. I say that power is purely despotic. He has absolute power over the lives of those who, by an unjust war, have forfeited them. He does not have power over the lives or fortunes of those who did not take part in the war. Nor does he have power over the possessions of those who were actually engaged in it.
Sect. 179. Secondly, I say then the conqueror gets no power but only over those who have actually assisted, concurred, or consented to that unjust force that is used against him: for the people having given to their governors no power to do an unjust thing, such as is to make an unjust war, (for they never had such a power in themselves) they ought not to be charged as guilty of the violence and unjustice that is committed in an unjust war, any farther than they actually abet it; no more than they are to be thought guilty of any violence or oppression their governors should use upon the people themselves, or any part of their fellow subjects, they having empowered them no more to the one than to the other. Conquerors, it is true, seldom trouble themselves to make the distinction, but they willingly permit the confusion of war to sweep all together: but yet this alters not the right; for the conquerors power over the lives of the conquered, being only because they have used force to do, or maintain an injustice, he can have that power only over those who have concurred in that force; all the rest are innocent; and he has no more title over the people of that country, who have done him no injury, and so have made no forfeiture of their lives, than he has over any other, who, without any injuries or provocations, have lived upon fair terms with him.
179. Secondly, I say the conqueror gains power only over those who actually assisted, agreed with, or consented to the unjust force used against him. The people did not give their governors the power to do an unjust thing. They did not give them the power to make an unjust war. They never had such power themselves. Therefore the people should not be held guilty for the violence and injustice committed in an unjust war. They are only guilty to the extent they actually aided it. Nor should they be blamed for violence or oppression their governors use against the people themselves or any part of their fellow subjects. The people empowered their governors no more to one than to the other. Conquerors, it is true, seldom make this distinction. They willingly let the confusion of war sweep everyone up. But that does not change the right. The conqueror's power over the lives of the conquered rests only on his use of force to do or maintain an injustice. He therefore has that power only over those who took part in that force. All the rest are innocent. He has no more title over the people of that country who did him no injury. Those people did not forfeit their lives. He has no more title over them than over any other people. Those people lived on fair terms with him without injury or provocation.
Sect. 180. Thirdly, The power a conqueror gets over those he overcomes in a just war, is perfectly despotical: he has an absolute power over the lives of those, who, by putting themselves in a state of war, have forfeited them; but he has not thereby a right and title to their possessions. This I doubt not, but at first sight will seem a strange doctrine, it being so quite contrary to the practice of the world; there being nothing more familiar in speaking of the dominion of countries, than to say such an one conquered it; as if conquest, without any more ado, conveyed a right of possession. But when we consider, that the practice of the strong and powerful, how universal soever it may be, is seldom the rule of right, however it be one part of the subjection of the conquered, not to argue against the conditions cut out to them by the conquering sword.
180. Thirdly, the power a conqueror gains over those he defeats in a just war is completely despotic. He has absolute power over the lives of those who put themselves in a state of war. By doing so they forfeit those lives. But he does not, by that fact, gain a right or title to their property. I have no doubt this will at first seem a strange view. It runs quite contrary to the world's practice. People often speak about a country's dominion by saying that someone conquered it. They act as if conquest alone, without more, gave a right of possession. But we must remember this. The practice of the strong and powerful, however universal, is rarely the rule of right. Still, one part of being subject to a conqueror is not disputing the terms he imposes with his sword.
Sect. 181. Though in all war there be usually a complication of force and damage, and the aggressor seldom fails to harm the estate, when he uses force against the persons of those he makes war upon; yet it is the use of force only that puts a man into the state of war: for whether by force he begins the injury, or else having quietly, and by fraud, done the injury, he refuses to make reparation, and by force maintains it, (which is the same thing, as at first to have done it by force) it is the unjust use of force that makes the war: for he that breaks open my house, and violently turns me out of doors; or having peaceably got in, by force keeps me out, does in effect the same thing; supposing we are in such a state, that we have no common judge on earth, whom I may appeal to, and to whom we are both obliged to submit: for of such I am now speaking. It is the unjust use of force then, that puts a man into the state of war with another; and thereby he that is guilty of it makes a forfeiture of his life: for quitting reason, which is the rule given between man and man, and using force, the way of beasts, he becomes liable to be destroyed by him he uses force against, as any savage ravenous beast, that is dangerous to his being.
181. In all war there is usually a mix of force and damage. The aggressor seldom fails to harm the estate when he uses force against the persons of those he makes war on. Yet it is the use of force alone that puts a man into the state of war. He may begin the injury by force. Or he may do the injury quietly and by fraud, and then refuse to make reparation and maintain it by force, which is the same as having done it by force at first. Either way, it is the unjust use of force that makes the war. Take the man who breaks into my house and violently throws me out of doors. Or take the man who gets in peaceably and then keeps me out by force. Both in effect do the same thing. This supposes we are in such a state that we have no common judge on earth whom I may appeal to, and whom we are both obliged to submit to. For it is of such cases that I am now speaking. So it is the unjust use of force that puts a man into the state of war with another. And by this the man guilty of it forfeits his life. For he abandons reason, which is the rule given between man and man, and uses force, the way of beasts. So he becomes liable to be destroyed by the man he uses force against, like any savage, ravenous beast that is dangerous to his being.
Sect. 182. But because the miscarriages of the father are no faults of the children, and they may be rational and peaceable, notwithstanding the brutishness and injustice of the father; the father, by his miscarriages and violence, can forfeit but his own life, but involves not his children in his guilt or destruction. His goods, which nature, that willeth the preservation of all mankind as much as is possible, hath made to belong to the children to keep them from perishing, do still continue to belong to his children: for supposing them not to have joined in the war, either thro’ infancy, absence, or choice, they have done nothing to forfeit them: nor has the conqueror any right to take them away, by the bare title of having subdued him that by force attempted his destruction; though perhaps he may have some right to them, to repair the damages he has sustained by the war, and the defence of his own right; which how far it reaches to the possessions of the conquered, we shall see by and by. So that he that by conquest has a right over a man’s person to destroy him if he pleases, has not thereby a right over his estate to possess and enjoy it: for it is the brutal force the aggressor has used, that gives his adversary a right to take away his life, and destroy him if he pleases, as a noxious creature; but it is damage sustained that alone gives him title to another man’s goods: for though I may kill a thief that sets on me in the highway, yet I may not (which seems less) take away his money, and let him go: this would be robbery on my side. His force, and the state of war he put himself in, made him forfeit his life, but gave me no title to his goods. The right then of conquest extends only to the lives of those who joined in the war, not to their estates, but only in order to make reparation for the damages received, and the charges of the war, and that too with reservation of the right of the innocent wife and children.
182. But the misdeeds of the father are no faults of the children. They may be rational and peaceable, despite the brutishness and injustice of the father. So the father, by his misdeeds and violence, can forfeit only his own life. He does not involve his children in his guilt or destruction. Nature wills the preservation of all mankind as much as possible. It has made his goods belong to the children, to keep them from perishing. So those goods still continue to belong to his children. For suppose they did not join in the war, whether through infancy, absence, or choice. Then they have done nothing to forfeit them. Nor has the conqueror any right to take them away by the bare title of having subdued the man who by force attempted his destruction. Perhaps, though, he may have some right to them, to repair the damages he has suffered by the war and by the defense of his own right. How far that reaches to the possessions of the conquered, we shall see shortly. So he who by conquest has a right over a man's person, to destroy him if he pleases, does not thereby have a right over his estate, to possess and enjoy it. For it is the brutal force the aggressor has used that gives his adversary a right to take away his life and destroy him if he pleases, as a harmful creature. But it is damage suffered that alone gives him title to another man's goods. For though I may kill a thief who attacks me on the highway, I may not take away his money and let him go, though that seems a lesser thing. That would be robbery on my side. His force, and the state of war he put himself in, made him forfeit his life, but gave me no title to his goods. The right of conquest, then, extends only to the lives of those who joined in the war. It does not extend to their estates, except to make reparation for the damages received and the costs of the war. And even that is with reservation of the right of the innocent wife and children.
Sect. 183. Let the conqueror have as much justice on his side, as could be supposed, he has no right to seize more than the vanquished could forfeit: his life is at the victor’s mercy; and his service and goods he may appropriate, to make himself reparation; but he cannot take the goods of his wife and children; they too had a title to the goods he enjoyed, and their shares in the estate he possessed: for example, I in the state of nature (and all commonwealths are in the state of nature one with another) have injured another man, and refusing to give satisfaction, it comes to a state of war, wherein my defending by force what I had gotten unjustly, makes me the aggressor. I am conquered: my life, it is true, as forfeit, is at mercy, but not my wife’s and children’s. They made not the war, nor assisted in it. I could not forfeit their lives; they were not mine to forfeit. My wife had a share in my estate; that neither could I forfeit. And my children also, being born of me, had a right to be maintained out of my labour or substance. Here then is the case: the conqueror has a title to reparation for damages received, and the children have a title to their father’s estate for their subsistence: for as to the wife’s share, whether her own labour, or compact, gave her a title to it, it is plain, her husband could not forfeit what was her’s. What must be done in the case? I answer; the fundamental law of nature being, that all, as much as may be, should be preserved, it follows, that if there be not enough fully to satisfy both, viz, for the conqueror’s losses, and children’s maintenance, he that hath, and to spare, must remit something of his full satisfaction, and give way to the pressing and preferable title of those who are in danger to perish without it.
183. Even if the conqueror has as much justice on his side as can be supposed, he has no right to take more than the vanquished could forfeit. The vanquished’s life is at the victor’s mercy. His service and goods may be taken to make reparation. But the victor cannot take the goods of his wife and children. They also had a claim to the goods he enjoyed and to shares in the estate he possessed. For example, imagine I, in the state of nature (and all commonwealths are in the state of nature one with another), injure another man and refuse to make amends. This leads to a state of war. By defending with force what I took unjustly, I become the aggressor. I am conquered. My life may be forfeited and is at the victor’s mercy, but not my wife’s and children’s. They did not make the war, nor did they assist in it. I could not forfeit their lives. They were not mine to forfeit. My wife had a share in my estate. I could not forfeit that share. My children, being my offspring, had a right to be supported from my labor or property. So here is the situation. The conqueror has a rightful claim to compensation for his losses. The children have a rightful claim on their father’s estate for their maintenance. As for the wife’s share, whether she earned it by her labor or obtained it by agreement, it is clear her husband could not forfeit what belonged to her. What should be done? I answer. The fundamental law of nature requires that, as much as possible, everyone be preserved. Therefore, if there is not enough to fully satisfy both the conqueror’s losses and the children’s maintenance, the one who can spare must give up part of his full compensation. He must yield to the stronger and more urgent claim of those who would perish without it.
Sect. 184. But supposing the charge and damages of the war are to be made up to the conqueror, to the utmost farthing; and that the children of the vanquished, spoiled of all their father’s goods, are to be left to starve and perish; yet the satisfying of what shall, on this score, be due to the conqueror, will scarce give him a title to any country he shall conquer: for the damages of war can scarce amount to the value of any considerable tract of land, in any part of the world, where all the land is possessed, and none lies waste. And if I have not taken away the conqueror’s land, which, being vanquished, it is impossible I should; scarce any other spoil I have done him can amount to the value of mine, supposing it equally cultivated, and of an extent any way coming near what I had overrun of his. The destruction of a year’s product or two (for it seldom reaches four or five) is the utmost spoil that usually can be done: for as to money, and such riches and treasure taken away, these are none of nature’s goods, they have but a fantastical imaginary value: nature has put no such upon them: they are of no more account by her standard, than the wampompeke of the Americans to an European prince, or the silver money of Europe would have been formerly to an American. And five years product is not worth the perpetual inheritance of land, where all is possessed, and none remains waste, to be taken up by him that is disseized: which will be easily granted, if one do but take away the imaginary value of money, the disproportion being more than between five and five hundred; though, at the same time, half a year’s product is more worth than the inheritance, where there being more land than the inhabitants possess and make use of, any one has liberty to make use of the waste: but there conquerors take little care to possess themselves of the lands of the vanquished, No damage therefore, that men in the state of nature (as all princes and governments are in reference to one another) suffer from one another, can give a conqueror power to dispossess the posterity of the vanquished, and turn them out of that inheritance, which ought to be the possession of them and their descendants to all generations. The conqueror indeed will be apt to think himself master: and it is the very condition of the subdued not to be able to dispute their right. But if that be all, it gives no other title than what bare force gives to the stronger over the weaker: and, by this reason, he that is strongest will have a right to whatever he pleases to seize on.
184. But suppose the costs and damages of the war are to be made up to the conqueror, to the last farthing. And suppose the children of the vanquished, robbed of all their father's goods, are to be left to starve and perish. Even so, satisfying what is due to the conqueror on this account will scarcely give him a title to any country he conquers. For the damages of war can scarcely amount to the value of any considerable tract of land, in any part of the world where all the land is possessed and none lies waste. I, being vanquished, cannot possibly have taken away the conqueror's land. And if I have not, scarcely any other spoil I have done him can amount to the value of my land. This supposes my land is equally cultivated, and of an extent anywhere near the part of his that I had overrun. The destruction of a year's or two years' produce (for it seldom reaches four or five) is the most spoil that can usually be done. As for money, and such riches and treasure taken away, these are none of nature's goods. They have only a fanciful, imaginary value. Nature has put no such value on them. By her standard they count for no more than the wampompeke of the Americans would to a European prince, or than the silver money of Europe would once have counted to an American. And five years' produce is not worth the perpetual inheritance of land, where all is possessed and none remains waste, to be taken up by the man who has been dispossessed. This will easily be granted if one only takes away the imaginary value of money. The disproportion is then more than between five and five hundred. At the same time, half a year's produce is worth more than the inheritance where there is more land than the inhabitants possess and use, and anyone is free to make use of the waste. But there conquerors take little care to take possession of the lands of the vanquished. Therefore no damage that men in the state of nature (as all princes and governments are in relation to one another) suffer from one another can give a conqueror power to dispossess the posterity of the vanquished. It cannot give him power to turn them out of that inheritance, which ought to be the possession of them and their descendants for all generations. The conqueror will indeed be apt to think himself master. And it is the very condition of the subdued not to be able to dispute their right. But if that is all, it gives no other title than what bare force gives the stronger over the weaker. And by this reasoning, whoever is strongest will have a right to whatever he pleases to seize.
Sect. 185. Over those then that joined with him in the war, and over those of the subdued country that opposed him not, and the posterity even of those that did, the conqueror, even in a just war, hath, by his conquest, no right of dominion: they are free from any subjection to him, and if their former government be dissolved, they are at liberty to begin and erect another to themselves.
185. The conqueror has no right by conquest to rule over those who joined him in the war. This is true even in a just war. He also has no right over the people of the conquered country who did not oppose him. Nor does he have any right over the descendants of those who did oppose him. They remain free from any subjection to him. If their former government is dissolved, they are free to establish a new one.
Sect. 186. The conqueror, it is true, usually, by the force he has over them, compels them, with a sword at their breasts, to stoop to his conditions, and submit to such a government as he pleases to afford them; but the enquiry is, what right he has to do so? If it be said, they submit by their own consent, then this allows their own consent to be necessary to give the conqueror a title to rule over them. It remains only to be considered, whether promises extorted by force, without right, can be thought consent, and how far they bind. To which I shall say, they bind not at all; because whatsoever another gets from me by force, I still retain the right of, and he is obliged presently to restore. He that forces my horse from me, ought presently to restore him, and I have still a right to retake him. By the same reason, he that forced a promise from me, ought presently to restore it, i.e. quit me of the obligation of it; or I may resume it myself, i.e. chuse whether I will perform it: for the law of nature laying an obligation on me only by the rules she prescribes, cannot oblige me by the violation of her rules: such is the extorting any thing from me by force. Nor does it at all alter the case to say, I gave my promise, no more than it excuses the force, and passes the right, when I put my hand in my pocket, and deliver my purse myself to a thief, who demands it with a pistol at my breast.
186. The conqueror usually forces people, with a sword at their chests, to accept his terms and to submit to whatever government he chooses to impose. But the question is, what right has he to do this? If it is said they submit by their own consent, that claim itself makes their consent necessary to give the conqueror the right to rule over them. We must therefore consider whether promises extorted by force, and without right, can be called consent, and how far such promises bind. I say they do not bind at all. Whatever someone takes from me by force I still have a right to, and the taker must immediately return it. If someone forces my horse from me, he ought to restore it at once, and I still have a right to retake it. By the same reasoning, one who forces a promise from me ought immediately to release me from it, that is, to free me from the obligation. Or I may resume the promise myself and choose whether to perform it. The law of nature can bind me only by the rules it prescribes, and it cannot bind me by someone else violating those rules, as when anything is extorted from me by force. It does not help to say, "I gave my promise." That does not excuse the use of force, nor transfer the right, any more than it would when I put my hand in my pocket and hand my purse to a thief who holds a pistol to my chest.
Sect. 187. From all which it follows, that the government of a conqueror, imposed by force on the subdued, against whom he had no right of war, or who joined not in the war against him, where he had right, has no obligation upon them.
187. From all this it follows that a conqueror's government imposes no obligation on the people he subdued. This applies when he had no right to wage war against them. It also does not bind those who did not join a war against him where he had a right.
Sect. 188. But let us suppose, that all the men of that community, being all members of the same body politic, may be taken to have joined in that unjust war wherein they are subdued, and so their lives are at the mercy of the conqueror.
188. Suppose all the men of that community are regarded as having joined that unjust war. They are all members of the same body politic and were subdued in it. Their lives would then be at the mercy of the conqueror.
Sect. 189. I say this concerns not their children who are in their minority: for since a father hath not, in himself, a power over the life or liberty of his child, no act of his can possibly forfeit it. So that the children, whatever may have happened to the fathers, are freemen, and the absolute power of the conqueror reaches no farther than the persons of the men that were subdued by him, and dies with them: and should he govern them as slaves, subjected to his absolute arbitrary power, he has no such right of dominion over their children. He can have no power over them but by their own consent, whatever he may drive them to say or do; and he has no lawfull authority, whilst force, and not choice, compels them to submission.
189. This does not affect their children who are minors. A father does not, by himself, have power over a child's life or liberty. No act of his can forfeit those rights. Therefore the children are free, no matter what happened to their fathers. The conqueror's absolute power reaches only the persons he subdued, and it dies with them. Even if he governs them as slaves under absolute arbitrary power, he has no right over their children. He can have power over them only by their own consent. This is true no matter what he forces them to say or do. He has no lawful authority as long as force, not choice, compels their submission.
Sect. 190. Every man is born with a double right: first, a right of freedom to his person, which no other man has a power over, but the free disposal of it lies in himself. Secondly, a right, before any other man, to inherit with his brethren his father’s goods.
190. Every person is born with two rights. First, the right to personal freedom. No one else has power over it. The person alone can decide how to use their body. Second, the primary right to inherit their father's goods together with their brothers.
Sect. 191. By the first of these, a man is naturally free from subjection to any government, tho’ he be born in a place under its jurisdiction; but if he disclaim the lawful government of the country he was born in, he must also quit the right that belonged to him by the laws of it, and the possessions there descending to him from his ancestors, if it were a government made by their consent.
191. By the first of these, a person is naturally free from subjection to any government. This is so even if he is born where that government has jurisdiction. But if he rejects the lawful government of his birth country, he must give up the rights its laws gave him. He must also forfeit any property there that came to him from his ancestors. This applies if the government was formed by their consent.
Sect. 192. By the second, the inhabitants of any country, who are descended, and derive a title to their estates from those who are subdued, and had a government forced upon them against their free consents, retain a right to the possession of their ancestors, though they consent not freely to the government, whose hard conditions were by force imposed on the possessors of that country: for the first conqueror never having had a title to the land of that country, the people who are the descendants of, or claim under those who were forced to submit to the yoke of a government by constraint, have always a right to shake it off, and free themselves from the usurpation or tyranny which the sword hath brought in upon them, till their rulers put them under such a frame of government as they willingly and of choice consent to. Who doubts but the Grecian Christians, descendants of the ancient possessors of that country, may justly cast off the Turkish yoke, which they have so long groaned under, whenever they have an opportunity to do it? For no government can have a right to obedience from a people who have not freely consented to it; which they can never be supposed to do, till either they are put in a full state of liberty to chuse their government and governors, or at least till they have such standing laws, to which they have by themselves or their representatives given their free consent, and also till they are allowed their due property, which is so to be proprietors of what they have, that no body can take away any part of it without their own consent, without which, men under any government are not in the state of freemen, but are direct slaves under the force of war.
192. By the second, the inhabitants of any country retain the right to their ancestors' possessions. This applies to those who descend from and inherit land from people who were subdued. It also applies to those who had a government forced on them without their free consent. It holds even when they do not freely consent to that government. Its harsh conditions were forced on the land's owners by violence. The first conqueror never had a title to that land. Therefore people who descend from, or claim under, those forced to submit have the right to throw off that government. They can free themselves from the usurpation or tyranny that the sword has imposed on them. This remains true until their rulers set up a government to which they willingly and freely consent. Who doubts that the Grecian Christians may justly cast off the Turkish yoke? They are descendants of the ancient owners and have long groaned under it. They may do so whenever they have the opportunity. No government can have a right to obedience from people who have not freely consented. They cannot be supposed to have consented until they are given full liberty to choose their government and governors. Or at least until they have standing laws to which they or their representatives have freely consented. They must also be allowed their proper property. That means they must truly own what they have so that no one can take any part of it without their consent. Without that consent, men under any government are not free. They are outright slaves under the force of war.
Sect. 193. But granting that the conqueror in a just war has a right to the estates, as well as power over the persons, of the conquered; which, it is plain, he hath not: nothing of absolute power will follow from hence, in the continuance of the government; because the descendants of these being all freemen, if he grants them estates and possessions to inhabit his country, (without which it would be worth nothing) whatsoever he grants them, they have, so far as it is granted, property in. The nature whereof is, that without a man’s own consent it cannot be taken from him.
193. But suppose the conqueror in a just war had a right to the estates of the conquered. Suppose he also had power over their persons. It is plain he does not. Even if he did, no absolute power would follow for the continued government. The descendants of the conquered would all be freemen. If he grants them estates and possessions to inhabit his country, without such grants the country would be worth nothing. Whatever he grants them, they have as property to the extent of the grant. The nature of this property is that it cannot be taken from a man without his own consent.
Sect. 194. Their persons are free by a native right, and their properties, be they more or less, are their own, and at their own dispose, and not at his; or else it is no property. Supposing the conqueror gives to one man a thousand acres, to him and his heirs for ever; to another he lets a thousand acres for his life, under the rent of 50£. or 500£. per ann. has not the one of these a right to his thousand acres for ever, and the other, during his life, paying the said rent? and hath not the tenant for life a property in all that he gets over and above his rent, by his labour and industry during the said term, supposing it be double the rent? Can any one say, the king, or conqueror, after his grant, may by his power of conqueror take away all, or part of the land from the heirs of one, or from the other during his life, he paying the rent? or can he take away from either the goods or money they have got upon the said land, at his pleasure? If he can, then all free and voluntary contracts cease, and are void in the world; there needs nothing to dissolve them at any time, but power enough: and all the grants and promises of men in power are but mockery and collusion: for can there be any thing more ridiculous than to say, I give you and your’s this for ever, and that in the surest and most solemn way of conveyance can be devised; and yet it is to be understood, that I have right, if I please, to take it away from you again to morrow?
194. Their persons are free by a natural right, and their property, whether large or small, belongs to them and is at their own disposal, not his. Otherwise it is not property. Suppose the conqueror gives one man a thousand acres to him and his heirs forever. He leases another man a thousand acres for his life, at a rent of £50 or £500 per year. Does the first not have a right to his thousand acres forever? Does the second not have a right to it during his life, as long as he pays that rent? Does not the life-tenant have a property interest in everything he earns by his labor on that land during the term that is beyond the rent, even if it is double the rent? Can anyone say the king or conqueror, after making the grant, can by his power as conqueror take away all or part of the land from the heirs of the first, or take it from the other during his life, even though he pays the rent? Or can he take away from either of them the goods or money they have acquired on that land at will? If he can, then all free and voluntary contracts end and become void in the world. Nothing would be needed to dissolve them but enough power. All grants and promises made by people in power would be mockery and collusion. What could be more ridiculous than to say, “I give you and your heirs this forever,” using the most solemn and secure form of conveyance, and yet mean that I have the right to take it away again tomorrow if I please?
Sect. 195. I will not dispute now whether princes are exempt from the laws of their country; but this I am sure, they owe subjection to the laws of God and nature. No body, no power, can exempt them from the obligations of that eternal law. Those are so great, and so strong, in the case of promises, that omnipotency itself can be tied by them. Grants, promises, and oaths, are bonds that hold the Almighty: whatever some flatterers say to princes of the world, who all together, with all their people joined to them, are, in comparison of the great God, but as a drop of the bucket, or a dust on the balance, inconsiderable, nothing!
195. I will not argue here whether princes are exempt from their country's laws. But I am sure they are subject to the laws of God and nature. No person and no power can free them from the obligations of that eternal law. These obligations are so great and so strong, especially for promises, that even omnipotence can be bound by them. Grants, promises, and oaths are bonds that hold the Almighty. Some flatterers tell the princes of the world otherwise. Compared to the great God, they and their people together are only a drop in the bucket. They are like dust on the balance. They are insignificant, nothing.
Sect. 196. The short of the case in conquest is this: the conqueror, if he have a just cause, has a despotical right over the persons of all, that actually aided, and concurred in the war against him, and a right to make up his damage and cost out of their labour and estates, so he injure not the right of any other. Over the rest of the people, if there were any that consented not to the war, and over the children of the captives themselves, or the possessions of either, he has no power; and so can have, by virtue of conquest, no lawful title himself to dominion over them, or derive it to his posterity; but is an aggressor, if he attempts upon their properties, and thereby puts himself in a state of war against them, and has no better a right of principality, he, nor any of his successors, than Hingar, or Hubba, the Danes, had here in England; or Spartacus, had he conquered Italy, would have had; which is to have their yoke cast off, as soon as God shall give those under their subjection courage and opportunity to do it. Thus, notwithstanding whatever title the kings of Assyria had over Judah, by the sword, God assisted Hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that conquering empire. And the lord was with Hezekiah, and he prospered; wherefore he went forth, and he rebelled against the king of Assyria, and served him not, 2 Kings xviii. 7. Whence it is plain, that shaking off a power, which force, and not right, hath set over any one, though it hath the name of rebellion, yet is no offence before God, but is that which he allows and countenances, though even promises and covenants, when obtained by force, have intervened: for it is very probable, to any one that reads the story of Ahaz and Hezekiah attentively, that the Assyrians subdued Ahaz, and deposed him, and made Hezekiah king in his father’s lifetime; and that Hezekiah by agreement had done him homage, and paid him tribute all this time.
196. In short, the case of conquest is this. If the conqueror has a just cause, he has a despotical right over the persons of all who actually aided and joined in the war against him. He also has a right to make up his damage and costs out of their labor and estates, provided he does not injure the right of anyone else. Over the rest of the people, if there were any who did not consent to the war, he has no power. Nor does he have any over the children of the captives themselves, or over the possessions of either. So by virtue of conquest he can have no lawful title himself to dominion over them, nor pass it to his posterity. Instead he is an aggressor if he makes an attempt on their properties, and so puts himself in a state of war against them. Neither he nor any of his successors has any better right to rule than Hingar or Hubba, the Danes, had here in England, or than Spartacus would have had if he had conquered Italy. That is, a right to have their yoke thrown off as soon as God gives those under their subjection the courage and opportunity to do it. So, whatever title the kings of Assyria had over Judah by the sword, God helped Hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that conquering empire. And the Lord was with Hezekiah, and he prospered. So he went out, and he rebelled against the king of Assyria, and did not serve him. 2 Kings xviii. 7. From this it is plain that shaking off a power which force, and not right, has set over anyone is no offense before God, though it has the name of rebellion. It is something God allows and approves, even where promises and covenants obtained by force have come in between. For it is very probable, to anyone who reads the story of Ahaz and Hezekiah attentively, that the Assyrians subdued Ahaz and deposed him, and made Hezekiah king in his father's lifetime. And it is probable that Hezekiah, by agreement, had done homage to the Assyrian king and paid him tribute all this time.