Sect. 95. MEN being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.
95. Men are, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent. So no one can be put out of this state and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent. The only way anyone gives up his natural liberty and puts on the bonds of civil society is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community. They do this for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living with one another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against anyone not of it. Any number of men may do this, because it does not injure the freedom of the rest. They are left as they were, in the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are at once incorporated and make one body politic. In it the majority have a right to act for and bind the rest.
Sect. 96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority: for that which acts any community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies, impowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole.
96. When a group of people, each agreeing, forms a community, they make that community a single body. It then has the power to act as one. That power depends on the will and decision of the majority. What moves a community is the consent of its members. A single body must move in one direction. So the community must follow the direction that the greater force carries it. That greater force is the consent of the majority. Otherwise the community could not act or remain a single body. Each person who joined agreed it should. Therefore every member is bound by that agreement to accept the majority's decision. Thus, in assemblies given power by positive laws, the majority's decision is taken as the decision of the whole. This applies when the law does not set the number required to make decisions. By the law of nature and reason, the majority holds the power of the whole.
Sect. 97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to every one of that society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties than he was in before in the state of nature. For what appearance would there be of any compact? what new engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society, than he himself thought fit, and did actually consent to? This would be still as great a liberty, as he himself had before his compact, or any one else in the state of nature hath, who may submit himself, and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit.
97. By agreeing with others to form one body politic under one government, every person obliges himself to the rest of that society. He must accept the majority’s decisions and be bound by them. Otherwise the original compact, by which he and others join into one society, would mean nothing. It would not be a real agreement if he remained as free and unconstrained as he was in the state of nature. What would be the appearance of any compact? What new obligation would exist if he were bound only by those decrees he personally thought fit and actually consented to? This would leave him with the same great liberty he had before the compact. It would be no different from anyone in the state of nature. Such a person may submit and consent to acts only when he thinks fit.
Sect. 98. For if the consent of the majority shall not, in reason, be received as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual; nothing but the consent of every individual can make any thing to be the act of the whole: but such a consent is next to impossible ever to be had, if we consider the infirmities of health, and avocations of business, which in a number, though much less than that of a commonwealth, will necessarily keep many away from the public assembly. To which if we add the variety of opinions, and contrariety of interests, which unavoidably happen in all collections of men, the coming into society upon such terms would be only like Cato’s coming into the theatre, only to go out again. Such a constitution as this would make the mighty Leviathan of a shorter duration, than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it was born in: which cannot be supposed, till we can think, that rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only to be dissolved: for where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again.
98. If the consent of the majority cannot reasonably be taken as the act of the whole and bind every individual, then only the consent of every single person could make anything the act of the whole. Such unanimous consent is almost impossible. People get sick and are called away by business. In any group, even much smaller than a commonwealth, many will necessarily be absent from the public assembly. If we add the variety of opinions and the conflict of interests that always arise among people, then forming society on those terms would be like Cato entering the theatre only to leave again. A constitution like that would make the mighty Leviathan last a shorter time than the weakest creatures, and it would not outlive the day it was born. We cannot suppose that rational people would form societies only to have them dissolve. Where the majority cannot bind the rest, they cannot act as one body, and the society will immediately fall apart.
Sect. 99. Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the ends for which they unite into society, to the majority of the community, unless they expresly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals, that enter into, or make up a commonwealth. And thus that, which begins and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which did, or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world.
99. Whoever, then, unites into a community out of a state of nature must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for which they unite into society. They give it up to the majority of the community, unless they expressly agreed on some number greater than the majority. And this is done simply by agreeing to unite into one political society. That is all the compact there is, or needs to be, between the individuals who enter into or make up a commonwealth. So what begins and actually constitutes any political society is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this, and this only, is what did or could give a beginning to any lawful government in the world.
Sect. 100. To this I find two objections made. First, That there are no instances to be found in story, of a company of men independent, and equal one amongst another, that met together, and in this way began and set up a government.
100. I find two objections to this. First, that history contains no example of a group of people who were independent and equal to one another. There is no case where such a group met and in that way founded a government.
Secondly, It is impossible of right, that men should do so, because all men being born under government, they are to submit to that, and are not at liberty to begin a new one.
Secondly, it is not right for people to do this. Everyone is born under a government. They must submit to it and are not free to start a new one.
Sect. 101. To the first there is this to answer, That it is not at all to be wondered, that history gives us but a very little account of men, that lived together in the state of nature. The inconveniences of that condition, and the love and want of society, no sooner brought any number of them together, but they presently united and incorporated, if they designed to continue together. And if we may not suppose men ever to have been in the state of nature, because we hear not much of them in such a state, we may as well suppose the armies of Salmanasser or Xerxes were never children, because we hear little of them, till they were men, and imbodied in armies. Government is every where antecedent to records, and letters seldom come in amongst a people till a long continuation of civil society has, by other more necessary arts, provided for their safety, ease, and plenty: and then they begin to look after the history of their founders, and search into their original, when they have outlived the memory of it: for it is with commonwealths as with particular persons, they are commonly ignorant of their own births and infancies: and if they know any thing of their original, they are beholden for it, to the accidental records that others have kept of it. And those that we have, of the beginning of any polities in the world, excepting that of the Jews, where God himself immediately interposed, and which favours not at all paternal dominion, are all either plain instances of such a beginning as I have mentioned, or at least have manifest footsteps of it.
101. To the first I answer. It is not surprising that history gives little account of people who lived together in the state of nature. The inconveniences of that condition and people's need for society soon brought them together. When they intended to stay together, they immediately united and incorporated. Denying that men were ever in the state of nature, merely because records are scarce, would be wrong. That would be like saying the armies of Salmanasser or Xerxes were never children. We hear little of them until they become men and are organized into armies. Government exists before written records. Writing rarely appears among a people until a long civil society develops. Other necessary arts first provide safety, comfort, and plenty. Only then do people begin to record the history of their founders. They search their origins after memory has faded. Commonwealths are like individuals in this respect. They usually do not know their births and infancy. If they know anything about their origin, they owe it to accidental records kept by others. The records we have about the beginnings of polities in the world, except the Jewish account, support this. The Jewish account involves God's immediate intervention. It does not favor paternal dominion. All other accounts are either clear examples of the kind of beginning I described or show obvious traces of it.
Sect. 102. He must shew a strange inclination to deny evident matter of fact, when it agrees not with his hypothesis, who will not allow, that the beginning of Rome and Venice were by the uniting together of several men free and independent one of another, amongst whom there was no natural superiority or subjection. And if Josephus Acosta’s word may be taken, he tells us, that in many parts of America there was no government at all.
102. He shows a strange tendency to deny evident facts when they do not fit his hypothesis. This applies to anyone who refuses to admit the plain origin of Rome and Venice. They began when several men, free and independent of one another, united. Among them there was no natural superiority or subjection. If we accept Josephus Acosta's account, he reports that many parts of America had no government at all.
There are great and apparent conjectures, says he, that these men, speaking of those of Peru, for a long time had neither kings nor commonwealths, but lived in troops, as they do this day in Florida, the Cheriquanas, those of Brazil, and many other nations, which have no certain kings, but as occasion is offered, in peace or war, they choose their captains as they please, 1. i. c. 25.
He notes clear reasons to think these people, those of Peru, long had neither kings nor organized governments. They lived in bands. This is still true today among the peoples of Florida, the Cheriquanas, the people of Brazil, and many others. These peoples have no settled kings. Instead, when needed, in peace or war, they choose captains as they please. 1. i. c. 25.
If it be said, that every man there was born subject to his father, or the head of his family; that the subjection due from a child to a father took not away his freedom of uniting into what political society he thought fit, has been already proved. But be that as it will, these men, it is evident, were actually free; and whatever superiority some politicians now would place in any of them, they themselves claimed it not, but by consent were all equal, till by the same consent they set rulers over themselves. So that their politic societies all began from a voluntary union, and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of their governors, and forms of government.
Someone may object that every man there was born subject to his father, or to the head of his family. To this I answer that it has already been proved that the subjection a child owes a father did not take away his freedom to unite into whatever political society he thought fit. But however that may be, these men were evidently free in fact. Whatever superiority some politicians now would place in any of them, they themselves did not claim it. By consent they were all equal, until by the same consent they set rulers over themselves. So their political societies all began from a voluntary union, and from the mutual agreement of men acting freely in the choice of their governors and forms of government.
Sect. 103. And I hope those who went away from Sparta with Palantus, mentioned by Justin, 1. iii. c. 4. will be allowed to have been freemen independent one of another, and to have set up a government over themselves, by their own consent. Thus I have given several examples, out of history, of people free and in the state of nature, that being met together incorporated and began a commonwealth. And if the want of such instances be an argument to prove that government were not, nor could not be so begun, I suppose the contenders for paternal empire were better let it alone, than urge it against natural liberty: for if they can give so many instances, out of history, of governments begun upon paternal right, I think (though at best an argument from what has been, to what should of right be, has no great force) one might, without any great danger, yield them the cause. But if I might advise them in the case, they would do well not to search too much into the original of governments, as they have begun de facto, lest they should find, at the foundation of most of them, something very little favourable to the design they promote, and such a power as they contend for.
103. I hope those who left Sparta with Palantus, mentioned by Justin 1. iii. c. 4, will be allowed to have been freemen independent of one another. I also hope they set up a government over themselves by their own consent. Thus I have given several historical examples of people who were free and in the state of nature. They met together, united, and began a commonwealth. If the lack of such examples is used to argue that governments were not, and could not be, begun this way, then the advocates of paternal empire would do better to drop the point than press it against natural liberty. If they can produce as many historical instances of governments begun by paternal right, one might, though an argument from what has been to what ought to be has little force, safely concede the point. But if I may advise them, they should not probe too deeply into the actual origins of governments as they began de facto. They may find that the foundations of most governments are little favourable to the design they promote, and not the kind of power they contend for.
Sect. 104. But to conclude, reason being plain on our side, that men are naturally free, and the examples of history shewing, that the governments of the world, that were begun in peace, had their beginning laid on that foundation, and were made by the consent of the people; there can be little room for doubt, either where the right is, or what has been the opinion, or practice of mankind, about the first erecting of governments.
104. In conclusion, reason clearly supports our view that people are naturally free. Historical examples show that governments begun in peace were founded on that principle. They were created by the consent of the people. There is little doubt about where the right lies. There is also little doubt about what people believed or did when they first formed governments.
Sect. 105. I will not deny, that if we look back as far as history will direct us, towards the original of commonwealths, we shall generally find them under the government and administration of one man. And I am also apt to believe, that where a family was numerous enough to subsist by itself, and continued entire together, without mixing with others, as it often happens, where there is much land, and few people, the government commonly began in the father: for the father having, by the law of nature, the same power with every man else to punish, as he thought fit, any offences against that law, might thereby punish his transgressing children, even when they were men, and out of their pupilage; and they were very likely to submit to his punishment, and all join with him against the offender, in their turns, giving him thereby power to execute his sentence against any transgression, and so in effect make him the law-maker, and governor over all that remained in conjunction with his family. He was fittest to be trusted; paternal affection secured their property and interest under his care; and the custom of obeying him, in their childhood, made it easier to submit to him, rather than to any other. If therefore they must have one to rule them, as government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live together; who so likely to be the man as he that was their common father; unless negligence, cruelty, or any other defect of mind or body made him unfit for it? But when either the father died, and left his next heir, for want of age, wisdom, courage, or any other qualities, less fit for rule; or where several families met, and consented to continue together; there, it is not to be doubted, but they used their natural freedom, to set up him, whom they judged the ablest, and most likely, to rule well over them. Conformable hereunto we find the people of America, who (living out of the reach of the conquering swords, and spreading domination of the two great empires of Peru and Mexico) enjoyed their own natural freedom, though, caeteris paribus, they commonly prefer the heir of their deceased king; yet if they find him any way weak, or uncapable, they pass him by, and set up the stoutest and bravest man for their ruler.
105. I will not deny that if we look back as far as history will guide us toward the origin of commonwealths, we shall generally find them under the government and administration of one man. I am also inclined to believe the following. Where a family was numerous enough to live by itself, and stayed together whole without mixing with others (as often happens where there is much land and few people), the government commonly began in the father. For by the law of nature the father had the same power as every other man to punish, as he thought fit, any offences against that law. So he might punish his children who broke it, even when they were men and out of their pupilage. And they were very likely to submit to his punishment, and all to join with him in their turns against the offender. In this way they gave him power to carry out his sentence against any transgression. So in effect they made him the lawmaker and governor over all who remained joined with his family. He was the fittest to be trusted. Paternal affection secured their property and interest under his care. And the habit of obeying him in childhood made it easier to submit to him than to anyone else. If they must have one man to rule them, then, as government is hardly to be avoided among men who live together, who was so likely to be the man as their common father? That is, unless negligence, cruelty, or some other defect of mind or body made him unfit for it. But the father might die and leave his next heir less fit for rule, for lack of age, wisdom, courage, or other qualities. Or several families might meet and consent to continue together. In those cases there is no doubt that they used their natural freedom to set up the man they judged the ablest and most likely to rule well over them. In keeping with this, we find the peoples of America. Living out of reach of the conquering swords and spreading domination of the two great empires of Peru and Mexico, they enjoyed their own natural freedom. Other things being equal, they commonly prefer the heir of their deceased king. Yet if they find him weak or incapable in any way, they pass him over and set up the stoutest and bravest man as their ruler.
Sect. 106. Thus, though looking back as far as records give us any account of peopling the world, and the history of nations, we commonly find the government to be in one hand; yet it destroys not that which I affirm, viz. that the beginning of politic society depends upon the consent of the individuals, to join into, and make one society; who, when they are thus incorporated, might set up what form of government they thought fit. But this having given occasion to men to mistake, and think, that by nature government was monarchical, and belonged to the father, it may not be amiss here to consider, why people in the beginning generally pitched upon this form, which though perhaps the father’s pre-eminency might, in the first institution of some commonwealths, give a rise to, and place in the beginning, the power in one hand; yet it is plain that the reason, that continued the form of government in a single person, was not any regard, or respect to paternal authority; since all petty monarchies, that is, almost all monarchies, near their original, have been commonly, at least upon occasion, elective.
106. Looking back as far as records give us any account of the peopling of the world and the history of nations, we commonly find the government in one hand. Yet this does not destroy what I affirm: that the beginning of political society depends on the consent of individuals to join into and make one society. Once they are so incorporated, they might set up whatever form of government they thought fit. But this has led men to mistake and think that government was by nature monarchical and belonged to the father. So it may not be amiss here to consider why people in the beginning generally settled on this form. Perhaps the father's pre-eminence might, in the first founding of some commonwealths, give rise to it and place the power in one hand at the beginning. Yet it is plain that the reason the form of government continued in a single person was not any regard or respect for paternal authority. For all petty monarchies, that is, almost all monarchies, near their origin, have commonly been elective, at least on occasion.
Sect. 107. First then, in the beginning of things, the father’s government of the childhood of those sprung from him, having accustomed them to the rule of one man, and taught them that where it was exercised with care and skill, with affection and love to those under it, it was sufficient to procure and preserve to men all the political happiness they sought for in society. It was no wonder that they should pitch upon, and naturally run into that form of government, which from their infancy they had been all accustomed to; and which, by experience, they had found both easy and safe. To which, if we add, that monarchy being simple, and most obvious to men, whom neither experience had instructed in forms of government, nor the ambition or insolence of empire had taught to beware of the encroachments of prerogative, or the inconveniences of absolute power, which monarchy in succession was apt to lay claim to, and bring upon them, it was not at all strange, that they should not much trouble themselves to think of methods of restraining any exorbitances of those to whom they had given the authority over them, and of balancing the power of government, by placing several parts of it in different hands. They had neither felt the oppression of tyrannical dominion, nor did the fashion of the age, nor their possessions, or way of living, (which afforded little matter for covetousness or ambition) give them any reason to apprehend or provide against it; and therefore it is no wonder they put themselves into such a frame of government, as was not only, as I said, most obvious and simple, but also best suited to their present state and condition; which stood more in need of defence against foreign invasions and injuries, than of multiplicity of laws. The equality of a simple poor way of living, confining their desires within the narrow bounds of each man’s small property, made few controversies, and so no need of many laws to decide them, or variety of officers to superintend the process, or look after the execution of justice, where there were but few trespasses, and few offenders. Since then those, who like one another so well as to join into society, cannot but be supposed to have some acquaintance and friendship together, and some trust one in another; they could not but have greater apprehensions of others, than of one another: and therefore their first care and thought cannot but be supposed to be, how to secure themselves against foreign force. It was natural for them to put themselves under a frame of government which might best serve to that end, and chuse the wisest and bravest man to conduct them in their wars, and lead them out against their enemies, and in this chiefly be their ruler.
107. At the start, fathers governed their children. This taught children to accept the rule of one man. They learned that when a single ruler acted with care, skill, and affection, he could provide political happiness. This was the kind people sought in society. So it was natural for them to choose that form of government. They had been used to it since childhood. Experience had shown it was easy and safe. Monarchy was simple and obvious. For people without experience in government, or who had not felt the ambition or arrogance of empire, monarchy seemed natural. They had not been taught to fear encroachments of prerogative. They did not yet see the dangers of absolute power that hereditary monarchy could claim. So they did not worry about methods to restrain rulers. They did not set up checks by dividing power among different hands. They had not experienced tyrannical oppression. Nor did the customs of the time, or their possessions and lifestyle, give them reason to fear it. Their simple way of life left little room for greed or ambition. Therefore they naturally chose that form of government. It was obvious and simple. It also fit their condition. They needed protection against foreign invasions more than many laws. Their equal, simple, and poor way of life limited desires. Each person's small property reduced disputes. So they had few controversies. There was little need for many laws. Nor did they need many officers to oversee legal processes or enforce justice. There were few trespasses and few offenders. People who join society must have some acquaintance and friendship. They must trust one another to some degree. They feared outsiders more than they feared each other. So their main concern became protecting themselves from foreign force. It was natural to choose a government suited to that goal. They chose the wisest and bravest man to command them in war. He would lead them against their enemies and chiefly serve as their ruler.
Sect. 108. Thus we see, that the kings of the Indians in America, which is still a pattern of the first ages in Asia and Europe, whilst the inhabitants were too few for the country, and want of people and money gave men no temptation to enlarge their possessions of land, or contest for wider extent of ground, are little more than generals of their armies; and though they command absolutely in war, yet at home and in time of peace they exercise very little dominion, and have but a very moderate sovereignty, the resolutions of peace and war being ordinarily either in the people, or in a council. Tho’ the war itself, which admits not of plurality of governors, naturally devolves the command into the king’s sole authority.
108. We can see that the kings of the Indians in America resemble rulers from the earliest ages. This pattern also held in Asia and Europe. When the population was sparse and there was little wealth, people had no reason to expand their holdings. They did not fight to claim more land. These kings were little more than generals of their armies. They had absolute command in war. At home and in peacetime they exercised very little authority. Their sovereignty was only moderate. Decisions about peace and war usually rested with the people or with a council. War does not allow multiple governors. So command naturally falls to the king alone.
Sect. 109. And thus in Israel itself, the chief business of their judges, and first kings, seems to have been to be captains in war, and leaders of their armies; which (besides what is signified by going out and in before the people, which was, to march forth to war, and home again in the heads of their forces) appears plainly in the story of Jephtha. The Ammonites making war upon Israel, the Gileadites in fear send to Jephtha, a bastard of their family whom they had cast off, and article with him, if he will assist them against the Ammonites, to make him their ruler; which they do in these words, And the people made him head and captain over them, Judg. xi, 11. which was, as it seems, all one as to be judge. And he judged Israel, judg. xii. 7. that is, was their captain-general six years. So when Jotham upbraids the Shechemites with the obligation they had to Gideon, who had been their judge and ruler, he tells them, He fought for you, and adventured his life far, and delivered you out of the hands of Midian, Judg. ix. 17. Nothing mentioned of him but what he did as a general: and indeed that is all is found in his history, or in any of the rest of the judges. And Abimelech particularly is called king, though at most he was but their general. And when, being weary of the ill conduct of Samuel’s sons, the children of Israel desired a king, like all the nations to judge them, and to go out before them, and to fight their battles, I. Sam viii. 20. God granting their desire, says to Samuel, I will send thee a man, and thou shalt anoint him to be captain over my people Israel, that he may save my people out of the hands of the Philistines, ix. 16. As if the only business of a king had been to lead out their armies, and fight in their defence; and accordingly at his inauguration pouring a vial of oil upon him, declares to Saul, that the Lord had anointed him to be captain over his inheritance, x. 1. And therefore those, who after Saul’s being solemnly chosen and saluted king by the tribes at Mispah, were unwilling to have him their king, made no other objection but this, How shall this man save us? v. 27. as if they should have said, this man is unfit to be our king, not having skill and conduct enough in war, to be able to defend us. And when God resolved to transfer the government to David, it is in these words, But now thy kingdom shall not continue: the Lord hath sought him a man after his own heart, and the Lord hath commanded him to be captain over his people, xiii. 14. As if the whole kingly authority were nothing else but to be their general: and therefore the tribes who had stuck to Saul’s family, and opposed David’s reign, when they came to Hebron with terms of submission to him, they tell him, amongst other arguments they had to submit to him as to their king, that he was in effect their king in Saul’s time, and therefore they had no reason but to receive him as their king now. Also (say they) in time past, when Saul was king over us, thou wast he that reddest out and broughtest in Israel, and the Lord said unto thee, Thou shalt feed my people Israel, and thou shalt be a captain over Israel.
109. And so in Israel itself, the chief business of their judges and first kings seems to have been to be captains in war and leaders of their armies. Besides what is meant by going out and in before the people, which was to march out to war and home again at the head of their forces, this appears plainly in the story of Jephtha. The Ammonites made war on Israel. The Gileadites, in fear, sent to Jephtha, a bastard of their family whom they had cast off. They agreed with him that if he would help them against the Ammonites, they would make him their ruler. They did it in these words: And the people made him head and captain over them, Judg. xi. 11. This was, it seems, the same as being judge. And he judged Israel, Judg. xii. 7, that is, he was their captain-general for six years. So when Jotham reproaches the Shechemites with what they owed to Gideon, who had been their judge and ruler, he tells them: He fought for you, and risked his life far, and delivered you out of the hands of Midian, Judg. ix. 17. Nothing is mentioned of him but what he did as a general. And indeed that is all that is found in his history, or in that of any of the other judges. And Abimelech in particular is called king, though at most he was only their general. The children of Israel grew weary of the bad conduct of Samuel's sons and wanted a king, like all the nations, to judge them, to go out before them, and to fight their battles, I. Sam. viii. 20. God granted their desire and said to Samuel: I will send you a man, and you shall anoint him to be captain over my people Israel, that he may save my people out of the hands of the Philistines, ix. 16. As if the only business of a king had been to lead out their armies and fight in their defence. And so at his inauguration, when a vial of oil is poured on him, Saul is told that the Lord had anointed him to be captain over his inheritance, x. 1. Saul was solemnly chosen and saluted as king by the tribes at Mispah. Yet some were unwilling to have him as their king, and they made no other objection but this: How shall this man save us? v. 27. It was as if they had said, this man is unfit to be our king, since he lacks enough skill and leadership in war to defend us. And when God resolved to transfer the government to David, it is in these words: But now your kingdom shall not continue. The Lord has sought him a man after his own heart, and the Lord has commanded him to be captain over his people, xiii. 14. As if the whole kingly authority were nothing else but to be their general. So the tribes who had stuck to Saul's family and opposed David's reign came to Hebron with terms of submission to him. Among other arguments for submitting to him as their king, they told him he had in effect been their king in Saul's time. So they had no reason not to receive him as their king now. Also (they say) in time past, when Saul was king over us, you were the one who led Israel out and brought them in. And the Lord said to you: You shall feed my people Israel, and you shall be a captain over Israel.
Sect. 110. Thus, whether a family by degrees grew up into a commonwealth, and the fatherly authority being continued on to the elder son, every one in his turn growing up under it, tacitly submitted to it, and the easiness and equality of it not offending any one, every one acquiesced, till time seemed to have confirmed it, and settled a right of succession by prescription: or whether several families, or the descendants of several families, whom chance, neighbourhood, or business brought together, uniting into society, the need of a general, whose conduct might defend them against their enemies in war, and the great confidence the innocence and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age, (such as are almost all those which begin governments, that ever come to last in the world) gave men one of another, made the first beginners of commonwealths generally put the rule into one man’s hand, without any other express limitation or restraint, but what the nature of the thing, and the end of government required: which ever of those it was that at first put the rule into the hands of a single person, certain it is no body was intrusted with it but for the public good and safety, and to those ends, in the infancies of commonwealths, those who had it commonly used it. And unless they had done so, young societies could not have subsisted; without such nursing fathers tender and careful of the public weal, all governments would have sunk under the weakness and infirmities of their infancy, and the prince and the people had soon perished together.
110. A family may have grown up by degrees into a commonwealth. The fatherly authority was continued on to the elder son, and everyone in his turn grew up under it and tacitly submitted to it. Its easiness and equality offended no one, so everyone acquiesced, until time seemed to have confirmed it and settled a right of succession by prescription. Or several families, or the descendants of several families, may have been brought together by chance, neighbourhood, or business and united into a society. Then the need of a general, whose leadership might defend them against their enemies in war, led the first founders of commonwealths generally to put the rule into one man's hands. So did the great confidence men had in one another, given by the innocence and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age (and almost all governments that ever come to last in the world begin in such an age). They put no express limitation or restraint on it, except what the nature of the thing and the end of government required. Whichever of these first put the rule into the hands of a single person, it is certain that nobody was entrusted with it except for the public good and safety. And in the infancy of commonwealths, those who had it commonly used it for those ends. Unless they had done so, young societies could not have survived. Without such nursing fathers, tender and careful of the public welfare, all governments would have sunk under the weakness and infirmities of their infancy. The prince and the people would soon have perished together.
Sect. 111. But though the golden age (before vain ambition, and amor sceleratus habendi, evil concupiscence, had corrupted men’s minds into a mistake of true power and honour) had more virtue, and consequently better governors, as well as less vicious subjects, and there was then no stretching prerogative on the one side, to oppress the people; nor consequently on the other, any dispute about privilege, to lessen or restrain the power of the magistrate, and so no contest betwixt rulers and people about governors or government: yet, when ambition and luxury in future ages* would retain and increase the power, without doing the business for which it was given; and aided by flattery, taught princes to have distinct and separate interests from their people, men found it necessary to examine more carefully the original and rights of government; and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitances, and prevent the abuses of that power, which they having intrusted in another’s hands only for their own good, they found was made use of to hurt them.
111. The golden age came before vain ambition and the wicked desire to possess (amor sceleratus habendi) corrupted men's minds about true power and honour. It had more virtue. Consequently it had better governors and fewer vicious subjects. There was then no stretching of prerogative on one side to oppress the people. Nor was there, on the other side, any dispute about privilege to lessen or restrain the magistrate's power. So there was no contest between rulers and people about governors or government. Yet in later ages,* ambition and luxury sought to keep and increase power without doing the work for which it was given. Flattery taught princes to have interests separate from those of their people. People therefore found it necessary to examine more carefully the origin and rights of government. They looked for ways to restrain excesses and prevent abuses of that power. They had entrusted power to others only for their own good. They found it was being used to harm them.
(*At first, when some certain kind of regiment was once approved, it may be nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of governing, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion which were to rule, till by experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy, did indeed but increase the sore which it should have cured. They saw, that to live by one man’s will, became the cause of all men’s misery. This constrained them to come unto laws wherein all men might see their duty before hand, and know the penalties of transgressing them. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
(*At first, when a certain kind of government was approved, they may not have thought further about how to govern. They left matters to the judgment and discretion of those who would rule. By experience they found this very inconvenient in every respect. The remedy they had devised actually made the problem worse. They saw that living under one man's will became the cause of everyone's misery. That forced them to make laws so everyone could see their duties beforehand and know the penalties for breaking them. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. 10.)
Sect. 112. Thus we may see how probable it is, that people that were naturally free, and by their own consent either submitted to the government of their father, or united together out of different families to make a government, should generally put the rule into one man’s hands, and chuse to be under the conduct of a single person, without so much as by express conditions limiting or regulating his power, which they thought safe enough in his honesty and prudence; though they never dreamed of monarchy being lure Divino, which we never heard of among mankind, till it was revealed to us by the divinity of this last age; nor ever allowed paternal power to have a right to dominion, or to be the foundation of all government. And thus much may suffice to shew, that as far as we have any light from history, we have reason to conclude, that all peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the people. I say peaceful, because I shall have occasion in another place to speak of conquest, which some esteem a way of beginning of governments.
112. Thus we may see how probable it is that people who were naturally free would generally put the rule into one man's hands. By their own consent they either submitted to the government of their father, or united together out of different families to make a government. And they would choose to be under the leadership of a single person, without even limiting or regulating his power by express conditions, since they thought it safe enough in his honesty and prudence. Yet they never dreamed of monarchy being Jure Divino, by divine right. We never heard of that among mankind until it was revealed to us by the divinity of this last age. Nor did they ever allow paternal power to have a right to dominion, or to be the foundation of all government. This much may be enough to show that, as far as history gives us any light, we have reason to conclude that all peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the people. I say peaceful, because I shall have occasion elsewhere to speak of conquest, which some regard as a way of beginning governments.
The other objection I find urged against the beginning of polities, in the way I have mentioned, is this, viz.
Another objection I have seen raised against the beginning of governments, as I described it, is this, namely.
Sect. 113. That all men being born under government, some or other, it is impossible any of them should ever be free, and at liberty to unite together, and begin a new one, or ever be able to erect a lawful government.
113. It says that all men are born under some government or other. So it is impossible for any of them ever to be free, and at liberty to unite together and begin a new one. Nor could they ever be able to set up a lawful government.
If this argument be good; I ask, how came so many lawful monarchies into the world? for if any body, upon this supposition, can shew me any one man in any age of the world free to begin a lawful monarchy, I will be bound to shew him ten other free men at liberty, at the same time to unite and begin a new government under a regal, or any other form; it being demonstration, that if any one, born under the dominion of another, may be so free as to have a right to command others in a new and distinct empire, every one that is born under the dominion of another may be so free too, and may become a ruler, or subject, of a distinct separate government. And so by this their own principle, either all men, however born, are free, or else there is but one lawful prince, one lawful government in the world. And then they have nothing to do, but barely to shew us which that is; which when they have done, I doubt not but all mankind will easily agree to pay obedience to him.
If this argument is valid, I ask this: how did so many lawful monarchies arise? If anyone on this assumption can show me one person in any age who was free to start a lawful monarchy, I will show him ten other free people who were equally at liberty. They could unite and begin a new government, royal or in any other form. This proves the point. If a person born under someone else's dominion can claim the right to command others in a new and separate empire, then every person born under someone else's dominion can make the same claim. Each could become either the ruler or the subject of a distinct government. So by their own principle, either all men, however born, are free, or there is only one lawful prince and one lawful government in the world. If it is the latter, they need only show us which one that is. Once they do, I doubt not all mankind will readily agree to obey him.
Sect. 114. Though it be a sufficient answer to their objection, to shew that it involves them in the same difficulties that it doth those they use it against; yet I shall endeavour to discover the weakness of this argument a little farther. All men, say they, are born under government, and therefore they cannot be at liberty to begin a new one. Every one is born a subject to his father, or his prince, and is therefore under the perpetual tie of subjection and allegiance. It is plain mankind never owned nor considered any such natural subjection that they were born in, to one or to the other that tied them, without their own consents, to a subjection to them and their heirs.
114. Showing that their objection puts them in the same difficulties as those they criticize is a sufficient reply. Yet I will try to expose this argument's weakness a little more. They say all people are born under government. Therefore they cannot be free to start a new one. Everyone is born a subject of their father or their prince. Therefore they are under a permanent tie of subjection and allegiance. It is clear that people never accepted or considered any such natural subjection. They did not think that being born under a parent or prince bound them, without their consent, to lifelong obedience. They did not accept that this obedience extended to that person and their heirs.
Sect. 115. For there are no examples so frequent in history, both sacred and profane, as those of men withdrawing themselves, and their obedience, from the jurisdiction they were born under, and the family or community they were bred up in, and setting up new governments in other places; from whence sprang all that number of petty commonwealths in the beginning of ages, and which always multiplied, as long as there was room enough, till the stronger, or more fortunate, swallowed the weaker; and those great ones again breaking to pieces, dissolved into lesser dominions. All which are so many testimonies against paternal sovereignty, and plainly prove, that it was not the natural right of the father descending to his heirs, that made governments in the beginning, since it was impossible, upon that ground, there should have been so many little kingdoms; all must have been but only one universal monarchy, if men had not been at liberty to separate themselves from their families, and the government, be it what it will, that was set up in it, and go and make distinct commonwealths and other governments, as they thought fit.
115. There are few things as common in history, both religious and secular, as people leaving the authority they were born under. They withdrew their obedience from the family or community in which they were raised. They then set up new governments elsewhere. From this arose many small commonwealths in the early ages. These multiplied while there was room. The stronger or more fortunate swallowed the weaker. Those larger states sometimes broke apart and dissolved into smaller dominions. All this counts against paternal sovereignty. It clearly shows that governments did not begin from a father's natural right passing to his heirs. If that had been the case, there could not have been so many little kingdoms. There would have been only one universal monarchy. That is unless people had been free to separate themselves from their families and from the government that existed there. Then they could go and form distinct commonwealths and other governments as they thought fit.
Sect. 116. This has been the practice of the world from its first beginning to this day; nor is it now any more hindrance to the freedom of mankind, that they are born under constituted and ancient polities, that have established laws, and set forms of government, than if they were born in the woods, amongst the unconfined inhabitants, that run loose in them: for those, who would persuade us, that by being born under any government, we are naturally subjects to it, and have no more any title or pretence to the freedom of the state of nature, have no other reason (bating that of paternal power, which we have already answered) to produce for it, but only, because our fathers or progenitors passed away their natural liberty, and thereby bound up themselves and their posterity to a perpetual subjection to the government, which they themselves submitted to. It is true, that whatever engagements or promises any one has made for himself, he is under the obligation of them, but cannot, by any compact whatsoever, bind his children or posterity: for his son, when a man, being altogether as free as the father, any act of the father can no more give away the liberty of the son, than it can of any body else: he may indeed annex such conditions to the land, he enjoyed as a subject of any commonwealth, as may oblige his son to be of that community, if he will enjoy those possessions which were his father’s; because that estate being his father’s property, he may dispose, or settle it, as he pleases.
116. This has been the practice of the world from its beginning to today. It is no more an obstacle to people's freedom that they are born under established, long-standing governments with laws and forms of rule than if they were born in the woods among its free inhabitants. Those who argue that being born under a government makes us naturally its subjects, and takes away our claim to the freedom of the state of nature, have no other reason. They rely only on paternal power, which we have already answered, and on the claim that our fathers or ancestors gave up their natural liberty. They say the fathers thereby bound themselves and their descendants to permanent subjection to the government they accepted. It is true that whatever promises or obligations a person makes for himself bind him. But no compact can bind his children or descendants. A son, when he becomes a man, is as free as his father. No act of the father can give away the son's liberty any more than it can give away anyone else's. A father may attach conditions to land he held as a subject of a commonwealth. Those conditions may require his son to be part of that community if the son wants to enjoy the possessions that were his father's. Because the estate was the father's property, he may dispose of or settle it as he pleases.
Sect. 117. And this has generally given the occasion to mistake in this matter; because commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions to be dismembered, nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their community, the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father, but under the same terms his father did, by becoming a member of the society; whereby he puts himself presently under the government he finds there established, as much as any other subject of that commonwealth. And thus the consent of freemen, born under government, which only makes them members of it, being given separately in their turns, as each comes to be of age, and not in a multitude together; people take no notice of it, and thinking it not done at all, or not necessary, conclude they are naturally subjects as they are men.
117. This is what has generally caused the mistake in this matter. Commonwealths do not allow any part of their territory to be broken off, or to be held by anyone outside their community. So a son cannot ordinarily enjoy his father's possessions except on the same terms his father did, by becoming a member of the society. By doing so he at once places himself under the government he finds established there, as much as any other subject of that commonwealth. Now the consent of free men born under a government is the only thing that makes them members of it. But this consent is given separately, by each in his turn as he comes of age, and not by a crowd all together. So people take no notice of it. They think it is not given at all, or is not necessary. And they conclude that they are subjects by nature, just as they are men by nature.
Sect. 118. But, it is plain, governments themselves understand it otherwise; they claim no power over the son, because of that they had over the father; nor look on children as being their subjects, by their fathers being so. If a subject of England have a child, by an English woman in France, whose subject is he? Not the king of England’s; for he must have leave to be admitted to the privileges of it: nor the king of France’s; for how then has his father a liberty to bring him away, and breed him as he pleases? and who ever was judged as a traytor or deserter, if he left, or warred against a country, for being barely born in it of parents that were aliens there? It is plain then, by the practice of governments themselves, as well as by the law of right reason, that a child is born a subject of no country or government. He is under his father’s tuition and authority, till he comes to age of discretion; and then he is a freeman, at liberty what government he will put himself under, what body politic he will unite himself to: for if an Englishman’s son, born in France, be at liberty, and may do so, it is evident there is no tie upon him by his father’s being a subject of this kingdom; nor is he bound up by any compact of his ancestors. And why then hath not his son, by the same reason, the same liberty, though he be born any where else? Since the power that a father hath naturally over his children, is the same, where-ever they be born, and the ties of natural obligations, are not bounded by the positive limits of kingdoms and commonwealths.
118. But it is clear that governments themselves see it differently. They do not claim power over a son because they have power over the father. They do not treat children as their subjects simply because their fathers are. If an English subject has a child by an English woman while in France, whose subject is the child? Not the king of England’s, because the child would need permission to enjoy those privileges. Nor the king of France’s. If the child were automatically France’s subject, how could his father have the right to take him away and raise him as he wishes? Who was ever judged a traitor or a deserter for leaving a country, or fighting against it, just because he was born there to parents who were foreigners? So, by the practice of governments and by the law of reason, a child is not born a subject of any country or government. He is under his father’s care and authority until he reaches the age of discretion. Then he is a free person. He may choose what government to join and what political body to unite with. If an Englishman’s son born in France may do this, it is clear his father’s status as a subject of this kingdom puts no tie on him. He is not bound by any compact made by his ancestors. Why then would his son not have the same liberty for the same reason, even if born elsewhere? The natural authority a father has over his children is the same wherever they are born. Natural obligations are not limited by the artificial borders of kingdoms and commonwealths.
Sect. 119. Every man being, as has been shewed, naturally free, and nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power, but only his own consent; it is to be considered, what shall be understood to be a sufficient declaration of a man’s consent, to make him subject to the laws of any government. There is a common distinction of an express and a tacit consent, which will concern our present case. No body doubts but an express consent, of any man entering into any society, makes him a perfect member of that society, a subject of that government. The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, and how far it binds, i.e. how far any one shall be looked on to have consented, and thereby submitted to any government, where he has made no expressions of it at all. And to this I say, that every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his possession be of land, to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that government.
119. Every person, as I have shown, is naturally free. Nothing can make him subject to any earthly power except his own consent. We must therefore consider what counts as a sufficient declaration of consent. What would make a person subject to a government's laws? People commonly distinguish between express consent and tacit consent. That distinction matters here. No one doubts that a person's express consent to join a society makes him a full member. It also makes him a subject of that government's authority. The hard question is what should be treated as tacit consent, and how far it binds someone. In other words, how far may a person be regarded as having consented and thus submitted? This applies where he has made no explicit statement. My answer is that anyone who has possessions in, or enjoys any part of, a government's territory gives tacit consent. He is therefore obligated to obey that government's laws while he enjoys them. He is bound to the same extent as any other subject. This applies whether his possession is land held for himself and his heirs forever. It also applies to a lodging rented for a week. It even covers mere free travel on a highway. In effect, it extends to anyone's very presence within the government's territory.
Sect. 120. To understand this the better, it is fit to consider, that every man, when he at first incorporates himself into any commonwealth, he, by his uniting himself thereunto, annexed also, and submits to the community, those possessions, which he has, or shall acquire, that do not already belong to any other government: for it would be a direct contradiction, for any one to enter into society with others for the securing and regulating of property; and yet to suppose his land, whose property is to be regulated by the laws of the society, should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government, to which he himself, the proprietor of the land, is a subject. By the same act therefore, whereby any one unites his person, which was before free, to any commonwealth, by the same he unites his possessions, which were before free, to it also; and they become, both of them, person and possession, subject to the government and dominion of that commonwealth, as long as it hath a being. Whoever therefore, from thenceforth, by inheritance, purchase, permission, or otherways, enjoys any part of the land, so annexed to, and under the government of that commonwealth, must take it with the condition it is under; that is, of submitting to the government of the commonwealth, under whose jurisdiction it is, as far forth as any subject of it.
120. To understand this better, consider this. When a person first joins a commonwealth, they submit themselves to that community. By doing so, they also attach to it the possessions they have or will acquire. This applies only to possessions that do not already belong to another government. It would contradict itself to join a society to secure and regulate property. Then to claim one’s land is exempt from that society's jurisdiction would be inconsistent. The land's property is to be regulated by the society's laws. The owner is a subject of that government. By the same act of uniting a person, who was previously free, to a commonwealth, they also unite their possessions, which were previously free. Both person and possessions become subject to the government and dominion of that commonwealth for as long as it exists. Therefore anyone who afterward acquires or enjoys any part of land annexed to that commonwealth must accept it with its condition. They may acquire it by inheritance, purchase, permission, or other means. They must submit to the government whose jurisdiction the land is under, to the same extent as any subject of that government.
Sect. 121. But since the government has a direct jurisdiction only over the land, and reaches the possessor of it, (before he has actually incorporated himself in the society) only as he dwells upon, and enjoys that; the obligation any one is under, by virtue of such enjoyment, to submit to the government, begins and ends with the enjoyment; so that whenever the owner, who has given nothing but such a tacit consent to the government, will, by donation, sale, or otherwise, quit the said possession, he is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other commonwealth; or to agree with others to begin a new one, in vacuis locis, in any part of the world, they can find free and unpossessed: whereas he, that has once, by actual agreement, and any express declaration, given his consent to be of any commonwealth, is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and remain unalterably a subject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of the state of nature; unless, by any calamity, the government he was under comes to be dissolved; or else by some public act cuts him off from being any longer a member of it.
121. The government's direct jurisdiction extends only to land. It reaches a possessor who has not yet joined society only while he lives on and uses that land. The duty someone incurs by enjoying the land to submit to that government begins and ends with that enjoyment. If an owner has only given such tacit consent, his obligation ends when he leaves the land. He may leave by gift, sale, or other means. He is then free to join any other commonwealth. He may also agree with others to start a new one in vacuis locis. They can do this in any part of the world they find free and unpossessed. But if someone gives express consent to a commonwealth, he is forever its subject. He must remain so and cannot return to the liberty of the state of nature. That can happen only if the government is dissolved by some calamity, or a public act removes him from membership.
Sect. 122. But submitting to the laws of any country, living quietly, and enjoying privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a member of that society: this is only a local protection and homage due to and from all those, who, not being in a state of war, come within the territories belonging to any government, to all parts whereof the force of its laws extends. But this no more makes a man a member of that society, a perpetual subject of that commonwealth, than it would make a man a subject to another, in whose family he found it convenient to abide for some time; though, whilst he continued in it, he were obliged to comply with the laws, and submit to the government he found there. And thus we see, that foreigners, by living all their lives under another government, and enjoying the privileges and protection of it, though they are bound, even in conscience, to submit to its administration, as far forth as any denison; yet do not thereby come to be subjects or members of that commonwealth. Nothing can make any man so, but his actually entering into it by positive engagement, and express promise and compact. This is that, which I think, concerning the beginning of political societies, and that consent which makes any one a member of any commonwealth.
122. But submitting to the laws of a country, living quietly there, and enjoying privileges and protection under its laws does not make a man a member of that society. This is only a local protection and a local homage. The protection is due to all those who come within the territories of any government, as long as they are not in a state of war, and the homage is due from them. This holds in every part of those territories where the force of its laws extends. But this no more makes a man a member of that society, a permanent subject of that commonwealth, than it would make a man the subject of another man in whose household he found it convenient to stay for some time. Yet while he stayed there, he would be obliged to comply with its laws and submit to the government he found there. And so we see that foreigners may live all their lives under another government and enjoy its privileges and protection. They are bound, even in conscience, to submit to its administration as fully as any denizen. Yet they do not thereby become subjects or members of that commonwealth. Nothing can make any man so except actually entering into it by a positive engagement, and an express promise and compact. This is what I think concerning the beginning of political societies, and the consent that makes anyone a member of any commonwealth.