Sect. 123. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and controul of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.
123. If man in the state of nature is as free as has been said, why will he part with his freedom? If he is absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to nobody, why will he give up this empire? Why will he subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? The answer is obvious. Though he has such a right in the state of nature, the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to invasion by others. For all are kings as much as he is, every man is his equal, and most men are no strict observers of fairness and justice. So the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe and very insecure. This makes him willing to leave a condition which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers. And it is not without reason that he seeks out others and is willing to join in society with them. They are already united, or mean to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates. I call these by the general name, property.
Sect. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting.
124. The main purpose of people joining together into commonwealths and placing themselves under government is to preserve their property. In the state of nature, many things needed for that are missing.
First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them: for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases.
First, there is no established and settled law that everyone accepts by common consent. Such a law would be the standard of right and wrong. It would also be the common measure to decide disputes between people. Although the law of nature is clear and understandable to all rational creatures, people are biased by their own interests. They are also ignorant because they do not study it. So they do not tend to accept it as a binding law when applying it to their particular cases.
Sect. 125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law: for every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men’s.
125. Secondly, in the state of nature there is no known and impartial judge. Such a judge would have authority to settle disputes according to established law. In that state everyone acts as both judge and enforcer of the law of nature. Because people favor themselves, passion and revenge easily carry them too far in their own cases. They act with too much heat. At the same time, negligence and indifference make them too lax when judging others.
Sect. 126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution, They who by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.
126. Thirdly, in the state of nature there is often no power to back and support a sentence when it is right, and to carry it out as it should be. Those who have offended by any injustice will seldom fail, where they are able, to make good their injustice by force. Such resistance often makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.
Sect. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to, by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of their property. It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it amongst them; and by such rules as the community, or those authorized by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as of the governments and societies themselves.
127. So mankind, despite all the privileges of the state of nature, is only in a bad condition while they remain in it, and they are quickly driven into society. That is why we seldom find any number of men living together in this state for any length of time. In it they are exposed to inconveniences from the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has to punish the offenses of others. These inconveniences make them take refuge under the established laws of government, and seek the preservation of their property there. This is what makes each of them so willing to give up his single power of punishing. It is to be exercised by those alone who are appointed to it among them, and by such rules as the community, or those it authorizes for that purpose, agree on. And here we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as of governments and societies themselves.
Sect. 128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two powers.
128. In the state of nature, putting aside the freedom to enjoy innocent pleasures, a person has two powers.
The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself, and others within the permission of the law of nature: by which law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one society, distinct from all other creatures. And were it not for the corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations.
The first is to do whatever he thinks necessary to preserve himself and others, within the bounds of the law of nature. This law is common to everyone. By it he and all other humans form one community and make up one society, distinct from all other creatures. If it were not for the corruption and vices of depraved people, no other society would be needed. There would be no reason for people to leave this great natural community. They would not need to form smaller, divided associations by formal agreements.
The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish the crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up, when he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular politic society, and incorporates into any commonwealth, separate from the rest of mankind.
Another power a person has in the state of nature is the authority to punish crimes committed against that law. He gives up both powers when he joins a private, if I may call it, particular political society. He then becomes part of a commonwealth separate from the rest of mankind.
Sect. 129. The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature.
129. The first power is the power to do whatever he thought necessary to preserve himself and others. He gives up that power to be regulated by the laws made by society. This is done so far as preserving himself and the rest of that society requires. Those laws of society often limit the liberty he had under the law of nature.
Sect. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force, (which he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit) to assist the executive power of the society, as the law thereof shall require: for being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require; which is not only necessary, but just, since the other members of the society do the like.
130. Secondly, he entirely gives up the power to punish. He also commits his natural force. Before, he could use that force to enforce the law of nature on his own authority as he saw fit. Now he uses it to help the society's executive power, as its laws require. He is in a new state where he will enjoy many conveniences from the labor, help, and company of others in the same community. He also receives protection from the society's combined strength. He must give up some of his natural liberty in providing for himself. The amount depends on what the society's good, prosperity, and safety require. This is not only necessary but just, since the other members of the society do the same.
Sect. 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one’s property, by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.
131. When people enter society, they give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature. They transfer these powers to the society to be managed by the legislature as the public good requires. They do this only to better preserve themselves, their liberty, and their property. No rational person would change their condition with the intention of becoming worse. Therefore the power of the society, or the legislature they create, can never be supposed to extend beyond the common good. It is obliged to secure everyone's property. It must provide against the three defects mentioned above. Those defects made the state of nature unsafe and uneasy. Whoever holds the legislative or supreme power in any commonwealth must govern by established standing laws. These laws must be published and known to the people. They must not rule by sudden decrees. They must appoint impartial and upright judges to decide disputes by those laws. They must use the community's force at home only to execute those laws. Abroad, they must use force only to prevent or redress foreign injuries and to protect the community from raids and invasion. All of this must aim at no other end than the peace, safety, and public good of the people.