Sect. 77. GOD having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination to drive him into society, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it. The first society was between man and wife, which gave beginning to that between parents and children; to which, in time, that between master and servant came to be added: and though all these might, and commonly did meet together, and make up but one family, wherein the master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a family; each of these, or all together, came short of political society, as we shall see, if we consider the different ends, ties, and bounds of each of these.
77. God made people such that, in his judgment, it was not good for them to be alone. He put upon them strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination that drove them into society. He also fitted them with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it. The first society was that of husband and wife. This gave rise to the society between parents and children. In time the relation between master and servant was added. Though these relations often came together and formed a single family. In that family the master or mistress had a kind of rule proper to a household. But each of these relations, or all of them together, still fell short of political society. This will be clear if we consider the different ends, ties, and bounds of each.
Sect. 78. Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman; and tho’ it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in one another’s bodies as is necessary to its chief end, procreation; yet it draws with it mutual support and assistance, and a communion of interests too, as necessary not only to unite their care and affection, but also necessary to their common off-spring, who have a right to be nourished, and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for themselves.
78. Marriage is formed by a voluntary agreement between a man and a woman. It mainly consists of a mutual sexual relationship and rights over each other's bodies. These are necessary for its main purpose, procreation. Marriage also brings mutual support, assistance, and shared interests. These unite the couple's care and affection. They are also necessary for their children. Children have the right to be fed and supported by their parents until they can provide for themselves.
Sect. 79. For the end of conjunction, between male and female, being not barely procreation, but the continuation of the species; this conjunction betwixt male and female ought to last, even after procreation, so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones, who are to be sustained by those that got them, till they are able to shift and provide for themselves. This rule, which the infinite wise maker hath set to the works of his hands, we find the inferior creatures steadily obey. In those viviparous animals which feed on grass, the conjunction between male and female lasts no longer than the very act of copulation; because the teat of the dam being sufficient to nourish the young, till it be able to feed on grass, the male only begets, but concerns not himself for the female or young, to whose sustenance he can contribute nothing. But in beasts of prey the conjunction lasts longer: because the dam not being able well to subsist herself, and nourish her numerous off-spring by her own prey alone, a more laborious, as well as more dangerous way of living, than by feeding on grass, the assistance of the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common family, which cannot subsist till they are able to prey for themselves, but by the joint care of male and female. The same is to be observed in all birds, (except some domestic ones, where plenty of food excuses the cock from feeding, and taking care of the young brood) whose young needing food in the nest, the cock and hen continue mates, till the young are able to use their wing, and provide for themselves.
79. Because the purpose of the union between male and female is not only procreation but the continuation of the species, this union should continue after procreation as long as the young need care and support. The parents who produced them should sustain the young until they can provide for themselves. We see lower creatures follow this rule. It is a law set by the infinitely wise Maker. In viviparous animals that eat grass, the union between male and female lasts only for the act of copulation. The mother's teat is enough to nourish the young until they can eat grass. The male only fathers them and does not concern himself with the mother or young, because he cannot help provide their food. In predatory animals the union lasts longer. The mother cannot easily support herself and feed many young by hunting alone. Hunting is more laborious and dangerous than grazing. The male's help is necessary to maintain their common family. The family cannot survive until the young can hunt for themselves without the joint care of both parents. The same is true for most birds. An exception is some domestic birds, where plenty of food excuses the male from feeding or caring for the brood. When the young need food in the nest, the male and female remain mates until the young can fly and fend for themselves.
Sect. 80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only reason, why the male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than other creatures, viz. because the female is capable of conceiving, and de facto is commonly with child again, and brings forth too a new birth, long before the former is out of a dependency for support on his parents help, and able to shift for himself, and has all the assistance is due to him from his parents: whereby the father, who is bound to take care for those he hath begot, is under an obligation to continue in conjugal society with the same woman longer than other creatures, whose young being able to subsist of themselves, before the time of procreation returns again, the conjugal bond dissolves of itself, and they are at liberty, till Hymen at his usual anniversary season summons them again to chuse new mates. Wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the great Creator, who having given to man foresight, and an ability to lay up for the future, as well as to supply the present necessity, hath made it necessary, that society of man and wife should be more lasting, than of male and female amongst other creatures; that so their industry might be encouraged, and their interest better united, to make provision and lay up goods for their common issue, which uncertain mixture, or easy and frequent solutions of conjugal society would mightily disturb.
80. I think this is the main, if not the only, reason men and women remain together longer than other animals. Women can become pregnant and often are pregnant again soon. They may give birth again long before their older child is independent or can support himself. The child also has not yet received all the help it needs from its parents. Because the father must care for the children he has begotten, he is obliged to remain in conjugal society with the same woman for longer than among other creatures. In many animals the young can feed themselves before the next mating season. Then the mating bond dissolves by itself. They are free to choose new mates until Hymen calls them again at his usual annual season. One cannot help but admire the wisdom of the great Creator. He gave humans foresight and the ability to save for the future as well as to meet present needs. He made the society of husband and wife more lasting than the pairing of animals. This encourages industry and unites parents’ interests. It helps them provide and save for their common offspring. Casual unions or easy, frequent dissolutions of marriage would greatly disturb this.
Sect. 81. But tho’ these are ties upon mankind, which make the conjugal bonds more firm and lasting in man, than the other species of animals; yet it would give one reason to enquire, why this compact, where procreation and education are secured, and inheritance taken care for, may not be made determinable, either by consent, or at a certain time, or upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts, there being no necessity in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it should always be for life; I mean, to such as are under no restraint of any positive law, which ordains all such contracts to be perpetual.
81. These are ties upon mankind that make the conjugal bond firmer and more lasting in man than in other species of animals. Yet they would give one reason to ask a question. Where procreation and education are secured, and inheritance is provided for, why may this compact not be made terminable like any other voluntary compact? Why may it not end by consent, or at a certain time, or upon certain conditions? For there is no necessity, in the nature of the thing or in its ends, that it should always be for life. I mean for those who are under no restraint of any positive law that ordains all such contracts to be perpetual.
Sect. 82. But the husband and wife, though they have but one common concern, yet having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it therefore being necessary that the last determination, i. e. the rule, should be placed somewhere; it naturally falls to the man’s share, as the abler and the stronger. But this reaching but to the things of their common interest and property, leaves the wife in the full and free possession of what by contract is her peculiar right, and gives the husband no more power over her life than she has over his; the power of the husband being so far from that of an absolute monarch, that the wife has in many cases a liberty to separate from him, where natural right, or their contract allows it; whether that contract be made by themselves in the state of nature, or by the customs or laws of the country they live in; and the children upon such separation fall to the father or mother’s lot, as such contract does determine.
82. Husband and wife have but one common concern. Yet since they have different understandings, they will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too. So it is necessary that the final decision, that is, the rule, be placed somewhere. It naturally falls to the man's share, as the abler and the stronger. But this reaches only to the things of their common interest and property. It leaves the wife in full and free possession of what by contract is her own particular right. And it gives the husband no more power over her life than she has over his. The power of the husband is so far from that of an absolute monarch that the wife in many cases has a liberty to separate from him, where natural right or their contract allows it. That contract may be made by themselves in the state of nature, or by the customs or laws of the country they live in. Upon such separation the children fall to the father's or mother's lot, as that contract determines.
Sect. 83. For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under politic government, as well as in the state of nature, the civil magistrate doth not abridge the right or power of either naturally necessary to those ends, viz. procreation and mutual support and assistance whilst they are together; but only decides any controversy that may arise between man and wife about them. If it were otherwise, and that absolute sovereignty and power of life and death naturally belonged to the husband, and were necessary to the society between man and wife, there could be no matrimony in any of those countries where the husband is allowed no such absolute authority. But the ends of matrimony requiring no such power in the husband, the condition of conjugal society put it not in him, it being not at all necessary to that state. Conjugal society could subsist and attain its ends without it; nay, community of goods, and the power over them, mutual assistance and maintenance, and other things belonging to conjugal society, might be varied and regulated by that contract which unites man and wife in that society, as far as may consist with procreation and the bringing up of children till they could shift for themselves; nothing being necessary to any society, that is not necessary to the ends for which it is made.
83. All the ends of marriage are to be obtained under political government as well as in the state of nature. So the civil magistrate does not cut short the right or power of either spouse that is naturally necessary to those ends, namely procreation and mutual support and assistance while they are together. He only decides any dispute that may arise between man and wife about them. Suppose it were otherwise. Suppose absolute sovereignty and power of life and death naturally belonged to the husband, and were necessary to the society between man and wife. Then there could be no marriage in any of those countries where the husband is allowed no such absolute authority. But the ends of marriage require no such power in the husband. So the condition of conjugal society did not place it in him, since it is not at all necessary to that state. Conjugal society could exist and attain its ends without it. Indeed, the contract that unites man and wife in that society might vary and regulate many things. These include community of goods (holding goods in common) and the power over them, mutual assistance and maintenance, and other things belonging to conjugal society. This holds as far as it is consistent with procreation and with bringing up the children until they can fend for themselves. For nothing is necessary to any society that is not necessary to the ends for which it is made.
Sect. 84. The society betwixt parents and children, and the distinct rights and powers belonging respectively to them, I have treated of so largely, in the foregoing chapter, that I shall not here need to say any thing of it. And I think it is plain, that it is far different from a politic society.
84. In the previous chapter I fully treated the society between parents and children. I explained the distinct rights and powers of each, so I need not say anything about it here. I think it is plain that it is very different from a political society.
Sect. 85. Master and servant are names as old as history, but given to those of far different condition; for a freeman makes himself a servant to another, by selling him, for a certain time, the service he undertakes to do, in exchange for wages he is to receive: and though this commonly puts him into the family of his master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof; yet it gives the master but a temporary power over him, and no greater than what is contained in the contract between them. But there is another sort of servants, which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who being captives taken in a just war, are by the right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. These men having, as I say, forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties, and lost their estates; and being in the state of slavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society; the chief end whereof is the preservation of property.
85. Master and servant are names as old as history. They refer to people in very different conditions. A freeman can make himself a servant to another. He does this by selling, for a set time, the service he agrees to perform in exchange for wages. This often puts him into his master's household and under its ordinary discipline. But it gives the master only temporary power over him. That power is no greater than what is written in their contract. There is another kind of servant called a slave. These are captives taken in a just war. By the right of nature they are subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. These men, as I said, have forfeited their lives and, with them, their liberties. They have also lost their estates. Being in slavery, they cannot hold property. In that state they cannot be considered part of civil society. The chief end of civil society is the preservation of property.
Sect. 86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family with all these subordinate relations of wife, children, servants, and slaves, united under the domestic rule of a family; which, what resemblance soever it may have in its order, offices, and number too, with a little commonwealth, yet is very far from it, both in its constitution, power and end: or if it must be thought a monarchy, and the paterfamilias the absolute monarch in it, absolute monarchy will have but a very shattered and short power, when it is plain, by what has been said before, that the master of the family has a very distinct and differently limited power, both as to time and extent, over those several persons that are in it; for excepting the slave (and the family is as much a family, and his power as paterfamilias as great, whether there be any slaves in his family or no) he has no legislative power of life and death over any of them, and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he. And he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family, who has but a very limited one over every individual in it. But how a family, or any other society of men, differ from that which is properly political society, we shall best see, by considering wherein political society itself consists.
86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family with all these subordinate relations of wife, children, servants, and slaves, united under the domestic rule of a family. Whatever resemblance it may have to a little commonwealth in its order, offices, and even numbers, it is very far from one in its constitution, power, and end. Or if it must be thought a monarchy, and the paterfamilias its absolute monarch, absolute monarchy will have only a very shattered and limited power. For it is plain from what has been said that the master of the family has a very distinct and differently limited power, both in time and extent, over the several persons in it. Except for the slave, he has no legislative power of life and death over any of them. (And the family is as much a family, and his power as paterfamilias as great, whether or not there are any slaves in his family.) And he has no power but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he. He certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family when he has only a very limited one over every individual in it. But how a family, or any other society of men, differs from what is properly political society, we shall best see by considering what political society itself consists in.
Sect. 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires it. But because no political society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that society; there, and there only is political society, where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it. And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the society, with such penalties as the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, and who are not, in political society together. Those who are united into one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another: but those who have no such common appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each being, where there is no other, judge for himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before shewed it, the perfect state of nature.
87. A person is born, as has been shown, with a right to perfect freedom and uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature. This right is equal to that of any other person or group in the world. By nature he has the power not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty, and estate, against injuries and attempts by others. He also has the power to judge and punish breaches of that law in others as he thinks the offense deserves. He may even use death as punishment for crimes that he considers heinous enough. However, no political society can exist or continue without the power to preserve property. It must also be able to punish the offenses of all its members in order to do that. Political society exists only where each member has given up this natural power. Each member transfers it into the hands of the community in all cases that do not prevent him from appealing for protection to the law the community establishes. When private judgment by each individual is excluded, the community becomes the umpire. It decides by established, impartial rules that are the same for everyone. The community appoints people to enforce those rules. Those officers resolve disputes between members over any matter of right. They also punish offenses a member commits against the society, using the penalties the law has established. From this it is easy to tell who is, and who is not, in political society. Those who are united into one body and have a common, established law and courts to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies and punish offenders, are in civil society with one another. But those who have no such common appeal on earth remain in the state of nature. Where there is no other, each person is judge for himself and executioner. This, as I have shown before, is the true state of nature.
Sect. 88. And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of it, committed amongst the members of that society, (which is the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members, by any one that is not of it, (which is the power of war and peace;) and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society, as far as is possible. But though every man who has entered into civil society, and is become a member of any commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to punish offences, against the law of nature, in prosecution of his own private judgment, yet with the judgment of offences, which he has given up to the legislative in all cases, where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a right to the commonwealth to employ his force, for the execution of the judgments of the commonwealth, whenever he shall be called to it; which indeed are his own judgments, they being made by himself, or his representative. And herein we have the original of the legislative and executive power of civil society, which is to judge by standing laws, how far offences are to be punished, when committed within the commonwealth; and also to determine, by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be vindicated; and in both these to employ all the force of all the members, when there shall be need.
88. And so the commonwealth comes to have a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the various transgressions committed among its members that they think deserve it. This is the power of making laws. It also has the power to punish any injury done to any of its members by anyone not of it. This is the power of war and peace. And all this is for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society, as far as possible. Every man who has entered into civil society and become a member of a commonwealth has thereby given up his power to punish offences against the law of nature by his own private judgment. He has given up the judgment of offences to the legislative in all cases where he can appeal to the magistrate. But along with it he has given the commonwealth a right to employ his force to carry out its judgments whenever he is called on. And these indeed are his own judgments, since they are made by himself or his representative. Here we have the origin of the legislative and executive power of civil society. This power is to judge by standing laws how far offences committed within the commonwealth are to be punished. It is also to determine, by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the case, how far injuries from outside are to be redressed. And in both of these it may employ all the force of all the members, when there is need.
Sect. 89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political, or civil society. And this is done, where-ever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme government; or else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for hereby he authorizes the society, or which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the society shall require; to the execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a commonwealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controversies, and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature.
89. Wherever any number of men are united into one society by giving up their individual executive power under the law of nature and handing it to the public, there and only there is a political or civil society. This happens when people in the state of nature come together to form one people, one body politic under one supreme government. It also happens when someone joins and becomes part of an existing government. By doing this he authorizes the society, that is, its legislature, to make laws for him as the public good requires. He must help enforce those laws, just as he would enforce his own decisions. This change moves people out of the state of nature into a commonwealth. It sets up a judge on earth with authority to decide disputes and to remedy injuries suffered by any member of the commonwealth. That judge is the legislature, or the magistrates it appoints. Wherever any group of people, however associated, has no such final authority to appeal to, they remain in the state of nature.
Sect. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil-government at all: for the end of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man’s being judge in his own case, by setting up a known authority, to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise, and which every one of the society ought to obey;* where-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to appeal to, for the decision of any difference between them, there those persons are still in the state of nature; and so is every absolute prince, in respect of those who are under his dominion.
90. It is clear, then, that absolute monarchy cannot exist within civil society. Some people call it the only true government. It is inconsistent with civil society and so cannot be a form of civil government. The purpose of civil society is to prevent and remedy the problems of the state of nature. These problems come from each person being judge in their own case. Civil society sets up a known authority that anyone in it can appeal to. People can appeal when they suffer an injury or when a dispute arises. Everyone in the society ought to obey that authority.* Wherever people do not have such an authority to decide their differences, they remain in the state of nature. An absolute prince is in that same situation toward those under his rule.
(*The public power of all society is above every soul contained in the same society; and the principal use of that power is, to give laws unto all that are under it, which laws in such cases we must obey, unless there be reason shewed which may necessarily inforce, that the law of reason, or of God, doth enjoin the contrary, Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 16.)
(*The public power of all society is above every soul contained in the same society. The principal use of that power is to give laws to all who are under it. In such cases we must obey those laws, unless a reason is shown which necessarily proves that the law of reason, or of God, commands the contrary, Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 16.)
Sect. 91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and executive power in himself alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with authority decide, and from whose decision relief and redress may be expected of any injury or inconviency, that may be suffered from the prince, or by his order: so that such a man, however intitled, Czar, or Grand Seignior, or how you please, is as much in the state of nature, with all under his dominion, as he is with the rest of mankind: for where-ever any two men are, who have no standing rule, and common judge to appeal to on earth, for the determination of controversies of right betwixt them, there they are still in the state of* nature, and under all the inconveniencies of it, with only this woful difference to the subject, or rather slave of an absolute prince: that whereas, in the ordinary state of nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, and according to the best of his power, to maintain it; now, whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only no appeal, as those in society ought to have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of rational creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend his right; and so is exposed to all the misery and inconveniencies, that a man can fear from one, who being in the unrestrained state of nature, is yet corrupted with flattery, and armed with power.
91. For he is supposed to have all power, both legislative and executive, in himself alone. So there is no judge to be found, and no appeal open to anyone, who may fairly, impartially, and with authority decide. There is no one from whose decision relief and redress may be expected for any injury or inconvenience suffered from the prince or by his order. So such a man, whatever his title, Czar or Grand Seignior or whatever you please, is as much in the state of nature with all under his dominion as he is with the rest of mankind. For wherever any two men have no standing rule and common judge on earth to appeal to for deciding controversies of right between them, they are still in the state of* nature. They are under all its inconveniences, with only this woeful difference to the subject, or rather slave, of an absolute prince. In the ordinary state of nature he has a liberty to judge of his right and to maintain it as best he can. But now, whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has no appeal, as those in society ought to have. More than that, as if he were degraded from the common state of rational creatures, he is denied a liberty to judge of or to defend his right. And so he is exposed to all the misery and inconveniences that a man can fear from one who is in the unrestrained state of nature, yet is corrupted with flattery and armed with power.
(*To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs, i.e. such as attend men in the state of nature, there was no way but only by growing into composition and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some kind of govemment public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govem, by them the peace, tranquillity and happy estate of the rest might be procured. Men always knew that where force and injury was offered, they might be defenders of themselves; they knew that however men may seek their own commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others, it was not to be suffered, but by all men, and all good means to be withstood. Finally, they knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his own right, and according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof, in as much as every man is towards himself, and them whom he greatly affects, partial; and therefore that strifes and troubles would be endless, except they gave their common consent, all to be ordered by some, whom they should agree upon, without which consent there would be no reason that one man should take upon him to be lord or judge over another, Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
(*To remove all such mutual grievances, injuries, and wrongs. These are the harms that attend people in the state of nature. There was no way to do this except by forming a compact and agreement among themselves. They had to establish some kind of public government and submit to it. By granting authority to rulers, they expected those rulers to secure the peace, tranquility, and well-being of the rest. People always knew that when force or injury was threatened, they could defend themselves. They also knew that people may pursue private gain. But if they do so by harming others, it must not be permitted. Everyone should resist such harm by all proper means. Finally, they understood that no one can reasonably judge his own rights and then enforce that judgment. Each person is partial to himself and to those he deeply cares for. Therefore disputes would be endless unless everyone gave their common consent to be ordered by some agreed authority. Without that consent there was no reason for one man to set himself up as lord or judge over another. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. 10.)
Sect. 92. For he that thinks absolute power purifies men’s blood, and corrects the baseness of human nature, need read but the history of this, or any other age, to be convinced of the contrary. He that would have been insolent and injurious in the woods of America, would not probably be much better in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion shall be found out to justify all that he shall do to his subjects, and the sword presently silence all those that dare question it: for what the protection of absolute monarchy is, what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to be and to what a degree of happiness and security it carries civil society, where this sort of government is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late relation of Ceylon, may easily see.
92. Anyone who thinks absolute power purifies men's blood and corrects the baseness of human nature need only read the history of this or any other age to be convinced of the contrary. A man who would have been insolent and injurious in the woods of America would probably not be much better on a throne. There perhaps learning and religion will be found to justify all he does to his subjects, and the sword will at once silence all who dare question it. Anyone who looks into the recent account of Ceylon may easily see what the protection of absolute monarchy is. He will see what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes. And he will see to what a degree of happiness and security it carries civil society where this sort of government has grown to perfection.
Sect. 93. In absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other governments of the world, the subjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any controversies, and restrain any violence that may happen betwixt the subjects themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks necessary, and believes he deserves to be thought a declared enemy to society and mankind, who should go about to take it away. But whether this be from a true love of mankind and society, and such a charity as we owe all one to another, there is reason to doubt: for this is no more than what every man, who loves his own power, profit, or greatness, may and naturally must do, keep those animals from hurting, or destroying one another, who labour and drudge only for his pleasure and advantage; and so are taken care of, not out of any love the master has for them, but love of himself, and the profit they bring him: for if it be asked, what security, what fence is there, in such a state, against the violence and oppression of this absolute ruler? the very question can scarce be borne. They are ready to tell you, that it deserves death only to ask after safety. Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant, there must be measures, laws and judges, for their mutual peace and security: but as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is above all such circumstances; because he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is right when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury, on that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the voice of faction and rebellion: as if when men quitting the state of nature entered into society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the restraint of laws, but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state of nature, increased with power, and made licentious by impunity. This is to think, that men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions.
93. In absolute monarchies, as in other governments, subjects have access to the law and to judges. These judges decide disputes and restrain violence between the subjects. Everyone thinks this necessary. They believe anyone who tries to take this away deserves to be called an enemy of society and of mankind. But whether this comes from a true love of humanity and society, and from the duty of charity we owe one another, is doubtful. For this is only what any person who loves power, profit, or greatness will and naturally must do. They will keep those creatures from hurting or destroying one another. Those creatures labor and toil only for that person's pleasure and advantage. They are cared for not out of any love the master has for them, but out of love for himself and for the profit they bring. If one asks what security or protection there is in such a state against the violence and oppression of this absolute ruler, the question is hardly tolerated. They will tell you that asking for safety deserves death. They admit there must be laws and judges to ensure peace and security among subjects. But they say the ruler must be absolute and above such restraints. Because he can do greater harm, they claim what he does is right. To ask how you can be protected from harm or injury by the strongest hand is immediately called the voice of faction and rebellion. They act as if, when people left the state of nature and entered society, they agreed that all but one would be bound by laws. That one, they say, should keep all the liberties of the state of nature. He would also gain power and become lawless because of impunity. This assumes people are so foolish that they guard against the mischief of pole-cats or foxes. Yet they are content, even consider it safe, to be devoured by lions.
Sect. 94. But whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people’s understandings, it hinders not men from feeling; and when they perceive, that any man, in what station soever, is out of the bounds of the civil society which they are of, and that they have no appeal on earth against any harm, they may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the state of nature, in respect of him whom they find to be so; and to take care, as soon as they can, to have that safety and security in civil society, for which it was first instituted, and for which only they entered into it. And therefore, though perhaps at first, (as shall be shewed more at large hereafter in the following part of this discourse) some one good and excellent man having got a pre-eminency amongst the rest, had this deference paid to his goodness and virtue, as to a kind of natural authority, that the chief rule, with arbitration of their differences, by a tacit consent devolved into his hands, without any other caution, but the assurance they had of his uprightness and wisdom; yet when time, giving authority, and (as some men would persuade us) sacredness of customs, which the negligent, and unforeseeing innocence of the first ages began, had brought in successors of another stamp, the people finding their properties not secure under the government, as then it was, (whereas government has no other end but the preservation of* property) could never be safe nor at rest, nor think themselves in civil society, till the legislature was placed in collective bodies of men, call them senate, parliament, or what you please. By which means every single person became subject, equally with other the meanest men, to those laws, which he himself, as part of the legislative, had established; nor could any one, by his own authority; avoid the force of the law, when once made; nor by any pretence of superiority plead exemption, thereby to license his own, or the miscarriages of any of his dependents.** No man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it: for if any man may do what he thinks fit, and there be no appeal on earth, for redress or security against any harm he shall do; I ask, whether he be not perfectly still in the state of nature, and so can be no part or member of that civil society; unless any one will say, the state of nature and civil society are one and the same thing, which I have never yet found any one so great a patron of anarchy as to affirm.
94. But no matter what flatterers say to please people's minds, that does not stop them from feeling. When they see that anyone, whatever their rank, is outside the bounds of the civil society they belong to, and that there is no appeal on earth against any harm he may do, they tend to consider themselves in the state of nature in relation to that person. They then try, as soon as they can, to secure the safety and protection in civil society for which it was first established and for which they entered it. Therefore, perhaps at first (as I will explain more fully later in this discourse) one good and excellent man rose above the rest. People paid deference to his goodness and virtue as a kind of natural authority. By tacit consent the chief rule and the arbitration of disputes passed into his hands. They did this without other safeguards, trusting his uprightness and wisdom. But over time authority grew, and, as some would persuade us, the sacredness of custom developed. The careless and short-sighted innocence of those first ages began customs that brought in successors of a different stamp. When the people found their property was not secure under that government as it then stood, they could never be safe or at rest. Government has no other end but the preservation of *property. They did not think themselves in civil society until the legislature was placed in collective bodies of men, whether you call them a senate, a parliament, or what you please. This made every single person subject, equally with the humblest man, to the laws which he himself, as part of the legislative, had helped establish. No one, by his own authority, could avoid the force of the law once it was made. Nor could anyone plead exemption by claiming superiority, thereby licensing his own faults or the miscarriages of any of his dependents. ** No man in civil society can be exempted from its laws. If any man may do as he thinks fit and there is no appeal on earth for redress or security against the harm he does, I ask whether he is not still in the state of nature. If he is, he can be no part or member of that civil society. Unless anyone will say the state of nature and civil society are one and the same thing, which I have never yet found anyone so great a patron of anarchy as to affirm.
(*At the first, when some certain kind of regiment was once appointed, it may be that nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of goveming, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion, which were to rule, till by experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy, did indeed but increase the sore, which it should have cured. They saw, that to live by one man’s will, became the cause of all men’s misery. This constrained them to come unto laws, wherein all men might see their duty beforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing them. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
(*At first, after a particular form of government was established, people may not have thought further about how to govern. They left matters to the judgment and discretion of those who ruled. By experience they found this approach very inconvenient in every way. What they meant as a remedy only made the problem worse. They saw that living by one man’s will became the cause of everyone’s misery. This forced them to create laws. Laws allowed everyone to know their duties beforehand and to learn the punishments for breaking them. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. 10.)
(**Civil law being the act of the whole body politic, doth therefore over-rule each several part of the same body. Hooker, ibid.)
(**Civil law is the act of the whole body politic. It therefore overrules each separate part of that body. Hooker, ibid.)