Sect. 52. IT may perhaps be censured as an impertinent criticism, in a discourse of this nature, to find fault with words and names, that have obtained in the world: and yet possibly it may not be amiss to offer new ones, when the old are apt to lead men into mistakes, as this of paternal power probably has done, which seems so to place the power of parents over their children wholly in the father, as if the mother had no share in it; whereas, if we consult reason or revelation, we shall find, she hath an equal title. This may give one reason to ask, whether this might not be more properly called parental power? for whatever obligation nature and the right of generation lays on children, it must certainly bind them equal to both the concurrent causes of it. And accordingly we see the positive law of God every where joins them together, without distinction, when it commands the obedience of children, Honour thy father and thy mother, Exod. xx. 12. Whosoever curseth his father or his mother, Lev. xx. 9. Ye shall fear every man his mother and his father, Lev. xix. 3. Children, obey your parents, &c. Eph. vi. 1. is the stile of the Old and New Testament.
52. Some may call it an impertinent criticism in a discussion like this to object to established words and names. Still, it can be useful to suggest new ones when the old terms tend to mislead people. The phrase "paternal power" probably does this. It seems to place the parents' power over their children entirely in the father. It treats the mother as if she had no share. If we consult reason or revelation, we find she has an equal claim. This suggests asking whether the term "parental power" would be more appropriate. Whatever obligation nature and the right of generation impose on children must bind them equally to both parents. Both parents are the joint causes of their existence. Accordingly, we see that God's positive law always names father and mother together when commanding children's obedience. "Honor your father and your mother," Exod. xx. 12. "Whoever curses his father or his mother," Lev. xx. 9. "Every person shall respect his mother and his father," Lev. xix. 3. "Children, obey your parents," Eph. vi. 1. This is the language of both the Old and New Testaments.
Sect. 53. Had but this one thing been well considered, without looking any deeper into the matter, it might perhaps have kept men from running into those gross mistakes, they have made, about this power of parents; which, however it might, without any great harshness, bear the name of absolute dominion, and regal authority, when under the title of paternal power it seemed appropriated to the father, would yet have founded but oddly, and in the very name shewn the absurdity, if this supposed absolute power over children had been called parental; and thereby have discovered, that it belonged to the mother too: for it will but very ill serve the turn of those men, who contend so much for the absolute power and authority of the fatherhood, as they call it, that the mother should have any share in it; and it would have but ill supported the monarchy they contend for, when by the very name it appeared, that that fundamental authority, from whence they would derive their government of a single person only, was not placed in one, but two persons jointly. But to let this of names pass.
53. Had this one thing alone been well considered, without looking any deeper into the matter, it might perhaps have kept men from running into the gross mistakes they have made about this power of parents. While it went under the title of paternal power and seemed to belong to the father, it might bear the name of absolute dominion and regal authority without sounding very harsh. But it would have sounded odd, and the very name would have shown the absurdity, if this supposed absolute power over children had been called parental. That would have revealed that it belonged to the mother too. For it will serve very badly the purpose of those men who argue so hard for the absolute power and authority of the fatherhood, as they call it, that the mother should have any share in it. And it would give poor support to the monarchy they argue for, if the very name showed that the fundamental authority from which they would derive their government by a single person was placed not in one person but in two jointly. But let this matter of names pass.
Sect. 54. Though I have said above, Chap. II. That all men by nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality: age or virtue may give men a just precedency: excellency of parts and merit may place others above the common level: birth may subject some, and alliance or benefits others, to pay an observance to those to whom nature, gratitude, or other respects, may have made it due: and yet all this consists with the equality, which all men are in, in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one over another; which was the equality I there spoke of, as proper to the business in hand, being that equal right, that every man hath, to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man.
54. Though I said above, Chap. II, that all men by nature are equal, I do not mean every sort of equality. Age or virtue may rightly give some people precedence. Superior parts and merit may place others above the common level. Birth may oblige some to show deference to others. Alliances or benefits may oblige others to show respect to those whom nature, gratitude, or other reasons make it due. Yet all this is consistent with the equality that all men have in relation to jurisdiction or dominion over one another. That was the equality I spoke of there, and it is the one relevant to this matter. It is the equal right that every person has to their natural freedom, without being subject to the will or authority of any other person.
Sect. 55. Children, I confess, are not born in this full state of equality, though they are born to it. Their parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction over them, when they come into the world, and for some time after; but it is but a temporary one. The bonds of this subjection are like the swaddling clothes they are wrapt up in, and supported by, in the weakness of their infancy: age and reason as they grow up, loosen them, till at length they drop quite off, and leave a man at his own free disposal.
55. I admit that children are not born fully equal, though they are born with a right to equality. When they are born, their parents have a kind of authority and jurisdiction over them. This authority lasts for a time, but it is only temporary. The ties of this subjection are like the swaddling clothes that wrap and support them in the weakness of infancy. As they grow, age and reason loosen those ties. They eventually fall away and leave the person free to act for himself.
Sect. 56. Adam was created a perfect man, his body and mind in full possession of their strength and reason, and so was capable, from the first instant of his being to provide for his own support and preservation, and govern his actions according to the dictates of the law of reason which God had implanted in him. From him the world is peopled with his descendants, who are all born infants, weak and helpless, without knowledge or understanding: but to supply the defects of this imperfect state, till the improvement of growth and age hath removed them, Adam and Eve, and after them all parents were, by the law of nature, under an obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate the children they had begotten; not as their own workmanship, but the workmanship of their own maker, the Almighty, to whom they were to be accountable for them.
56. Adam was created a perfect man. His body and mind were in full possession of their strength and reason. He was therefore able, from the first instant of his existence, to provide for his own support and preservation. He could govern his actions by the law of reason God had implanted in him. From Adam the world has been filled with descendants. They are all born infants, weak and helpless, without knowledge or understanding. To make up for these defects until growth and age correct them. Adam and Eve had this duty. After them, all parents did too. The law of nature obliged parents to preserve, nourish, and educate their children. The children were not the parents' workmanship. They were the workmanship of their maker, the Almighty, to whom parents are accountable.
Sect. 57. The law, that was to govern Adam, was the same that was to govern all his posterity, the law of reason. But his offspring having another way of entrance into the world, different from him, by a natural birth, that produced them ignorant and without the use of reason, they were not presently under that law; for no body can be under a law, which is not promulgated to him; and this law being promulgated or made known by reason only, he that is not come to the use of his reason, cannot be said to be under this law; and Adam’s children, being not presently as soon as born under this law of reason, were not presently free: for law, in its true notion, is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes no farther than is for the general good of those under that law: could they be happier without it, the law, as an useless thing, would of itself vanish; and that ill deserves the name of confinement which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices. So that, however it may be mistaken, the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom: for in all the states of created beings capable of laws, where there is no law, there is no freedom: for liberty is, to be free from restraint and violence from others; which cannot be, where there is no law: but freedom is not, as we are told, a liberty for every man to do what he lists: (for who could be free, when every other man’s humour might domineer over him?) but a liberty to dispose, and order as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole property, within the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.
57. The law that governed Adam was the same law that governed all his descendants. It was the law of reason. But his children entered the world in a different way from him. They were born naturally, ignorant and without the use of reason. So they were not immediately under that law. No one can be under a law that has not been made known to them. This law is made known only by reason. A person who has not come to the use of reason cannot be said to be under this law. Adam’s children, not immediately under this law of reason at birth, were not immediately free. Law, in its true sense, is not chiefly a limit. It is a direction for a free and intelligent person toward their proper interest. It prescribes only what is for the general good of those under it. If people could be happier without it, the law, as something useless, would disappear on its own. A restriction that only keeps us away from bogs and precipices hardly deserves the name of confinement. So, whatever people may think, the purpose of law is not to abolish or restrain freedom. Its purpose is to preserve and enlarge freedom. In every society of beings capable of law, where there is no law, there is no freedom. Liberty means being free from restraint and violence by others. That cannot exist where there is no law. Freedom is not, as some say, a liberty for each person to do whatever they please. Who could be free if every other person’s humour might dominate them? True freedom is the liberty to manage and order one’s person, actions, possessions, and whole property as one wishes. This is within the limits of the laws under which one lives. It means not being subject to another’s arbitrary will, but freely following one’s own.
Sect. 58. The power, then, that parents have over their children, arises from that duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their off-spring, during the imperfect state of childhood. To inform the mind, and govern the actions of their yet ignorant nonage, till reason shall take its place, and ease them of that trouble, is what the children want, and the parents are bound to: for God having given man an understanding to direct his actions, has allowed him a freedom of will, and liberty of acting, as properly belonging thereunto, within the bounds of that law he is under. But whilst he is in an estate, wherein he has not understanding of his own to direct his will, he is not to have any will of his own to follow: he that understands for him, must will for him too; he must prescribe to his will, and regulate his actions; but when he comes to the estate that made his father a freeman, the son is a freeman too.
58. The authority parents have over their children comes from their duty to care for them during childhood. They must inform the child's mind and guide their actions while the child is still ignorant. This continues until reason develops and relieves the parents of that burden. Children need this care, and parents are bound to provide it. God gave humans understanding to direct their actions. He also gave them freedom of will and liberty to act within the law they are under. But while a person is in a condition where they lack understanding to guide their own will, they should not have a will of their own to follow. Whoever understands for them must will for them as well. That person must decide for them and regulate their actions. When the child reaches the same condition that made his father a free man, the child is free too.
Sect. 59. This holds in all the laws a man is under, whether natural or civil. Is a man under the law of nature? What made him free of that law? what gave him a free disposing of his property, according to his own will, within the compass of that law? I answer, a state of maturity wherein he might be supposed capable to know that law, that so he might keep his actions within the bounds of it. When he has acquired that state, he is presumed to know how far that law is to be his guide, and how far he may make use of his freedom, and so comes to have it; till then, some body else must guide him, who is presumed to know how far the law allows a liberty. If such a state of reason, such an age of discretion made him free, the same shall make his son free too. Is a man under the law of England? What made him free of that law? that is, to have the liberty to dispose of his actions and possessions according to his own will, within the permission of that law? A capacity of knowing that law; which is supposed by that law, at the age of one and twenty years, and in some cases sooner. If this made the father free, it shall make the son free too. Till then we see the law allows the son to have no will, but he is to be guided by the will of his father or guardian, who is to understand for him. And if the father die, and fail to substitute a deputy in his trust; if he hath not provided a tutor, to govern his son, during his minority, during his want of understanding, the law takes care to do it; some other must govern him, and be a will to him, till he hath attained to a state of freedom, and his understanding be fit to take the government of his will. But after that, the father and son are equally free as much as tutor and pupil after nonage; equally subjects of the same law together, without any dominion left in the father over the life, liberty, or estate of his son, whether they be only in the state and under the law of nature, or under the positive laws of an established government.
59. This is true for every law a person is subject to, whether natural or civil. Is a man under the law of nature? What makes him free under that law? What gives him the right to manage his property as he wishes, within that law’s limits? I answer: reaching a mature state in which he can be expected to know that law, so he can keep his actions within its bounds. Once he has reached that state, he is presumed to know how far the law should guide him and how far he may use his freedom, so he acquires that freedom. Until then, someone else must guide him, someone presumed to know how far the law allows liberty. If this state of reason, this age of discretion, made him free, the same will make his son free too. Is a man under the law of England? What makes him free under that law, that is, able to dispose of his actions and possessions by his own will within the law’s permission? A capacity to know that law. The law assumes this capacity at the age of twenty-one years, and in some cases earlier. If this made the father free, it makes the son free as well. Until then, the law allows the son to have no will of his own. He must be guided by the will of his father or guardian, who understands for him. If the father dies and fails to appoint a deputy in his trust, if he has not provided a tutor to govern his son during his minority, the law steps in to provide care. Someone else must govern him and act as his will until he reaches freedom and his understanding is fit to govern his will. After that, father and son are equally free, just as tutor and pupil are after majority. They are equally subject to the same law, with no dominion left in the father over the life, liberty, or estate of his son. This is true whether they are only in the state and under the law of nature, or under the positive laws of an established government.
Sect. 60. But if, through defects that may happen out of the ordinary course of nature, any one comes not to such a degree of reason, wherein he might be supposed capable of knowing the law, and so living within the rules of it, he is never capable of being a free man, he is never let loose to the disposure of his own will (because he knows no bounds to it, has not understanding, its proper guide) but is continued under the tuition and government of others, all the time his own understanding is uncapable of that charge. And so lunatics and ideots are never set free from the government of their parents;
60. But if a person has defects that arise outside the normal course of nature, they may never reach the reason needed to know the law. If they cannot know the law, they cannot live by its rules and cannot be a free person. They are not left to dispose of their own will. They have no understanding to guide them, so they know no bounds to their will. Instead, they remain under the care and authority of others while their understanding cannot bear that responsibility. Thus lunatics and idiots are never set free from their parents' authority.
children, who are not as yet come unto those years whereat they may have; and innocents which are excluded by a natural defect from ever having; thirdly, madmen, which for the present cannot possibly have the use of right reason to guide themselves, have for their guide, the reason that guideth other men which are tutors over them, to seek and procure their good for them,
Children, who have not yet reached the age at which they can use reason. And innocents, who are by natural defect prevented from ever using it. Thirdly, madmen, who at present cannot possibly use right reason to guide themselves. They are guided by the reason that guides other men who act as their tutors. Those tutors are to seek and procure the good for them.
says Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sec. 7. All which seems no more than that duty, which God and nature has laid on man, as well as other creatures, to preserve their offspring, till they can be able to shift for themselves, and will scarce amount to an instance or proof of parents regal authority.
Hooker says this in Eccl. Pol., book i, section 7. All of it seems to mean only the duty God and nature have placed on humans and other creatures. That duty is to preserve their offspring until they can provide for themselves. It will hardly amount to proof of parents' regal authority.
Sect. 61. Thus we are born free, as we are born rational; not that we have actually the exercise of either: age, that brings one, brings with it the other too. And thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to parents may consist together, and are both founded on the same principle. A child is free by his father’s title, by his father’s understanding, which is to govern him till he hath it of his own. The freedom of a man at years of discretion, and the subjection of a child to his parents, whilst yet short of that age, are so consistent, and so distinguishable, that the most blinded contenders for monarchy, by right of fatherhood, cannot miss this difference; the most obstinate cannot but allow their consistency: for were their doctrine all true, were the right heir of Adam now known, and by that title settled a monarch in his throne, invested with all the absolute unlimited power Sir Robert Filmer talks of; if he should die as soon as his heir were born, must not the child, notwithstanding he were never so free, never so much sovereign, be in subjection to his mother and nurse, to tutors and governors, till age and education brought him reason and ability to govern himself and others? The necessities of his life, the health of his body, and the information of his mind, would require him to be directed by the will of others, and not his own; and yet will any one think, that this restraint and subjection were inconsistent with, or spoiled him of that liberty or sovereignty he had a right to, or gave away his empire to those who had the government of his nonage? This government over him only prepared him the better and sooner for it. If any body should ask me, when my son is of age to be free? I shall answer, just when his monarch is of age to govern. But at what time, says the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 6. a man may be said to have attained so far forth the use of reason, as sufficeth to make him capable of those laws whereby he is then bound to guide his actions: this is a great deal more easy for sense to discern, than for any one by skill and learning to determine.
61. Thus we are born free, as we are born rational. Not that we actually have the use of either at birth. Age, which brings one, brings the other with it too. And so we see how natural freedom and subjection to parents may exist together. Both are founded on the same principle. A child is free by his father's title, by his father's understanding, which is to govern him until he has understanding of his own. The freedom of a man at years of discretion, and the subjection of a child to his parents while he is still short of that age, are so consistent and so distinguishable that even the most blinded defenders of monarchy by right of fatherhood cannot miss the difference. The most obstinate cannot help but allow that they are consistent. For suppose their doctrine were all true. Suppose the right heir of Adam were now known, and by that title settled as a monarch on his throne, invested with all the absolute, unlimited power Sir Robert Filmer talks of. If he died as soon as his heir was born, must not the child be in subjection to his mother and nurse, to tutors and governors? This would hold however free and however sovereign he was, until age and education brought him reason and ability to govern himself and others. The necessities of his life, the health of his body, and the instruction of his mind would require him to be directed by the will of others and not his own. Yet will anyone think that this restraint and subjection was inconsistent with the liberty or sovereignty he had a right to? Or that it robbed him of it, or gave away his empire to those who governed him in his minority? This government over him only prepared him better and sooner for it. If anybody should ask me when my son is of age to be free, I shall answer: just when his monarch is of age to govern. But at what time, says the judicious Hooker (Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 6), may a man be said to have attained so much use of reason as suffices to make him capable of those laws by which he is then bound to guide his actions? This is much easier for sense to discern than for anyone to determine by skill and learning.
Sect. 62. Common-wealths themselves take notice of, and allow, that there is a time when men are to begin to act like free men, and therefore till that time require not oaths of fealty, or allegiance, or other public owning of, or submission to the government of their countries.
62. Commonwealths themselves recognize and admit that there is a time when people should begin to act as free individuals. Therefore, until that time they do not require oaths of fealty or allegiance. They also do not require other public acknowledgment of, or submission to, the government of their countries.
Sect. 63. The freedom then of man, and liberty of acting according to his own will, is grounded on his having reason, which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will. To turn him loose to an unrestrained liberty, before he has reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free; but to thrust him out amongst brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much beneath that of a man, as their’s. This is that which puts the authority into the parents hands to govern the minority of their children. God hath made it their business to employ this care on their offspring, and hath placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness and concern to temper this power, to apply it, as his wisdom designed it, to the children’s good, as long as they should need to be under it.
63. A person's freedom and the liberty to act according to his own will are founded on reason. Reason teaches him the law by which he should govern himself. It also shows him how far he is left to the freedom of his own will. Letting him loose into unrestrained freedom before reason guides him is not granting him his natural right to be free. It is throwing him out among brutes and abandoning him to a state as wretched and as far beneath that of a human as theirs is. This is what gives parents the authority to govern their children while they are minors. God has made it their duty to provide this care for their offspring. He has placed in them natural inclinations of tenderness and concern to temper their authority. They should apply it, as his wisdom intended, for the children's good, for as long as the children need to be under it.
Sect. 64. But what reason can hence advance this care of the parents due to their off-spring into an absolute arbitrary dominion of the father, whose power reaches no farther, than by such a discipline, as he finds most effectual, to give such strength and health to their bodies, such vigour and rectitude to their minds, as may best fit his children to be most useful to themselves and others; and, if it be necessary to his condition, to make them work, when they are able, for their own subsistence. But in this power the mother too has her share with the father.
64. But what reason can turn this parental care owed to their offspring into an absolute, arbitrary dominion of the father? His authority goes no further than the discipline he finds most effective. That discipline should give their bodies strength and health. It should give their minds vigor and uprightness. The aim is to fit the children to be most useful to themselves and to others. If his condition requires it, he may make them work when they are able to provide for themselves. The mother also shares this power with the father.
Sect. 65. Nay, this power so little belongs to the father by any peculiar right of nature, but only as he is guardian of his children, that when he quits his care of them, he loses his power over them, which goes along with their nourishment and education, to which it is inseparably annexed; and it belongs as much to the foster-father of an exposed child, as to the natural father of another. So little power does the bare act of begetting give a man over his issue; if all his care ends there, and this be all the title he hath to the name and authority of a father. And what will become of this paternal power in that part of the world, where one woman hath more than one husband at a time? or in those parts of America, where, when the husband and wife part, which happens frequently, the children are all left to the mother, follow her, and are wholly under her care and provision? If the father die whilst the children are young, do they not naturally every where owe the same obedience to their mother, during their minority, as to their father were he alive? and will any one say, that the mother hath a legislative power over her children? that she can make standing rules, which shall be of perpetual obligation, by which they ought to regulate all the concerns of their property, and bound their liberty all the course of their lives? or can she inforce the observation of them with capital punishments? for this is the proper power of the magistrate, of which the father hath not so much as the shadow. His command over his children is but temporary, and reaches not their life or property: it is but a help to the weakness and imperfection of their nonage, a discipline necessary to their education: and though a father may dispose of his own possessions as he pleases, when his children are out of danger of perishing for want, yet his power extends not to the lives or goods, which either their own industry, or another’s bounty has made their’s; nor to their liberty neither, when they are once arrived to the infranchisement of the years of discretion. The father’s empire then ceases, and he can from thence forwards no more dispose of the liberty of his son, than that of any other man: and it must be far from an absolute or perpetual jurisdiction, from which a man may withdraw himself, having license from divine authority to leave father and mother, and cleave to his wife.
65. Indeed, this power belongs to the father so little by any special right of nature, and only as he is guardian of his children, that when he gives up his care of them, he loses his power over them. That power goes along with their nourishment and education, to which it is inseparably attached. And it belongs as much to the foster-father of an abandoned child as to the natural father of another. So little power does the bare act of begetting give a man over his offspring, if all his care ends there and this is all the title he has to the name and authority of a father. And what will become of this paternal power in that part of the world where one woman has more than one husband at a time? Or in those parts of America where husband and wife part, which happens frequently, and the children are all left to the mother, follow her, and are wholly under her care and provision? If the father dies while the children are young, do they not naturally, everywhere, owe the same obedience to their mother during their minority as to their father if he were alive? And will anyone say that the mother has a legislative power over her children? That she can make standing rules of perpetual obligation, by which they ought to regulate all the concerns of their property and bound their liberty for the whole course of their lives? Or can she enforce the observance of them with capital punishments? For this is the proper power of the magistrate, of which the father has not so much as the shadow. His command over his children is only temporary, and does not reach their life or property. It is only a help to the weakness and imperfection of their childhood, a discipline necessary to their education. A father may dispose of his own possessions as he pleases, once his children are out of danger of perishing from want. Yet his power does not extend to the lives or goods that either their own industry or another's generosity has made theirs. Nor does it extend to their liberty, once they have reached the freedom of the years of discretion. The father's rule then ends. From then on he can no more dispose of his son's liberty than that of any other man. And it must be far from an absolute or perpetual jurisdiction, since a man may withdraw himself from it, having permission from divine authority to leave father and mother and cleave to his wife.
Sect. 66. But though there be a time when a child comes to be as free from subjection to the will and command of his father, as the father himself is free from subjection to the will of any body else, and they are each under no other restraint, but that which is common to them both, whether it be the law of nature, or municipal law of their country; yet this freedom exempts not a son from that honour which he ought, by the law of God and nature, to pay his parents. God having made the parents instruments in his great design of continuing the race of mankind, and the occasions of life to their children; as he hath laid on them an obligation to nourish, preserve, and bring up their offspring; so he has laid on the children a perpetual obligation of honouring their parents, which containing in it an inward esteem and reverence to be shewn by all outward expressions, ties up the child from any thing that may ever injure or affront, disturb or endanger, the happiness or life of those from whom he received his; and engages him in all actions of defence, relief, assistance and comfort of those, by whose means he entered into being, and has been made capable of any enjoyments of life: from this obligation no state, no freedom can absolve children. But this is very far from giving parents a power of command over their children, or an authority to make laws and dispose as they please of their lives or liberties. It is one thing to owe honour, respect, gratitude and assistance; another to require an absolute obedience and submission. The honour due to parents, a monarch in his throne owes his mother; and yet this lessens not his authority, nor subjects him to her government.
66. There comes a time when a child is as free from subjection to the will and command of his father as the father himself is free from subjection to the will of anybody else. Each is then under no restraint but what is common to them both, whether it is the law of nature or the municipal law of their country. Yet this freedom does not exempt a son from the honour he ought to pay his parents by the law of God and nature. God made the parents instruments in his great design of continuing the race of mankind, and the source of life to their children. As he has laid on them an obligation to nourish, preserve, and bring up their offspring, so he has laid on the children a perpetual obligation to honour their parents. This honour contains an inward esteem and reverence, to be shown by all outward expressions. It restrains the child from anything that may ever injure or affront, disturb or endanger, the happiness or life of those from whom he received his own. It commits him to every act of defence, relief, assistance, and comfort toward those by whose means he came into being and was made capable of any enjoyments of life. No condition of life, and no freedom, can release children from this obligation. But this is very far from giving parents a power of command over their children, or an authority to make laws and dispose of their lives or liberties as they please. It is one thing to owe honour, respect, gratitude, and assistance. It is another to require an absolute obedience and submission. A monarch on his throne owes his mother the honour due to parents. Yet this does not lessen his authority, nor subject him to her government.
Sect. 67. The subjection of a minor places in the father a temporary government, which terminates with the minority of the child: and the honour due from a child, places in the parents a perpetual right to respect, reverence, support and compliance too, more or less, as the father’s care, cost, and kindness in his education, has been more or less. This ends not with minority, but holds in all parts and conditions of a man’s life. The want of distinguishing these two powers, viz. that which the father hath in the right of tuition, during minority, and the right of honour all his life, may perhaps have caused a great part of the mistakes about this matter: for to speak properly of them, the first of these is rather the privilege of children, and duty of parents, than any prerogative of paternal power. The nourishment and education of their children is a charge so incumbent on parents for their children’s good, that nothing can absolve them from taking care of it: and though the power of commanding and chastising them go along with it, yet God hath woven into the principles of human nature such a tenderness for their off-spring, that there is little fear that parents should use their power with too much rigour; the excess is seldom on the severe side, the strong byass of nature drawing the other way. And therefore God almighty when he would express his gentle dealing with the Israelites, he tells them, that though he chastened them, he chastened them as a man chastens his son, Deut. viii. 5. i.e. with tenderness and affection, and kept them under no severer discipline than what was absolutely best for them, and had been less kindness to have slackened. This is that power to which children are commanded obedience, that the pains and care of their parents may not be increased, or ill rewarded.
67. The subjection of a minor places in the father a temporary government, which ends with the child's minority. The honour due from a child places in the parents a perpetual right to respect, reverence, support, and compliance too. This right is greater or less as the father's care, cost, and kindness in the child's education has been greater or less. It does not end with minority, but holds in all parts and conditions of a man's life. There are two powers here: the power the father has by right of tuition during minority, and the right of honour all his life. Failing to distinguish them may perhaps have caused a great part of the mistakes about this matter. For, to speak properly of them, the first is rather the privilege of children and the duty of parents than any prerogative of paternal power. The nourishment and education of their children is a charge laid so firmly on parents for their children's good that nothing can release them from taking care of it. The power of commanding and chastising them goes along with it. Yet God has woven into the principles of human nature such a tenderness for their offspring that there is little fear parents will use their power too harshly. The excess is seldom on the severe side, since the strong bias of nature pulls the other way. And so when God almighty wanted to express his gentle dealing with the Israelites, he told them that though he chastened them, he chastened them as a man chastens his son (Deut. viii. 5). That is, he did it with tenderness and affection. He kept them under no severer discipline than what was absolutely best for them, and it would have been less kindness to have slackened it. This is the power children are commanded to obey, so that their parents' pains and care may not be increased or badly rewarded.
Sect. 68. On the other side, honour and support, all that which gratitude requires to return for the benefits received by and from them, is the indispensable duty of the child, and the proper privilege of the parents. This is intended for the parents advantage, as the other is for the child’s; though education, the parents duty, seems to have most power, because the ignorance and infirmities of childhood stand in need of restraint and correction; which is a visible exercise of rule, and a kind of dominion. And that duty which is comprehended in the word honour, requires less obedience, though the obligation be stronger on grown, than younger children: for who can think the command, Children obey your parents, requires in a man, that has children of his own, the same submission to his father, as it does in his yet young children to him; and that by this precept he were bound to obey all his father’s commands, if, out of a conceit of authority, he should have the indiscretion to treat him still as a boy?
68. On the other hand, honor and support, everything gratitude requires to repay benefits received from parents, are the child's indispensable duty and the parents' proper privilege. This duty is meant for the parents' advantage, while the other duty is meant for the child's. Education, which is the parents' responsibility, seems to have the greatest force. Childhood's ignorance and weakness need restraint and correction. That makes parental rule visible and a kind of dominion. The duty expressed by the word "honor" requires less obedience. Still, the obligation is stronger for grown children than for younger ones. Who can think the command "Children, obey your parents" requires a man who has children of his own to submit to his father in the same way his young children must submit to him? Who can think this command would bind him to obey every order of his father, if the father, out of a conceit of authority, foolishly kept treating him like a boy?
Sect. 69. The first part then of paternal power, or rather duty, which is education, belongs so to the father, that it terminates at a certain season; when the business of education is over, it ceases of itself, and is also alienable before: for a man may put the tuition of his son in other hands; and he that has made his son an apprentice to another, has discharged him, during that time, of a great part of his obedience both to himself and to his mother. But all the duty of honour, the other part, remains never the less entire to them; nothing can cancel that: it is so inseparable from them both, that the father’s authority cannot dispossess the mother of this right, nor can any man discharge his son from honouring her that bore him. But both these are very far from a power to make laws, and enforcing them with penalties, that may reach estate, liberty, limbs and life. The power of commanding ends with nonage; and though, after that, honour and respect, support and defence, and whatsoever gratitude can oblige a man to, for the highest benefits he is naturally capable of, be always due from a son to his parents; yet all this puts no scepter into the father’s hand, no sovereign power of commanding. He has no dominion over his son’s property, or actions; nor any right, that his will should prescribe to his son’s in all things; however it may become his son in many things, not very inconvenient to him and his family, to pay a deference to it.
69. The first part of paternal power, or rather duty, is education. This duty belongs to the father, but it ends at a certain time. When education is finished, it stops on its own. It can also be transferred before that. A father may place his son's education in other hands. If a father makes his son an apprentice to another, the son is freed for that time from much obedience. That applies to both father and mother. But the duty of honor, the other part, stays whole. Nothing can cancel it. It is so inseparable from both parents that the father's authority cannot take this right from the mother. No one can free a son from honoring his mother. Neither of these powers gives a right to make laws or to enforce them with penalties that may reach estate, liberty, limbs, and life. The power to command ends when the child reaches adulthood. After that, honor, respect, support, and defense remain due from a son. So does any gratitude he owes for the greatest benefits he naturally received. Yet none of this puts a scepter into the father's hand, nor gives him sovereign power to command. He has no dominion over his son's property or actions. He has no right to make his will bind his son in all things. However, it may be proper for a son in many matters to show deference to his father's wishes, when doing so causes little harm to himself or his family.
Sect. 70. A man may owe honour and respect to an ancient, or wise man; defence to his child or friend; relief and support to the distressed; and gratitude to a benefactor, to such a degree, that all he has, all he can do, cannot sufficiently pay it: but all these give no authority, no right to any one, of making laws over him from whom they are owing. And it is plain, all this is due not only to the bare title of father; not only because, as has been said, it is owing to the mother too; but because these obligations to parents, and the degrees of what is required of children, may be varied by the different care and kindness, trouble and expence, which is often employed upon one child more than another.
70. A man may owe honour and respect to an aged or wise man, defence to his child or friend, relief and support to the distressed, and gratitude to a benefactor. He may owe these to such a degree that all he has and all he can do cannot sufficiently repay them. But none of these gives anyone authority, or any right to make laws over the person who owes them. And it is plain that all this is not due merely to the bare title of father. This is plain not only because, as has been said, it is owed to the mother too. It is plain also because these obligations to parents, and the degree of what is required of children, may vary. They vary with the different care and kindness, trouble and expense, which is often spent on one child more than another.
Sect. 71. This shews the reason how it comes to pass, that parents in societies, where they themselves are subjects, retain a power over their children, and have as much right to their subjection, as those who are in the state of nature. Which could not possibly be, if all political power were only paternal, and that in truth they were one and the same thing: for then, all paternal power being in the prince, the subject could naturally have none of it. But these two powers, political and paternal, are so perfectly distinct and separate; are built upon so different foundations, and given to so different ends, that every subject that is a father, has as much a paternal power over his children, as the prince has over his: and every prince, that has parents, owes them as much filial duty and obedience, as the meanest of his subjects do to their’s; and can therefore contain not any part or degree of that kind of dominion, which a prince or magistrate has over his subject.
71. This shows how it comes about that parents in societies where they themselves are subjects keep a power over their children. They have as much right to their children's subjection as those in the state of nature. This could not possibly be if all political power were only paternal, and the two were in truth one and the same thing. For then all paternal power would be in the prince, and the subject could naturally have none of it. But these two powers, political and paternal, are perfectly distinct and separate. They are built on very different foundations and given for very different ends. So every subject who is a father has as much paternal power over his children as the prince has over his. And every prince who has parents owes them as much filial duty and obedience as the lowest of his subjects owes theirs. Paternal power therefore cannot contain any part or degree of the kind of dominion that a prince or magistrate has over his subject.
Sect. 72. Though the obligation on the parents to bring up their children, and the obligation on children to honour their parents, contain all the power on the one hand, and submission on the other, which are proper to this relation, yet there is another power ordinarily in the father, whereby he has a tie on the obedience of his children; which tho’ it be common to him with other men, yet the occasions of shewing it, almost constantly happening to fathers in their private families, and the instances of it elsewhere being rare, and less taken notice of, it passes in the world for a part of paternal jurisdiction. And this is the power men generally have to bestow their estates on those who please them best; the possession of the father being the expectation and inheritance of the children, ordinarily in certain proportions, according to the law and custom of each country; yet it is commonly in the father’s power to bestow it with a more sparing or liberal hand, according as the behaviour of this or that child hath comported with his will and humour.
72. Parents' duty to raise their children and children's duty to honor their parents cover the authority and obedience proper to this relationship. But fathers usually have another power that binds their children's obedience. This power is not unique to fathers. Other people have it too. Yet the chance to show it almost always happens to fathers in their private families. Examples elsewhere are rare and less noticed, so people regard it as part of parental authority. This power is the general ability people have to leave their property to those they prefer. A father's property is normally his children's expected inheritance. Children typically expect certain shares under the laws and customs of each country. Still, the father commonly can give it more sparingly or more generously, depending on how each child's behavior has matched his will and temper.
Sect. 73. This is no small tie on the obedience of children: and there being always annexed to the enjoyment of land, a submission to the government of the country, of which that land is a part; it has been commonly supposed, that a father could oblige his posterity to that government, of which he himself was a subject, and that his compact held them; whereas, it being only a necessary condition annexed to the land, and the inheritance of an estate which is under that government, reaches only those who will take it on that condition, and so is no natural tie or engagement, but a voluntary submission: for every man’s children being by nature as free as himself, or any of his ancestors ever were, may, whilst they are in that freedom, choose what society they will join themselves to, what commonwealth they will put themselves under. But if they will enjoy the inheritance of their ancestors, they must take it on the same terms their ancestors had it, and submit to all the conditions annexed to such a possession. By this power indeed fathers oblige their children to obedience to themselves, even when they are past minority, and most commonly too subject them to this or that political power: but neither of these by any peculiar right of fatherhood, but by the reward they have in their hands to inforce and recompence such a compliance; and is no more power than what a French man has over an English man, who by the hopes of an estate he will leave him, will certainly have a strong tie on his obedience: and if, when it is left him, he will enjoy it, he must certainly take it upon the conditions annexed to the possession of land in that country where it lies, whether it be France or England.
73. This is no small tie on the obedience of children. Submission to the government of a country is always attached to the enjoyment of land that is part of it. So it has commonly been supposed that a father could bind his posterity to the government he himself was subject to, and that his compact held them. But this is only a necessary condition attached to the land. The inheritance of an estate under that government reaches only those who will take it on that condition. So it is no natural tie or engagement, but a voluntary submission. For every man's children are by nature as free as he himself, or any of his ancestors, ever were. While they are in that freedom, they may choose what society they will join, and what commonwealth they will put themselves under. But if they will enjoy the inheritance of their ancestors, they must take it on the same terms their ancestors had it, and submit to all the conditions attached to such a possession. By this power fathers do indeed oblige their children to obey them, even when they are past minority. Most commonly they also subject them to this or that political power. But neither is by any special right of fatherhood. It is by the reward they hold in their hands to enforce and repay such compliance. It is no more power than a Frenchman has over an Englishman. If the Englishman hopes for an estate the Frenchman will leave him, the Frenchman will certainly have a strong tie on his obedience. And if the Englishman wants to enjoy the estate when it is left to him, he must certainly take it on the conditions attached to the possession of land in the country where it lies, whether France or England.
Sect. 74. To conclude then, tho’ the father’s power of commanding extends no farther than the minority of his children, and to a degree only fit for the discipline and government of that age; and tho’ that honour and respect, and all that which the Latins called piety, which they indispensably owe to their parents all their life-time, and in all estates, with all that support and defence is due to them, gives the father no power of governing, i.e. making laws and enacting penalties on his children; though by all this he has no dominion over the property or actions of his son: yet it is obvious to conceive how easy it was, in the first ages of the world, and in places still, where the thinness of people gives families leave to separate into unpossessed quarters, and they have room to remove or plant themselves in yet vacant habitations, for the father of the family to become the prince of it;* he had been a ruler from the beginning of the infancy of his children: and since without some government it would be hard for them to live together, it was likeliest it should, by the express or tacit consent of the children when they were grown up, be in the father, where it seemed without any change barely to continue; when indeed nothing more was required to it, than the permitting the father to exercise alone, in his family, that executive power of the law of nature, which every free man naturally hath, and by that permission resigning up to him a monarchical power, whilst they remained in it. But that this was not by any paternal right, but only by the consent of his children, is evident from hence, that no body doubts, but if a stranger, whom chance or business had brought to his family, had there killed any of his children, or committed any other fact, he might condemn and put him to death, or other-wise have punished him, as well as any of his children; which it was impossible he should do by virtue of any paternal authority over one who was not his child, but by virtue of that executive power of the law of nature, which, as a man, he had a right to: and he alone could punish him in his family, where the respect of his children had laid by the exercise of such a power, to give way to the dignity and authority they were willing should remain in him, above the rest of his family.
74. To conclude, the father's power to command lasts only until his children reach adulthood. It only covers the discipline appropriate to their age. The honour and respect, the piety the Latins named, which children owe their parents for life, and all the support and protection due to them, do not give the father power to govern. That is, they do not allow him to make laws or impose penalties on his children. By all this, the father has no dominion over his son's property or actions. Yet it is easy to see how, in the earliest ages of the world, and in places even now where people are sparse, families could spread into unoccupied areas and settle in empty homes. In such cases the head of the household easily became the leader of that group.* He had been in charge from his children's infancy. Since living together without some government would be difficult, it was most likely that the children, once grown, gave explicit or tacit consent for the government to remain with their father. It seemed only a continuation of what had already existed. In truth, all that was needed was to allow the father alone to exercise, within the family, the executive power of the law of nature that every free person has. By this allowance they effectively handed him a monarchical power while they remained under it. That this came from the children's consent and not from any paternal right is clear. No one doubts that if a stranger, brought into the family by chance or business, killed one of the children or committed some other crime there, the father could lawfully condemn and execute him, or otherwise punish him, as he could any of his children. He could not do that by any parental authority over someone who was not his child. He could do it by the same executive power of the law of nature that every man has. He alone could punish the stranger in his household because his children's respect had set aside their own exercise of such power, to allow the dignity and authority they were willing should remain in him above the rest of the family.
(*It is no improbable opinion therefore, which the archphilosopher was of, that the chief person in every houshold was always, as it were, a king: so when numbers of housholds joined themselves in civil societies together, kings were the first kind of governors amongst them, which is also, as it seemeth, the reason why the name of fathers continued still in them, who, of fathers, were made rulers; as also the ancient custom of governors to do as Melchizedec, and being kings, to exercise the office of priests, which fathers did at the first, grew perhaps by the same occasion. Howbeit, this is not the only kind of regiment that has been received in the world. The inconveniences of one kind have caused sundry others to be devised; so that in a word, all public regiment, of what kind soever, seemeth evidently to have risen from the deliberate advice, consultation and composition between men, judging it convenient and behoveful; there being no impossibility in nature considered by itself, but that man might have lived without any public regiment, Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10.)
(*It is therefore not an unlikely opinion, which the archphilosopher held, that the chief person in every household was, as it were, a king. When many households joined together into civil societies, kings became their first governors. This, it seems, explains why the name "fathers" continued for those who, as fathers, became rulers. It may also explain the ancient custom of governors acting like Melchizedec, being kings and also performing priestly duties. Fathers originally performed those duties. However, this was not the only form of government used. The problems of one form led people to devise many others. In short, all forms of public government seem to have come from deliberate agreement among men. They consulted and arranged things when they judged it convenient and necessary. There is no natural impossibility that people might have lived without any public government. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. lib. i. 10.)
Sect. 75. Thus it was easy, and almost natural for children, by a tacit, and scarce avoidable consent, to make way for the father’s authority and government. They had been accustomed in their childhood to follow his direction, and to refer their little differences to him, and when they were men, who fitter to rule them? Their little properties, and less covetousness, seldom afforded greater controversies; and when any should arise, where could they have a fitter umpire than he, by whose care they had every one been sustained and brought up, and who had a tenderness for them all? It is no wonder that they made no distinction betwixt minority and full age; nor looked after one and twenty, or any other age that might make them the free disposers of themselves and fortunes, when they could have no desire to be out of their pupilage: the government they had been under, during it, continued still to be more their protection than restraint; and they could no where find a greater security to their peace, liberties, and fortunes, than in the rule of a father.
75. Thus it was easy, and almost natural, for children to make way for the father's authority and government by a tacit and scarcely avoidable consent. In their childhood they had been used to following his direction and referring their little differences to him. When they were men, who was fitter to rule them? Their small properties and smaller covetousness seldom gave rise to greater disputes. And when any arose, where could they find a fitter umpire than he? It was by his care that every one of them had been sustained and brought up, and he had a tenderness for them all. It is no wonder that they made no distinction between minority and full age. Nor did they look for twenty-one, or any other age that might make them free to dispose of themselves and their fortunes, since they could have no desire to leave their pupilage. The government they had been under during it still continued to be more their protection than their restraint. And nowhere could they find greater security for their peace, liberties, and fortunes than in the rule of a father.
Sect. 76. Thus the natural fathers of families, by an insensible change, became the politic monarchs of them too: and as they chanced to live long, and leave able and worthy heirs, for several successions, or otherwise; so they laid the foundations of hereditary, or elective kingdoms, under several constitutions and manners, according as chance, contrivance, or occasions happened to mould them. But if princes have their titles in their fathers right, and it be a sufficient proof of the natural right of fathers to political authority, because they commonly were those in whose hands we find, de facto, the exercise of government: I say, if this argument be good, it will as strongly prove, that all princes, nay princes only, ought to be priests, since it is as certain, that in the beginning, the father of the family was priest, as that he was ruler in his own houshold.
76. Thus the natural fathers of families, by an imperceptible change, became their political monarchs too. As they happened to live long and leave able and worthy heirs for several successions, or otherwise, they laid the foundations of hereditary or elective kingdoms. These had various constitutions and manners, as chance, design, or circumstances happened to shape them. But suppose princes hold their titles by their fathers' right. And suppose it is sufficient proof of the natural right of fathers to political authority that fathers were commonly the ones in whose hands we find, de facto, the exercise of government. I say, if this argument is good, it will just as strongly prove that all princes, indeed princes only, ought to be priests. For it is as certain that in the beginning the father of the family was priest as that he was ruler in his own household.