Sect. 25. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence: or revelation, which gives us an account of those grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is very clear, that God, as king David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the earth to the children of men; given it to mankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty, how any one should ever come to have a property in any thing: I will not content myself to answer, that if it be difficult to make out property, upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam, and his posterity in common, it is impossible that any man, but one universal monarch, should have any property upon a supposition, that God gave the world to Adam, and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity. But I shall endeavour to shew, how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express compact of all the commoners.
25. Consider natural reason, which tells us that men, once born, have a right to their preservation, and so to food and drink and such other things as nature provides for their subsistence. Or consider revelation, which gives us an account of the grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah and his sons. Either way, it is very clear that God, as King David says in Psal. cxv. 16, has given the earth to the children of men. He has given it to mankind in common. But supposing this, it seems to some a very great difficulty how anyone should ever come to have property in anything. I could answer as follows, but I will not be content with that answer alone. Suppose it is difficult to make out property on the supposition that God gave the world to Adam and his posterity in common. Then on the supposition that God gave the world to Adam and his heirs in succession, excluding all the rest of his posterity, it is impossible that any man but one universal monarch should have any property. But I shall try to show how men might come to have property in separate parts of what God gave to mankind in common. And I shall show it without any express compact of all the commoners.
Sect. 26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their being. And tho’ all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state: yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other, before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular man. The fruit, or venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his life.
26. God has given the world to all people in common. He has also given them reason to use it for their best advantage and convenience. The earth and everything in it are given to people for the support and comfort of their lives. All the fruits it naturally produces and the animals it feeds belong to everyone in common. They come from nature's spontaneous hand. No one originally has private ownership, exclusive of the rest of humanity, over any of them in their natural state. Yet because these things are given for human use, there must be a way to appropriate them. Without appropriation they cannot be of use or benefit to any particular person. The fruit or game that feeds a person living in the wild must become theirs. That person knows no fenced land and is still a tenant in common. The food must become part of them so that no one else can claim a right to it. This must happen before it can do them any good in supporting their life.
Sect. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.
27. Though the earth and all inferior creatures are common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person. Nobody has any right to this but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatever, then, he removes out of the state that nature has provided and left it in, he has mixed his labour with. He has joined to it something that is his own, and so makes it his property. Since he has removed it from the common state nature placed it in, his labour has attached something to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this labour is the unquestionable property of the labourer. So no man but he can have a right to what it is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.
Sect. 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. No body can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and common: that added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right. And will any one say, he had no right to those acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in, which begins the property; without which the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that part, does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore I have digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others, become my property, without the assignation or consent of any body. The labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.
28. He who is nourished by the acorns he picked under an oak, or by the apples he gathered in the woods, has clearly made them his own. Nobody can deny that the food is his. I then ask, when did they become his? When he digested them? When he ate them? When he boiled them? When he brought them home? Or when he picked them up? It is plain that if the first gathering did not make them his, nothing else could. That labour made a distinction between them and the common. It added something to them that nature, the common mother of all, had not done. So they became his private right. And will anyone say he had no right to those acorns or apples he thus claimed because he did not have the consent of all mankind? Was it robbery to take for himself what belonged to everyone in common? If such universal consent were necessary, people would have starved despite the plenty God had given them. We see in commons that remain so by agreement that taking any part of what is common, and removing it from the state nature leaves it in, is what begins property. Without that, the common is of no use. The taking of this or that part does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners. Thus the grass my horse has eaten, the turf my servant has cut, and the ore I have dug in any place where I have a right with others, become my property without the assignment or consent of anybody. The labour that was mine, in removing them from the common state they were in, has fixed my property in them.
Sect. 29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary to any one’s appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common, children or servants could not cut the meat, which their father or master had provided for them in common, without assigning to every one his peculiar part. Though the water running in the fountain be every one’s, yet who can doubt, but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labour hath taken it out of the hands of nature, where it was common, and belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himself.
29. If every commoner's explicit consent were required before anyone could take any part of what is held in common, then children or servants could not cut the meat their father or master had provided for them in common without assigning each person his proper share. The water running in a fountain belongs to everyone. Yet who can doubt that the water in the pitcher belongs only to the person who drew it out? His labor took it out of nature's hands. There it was common and belonged equally to all her children. By that labor he appropriated it to himself.
Sect. 30. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian’s who hath killed it; it is allowed to be his goods, who hath bestowed his labour upon it, though before it was the common right of every one. And amongst those who are counted the civilized part of mankind, who have made and multiplied positive laws to determine property, this original law of nature, for the beginning of property, in what was before common, still takes place; and by virtue thereof, what fish any one catches in the ocean, that great and still remaining common of mankind; or what ambergrise any one takes up here, is by the labour that removes it out of that common state nature left it in, made his property, who takes that pains about it. And even amongst us, the hare that any one is hunting, is thought his who pursues her during the chase: for being a beast that is still looked upon as common, and no man’s private possession; whoever has employed so much labour about any of that kind, as to find and pursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of nature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a property.
30. Thus the law of reason makes the deer the property of the Indian who has killed it. It belongs to the person who has put his labour into it, even though it was before common to everyone. Among those considered the civilized part of mankind, people have made many positive laws to determine property. Still, this original law of nature about the beginning of property in what was once common holds true. By that law, the fish someone catches in the ocean becomes his. The ocean is a great and continuing common of mankind. Likewise, ambergrise that someone picks up becomes his. The labour that removes such things from the common state nature left them in makes them the property of the person who takes that trouble. Even among us, the hare that someone hunts is regarded as belonging to the person who pursues it during the chase. It is still seen as common and not anyone’s private possession. Whoever does the labour to find and chase it removes it from that common state. In doing so, that person begins a property right.
Sect. 31. It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the acorns, or other fruits of the earth, &c. makes a right to them, then any one may ingross as much as he will. To which I answer, Not so. The same law of nature, that does by this means give us property, does also bound that property too. God has given us all things richly, 1 Tim. vi. 12. is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration. But how far has he given it us? To enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy. And thus, considering the plenty of natural provisions there was a long time in the world, and the few spenders; and to how small a part of that provision the industry of one man could extend itself, and ingross it to the prejudice of others; especially keeping within the bounds, set by reason, of what might serve for his use; there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so established.
31. Someone might object. They could say that if gathering acorns or fruits gives a right, anyone could take as much as they want. My answer is no. The same law of nature that gives us property also limits that property. "God has given us all things richly" (1 Tim. vi. 12). This is reason confirmed by inspiration. But how far has he given them to us? He has given them to be enjoyed. A person may take as much as they can use to improve their life before it spoils. By their labor they may establish ownership of that amount. Anything beyond this is more than their share and belongs to others. God made nothing for people to spoil or destroy. Natural provisions were abundant for a long time. Few people used them. So there was little chance for one person to take much. One person's industry could claim only a small part. Thus it rarely harmed others. If people kept within reasonable limits of what they needed, there was little room for quarrels about such property.
Sect. 32. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth, and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself; as that which takes in and carries with it all the rest; I think it is plain, that property in that too is acquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, inclose it from the common. Nor will it invalidate his right, to say every body else has an equal title to it; and therefore he cannot appropriate, he cannot inclose, without the consent of all his fellow-commoners, all mankind. God, when he gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man also to labour, and the penury of his condition required it of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e. improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour. He that in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from him.
32. But the chief matter of property is now not the fruits of the earth and the beasts that live on it. It is the earth itself, as that which takes in and carries with it all the rest. I think it is plain that property in land too is acquired in the same way as in the former case. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. By his labour he, as it were, encloses it from the common. Nor is his right invalidated by the objection that everybody else has an equal title to the land. The objection says he therefore cannot appropriate it, cannot enclose it, without the consent of all his fellow commoners, all mankind. When God gave the world in common to all mankind, he also commanded man to labour, and the poverty of his condition required it of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, that is, to improve it for the benefit of life. In doing so he laid out on it something that was his own, his labour. He who, in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled, and sowed any part of it thereby attached to it something that was his property. Another had no title to this, and could not take it from him without injury.
Sect. 33. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there was never the less left for others because of his enclosure for himself: for he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all. No body could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst: and the case of land and water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same.
33. Appropriating a parcel of land by improving it did not harm anyone. There was still enough, and as good, left for others. There was even more land than the unprovided could use. So, in effect, nothing was taken from others when someone enclosed land for himself. If a person leaves as much as another can use, he has, for all practical purposes, taken nothing at all. No one could claim injury if another drank a large draught. A whole river of the same water remained to quench his thirst. The situation with land and water, when there is enough of both, is exactly the same.
Sect. 34. God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for their benefit, and the greatest conveniencies of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational, (and labour was to be his title to it;) not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious. He that had as good left for his improvement, as was already taken up, needed not complain, ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another’s labour: if he did, it is plain he desired the benefit of another’s pains, which he had no right to, and not the ground which God had given him in common with others to labour on, and whereof there was as good left, as that already possessed, and more than he knew what to do with, or his industry could reach to.
34. God gave the world to men in common. But he gave it to them for their benefit, and for the greatest conveniences of life they were able to draw from it. So it cannot be supposed that he meant it always to remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational (and labour was to be his title to it). He did not give it to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious. A man who had as good land left for his improvement as what was already taken up had no need to complain. He ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's labour. If he did, it is plain that he desired the benefit of another's pains, which he had no right to. He did not desire the ground God had given him in common with others to labour on. Of that ground there was as good left as what was already possessed, and more than he knew what to do with, or than his industry could reach.
Sect. 35. It is true, in land that is common in England, or any other country, where there is plenty of people under government, who have money and commerce, no one can inclose or appropriate any part, without the consent of all his fellow-commoners; because this is left common by compact, i.e. by the law of the land, which is not to be violated. And though it be common, in respect of some men, it is not so to all mankind; but is the joint property of this country, or this parish. Besides, the remainder, after such enclosure, would not be as good to the rest of the commoners, as the whole was when they could all make use of the whole; whereas in the beginning and first peopling of the great common of the world, it was quite otherwise. The law man was under, was rather for appropriating. God commanded, and his wants forced him to labour. That was his property which could not be taken from him where-ever he had fixed it. And hence subduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we see are joined together. The one gave title to the other. So that God, by commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to appropriate: and the condition of human life, which requires labour and materials to work on, necessarily introduces private possessions.
35. It is true that when land is common in England or any other country, and there are many people living under government, the situation is different. If those people have money and trade, no one can enclose or appropriate any part of the common land without the consent of all his fellow-commoners. This land is held in common by agreement, that is, by the law of the land, which must not be violated. And though it is common with respect to some people, it is not common to all mankind. It is the joint property of this country or of this parish. Besides, what remains after such an enclosure would not be as good for the other commoners as the whole was when they all could use it. In the beginning, when the great common of the world was first peopled, things were quite different. The law under which man lived favored appropriation. God commanded man to subdue the earth, and his needs forced him to labour. What he had fixed by his labour became his property and could not be taken from him. Thus subduing or cultivating the earth and having dominion are joined together. One gave title to the other. So by commanding man to subdue the earth, God gave authority to appropriate to that extent. And the condition of human life, which requires labour and materials to work on, necessarily brings about private possessions.
Sect. 36. The measure of property nature has well set by the extent of men’s labour and the conveniencies of life: no man’s labour could subdue, or appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for any man, this way, to intrench upon the right of another, or acquire to himself a property, to the prejudice of his neighbour, who would still have room for as good, and as large a possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated. This measure did confine every man’s possession to a very moderate proportion, and such as he might appropriate to himself, without injury to any body, in the first ages of the world, when men were more in danger to be lost, by wandering from their company, in the then vast wilderness of the earth, than to be straitened for want of room to plant in. And the same measure may be allowed still without prejudice to any body, as full as the world seems: for supposing a man, or family, in the state they were at first peopling of the world by the children of Adam, or Noah; let him plant in some inland, vacant places of America, we shall find that the possessions he could make himself, upon the measures we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day, prejudice the rest of mankind, or give them reason to complain, or think themselves injured by this man’s incroachment, though the race of men have now spread themselves to all the corners of the world, and do infinitely exceed the small number was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of ground is of so little value, without labour, that I have heard it affirmed, that in Spain itself a man may be permitted to plough, sow and reap, without being disturbed, upon land he has no other title to, but only his making use of it. But, on the contrary, the inhabitants think themselves beholden to him, who, by his industry on neglected, and consequently waste land, has increased the stock of corn, which they wanted. But be this as it will, which I lay no stress on; this I dare boldly affirm, that the same rule of propriety, (viz.) that every man should have as much as he could make use of, would hold still in the world, without straitening any body; since there is land enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention of money, and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced (by consent) larger possessions, and a right to them; which, how it has done, I shall by and by shew more at large.
36. Nature has wisely limited property to the extent of a person's labor and the needs of life. No one could, by their labor, subdue or appropriate all the land. Nor could their enjoyment consume more than a small part. Therefore, in this way it was impossible for anyone to infringe on another's rights. No one could acquire property to the prejudice of a neighbor. After someone had taken what they needed, others still had room for possessions as good and as large as before. This rule limited each person's holding to a moderate amount. They could take only what they could use without injuring anyone. In the early ages, people risked being lost if they wandered from their group. The wilderness was vast, and they feared getting separated more than lacking land to farm. The same rule can still hold without harming anyone, even though the world now seems full. Imagine a man or family settling empty inland lands in America, like the early descendants of Adam or Noah. Under our rule, the land they could claim would not be very large. Even today such claims would not harm the rest of mankind or give people cause to complain. This is true even though people have now spread everywhere and outnumber the original population many times. In fact, land is worth little without labor. I have heard it said that even in Spain a person may be allowed to plow, sow, and reap. They may do this on land they do not own, simply by making use of it. The local inhabitants often feel grateful to such a person. By working neglected and waste land, he increases the grain supply they need. Be that as it may, I do not insist on that point. What I affirm strongly is this. The same rule of property, that everyone should have as much as they can use, could still work. There is land enough in the world to support twice the number of people. But the invention of money and the tacit agreement to assign durable value changed this. They introduced larger possessions and rights to them by common consent. I will explain how this happened shortly.
Sect. 37. This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of having more than man needed had altered the intrinsic value of things, which depends only on their usefulness to the life of man; or had agreed, that a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or decay, should be worth a great piece of flesh, or a whole heap of corn; though men had a right to appropriate, by their labour, each one of himself, as much of the things of nature, as he could use: yet this could not be much, nor to the prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still left to those who would use the same industry. To which let me add, that he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind: for the provisions serving to the support of human life, produced by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal richness lying waste in common. And therefore he that incloses land, and has a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred left to nature, may truly be said to give ninety acres to mankind: for his labour now supplies him with provisions out of ten acres, which were but the product of an hundred lying in common. I have here rated the improved land very low, in making its product but as ten to one, when it is much nearer an hundred to one: for I ask, whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of America, left to nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencies of life, as ten acres of equally fertile land do in Devonshire, where they are well cultivated?
37. This is certain. In the beginning, the desire of having more than men needed had not yet altered the intrinsic value of things, which depends only on their usefulness to the life of man. Nor had men yet agreed that a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or decay, should be worth a great piece of meat or a whole heap of grain. At that time men had a right to appropriate by their labour, each for himself, as much of the things of nature as he could use. Yet this could not be much, nor could it harm others, where the same plenty was still left to those who would use the same industry. To this let me add that a man who appropriates land to himself by his labour does not lessen the common stock of mankind but increases it. Consider the provisions for human life produced by one acre of enclosed and cultivated land. They are (to put it far below the truth) ten times more than those yielded by an acre of equally rich land lying waste in common. So he who encloses land, and gets more of the conveniences of life from ten acres than he could from a hundred left to nature, may truly be said to give ninety acres to mankind. For his labour now supplies him with provisions from ten acres that were only the product of a hundred lying in common. I have rated the improved land very low here, putting its product at only ten to one, when it is much nearer a hundred to one. For I ask this. In the wild woods and uncultivated waste of America, left to nature without any improvement, tillage, or husbandry, do a thousand acres yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniences of life as ten acres of equally fertile land do in Devonshire, where they are well cultivated?
Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild fruit, killed, caught, or tamed, as many of the beasts, as he could; he that so imployed his pains about any of the spontaneous products of nature, as any way to alter them from the state which nature put them in, by placing any of his labour on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them: but if they perished, in his possession, without their due use; if the fruits rotted, or the venison putrified, before he could spend it, he offended against the common law of nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbour’s share, for he had no right, farther than his use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him conveniencies of life.
Before the appropriation of land, anyone who gathered wild fruit claimed it. The same was true for anyone who killed, caught, or tamed beasts. Anyone who applied their labor to nature's spontaneous products altered them from the state in which nature left them. By doing so they acquired property in those things. But if these things spoiled while in their possession because they were not used, they violated the common law of nature and could be punished. For example, if the fruits rotted or the game decayed before they could use it, they were liable to punishment. They invaded their neighbour’s share. They had no right to more than their own use required, and could take only what served to provide the conveniences of life.
Sect. 38. The same measures governed the possession of land too: whatsoever he tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled, that was his peculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed, and could feed, and make use of, the cattle and product was also his. But if either the grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the earth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, and might be the possession of any other. Thus, at the beginning, Cain might take as much ground as he could till, and make it his own land, and yet leave enough to Abel’s sheep to feed on; a few acres would serve for both their possessions. But as families increased, and industry inlarged their stocks, their possessions inlarged with the need of them; but yet it was commonly without any fixed property in the ground they made use of, till they incorporated, settled themselves together, and built cities; and then, by consent, they came in time, to set out the bounds of their distinct territories, and agree on limits between them and their neighbours; and by laws within themselves, settled the properties of those of the same society: for we see, that in that part of the world which was first inhabited, and therefore like to be best peopled, even as low down as Abraham’s time, they wandered with their flocks, and their herds, which was their substance, freely up and down; and this Abraham did, in a country where he was a stranger. Whence it is plain, that at least a great part of the land lay in common; that the inhabitants valued it not, nor claimed property in any more than they made use of. But when there was not room enough in the same place, for their herds to feed together, they by consent, as Abraham and Lot did, Gen. xiii. 5. separated and inlarged their pasture, where it best liked them. And for the same reason Esau went from his father, and his brother, and planted in mount Seir, Gen. xxxvi. 6.
38. The same rules applied to the possession of land. Whatever a person cultivated, reaped, stored, and used before it spoiled was his own. Whatever he enclosed and could feed his cattle with, and use the produce of, was also his. If the grass inside his enclosure rotted on the ground, or his crops perished because they were not gathered and stored, that part of the land, despite being enclosed, was still considered waste. It could be taken by anyone. At the beginning, Cain could take as much land as he could plow and cultivate and claim it as his own. He would still leave enough for Abel’s sheep to graze. A few acres would serve both their needs. As families grew and industry increased their stock, their possessions expanded as required. Yet they usually had no fixed property in the land they used until they came together, settled, and built cities. Then, by common consent, they eventually marked the boundaries of their territories and agreed on limits with their neighbors. They also made laws within their society to settle property rights among themselves. We see that in the part of the world first inhabited, and therefore likely most densely populated, people still wandered freely with their flocks and herds, even as late as Abraham’s time. These flocks and herds were their wealth, and Abraham did the same while living as a stranger in that land. From this it is clear that much land remained common. The inhabitants did not value or claim more land than they actually used. When there was not enough room for their herds to graze together, they agreed to separate. As Abraham and Lot did, Gen. xiii. 5, they enlarged their pastures where it suited them. For the same reason Esau left his father and brother and settled in Mount Seir, Gen. xxxvi. 6.
Sect. 39. And thus, without supposing any private dominion, and property in Adam, over all the world, exclusive of all other men, which can no way be proved, nor any one’s property be made out from it; but supposing the world given, as it was, to the children of men in common, we see how labour could make men distinct titles to several parcels of it, for their private uses; wherein there could be no doubt of right, no room for quarrel.
39. We need not assume that Adam had private dominion or ownership of the whole world. That claim would exclude everyone else and cannot be proved. Nor can anyone’s property be derived from it. Suppose instead the world was given to the children of men in common, as it was. We then see how labor could create distinct titles to parts of it for private use. In that case there would be no doubt about the right, and no room for quarrel.
Sect. 40. Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it may appear, that the property of labour should be able to over-balance the community of land: for it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing; and let any one consider what the difference is between an acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of the same land lying in common, without any husbandry upon it, and he will find, that the improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very modest computation to say, that of the products of the earth useful to the life of man nine tenths are the effects of labour: nay, if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use, and cast up the several expences about them, what in them is purely owing to nature, and what to labour, we shall find, that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labour.
40. It may not be as strange as it first seems that the property of labor can outweigh the community's claim to land. Labor is what gives things their different values. Consider an acre planted with tobacco or sugar, or sown with wheat or barley. Now consider the same acre left common and uncultivated. You will find that the improvements from labor make up the far greater part of the value. A modest estimate would say that nine tenths of the earth's products useful to human life are the result of labor. If we properly assess things as we use them and add up their expenses, separating what is due to nature from what is due to labor, we will find that in most cases ninety-nine hundredths are entirely the result of labor.
Sect. 41. There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than several nations of the Americans are of this, who are rich in land, and poor in all the comforts of life; whom nature having furnished as liberally as any other people, with the materials of plenty, i.e. a fruitful soil, apt to produce in abundance, what might serve for food, raiment, and delight; yet for want of improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy: and a king of a large and fruitful territory there, feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day-labourer in England.
41. Nothing could demonstrate this more clearly than several nations of the Americans do. They are rich in land and poor in all the comforts of life. Nature has furnished them as generously as any other people with the materials of plenty, that is, a fruitful soil, able to produce in abundance what might serve for food, clothing, and delight. Yet for lack of improving it by labour, they have not one hundredth part of the conveniences we enjoy. And a king of a large and fruitful territory there feeds, lodges, and is clothed worse than a day labourer in England.
Sect. 42. To make this a little clearer, let us but trace some of the ordinary provisions of life, through their several progresses, before they come to our use, and see how much they receive of their value from human industry. Bread, wine and cloth, are things of daily use, and great plenty; yet notwithstanding, acorns, water and leaves, or skins, must be our bread, drink and cloathing, did not labour furnish us with these more useful commodities: for whatever bread is more worth than acorns, wine than water, and cloth or silk, than leaves, skins or moss, that is wholly owing to labour and industry; the one of these being the food and raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other, provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us, which how much they exceed the other in value, when any one hath computed, he will then see how much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy in this world: and the ground which produces the materials, is scarce to be reckoned in, as any, or at most, but a very small part of it; so little, that even amongst us, land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste; and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing.
42. To make this a little clearer, let's trace some common everyday items through the steps before we use them. We will see how much of their value comes from human industry. Bread, wine, and cloth are common and plentiful. Still, without labor our food, drink, and clothing would be acorns, water, and leaves or skins. Whatever makes bread more valuable than acorns, wine than water, or cloth and silk than leaves, skins, or moss is entirely due to labor and industry. The first are the food and clothing that nature supplies without help. The second are the goods our labor and effort produce. Once someone calculates how much more valuable the latter are, they will see that labor creates the vast majority of the value of the things we enjoy in this world. The land that produces the raw materials contributes hardly anything to that value. At most it is a very small part. So little, that among us land left entirely to nature, without improved pasture, tillage, or planting, is rightly called, as it is, waste. Its benefit amounts to almost nothing.
This shews how much numbers of men are to be preferred to largeness of dominions; and that the increase of lands, and the right employing of them, is the great art of government: and that prince, who shall be so wise and godlike, as by established laws of liberty to secure protection and encouragement to the honest industry of mankind, against the oppression of power and narrowness of party, will quickly be too hard for his neighbours: but this by the by.
This shows that numbers of people should be preferred to large dominions. Increasing land and using it rightly is the great art of government. A prince who is wise and godlike will establish laws of liberty. Those laws will secure protection and encouragement for honest industry. He will protect that industry against the abuse of power and the narrowness of party. Such a ruler will quickly be too strong for his neighbors. But that is beside the point.
To return to the argument in hand.
To return to the argument at hand.
Sect. 43. An acre of land, that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and another in America, which, with the same husbandry, would do the like, are, without doubt, of the same natural intrinsic value: but yet the benefit mankind receives from the one in a year, is worth 5l. and from the other possibly not worth a penny, if all the profit an Indian received from it were to be valued, and sold here; at least, I may truly say, not one thousandth. It is labour then which puts the greatest part of value upon land, without which it would scarcely be worth any thing: it is to that we owe the greatest part of all its useful products; for all that the straw, bran, bread, of that acre of wheat, is more worth than the product of an acre of as good land, which lies waste, is all the effect of labour: for it is not barely the plough-man’s pains, the reaper’s and thresher’s toil, and the baker’s sweat, is to be counted into the bread we eat; the labour of those who broke the oxen, who digged and wrought the iron and stones, who felled and framed the timber employed about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utensils, which are a vast number, requisite to this corn, from its being feed to be sown to its being made bread, must all be charged on the account of labour, and received as an effect of that: nature and the earth furnished only the almost worthless materials, as in themselves. It would be a strange catalogue of things, that industry provided and made use of, about every loaf of bread, before it came to our use, if we could trace them; iron, wood, leather, bark, timber, stone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dying drugs, pitch, tar, masts, ropes, and all the materials made use of in the ship, that brought any of the commodities made use of by any of the workmen, to any part of the work; all which it would be almost impossible, at least too long, to reckon up.
43. An acre of land here that yields twenty bushels of wheat and an acre in America that would yield the same with the same farming methods are, without doubt, of the same natural intrinsic value. But the benefit people receive from the one in a year is worth £5. The benefit from the other might not be worth a penny if all the profit a Native American got from it were valued and sold here. At least, I may truly say, not one thousandth. It is labour that gives most of the value to land. Without labour it would hardly be worth anything. We owe most of its useful products to labour. All the value of the straw, bran, and bread from that acre, over the product of an equally good acre left waste, is the result of labour. It is not only the plowman’s pains, the reaper’s and thresher’s toil, and the baker’s sweat that go into the bread we eat. We must also include the labour of those who broke in the oxen, who dug and worked the iron and stone, and who cut and shaped the timber used in the plow, mill, oven, and other tools. These tools are many and necessary for the grain, from when it is planted until it becomes bread. All of this labour must be counted and seen as its effect. Nature and the earth provided only the nearly worthless raw materials by themselves. If we could trace everything, we would find a strange list of items industry supplied for every loaf of bread before it reached us. Iron, wood, leather, bark, timber, stone, bricks, coal, lime, cloth, dyeing materials, pitch, tar, masts, ropes, and all the materials used in the ship that brought any commodity to any of the workers would appear. All of these were used at different stages by the workmen. It would be almost impossible, or at least too long, to list them all.
Sect. 44. From all which it is evident, that though the things of nature are given in common, yet man, by being master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labour of it, had still in himself the great foundation of property; and that, which made up the great part of what he applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had improved the conveniencies of life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others.
44. From all this it is clear. Although the things of nature are given in common, each person is master of himself. He owns his own body and the labour it performs. That gives him the basic foundation of property. When invention and the arts improved the conveniences of life, people produced more comforts. Much of what a person made and used for his support and comfort was entirely his own. It did not belong in common to others.
Sect. 45. Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property, wherever any one was pleased to employ it upon what was common, which remained a long while the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind makes use of. Men, at first, for the most part, contented themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their necessities: and though afterwards, in some parts of the world, (where the increase of people and stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce, and so of some value) the several communities settled the bounds of their distinct territories, and by laws within themselves regulated the properties of the private men of their society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled the property which labour and industry began; and the leagues that have been made between several states and kingdoms, either expresly or tacitly disowning all claim and right to the land in the others possession, have, by common consent, given up their pretences to their natural common right, which originally they had to those countries, and so have, by positive agreement, settled a property amongst themselves, in distinct parts and parcels of the earth; yet there are still great tracts of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind, in the consent of the use of their common money) lie waste, and are more than the people who dwell on it do, or can make use of, and so still lie in common; tho’ this can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of money.
45. In the beginning, labor gave people a right to property when they applied it to what was common. For a long time most land remained common, and even now more land exists than people use. At first, most people made do with what unassisted nature provided for their needs. Later, in some areas, population growth and accumulation of capital made land scarce. The introduction of money also increased its value. Communities there fixed the boundaries of their territories. They made laws regulating private property. By agreement they settled the property that labor and industry had begun. Treaties between states and kingdoms, either explicit or implied, renounced any claim to land held by others. By common consent they gave up their original natural right to those lands. Thus, by positive agreement, they established private property in distinct parts of the earth. Yet large tracts still remain unused. The people living on them have not joined the rest of mankind in accepting commonly used money. These lands lie waste. They are larger than the inhabitants can use, so they remain common. This rarely happens among those who have accepted the use of money.
Sect. 46. The greatest part of things really useful to the life of man, and such as the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the world look after, as it doth the Americans now, are generally things of short duration; such as, if they are not consumed by use, will decay and perish of themselves: gold, silver and diamonds, are things that fancy or agreement hath put the value on, more than real use, and the necessary support of life. Now of those good things which nature hath provided in common, every one had a right (as hath been said) to as much as he could use, and property in all that he could effect with his labour; all that his industry could extend to, to alter from the state nature had put it in, was his. He that gathered a hundred bushels of acorns or apples, had thereby a property in them, they were his goods as soon as gathered. He was only to look, that he used them before they spoiled, else he took more than his share, and robbed others. And indeed it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he could make use of. If he gave away a part to any body else, so that it perished not uselesly in his possession, these he also made use of. And if he also bartered away plums, that would have rotted in a week, for nuts that would last good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he wasted not the common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of goods that belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselesly in his hands. Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal, pleased with its colour; or exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond, and keep those by him all his life he invaded not the right of others, he might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of the bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his possession, but the perishing of any thing uselesly in it.
46. Most of the things that really matter to human life are the things the first common people looked for to survive. These things generally last only a short time. The same is true for the Americans now. If they are not consumed, they will decay and spoil on their own. Gold, silver, and diamonds have value more from fashion or agreement than from real use or the necessary support of life. Now, of those goods nature provided in common, everyone had a right, as has been said, to as much as he could use. He also had property in whatever he could make his by labour. All that his labour could reach and change from the state nature had put it in became his. A person who gathered a hundred bushels of acorns or apples therefore had property in them. They were his goods as soon as he gathered them. He only had to be careful to use them before they spoiled. Otherwise he took more than his share and robbed others. It was both foolish and dishonest to hoard more than he could use. If he gave part of them to someone, so they did not rot while in his possession, he still made use of them. If he traded plums that would have rotted in a week for nuts that would keep him for a year, he did no harm. He did not waste the common stock nor destroy any part of the goods belonging to others, as long as nothing perished uselessly in his hands. Likewise, if he exchanged his nuts for a piece of metal because he liked its colour, or swapped his sheep for shells, or his wool for a bright pebble or a diamond and kept those durable things all his life, he did not violate others’ rights. He could accumulate as many durable things as he pleased. The limit on rightful property was not the size of his possessions, but whether anything perished uselessly in them.
Sect. 47. And thus came in the use of money, some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable supports of life.
47. And so money came into use. It was a durable thing people could keep without it spoiling. By mutual agreement, people accepted it in exchange for the truly useful but perishable supports of life.
Sect. 48. And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men possessions in different proportions, so this invention of money gave them the opportunity to continue and enlarge them: for supposing an island, separate from all possible commerce with the rest of the world, wherein there were but an hundred families, but there were sheep, horses and cows, with other useful animals, wholsome fruits, and land enough for corn for a hundred thousand times as many, but nothing in the island, either because of its commonness, or perishableness, fit to supply the place of money; what reason could any one have there to enlarge his possessions beyond the use of his family, and a plentiful supply to its consumption, either in what their own industry produced, or they could barter for like perishable, useful commodities, with others? Where there is not some thing, both lasting and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there men will not be apt to enlarge their possessions of land, were it never so rich, never so free for them to take: for I ask, what would a man value ten thousand, or an hundred thousand acres of excellent land, ready cultivated, and well stocked too with cattle, in the middle of the inland parts of America, where he had no hopes of commerce with other parts of the world, to draw money to him by the sale of the product? It would not be worth the enclosing, and we should see him give up again to the wild common of nature, whatever was more than would supply the conveniencies of life to be had there for him and his family.
48. And as different degrees of industry tended to give men possessions in different proportions, so this invention of money gave them the opportunity to keep and enlarge them. For suppose an island, cut off from all possible commerce with the rest of the world. Suppose there were only a hundred families on it. But there were sheep, horses, and cows, with other useful animals, wholesome fruits, and land enough for grain for a hundred thousand times as many. Yet there was nothing on the island fit to take the place of money, either because it was too plentiful or because it was perishable. What reason could anyone there have to enlarge his possessions beyond the use of his family and a plentiful supply for its consumption? That supply might come from what their own industry produced, or from what they could barter with others for similar perishable, useful goods. Where there is not something both lasting and scarce, and so valuable enough to be hoarded, men will not tend to enlarge their possessions of land. This holds however rich the land may be, and however free for them to take. For I ask, what would ten thousand, or a hundred thousand, acres of excellent land be worth to a man? Suppose it ready cultivated, and well stocked with cattle too, in the middle of the inland parts of America. Suppose he had no hope of commerce with other parts of the world to draw money to him by selling the product. It would not be worth enclosing. We would see him give back to the wild common of nature whatever was more than would supply the conveniences of life to be had there for him and his family.
Sect. 49. Thus in the beginning all the world was America, and more so than that is now; for no such thing as money was any where known. Find out something that hath the use and value of money amongst his neighbours, you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge his possessions.
49. In the beginning, the whole world was like America. It was even more so than it is now, because no one knew about money. If someone finds among his neighbors something that serves as money and has value, you will see it happen. The same person will soon begin to increase their possessions.
Sect. 50. But since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of man in proportion to food, raiment, and carriage, has its value only from the consent of men, whereof labour yet makes, in great part, the measure, it is plain, that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth, they having, by a tacit and voluntary consent, found out, a way how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus gold and silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to any one; these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the possessor. This partage of things in an inequality of private possessions, men have made practicable out of the bounds of society, and without compact, only by putting a value on gold and silver, and tacitly agreeing in the use of money: for in governments, the laws regulate the right of property, and the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions.
50. Gold and silver are of little use to the life of man compared with food, clothing, and transport. They have their value only from the consent of men, though labour still largely sets the measure of it. So it is plain that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth. By a tacit and voluntary consent, they have found a way by which a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of. He does it by receiving gold and silver in exchange for the surplus. These may be hoarded up without injury to anyone, since these metals do not spoil or decay in the hands of the possessor. Men have made this division of things into unequal private possessions practicable outside the bounds of society, and without compact. They did it only by putting a value on gold and silver and tacitly agreeing to use money. For in governments, the laws regulate the right of property, and the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions.
Sect. 51. And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive, without any difficulty, how labour could at first begin a title of property in the common things of nature, and how the spending it upon our uses bounded it. So that there could then be no reason of quarrelling about title, nor any doubt about the largeness of possession it gave. Right and conveniency went together; for as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour upon, so he had no temptation to labour for more than he could make use of. This left no room for controversy about the title, nor for encroachment on the right of others; what portion a man carved to himself, was easily seen; and it was useless, as well as dishonest, to carve himself too much, or take more than he needed.
51. I think it is easy to see how labor could at first create a title of property in the things held in common in nature. Using that labor to make things for our needs set limits on that title. There was then no reason to argue about title or to doubt how large the possession was. Rights and convenience went together. A person had a right to everything they could apply their labor to. They had no reason to work for more than they could use. This left no room for disputes over title or for encroaching on others' rights. The portion a person carved out for themselves was easy to see. It was useless and dishonest to take more than was needed.