Chapter 14

As every political community consists of those who govern and of those who are governed, let us consider whether during the continuance of their lives they ought to be the same persons or different; for it is evident that the mode of education should be adapted to this distinction. Now, if one man differed from another as much, as we believe, the gods and heroes differ from men: in the first place, being far their superiors in body; and, secondly, in the soul: so that the superiority of the governors over the governed might be evident beyond a doubt, it is certain that it would be better for the one always to govern, the other always to be governed: but, as this is not easy to obtain, and kings are not so superior to those they govern as Scylax informs us they are in India, it is evident that for many reasons it is necessary that all in their turns should both govern and be governed: for it is just that those who are equal should have everything alike; and it is difficult for a state to continue which is founded in injustice; for all those in the country who are desirous of innovation will apply themselves to those who are under the government of the rest, and such will be their numbers in the state, that it will be impossible for the magistrates to get the better of them. But that the governors ought to excel the governed is beyond a doubt; the legislator therefore ought to consider how this shall be, and how it may be contrived that all shall have their equal share in the administration. Now, with respect to this it will be first said, that nature herself has directed us in our choice, laying down the selfsame thing when she has made some young, others old: the first of whom it becomes to obey, the latter to command; for no one when he is young is offended at his being under government, or thinks himself too good for it; more especially when he considers that he himself shall receive the same honours which he pays when he shall arrive at a proper age. In some respects it must be acknowledged that the governors and the governed are the same, in others they are different; it is therefore necessary that their education should be in [1333a] some respect the same, in others different: as they say, that he will be a good governor who has first learnt to obey. Now of governments, as we have already said, some are instituted for the sake of him who commands; others for him who obeys: of the first sort is that of the master over the servant; of the latter, that of freemen over each other. Now some things which are commanded differ from others; not in the business, but in the end proposed thereby: for which reason many works, even of a servile nature, are not disgraceful for young freemen to perform; for many things which are ordered to be done are not honourable or dishonourable so much in their own nature as in the end which is proposed, and the reason for which they are undertaken. Since then we have determined, that the virtue of a good citizen and good governor is the same as of a good man; and that every one before he commands should have first obeyed, it is the business of the legislator to consider how his citizens may be good men, what education is necessary to that purpose, and what is the final object of a good life. The soul of man may be divided into two parts; that which has reason in itself, and that which hath not, but is capable of obeying its dictates: and according to the virtues of these two parts a man is said to be good: but of those virtues which are the ends, it will not be difficult for those to determine who adopt the division I have already given; for the inferior is always for the sake of the superior; and this is equally evident both in the works of art as well as in those of nature; but that is superior which has reason. Reason itself also is divided into two parts, in the manner we usually divide it; the theoretic and the practical; which division therefore seems necessary for this part also: the same analogy holds good with respect to actions; of which those which are of a superior nature ought always to be chosen by those who have it in their power; for that is always most eligible to every one which will procure the best ends. Now life is divided into labour and rest, war and peace; and of what we do the objects are partly necessary and useful, partly noble: and we should give the same preference to these that we do to the different parts of the soul and its actions, as war to procure peace; labour, rest; and the useful, the noble. The politician, therefore, who composes a body of laws ought to extend his views to everything; the different parts of the soul and their actions; more particularly to those things which are of a superior nature and ends; and, in the same manner, to the lives of men and their different actions.

Every political community consists of rulers and those they rule. Let us consider whether these roles should belong to the same people throughout their lives or to different people. Education must clearly be adapted to this distinction. Suppose some people differed from others as much as we believe gods and heroes differ from human beings. Suppose they were far superior first in body and then in soul, making their superiority as rulers beyond doubt. In that case, it would certainly be better for one group always to rule and the other always to obey. But such superiority is not easy to find. Kings are not as superior to their subjects as Scylax tells us they are in India. So, for many reasons, everyone must take turns ruling and being ruled. Justice requires equals to have equal shares in everything. And a state founded on injustice has difficulty surviving. Everyone in the country who wants political change will rally to those ruled by the rest. Their numbers within the state will be so great that the officials will be unable to overcome them. Yet rulers must undoubtedly be superior to those they rule. The lawmaker must therefore consider how to ensure this superiority while giving everyone an equal share in government. On this question, we can first say that nature herself has guided our choice. By making some people young and others old, nature has established this very distinction. The young should obey, and the old should command. No young person resents being ruled or thinks himself too good to obey. This is especially true when he expects to receive the same honors at the proper age that he now gives others. In some respects, then, rulers and those they rule are the same people. In other respects, they are different. Their education must therefore be [1333a] the same in some respects and different in others. As people say, a good ruler must first have learned to obey. As we have already said, some forms of government serve the person who commands. Others serve the person who obeys. A master's rule over a slave belongs to the first kind. The rule of free people over one another belongs to the second. Some tasks people are ordered to perform differ not in the work itself, but in its purpose. For this reason, many tasks, even those suited to slaves, are not disgraceful for young free people to perform. Many assigned tasks are honorable or dishonorable less because of their nature than because of their purpose and motive. We have established that a good citizen and a good ruler have the same virtue as a good person. We have also established that everyone should obey before commanding. The lawmaker must therefore consider how citizens can become good people and what education they need for that purpose. The lawmaker must also consider the ultimate goal of a good life. The human soul can be divided into two parts. One possesses reason in itself. The other lacks reason but can follow its directions. A person is called good according to the virtues of these two parts. Those who accept this division will easily determine which virtues are ends in themselves. For the lower always exists for the sake of the higher. This is equally clear in human craftsmanship and in nature. And the part that possesses reason is higher. Reason itself is also divided in the usual way into two parts, theoretical and practical. So we must also recognize this division within the rational part of the soul. The same principle applies to actions. People who have the power to choose should always choose actions of a higher kind. For everyone should always prefer whatever achieves the best ends. Life is divided into work and leisure, war and peace. Some of our actions aim at what is necessary and useful, others at what is noble. We should rank these aims as we rank the different parts of the soul and their actions. War should serve peace, work should serve leisure, and the useful should serve the noble. The statesman who draws up laws must therefore consider everything: the different parts of the soul and their actions. He must pay particular attention to the higher parts and actions, and to their ends. In the same way, he must consider people's lives and their different actions.

They ought to be fitted both for labour and war, but rather [1333b] for rest and peace; and also to do what is necessary and useful, but rather what is fair and noble. It is to those objects that the education of the children ought to tend, and of all the youths who want instruction. All the Grecian states which now seem best governed, and the legislators who founded those states, appear not to have framed their polity with a view to the best end, or to every virtue, in their laws and education; but eagerly to have attended to what is useful and productive of gain: and nearly of the same opinion with these are some persons who have written lately, who, by praising the Lacedaemonian state, show they approve of the intention of the legislator in making war and victory the end of his government. But how contrary to reason this is, is easily proved by argument, and has already been proved by facts (but as the generality of men desire to have an extensive command, that they may have everything desirable in the greater abundance; so Thibron and others who have written on that state seem to approve of their legislator for having procured them an extensive command by continually enuring them to all sorts of dangers and hardships): for it is evident, since the Lacedemonians have now no hope that the supreme power will be in their own hand, that neither are they happy nor was their legislator wise. This also is ridiculous, that while they preserved an obedience to their laws, and no one opposed their being governed by them, they lost the means of being honourable: but these people understand not rightly what sort of government it is which ought to reflect honour on the legislator; for a government of freemen is nobler than despotic power, and more consonant to virtue. Moreover, neither should a city be thought happy, nor should a legislator be commended, because he has so trained the people as to conquer their neighbours; for in this there is a great inconvenience: since it is evident that upon this principle every citizen who can will endeavour to procure the supreme power in his own city; which crime the Lacedaemonians accuse Pausanias of, though he enjoyed such great honours.

They should be prepared for both work and war, but above all [1333b] for rest and peace. They should also do what is necessary and useful, but above all what is admirable and noble. These should be the aims of education for children and all young people who need instruction. All the Grecian states now considered best governed seem to have fallen short, along with the legislators who founded them. Their laws and education seem designed neither for the best goal nor for every virtue. Instead, they have eagerly pursued what is useful and profitable. Some recent writers hold nearly the same view. By praising the Lacedaemonian state, these writers endorse its legislator’s decision to make war and victory his government’s goal. But arguments easily show how unreasonable this goal is, and events have already proved it. Most people want extensive power so that they can have more of everything they desire. Similarly, Thibron and others who have written about that state seem to praise its legislator for securing extensive power. He did so by continually training the people to endure every kind of danger and hardship. For the Lacedemonians now have no hope of holding supreme power. Their loss of that hope makes it clear that they are neither happy nor guided by a wise legislator. Another point is ridiculous. Although they continued to obey their laws, and no one opposed their rule under those laws, they lost the means of gaining honour. But these writers misunderstand what kind of government should bring honour to its legislator. Governing free people is nobler than exercising despotic power, and more consistent with virtue. Moreover, a city should not be considered happy merely because its people have been trained to conquer their neighbours. Nor should its legislator be praised for such training. For this approach has a serious drawback. On this principle, every citizen who can will try to gain supreme power in his own city. This is the crime the Lacedaemonians accuse Pausanias of, although he enjoyed such great honours.

Such reasoning and such laws are neither political, useful nor true: but a legislator ought to instil those laws on the minds of men which are most useful for them, both in their public and private capacities. The rendering a people fit for war, that they may enslave their inferiors ought not to be the care of the legislator; but that they may not themselves be reduced to slavery by others. In [1334a] the next place, he should take care that the object of his government is the safety of those who are under it, and not a despotism over all: in the third place, that those only are slaves who are fit to be only so. Reason indeed concurs with experience in showing that all the attention which the legislator pays to the business of war, and all other rules which he lays down, should have for their object rest and peace; since most of those states (which we usually see) are preserved by war; but, after they have acquired a supreme power over those around them, are ruined; for during peace, like a sword, they lose their brightness: the fault of which lies in the legislator, who never taught them how to be at rest.

Such reasoning and laws are neither politically sound, useful, nor true. Instead, a legislator should teach people the laws most useful to them in both public and private life. His concern should not be to prepare people for war so they can enslave their inferiors. Rather, he should prepare them so that others cannot enslave them. In [1334a] the second place, he should ensure that his government aims to protect those under its rule. It should not aim at despotic power over everyone. Third, he should ensure that only those fit for nothing but slavery are slaves. Reason and experience agree on the proper aim of all the legislator’s attention to warfare and all his other rules. That aim should be rest and peace. For most states we commonly see are kept safe by war. But once these states gain supreme power over their neighbors, they are ruined. In peace they lose their shine, like a sword. The fault lies with the legislator, who never taught them how to live at rest.