Chapter 15

As there is one end common to a man both as an individual and a citizen, it is evident that a good man and a good citizen must have the same object in view; it is evident that all the virtues which lead to rest are necessary; for, as we have often said, the end of war is peace, of labour, rest; but those virtues whose object is rest, and those also whose object is labour, are necessary for a liberal life and rest; for we want a supply of many necessary things that we may be at rest. A city therefore ought to be temperate, brave, and patient; for, according to the proverb, "Rest is not for slaves;" but those who cannot bravely face danger are the slaves of those who attack them. Bravery, therefore, and patience are necessary for labour, philosophy for rest, and temperance and justice in both; but these chiefly in time of peace and rest; for war obliges men to be just and temperate; but the enjoyment of pleasure, with the rest of peace, is more apt to produce insolence; those indeed who are easy in their circumstances, and enjoy everything that can make them happy, have great occasion for the virtues of temperance and justice. Thus if there are, as the poets tell us, any inhabitants in the happy isles, to these a higher degree of philosophy, temperance, and justice will be necessary, as they live at their ease in the full plenty of every sensual pleasure. It is evident, therefore, that these virtues are necessary in every state that would be happy or worthy; for he who is worthless can never enjoy real good, much less is he qualified to be at rest; but can appear good only by labour and being at war, but in peace and at rest the meanest of creatures. For which reason virtue should not be cultivated as the Lacedaemonians did; for they did not differ from others in their opinion concerning the supreme good, but in [1334b] imagining this good was to be procured by a particular virtue; but since there are greater goods than those of war, it is evident that the enjoyment of those which are valuable in themselves should be desired, rather than those virtues which are useful in war; but how and by what means this is to be acquired is now to be considered. We have already assigned three causes on which it will depend; nature, custom, and reason, arid shown what sort of men nature must produce for this purpose; it remains then that we determine which we shall first begin by in education, reason or custom, for these ought always to preserve the most entire harmony with each other; for it may happen that reason may err from the end proposed, and be corrected by custom. In the first place, it is evident that in this as in other things, its beginning or production arises from some principle, and its end also arises from another principle, which is itself an end. Now, with us, reason and intelligence are the end of nature; our production, therefore, and our manners ought to be accommodated to both these. In the next place, as the soul and the body are two distinct things, so also we see that the soul is divided into two parts, the reasoning and not-reasoning, with their habits which are two in number, one belonging to each, namely appetite and intelligence; and as the body is in production before the soul, so is the not-reasoning part of the soul before the reasoning; and this is evident; for anger, will and desire are to be seen in children nearly as soon as they are born; but reason and intelligence spring up as they grow to maturity. The body, therefore, necessarily demands our care before the soul; next the appetites for the sake of the mind; the body for the sake of the soul.

A man has the same ultimate goal as an individual and as a citizen. Clearly, then, a good man and a good citizen must aim at the same goal. All the virtues that lead to leisure are therefore necessary. As we have often said, the goal of war is peace, and the goal of work is leisure. But a free and fulfilling life of leisure requires both the virtues of leisure and the virtues of work. For we need a supply of many necessities before we can enjoy leisure. A city must therefore have self-control, courage, and endurance. For, as the proverb says, "Rest is not for slaves." But people who cannot bravely face danger become slaves to those who attack them. Courage and endurance are therefore necessary for work, and philosophy for leisure. Self-control and justice are necessary for both, but especially in times of peace and leisure. For war forces men to act justly and control themselves. But pleasure, combined with the ease of peace, is more likely to produce arrogance. Indeed, people who live comfortably and have everything needed for happiness have great need of self-control and justice. Thus, if the happy isles have inhabitants, as the poets tell us, those inhabitants need greater philosophy, self-control, and justice. For they live at ease, surrounded by every physical pleasure in abundance. Clearly, then, these virtues are necessary in every state that seeks happiness or excellence. For a worthless person can never enjoy what is truly good, much less make proper use of leisure. Such a person can appear good only through work and war. In peace and leisure, however, he appears the lowest of creatures. For this reason, virtue should not be cultivated as the Lacedaemonians cultivated it. They did not differ from others in their view of the highest good. Instead, they differed in [1334b] believing that this good could be gained through one particular virtue. But there are greater goods than those of war. Clearly, then, we should desire to enjoy things valuable in themselves rather than the virtues useful in war. We must now consider how and by what means we can achieve this goal. We have already identified three factors on which achieving this goal depends: nature, habit, and reason. We have also explained what kind of men nature must produce for this purpose. We must now decide whether education should begin with reason or habit. For reason and habit should always remain in complete harmony. Reason may stray from the intended goal, and habit may correct it. First, clearly, here as elsewhere, development begins from one principle and reaches its end through another principle. This second principle is itself an end. In human beings, reason and intelligence are nature's goal. Our development and habits should therefore be shaped to serve both. Next, just as the soul and body are distinct, we see that the soul also has two parts. One part reasons, and the other does not. Each has its own characteristic activity: appetite belongs to the nonreasoning part, and intelligence to the reasoning part. Just as the body develops before the soul, the nonreasoning part of the soul develops before the reasoning part. The evidence is clear. Anger, will, and desire appear in children almost as soon as they are born. But reason and intelligence emerge as children grow toward maturity. The body must therefore receive our care before the soul. Next, we must care for the appetites for the sake of the mind, and the body for the soul's sake.