Chapter 13

We will now show of what numbers and of what sort of people a government ought to consist, that the state may be happy and well administered. As there are two particulars on which the excellence and perfection of everything depend, one of these is, that the object and end proposed should be proper; the other, that the means to accomplish it should be adapted to that purpose; for it may happen that these may either agree or disagree with each other; for the end we propose may be good, but in taking the means to obtain it we may err; at other times we may have the right and proper means in our power, but the end may be bad, and sometimes we may mistake in both; as in the art of medicine the physician does not sometimes know in what situation the body ought to be, to be healthy; nor what to do to procure the end he aims at. In every art and science, therefore, we should be master of this knowledge, namely, the proper end, and the means to obtain it. Now it is evident that all persons are desirous to live well and be happy; but that some have the means thereof in their own power, others not; and this either through nature [1332a] or fortune; for many ingredients are necessary to a happy life; but fewer to those who are of a good than to those who are of a bad disposition. There are others who continually have the means of happiness in their own power, but do not rightly apply them. Since we propose to inquire what government is best, namely, that by which a state may be best administered, and that state is best administered where the people are the happiest, it is evident that happiness is a thing we should not be unacquainted with. Now, I have already said in my treatise on Morals (if I may here make any use of what I have there shown), that happiness consists in the energy and perfect practice of virtue; and this not relatively, but simply; I mean by relatively, what is necessary in some certain circumstances; by simply, what is good and fair in itself: of the first sort are just punishments, and restraints in a just cause; for they arise from virtue and are necessary, and on that account are virtuous; though it is more desirable that neither any state nor any individual should stand in need of them; but those actions which are intended either to procure honour or wealth are simply good; the others eligible only to remove an evil; these, on the contrary, are the foundation and means of relative good. A worthy man indeed will bear poverty, disease, and other unfortunate accidents with a noble mind; but happiness consists in the contrary to these (now we have already determined in our treatise on Morals, that he is a man of worth who considers what is good because it is virtuous as what is simply good; it is evident, therefore, that all the actions of such a one must be worthy and simply good): this has led some persons to conclude, that the cause of happiness was external goods; which would be as if any one should suppose that the playing well upon the lyre was owing to the instrument, and not to the art. It necessarily follows from what has been said, that some things should be ready at hand and others procured by the legislator; for which reason in founding a city we earnestly wish that there may be plenty of those things which are supposed to be under the dominion of fortune (for some things we admit her to be mistress over); but for a state to be worthy and great is not only the work of fortune but of knowledge and judgment also. But for a state to be worthy it is necessary that those citizens which are in the administration should be worthy also; but as in our city every citizen is to be so, we must consider how this may be accomplished; for if this is what every one could be, and not some individuals only, it would be more desirable; for then it would follow, that what might be done by one might be done by all. Men are worthy and good three ways; by nature, by custom, by reason. In the first place, a man ought to be born a man, and not any other animal; that is to say, he ought to have both a body and soul; but it avails not to be only born [1332b] with some things, for custom makes great alterations; for there are some things in nature capable of alteration either way which are fixed by custom, either for the better or the worse. Now, other animals live chiefly a life of nature; and in very few things according to custom; but man lives according to reason also, which he alone is endowed with; wherefore he ought to make all these accord with each other; for if men followed reason, and were persuaded that it was best to obey her, they would act in many respects contrary to nature and custom. What men ought naturally to be, to make good members of a community, I have already determined; the rest of this discourse therefore shall be upon education; for some things are acquired by habit, others by hearing them.

We will now explain how many people a government should include and what kind of people they should be. The aim is a happy, well-governed state. The excellence and perfection of anything depend on two things. First, the goal must be right. Second, the means must suit that goal. These two things may agree or conflict. We may choose a good goal but make mistakes in the means we use to reach it. At other times, we may have the right means available, but our goal may be bad. Sometimes we may be wrong about both. In medicine, for example, a doctor may not know what condition the body needs for health. Nor may the doctor know how to achieve the intended result. In every art and science, therefore, we must understand both the proper goal and the means of reaching it. Clearly, everyone wants to live well and be happy. But some people have the means to do so, while others do not. This difference comes either from nature [1332a] or from fortune. A happy life requires many things. But people with good characters need fewer of these things than people with bad characters. Others always have the means of happiness available but do not use them properly. We are asking what government is best, meaning the government under which a state can be best administered. And the best-administered state is the one whose people are happiest. Clearly, then, we must understand happiness. As I have already said in my treatise on Morals, happiness consists in the active and complete practice of virtue. I draw here on what I established there, if I may do so. This practice is good in itself, not merely good under certain circumstances. By good under certain circumstances, I mean what is necessary in a particular situation. By good in itself, I mean what is inherently good and noble. Just punishments and restraints imposed for a just cause belong to the first kind. They arise from virtue and are necessary, and for that reason they are virtuous. Yet it would be better if no state or individual needed them. By contrast, actions intended to gain either honor or wealth are good in themselves. Punishments and restraints are worth choosing only to remove an evil. Actions good in themselves, however, provide the foundation and means for what is good under particular circumstances. A good man will indeed face poverty, disease, and other misfortunes with a noble spirit. But happiness consists in conditions opposite to these. In my treatise on Morals, we have already defined a good man. He regards what is good because it is virtuous as good in itself. Clearly, then, all his actions must be worthy and good in themselves. This connection has led some people to conclude that external goods cause happiness. But that would be like saying that skillful lyre playing comes from the instrument rather than the player's art. It necessarily follows that some things must already be available, while others must be provided by the lawmaker. For this reason, when founding a city, we earnestly hope for an abundance of things considered subject to fortune. We do, after all, accept that fortune controls some things. But making a state good and great requires not only fortune, but also knowledge and judgment. For a state to be good, the citizens who govern it must also be good. In our city, every citizen is to take part in government, so we must consider how to achieve this goodness. If everyone could be good, rather than only some individuals, that would be more desirable. Then what one person could achieve could be achieved by all. People become worthy and good in three ways: through nature, habit, and reason. First, a person must be born human, not some other animal, with both a human body and soul. But being born [1332b] with certain qualities is not enough, because habit makes great changes. Some natural qualities can develop in either direction. Habit fixes them for better or worse. Other animals live chiefly by nature, and only in very few respects by habit. But human beings also live by reason, a capacity they alone possess. Therefore, nature, habit, and reason must be brought into harmony. If people followed reason and believed it best to obey reason, they would often act against nature and habit. I have already explained what natural qualities people need to be good members of a community. The rest of this discussion will therefore concern education. For some things are learned through habit, and others through instruction.