Chapter 2

It now remains for us to say whether the happiness of any individual man and the city is the same or different: but this also is evident; for whosoever supposes that riches will make a person happy, must place the happiness of the city in riches if it possesses them; those who prefer a life which enjoys a tyrannic power over others will also think, that the city which has many others under its command is most happy: thus also if any one approves a man for his virtue, he will think the most worthy city the happiest: but here there are two particulars which require consideration, one of which is, whether it is the most eligible life to be a member of the community and enjoy the rights of a citizen, or whether to live as a stranger, without interfering in public affairs; and also what form of government is to be preferred, and what disposition of the state is best; whether the whole community should be eligible to a share in the administration, or only the greater part, and some only: as this, therefore, is a subject of political examination and speculation, and not what concerns the individual, and the first of these is what we are at present engaged in, the one of these I am not obliged to speak to, the other is the proper business of my present design. It is evident that government must be the best which is so established, that every one therein may have it in his power to act virtuously and live happily: but some, who admit that a life of virtue is most eligible, still doubt which is preferable a public life of active virtue, or one entirely disengaged from what is without and spent in contemplation; which some say is the only one worthy of a philosopher; and one of these two different modes of life both now and formerly seem to have been chosen by all those who were the most virtuous men; I mean the public or philosophic. And yet it is of no little consequence on which side the truth lies; for a man of sense must naturally incline to the better choice; both as an individual and a citizen. Some think that a tyrannic government over those near us is the greatest injustice; but that a political one is not unjust: but that still is a restraint on the pleasures and tranquillity of life. Others hold the quite contrary opinion, and think that a public and active life is the only life for man: for that private persons have no opportunity of practising any one virtue, more than they have who are engaged in public life the management of the [1324b] state. These are their sentiments; others say, that a tyrannical and despotical mode of government is the only happy one; for even amongst some free states the object of their laws seems to be to tyrannise over their neighbours: so that the generality of political institutions, wheresoever dispersed, if they have any one common object in view, have all of them this, to conquer and govern. It is evident, both from the laws of the Lacedaemonians and Cretans, as well as by the manner in which they educated their children, that all which they had in view was to make them soldiers: besides, among all nations, those who have power enough and reduce others to servitude are honoured on that account; as were the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Gauls: with some there are laws to heighten the virtue of courage; thus they tell us that at Carthage they allowed every person to wear as many rings for distinction as he had served campaigns. There was also a law in Macedonia, that a man who had not himself killed an enemy should be obliged to wear a halter; among the Scythians, at a festival, none were permitted to drink out of the cup was carried about who had not done the same thing. Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, they fixed as many columns upon a man's tomb as he had slain enemies: and among different nations different things of this sort prevail, some of them established by law, others by custom. Probably it may seem too absurd to those who are willing to take this subject into their consideration to inquire whether it is the business of a legislator to be able to point out by what means a state may govern and tyrannise over its neighbours, whether they will, or will not: for how can that belong either to the politician or legislator which is unlawful? for that cannot be lawful which is done not only justly, but unjustly also: for a conquest may be unjustly made. But we see nothing of this in the arts: for it is the business neither of the physician nor the pilot to use either persuasion or force, the one to his patients, the other to his passengers: and yet many seem to think a despotic government is a political one, and what they would not allow to be just or proper, if exercised over themselves, they will not blush to exercise over others; for they endeavour to be wisely governed themselves, but think it of no consequence whether others are so or not: but a despotic power is absurd, except only where nature has framed the one party for dominion, the other for subordination; and therefore no one ought to assume it over all in general, but those only which are the proper objects thereof: thus no one should hunt men either for food or sacrifice, but what is fit for those purposes, and these are wild animals which are eatable.

We must now ask whether happiness is the same for an individual and a city, or different. But the answer is clear. Whoever thinks wealth makes a person happy must also think a city is happy if it possesses wealth. Those who prefer exercising tyrannical power over others will also consider the city ruling over many others the happiest. Likewise, anyone who admires a man for his virtue will consider the most virtuous city the happiest. But two questions need consideration here. First, is it better to belong to a community and enjoy a citizen’s rights? Or is it better to live as an outsider, taking no part in public affairs? Second, what form of government and organization of the state is best? Should the whole community be eligible to share in government, or only the greater part, or just some? This second question belongs to political inquiry and reflection, rather than to the study of individual life. Since political inquiry is our present concern, I need not discuss the first question. The second is the proper subject of this discussion. Clearly, the best government must enable everyone within it to act virtuously and live happily. But some people accept that a virtuous life is best while still doubting which kind of life is preferable. Is it an active public life of virtue? Or is it a life removed entirely from external affairs and devoted to contemplation? Some say the contemplative life is the only life worthy of a philosopher. Both now and in the past, all the most virtuous men seem to have chosen one of these two lives. I mean the public life or the philosophical life. Yet it matters greatly which view is right. A sensible man must naturally favor the better choice, both as an individual and as a citizen. Some think exercising tyrannical rule over those around us is the greatest injustice. They think governing them as citizens is not unjust, but still limits life’s pleasures and peace. Others hold exactly the opposite view. They think an active public life is the only life for a human being. In their view, private individuals have no greater opportunity to practice any virtue than those managing the [1324b] state. Such are their views. Others say that tyrannical and despotic rule is the only happy way of life. Even in some free states, the purpose of the laws seems to be domination over neighboring peoples. Thus, most political institutions everywhere, if they share any single aim, aim to conquer and rule. The laws of the Lacedaemonians and Cretans clearly show that their sole aim was to make soldiers. Their methods of educating children show the same purpose. Moreover, among all nations, those powerful enough to enslave others are honored for doing so. This was true of the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Gauls. Some peoples have laws designed to encourage courage. At Carthage, we are told, each person could wear one ring of distinction for every military campaign he had served. Macedonia also had a law requiring a man to wear a halter unless he had personally killed an enemy. Among the Scythians, a cup was passed around at a festival. No one who had not killed an enemy could drink from it. Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, a man’s tomb received one column for every enemy he had killed. Different nations have different practices of this kind. Some are established by law, others by custom. Those willing to consider this subject may find the following question too absurd to ask. Is a lawmaker’s task to discover how a state can rule and tyrannize over its neighbors, willing or unwilling? How can something unlawful belong to the work of a statesman or lawmaker? A practice cannot be lawful if it can be carried out unjustly as well as justly. Conquest, after all, can be unjust. Yet we see nothing like this in the skilled professions. Neither a doctor nor a ship’s pilot has the task of using persuasion or force. The doctor’s task is not to persuade or compel patients, nor the pilot’s to persuade or compel passengers. Yet many seem to think despotic rule is government over citizens. They shamelessly exercise power over others that they would consider neither just nor proper if exercised over themselves. They seek wise government for themselves, but think it does not matter whether others are wisely governed. But despotic power is absurd unless nature has made one party to rule and the other to obey. Therefore, no one should claim such power over everyone indiscriminately, but only over those suited to it. Likewise, no one should hunt human beings for food or sacrifice. Only creatures suited to those purposes should be hunted, namely edible wild animals.

Now a city which is well governed might be very [1325a] happy in itself while it enjoyed a good system of laws, although it should happen to be so situated as to have no connection with any other state, though its constitution should not be framed for war or conquest; for it would then have no occasion for these. It is evident therefore that the business of war is to be considered as commendable, not as a final end, but as the means of procuring it. It is the duty of a good legislator to examine carefully into his state; and the nature of the people, and how they may partake of every intercourse, of a good life, and of the happiness which results from it: and in this respect some laws and customs differ from others. It is also the duty of a legislator, if he has any neighbouring states to consider in what manner he shall oppose each of them, or what good offices he shall show them. But what should be the final end of the best governments will be considered hereafter.

Now a well-governed city might be very [1325a] happy on its own, as long as it had good laws. This could be true even if its location left it with no contact with any other state. Its constitution need not be designed for war or conquest, since the city would have no need for either. Clearly, then, warfare deserves praise not as an ultimate goal, but as a means of achieving that goal. A good lawmaker must carefully examine the state and the character of its people. The lawmaker must consider how the people can share in every kind of interaction and in a good life. The lawmaker must also consider how they can share in the happiness that results from such a life. In this respect, some laws and customs differ from others. If the state has neighbors, the lawmaker must also consider how to oppose each neighboring state or offer it help. But we will consider later what the ultimate goal of the best governments should be.