Chapter 3

We will now speak to those who, while they agree that a life of virtue is most eligible, yet differ in the use of it addressing ourselves to both these parties; for there are some who disapprove of all political governments, and think that the life of one who is really free is different from the life of a citizen, and of all others most eligible: others again think that the citizen is the best; and that it is impossible for him who does nothing to be well employed; but that virtuous activity and happiness are the same thing. Now both parties in some particulars say what is right, in others what is wrong, thus, that the life of a freeman is better than the life of a slave is true, for a slave, as a slave, is employed in nothing honourable; for the common servile employments which he is commanded to perform have nothing virtuous in them; but, on the other hand, it is not true that a submission to all sorts of governments is slavery; for the government of freemen differs not more from the government of slaves than slavery and freedom differ from each other in their nature; and how they do has been already mentioned. To prefer doing of nothing to virtuous activity is also wrong, for happiness consists in action, and many noble ends are produced by the actions of the just and wise. From what we have already determined on this subject, some one probably may think, that supreme power is of all things best, as that will enable a man to command very many useful services from others; so that he who can obtain this ought not to give it up to another, but rather to seize it: and, for this purpose, the father should have no attention or regard for the son, or the son for the father, or friend for friend; for what is best is most eligible: but to be a member of the community and be in felicity is best. What these persons advance might probably be true, if the supreme good was certainly theirs who plunder and use violence to others: but it is [1325b] most unlikely that it should be so; for it is a mere supposition: for it does not follow that their actions are honourable who thus assume the supreme power over others, without they were by nature as superior to them as a man to a woman, a father to a child, a master to a slave: so that he who so far forsakes the paths of virtue can never return back from whence he departed from them: for amongst equals whatever is fair and just ought to be reciprocal; for this is equal and right; but that equals should not partake of what is equal, or like to like, is contrary to nature: but whatever is contrary to nature is not right; therefore, if there is any one superior to the rest of the community in virtue and abilities for active life, him it is proper to follow, him it is right to obey, but the one alone will not do, but must be joined to the other also: and, if we are right in what we have now said, it follows that happiness consists in virtuous activity, and that both with respect to the community as well as the individual an active life is the happiest: not that an active life must necessarily refer to other persons, as some think, or that those studies alone are practical which are pursued to teach others what to do; for those are much more so whose final object is in themselves, and to improve the judgment and understanding of the man; for virtuous activity has an end, therefore is something practical; nay, those who contrive the plan which others follow are more particularly said to act, and are superior to the workmen who execute their designs. But it is not necessary that states which choose to have no intercourse with others should remain inactive; for the several members thereof may have mutual intercourse with each other; for there are many opportunities for this among the different citizens; the same thing is true of every individual: for, was it otherwise, neither could the Deity nor the universe be perfect; to neither of whom can anything external separately exist. Hence it is evident that that very same life which is happy for each individual is happy also for the state and every member of it.

We will now address two groups who agree that a virtuous life is best but disagree about practicing virtue. Some reject all political government. They think a truly free person’s life differs from a citizen’s life and is better than any other. Others think the citizen’s life is best. They believe someone who does nothing cannot be doing well, and that virtuous activity and happiness are the same. Both groups are right in some respects and wrong in others. It is true that a free person’s life is better than a slave’s. For a slave, acting as a slave, does nothing honorable. The ordinary servile tasks a slave is ordered to perform contain no virtue. But it is not true that submission to every kind of government is slavery. Governing free people differs from governing slaves just as freedom and slavery differ in their nature. We have already explained those differences. It is also wrong to prefer doing nothing to virtuous activity. Happiness consists in action, and the actions of just and wise people achieve many noble ends. From what we have established, someone might conclude that supreme power is best of all. Supreme power enables a person to command many useful services from others. On this view, anyone able to gain supreme power should seize it rather than surrender it to someone else. In pursuing power, a father should have no regard for his son, nor a son for his father. Nor should friends have regard for one another. For what is best is most desirable, and belonging to the community and being happy is best. These arguments might perhaps be true if the highest good certainly belonged to those who plunder and use violence against others. But it is [1325b] most unlikely that the highest good belongs to them. Their argument rests on a mere assumption. Taking supreme power over others does not make a person’s actions honorable. Such actions would require the ruler to be naturally superior to those ruled. The superiority would have to match that of a man over a woman, a father over a child, or a master over a slave. Someone who strays so far from virtue can never regain the point from which he departed. For among equals, whatever is fair and just must be reciprocal. Reciprocity is equal and right. Denying equals an equal share, or treating similar people differently, is contrary to nature. And whatever is contrary to nature is not right. Therefore, if someone surpasses the rest of the community in virtue and ability to act, that person should lead. It is right to obey that person. But virtue alone is not enough, nor is ability alone. Both must be present. If our argument is right, happiness consists in virtuous activity. An active life is therefore happiest for both the community and the individual. But an active life need not involve other people, as some think. Nor are studies practical only when they teach others what to do. Studies pursued for their own sake, to improve a person’s judgment and understanding, are much more practical. For virtuous activity has an end and is therefore practical. Indeed, those who devise the plans others follow are more properly said to act. They are also superior to the workers who carry out their designs. Nor must states remain inactive if they choose to have no dealings with other states. Their members can interact with one another. There are many opportunities for such interaction among different citizens. The same is true of each individual. Otherwise, neither the Deity nor the universe could be perfect, since nothing exists separately outside either of them. Clearly, then, the same life brings happiness to each individual, to the state, and to every member of the state.