Chapter 8

We are now to consider upon what the preservation of governments in general and of each state in particular depends; and, in the first place, it is evident that if we are right in the causes we have assigned for their destruction, we know also the means of their preservation; for things contrary produce contraries: but destruction and preservation are contrary to each other. In well-tempered governments it requires as much care as anything whatsoever, that nothing be done contrary to law: and this ought chiefly to be attended to in matters of small consequence; for an illegality that approaches insensibly, approaches secretly, as in a family small expenses continually repeated consume a man's income; for the understanding is deceived thereby, as by this false argument; if every part is little, then the whole is little: now, this in one sense is true, in another is false, for the whole and all the parts together are large, though made up of small parts. The first therefore of anything is what the state ought to guard against. In the next place, no credit ought to be given to those who endeavour to deceive the people with false pretences; for they will be [1308a] confuted by facts. The different ways in which they will attempt to do this have been already mentioned. You may often perceive both aristocracies and oligarchies continuing firm, not from the stability of their forms of government, but from the wise conduct of the magistrates, both towards those who have a part in the management of public affairs, and those also who have not: towards those who have not, by never injuring them; and also introducing those who are of most consequence amongst them into office; nor disgracing those who are desirous of honour; or encroaching on the property of individuals; towards those who have, by behaving to each other upon an equality; for that equality which the favourers of a democracy desire to have established in the state is not only just, but convenient also, amongst those who are of the same rank: for which reason, if the administration is in the hands of many, those rules which are established in democracies will be very useful; as to let no one continue in office longer than six months: that all those who are of the same rank may have their turn; for between these there is a sort of democracy: for which reason demagogues are most likely to arise up amongst them, as we have already mentioned: besides, by this means both aristocracies and democracies will be the less liable to be corrupted into dynasties, because it will not be so easy for those who are magistrates for a little to do as much mischief as they could in a long time: for it is from hence that tyrannies arise in democracies and oligarchies; for either those who are most powerful in each state establish a tyranny, as the demagogues in the one, the dynasties in the other, or the chief magistrates who have been long in power. Governments are sometimes preserved not only by having the means of their corruption at a great distance, but also by its being very near them; for those who are alarmed at some impending evil keep a stricter hand over the state; for which reason it is necessary for those who have the guardianship of the constitution to be able to awaken the fears of the people, that they may preserve it, and not like a night-guard to be remiss in protecting the state, but to make the distant danger appear at hand. Great care ought also to be used to endeavour to restrain the quarrels and disputes of the nobles by laws, as well as to prevent those who are not already engaged in them from taking a part therein; for to perceive an evil at its very first approach is not the lot of every one, but of the politician. To prevent any alteration taking place in an oligarchy or free state on account of the census, if that happens to continue the same while the quantity of money is increased, it will be useful to take a general account of the whole amount of it in former times, to compare it with the present, and to do this every year in those cities where the census is yearly, [1308b] in larger communities once in three or five years; and if the whole should be found much larger or much less than it was at the time when the census was first established in the state, let there be a law either to extend or contract it, doing both these according to its increase or decrease; if it increases making the census larger, if it decreases smaller: and if this latter is not done in oligarchies and free states, you will have a dynasty arise in the one, an oligarchy in the other: if the former is not, free states will be changed into democracies, and oligarchies into free states or democracies. It is a general maxim in democracies, oligarchies, monarchies, and indeed in all governments, not to let any one acquire a rank far superior to the rest of the community, but rather to endeavour to confer moderate honours for a continuance than great ones for a short time; for these latter spoil men, for it is not every one who can bear prosperity: but if this rule is not observed, let not those honours which were conferred all at once be all at once taken away, but rather by degrees. But, above all things, let this regulation be made by the law, that no one shall have too much power, either by means of his fortune or friends; but if he has, for his excess therein, let it be contrived that he shall quit the country. Now, as many persons promote innovations, that they may enjoy their own particular manner of living, there ought to be a particular officer to inspect the manners of every one, and see that these are not contrary to the genius of the state in which he lives, whether it may be an oligarchy, a democracy, or any other form of government; and, for the same reason, those should be guarded against who are most prosperous in the city: the means of doing which is by appointing those who are otherwise to the business and the offices of the state. I mean, to oppose men of account to the common people, the poor to the rich, and to blend both these into one body, and to increase the numbers of those who are in the middle rank; and this will prevent those seditions which arise from an inequality of condition. But above all, in every state it is necessary, both by the laws and every other method possible, to prevent those who are employed by the public from being venal, and this particularly in an oligarchy; for then the people will not be so much displeased from seeing themselves excluded from a share in the government (nay, they will rather be glad to have leisure to attend their private affairs) as at suspecting that the officers of the state steal the public money, then indeed they are afflicted with double concern, both because they are deprived of the honours of the state, and pillaged by those who enjoy them. There is one method of blending together a democracy and an aristocracy, [1309a] if office brought no profit; by which means both the rich and the poor will enjoy what they desire; for to admit all to a share in the government is democratical; that the rich should be in office is aristocratical. This must be done by letting no public employment whatsoever be attended with any emolument; for the poor will not desire to be in office when they can get nothing by it, but had rather attend to their own affairs: but the rich will choose it, as they want nothing of the community. Thus the poor will increase their fortunes by being wholly employed in their own concerns; and the principal part of the people will not be governed by the lower sort. To prevent the exchequer from being defrauded, let all public money be delivered out openly in the face of the whole city, and let copies of the accounts be deposited in the different wards tribes, and divisions. But, as the magistrates are to execute their offices without any advantages, the law ought to provide proper honours for those who execute them well. In democracies also it is necessary that the rich should be protected, by not permitting their lands to be divided, nor even the produce of them, which in some states is done unperceivably. It would be also better if the people would prevent them when they offer to exhibit a number of unnecessary and yet expensive public entertainments of plays, music, processions, and the like. In an oligarchy it is necessary to take great care of the poor, and allot them public employments which are gainful; and, if any of the rich insult them, to let their punishment be severer than if they insulted one of their own rank; and to let estates pass by affinity, and not gift: nor to permit any person to have more than one; for by this means property will be more equally divided, and the greater part of the poor get into better circumstances. It is also serviceable in a democracy and an oligarchy to allot those who take no part in public affairs an equality or a preference in other things; the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an oligarchy: but still all the principal offices in the state to be filled only by those who are best qualified to discharge them.

We must now consider what preserves governments in general and each state in particular. First, if we have correctly identified the causes of their destruction, we also know how to preserve them. Opposite causes produce opposite effects, and destruction is the opposite of preservation. In well-balanced governments, preventing any violation of the law requires as much care as anything else. Small matters deserve particular attention. Unlawfulness creeps in unnoticed, just as repeated small household expenses consume a person's income. Such expenses deceive our judgment through a false argument: if every part is small, the whole is small. In one sense this is true, but in another it is false. The whole, or all the parts together, is large, although each part is small. The state must therefore guard against the first beginnings of wrongdoing. Next, we should not believe those who try to deceive the people with false claims. The facts will [1308a] prove them wrong. We have already discussed the different ways they attempt this deception. Aristocracies and oligarchies often remain secure, not because their constitutions are stable, but because their officials act wisely. These officials act wisely toward both those who share in government and those who do not. They never mistreat those excluded from government, and they bring the most influential among them into office. They do not dishonor those who seek honor or take away anyone's property. Among those who share in government, officials treat one another as equals. The equality that supporters of democracy seek throughout the state is both just and useful among people of equal standing. So, when many people share in government, democratic rules can be very useful. For example, no one should hold office for longer than six months. Everyone of equal standing can then take a turn. There is a kind of democracy among these people. For that reason, demagogues are especially likely to arise among them, as we have already mentioned. Short terms also make both aristocracies and democracies less likely to become dynasties ruled by powerful families. Officials serving briefly cannot do as much harm as those serving for a long time. Long tenure is a source of tyranny in democracies and oligarchies. Tyranny may be established by the most powerful people, such as demagogues in democracies or ruling families in oligarchies. Or it may be established by chief officials who have long held power. Governments are sometimes preserved because the causes of their downfall are far away, but sometimes because those causes are near. People alarmed by an approaching danger keep a closer watch over the state. So those responsible for protecting the constitution must be able to awaken the people's fears to preserve it. The people must not neglect the state's protection like a careless night watchman. Its guardians must make distant danger seem close at hand. Great care must also be taken to restrain quarrels and disputes among the nobles through laws. Those not already involved must also be prevented from joining these disputes. Not everyone can recognize an evil when it first appears. That is the statesman's task. In an oligarchy or constitutional republic, political change may follow if property qualifications remain fixed while wealth increases. To prevent this, compare the total wealth in earlier times with its present amount. Make this comparison yearly in cities where property assessments are annual, [1308b] and every three or five years in larger communities. The total may prove much greater or smaller than when the property qualification was first established. If so, a law should raise or lower the qualification in proportion to the change. If wealth increases, raise the qualification. If wealth decreases, lower it. If the qualification is not lowered, an oligarchy will become a dynasty, and a constitutional republic will become an oligarchy. If the qualification is not raised, constitutional republics will become democracies, and oligarchies will become constitutional republics or democracies. A general rule applies to democracies, oligarchies, monarchies, and indeed all governments. No one should rise far above the rest of the community. Instead, grant moderate honors over a long period rather than great honors for a short time. Great honors spoil people, since not everyone can bear good fortune. But if this rule is ignored, honors granted all at once should not be removed all at once. They should instead be withdrawn gradually. Above all, the law must prevent anyone from gaining too much power through wealth or friends. If someone does gain excessive power, arrangements should be made for that person to leave the country. Many people promote political change so that they can live as they please. So a special official should inspect everyone's way of life. The official should check whether people's conduct conflicts with the character of their state, whether oligarchy, democracy, or another form. For the same reason, the state must guard against those who prosper most in the city. The way to do this is to appoint people in different circumstances to public business and office. I mean setting prominent people against the common people, and the poor against the rich. Both groups should be combined into one body, and the middle class should be enlarged. These measures will prevent civil conflicts caused by unequal conditions. Above all, every state must use laws and every other possible means to prevent public officials from profiting dishonestly. This is especially important in an oligarchy. The people will not resent exclusion from government as much as they resent suspected theft of public money. Indeed, they may welcome the leisure to attend to their own affairs. But if they suspect officials of stealing public money, they suffer a double grievance. They are denied public honors and robbed by those who enjoy them. Democracy and aristocracy could be combined in one way, [1309a] if public office brought no profit. Both rich and poor would then get what they want. Allowing everyone to share in government is democratic. Having the rich hold office is aristocratic. This combination requires that no public position bring any financial reward. The poor will not want office if they gain nothing from it. They will prefer to attend to their own affairs. But the rich will choose office, since they need nothing from the community. The poor will thus increase their wealth by devoting themselves entirely to their own business. And the leading citizens will not be governed by the lower classes. To prevent theft from the treasury, all public money should be paid out openly before the whole city. Copies of the accounts should be deposited in the different wards, tribes, and districts. But since officials are to serve without financial benefit, the law should provide suitable honors for those who serve well. In democracies, the rich must also be protected. Their land must not be divided up, nor even its produce, as happens unnoticed in some states. It would also be better to stop the rich from offering numerous unnecessary and expensive public entertainments. These include plays, music, processions, and similar events. In an oligarchy, great care must be taken of the poor. They should receive paid public positions. If rich people insult the poor, their punishment should be harsher than for insulting someone of their own rank. Estates should pass through family connections, not by gift, and no one should be allowed more than one estate. Property will then be distributed more equally, and most of the poor will become better off. In both democracies and oligarchies, those excluded from public affairs should receive equal or preferential treatment in other matters. This means the rich in a democracy and the poor in an oligarchy. But all the state's principal offices should still go only to those best qualified to perform their duties.