Chapter 9

There are three qualifications necessary for those who fill the first departments in government; first of all, an affection for the established constitution; second place, abilities every way completely equal to the business of their office; in the third, virtue and justice correspondent to the nature of that particular state they are placed in; for if justice is not the same in all states, it is evident that there must be different species thereof. There may be some doubt, when all these qualifications do not in the same persons, in what manner the choice shall be made; as for instance, suppose that one person is an accomplished general, but a bad man and no friend to the [1309b] constitution; another is just and a friend to it, which shall one prefer? we should then consider of two qualities, which of them the generality possess in a greater degree, which in a less; for which reason in the choice of a general we should regard his courage more than his virtue as the more uncommon quality; as there are fewer capable of conducting an army than there are good men: but, to protect the state or manage the finances, the contrary rule should be followed; for these require greater virtue than the generality are possessed of, but only that knowledge which is common to all. It may be asked, if a man has abilities equal to his appointment in the state, and is affectionate to the constitution, what occasion is there for being virtuous, since these two things alone are sufficient to enable him to be useful to the public? it is, because those who possess those qualities are often deficient in prudence; for, as they often neglect their own affairs, though they know them and love themselves, so nothing will prevent their serving the public in the same manner. In short, whatsoever the laws contain which we allow to be useful to the state contributes to its preservation: but its first and principal support is (as has been often insisted upon) to have the number of those who desire to preserve it greater than those who wish to destroy it. Above all things that ought not to be forgotten which many governments now corrupted neglect; namely, to preserve a mean. For many things seemingly favourable to a democracy destroy a democracy, and many things seemingly favourable to an oligarchy destroy an oligarchy. Those who think this the only virtue extend it to excess, not considering that as a nose which varies a little from perfect straightness, either towards a hook nose or a flat one, may yet be beautiful and agreeable to look at; but if this particularity is extended beyond measure, first of all the properties of the part is lost, but at last it can hardly be admitted to be a nose at all, on account of the excess of the rise or sinking: thus it is with other parts of the human body; so also the same thing is true with respect to states; for both an oligarchy and a democracy may something vary from their most perfect form and yet be well constituted; but if any one endeavours to extend either of them too far, at first he will make the government the worse for it, but at last there will be no government at all remaining. The lawgiver and the politician therefore should know well what preserves and what destroys a democracy or an oligarchy, for neither the one nor the other can possibly continue without rich and poor: but that whenever an entire equality of circumstances [1310a] prevails, the state must necessarily become of another form; so that those who destroy these laws, which authorise an inequality in property, destroy the government. It is also an error in democracies for the demagogues to endeavour to make the common people superior to the laws; and thus by setting them at variance with the rich, dividing one city into two; whereas they ought rather to speak in favour of the rich. In oligarchies, on the contrary, it is wrong to support those who are in administration against the people. The oaths also which they take in an oligarchy ought to be contrary to what they now are; for, at present, in some places they swear, "I will be adverse to the common people, and contrive all I can against them;" whereas they ought rather to suppose and pretend the contrary; expressing in their oaths, that they will not injure the people. But of all things which I have mentioned, that which contributes most to preserve the state is, what is now most despised, to educate your children for the state; for the most useful laws, and most approved by every statesman, will be of no service if the citizens are not accustomed to and brought up in the principles of the constitution; of a democracy, if that is by law established; of an oligarchy, if that is; for if there are bad morals in one man, there are in the city. But to educate a child fit for the state, it must not be done in the manner which would please either those who have the power in an oligarchy or those who desire a democracy, but so as they may be able to conduct either of these forms of governments. But now the children of the magistrates in an oligarchy are brought up too delicately, and the children of the poor hardy with exercise and labour; so that they are both desirous of and able to promote innovations. In democracies of the purest form they pursue a method which is contrary to their welfare; the reason of which is, that they define liberty wrong: now, there are two things which seem to be the objects of a democracy, that the people in general should possess the supreme power, and all enjoy freedom; for that which is just seems to be equal, and what the people think equal, that is a law: now, their freedom and equality consists in every one's doing what they please: that is in such a democracy every one may live as he likes; "as his inclination guides," in the words of Euripides: but this is wrong, for no one ought to think it slavery to live in subjection to government, but protection. Thus I have mentioned the causes of corruption in different states, and the means of their preservation.

Those who hold the highest government offices need three qualifications. First, they must be loyal to the established constitution. Second, their abilities must fully meet the demands of their office. Third, their virtue and justice must suit the particular state they serve. For if justice differs between states, there must clearly be different kinds of justice. When these qualifications do not all appear in the same person, choosing an official may be difficult. Suppose one candidate is a skilled general, but a bad man and no friend to the [1309b] constitution. Another is just and loyal to the constitution. Which should we prefer? We should consider which of the two qualities is more common and which is rarer. So when choosing a general, we should value courage more than virtue, because courage is the rarer quality. Fewer people can command an army than are good men. But when choosing someone to protect the state or manage its finances, we should follow the opposite rule. These offices require greater virtue than most people possess, but only knowledge that everyone shares. Someone may ask why an official needs virtue if he has the necessary abilities and loyalty to the constitution. Are these two qualifications not enough to make him useful to the public? The answer is that people with these qualities often lack sound judgment. People often neglect their own affairs, even though they understand those affairs and love themselves. So nothing prevents them from handling public affairs with the same neglect. In short, every legal provision we recognize as useful to the state helps preserve the state. But the state's first and greatest support is one I have often emphasized. Those who want to preserve the state must outnumber those who want to destroy it. Above all, we must remember something that many governments now in decline neglect: the need for moderation. Many measures that seem to favor democracy destroy democracy. Many measures that seem to favor oligarchy destroy oligarchy. Those who regard their government's defining principle as its only virtue carry that principle too far. They overlook a comparison with the shape of a nose. A nose may depart slightly from perfect straightness, becoming hooked or flat, and still look beautiful and pleasing. But if that feature becomes excessive, the nose first loses its proper proportions. Eventually, the extreme height or flatness makes it hardly recognizable as a nose. The same is true of other parts of the human body, and also of states. Both an oligarchy and a democracy may depart somewhat from their ideal form and still be well organized. But anyone who pushes either form too far will first make the government worse. Eventually, no government will remain at all. Lawmakers and politicians must therefore understand clearly what preserves and what destroys a democracy or an oligarchy. Neither form can possibly survive without both rich and poor. But whenever complete equality of economic circumstances [1310a] prevails, the state must necessarily take a different form. So those who abolish laws allowing unequal property ownership destroy the government. In democracies, demagogues also make a mistake when they try to place the common people above the laws. By setting the people against the rich, they divide one city into two. Instead, they should speak in support of the rich. In oligarchies, the opposite applies. It is wrong to support those in office against the people. The oaths taken in an oligarchy should also say the opposite of what they now say. In some places, officials now swear, "I will oppose the common people and do everything I can against them." Instead, they should adopt and declare the opposite position. Their oaths should state that they will not harm the people. Of everything I have mentioned, education suited to the state does the most to preserve it. Yet education of this kind is now neglected more than anything else. Even the most useful laws, approved by every statesman, will be useless without the right upbringing. Citizens must grow up accustomed to the principles of their constitution. If democracy is established by law, they must learn democratic principles. If oligarchy is established, they must learn oligarchic principles. For if bad habits can exist in an individual, they can also exist in a city. But educating children to suit the state does not mean simply pleasing those who hold power in an oligarchy. Nor does it mean pleasing those who want democracy. Rather, education must prepare citizens to maintain either form of government. Yet in oligarchies today, the children of officials are brought up too softly. Meanwhile, exercise and labor make the children of the poor tough. As a result, the poor are both eager and able to bring about political change. In democracies of the purest form, people follow a course that works against their own welfare. The reason is that they misunderstand freedom. Democracy seems to have two aims: supreme power for the people as a whole, and freedom for everyone. For justice seems to mean equality, and whatever the people consider equal becomes law. On this view, freedom and equality mean that everyone does whatever they please. In such a democracy, everyone may live as they like, "as his inclination guides," in the words of Euripides. But this view is wrong. No one should regard living under a government as slavery. Instead, everyone should regard it as protection. I have now described the causes of decline in different states and the means of preserving them.