Chapter 7

Commotions also arise in aristocracies, from there being so few persons in power (as we have already observed they do in oligarchies, for in this particular an aristocracy is most near an oligarchy, for in both these states the administration of public affairs is in the hands of a few; not that this arises from the same cause in both, though herein they chiefly seem alike): and these will necessarily be most likely to happen when the generality of the people are high-spirited and think themselves equal to each other in merit; such were those at Lacedasmon, called the Partheniae (for these were, as well as others, descendants of citizens), who being detected in a conspiracy against the state, were sent to found Tarentum. They will happen also when some great men are disgraced by those who have received higher honours than themselves, to whom they are no ways inferior in abilities, as Lysander by the kings: or when an ambitious man cannot get into power, as Cinadon, who, in the reign of Agesilaus, was chief in a conspiracy against the Spartans: and also when some are too poor and others too rich, which will most frequently happen in time of war; as at Lacedaemon during the Messenian war, which is proved by a poem of Tyrtaeus, [1307a] called "Eunomia;" for some persons being reduced thereby, desired that the lands might be divided: and also when some person of very high rank might still be higher if he could rule alone, which seemed to be Pausanias's intention at Lacedaemon, when he was their general in the Median war, and Anno's at Carthage. But free states and aristocracies are mostly destroyed from want of a fixed administration of public affairs; the cause of which evil arises at first from want of a due mixture of the democratic and the oligarchic parts in a free state; and in an aristocracy from the same causes, and also from virtue not being properly joined to power; but chiefly from the two first, I mean the undue mixture of the democratic and oligarchic parts; for these two are what all free states endeavour to blend together, and many of those which we call aristocracies, in this particular these states differ from each other, and on this account the one of them is less stable than the other, for that state which inclines most to an oligarchy is called an aristocracy, and that which inclines most to a democracy is called a free state; on which account this latter is more secure than the former, for the wider the foundation the securer the building, and it is ever best to live where equality prevails. But the rich, if the community gives them rank, very often endeavour to insult and tyrannise over others. On the whole, whichever way a government inclines, in that it will settle, each party supporting their own. Thus a free state will become a democracy; an aristocracy an oligarchy; or the contrary, an aristocracy may change into a democracy (for the poor, if they think themselves injured, directly take part with the contrary side) and a free state into an oligarchy. The only firm state is that where every one enjoys that equality he has a right to and fully possesses what is his own. And what I have been speaking of happened to the Thurians; for the magistrates being elected according to a very high census, it was altered to a lower, and they were subdivided into more courts, but in consequence of the nobles possessing all the land, contrary to law; the state was too much of an oligarchy, which gave them an opportunity of encroaching greatly on the rest of the people; but these, after they had been well inured to war, so far got the better of their guards as to expel every one out of the country who possessed more than he ought. Moreover, as all aristocracies are free oligarchies, the nobles therein endeavour to have rather too much power, as at Lacedaemon, where property is now in the hands of a few, and the nobles have too much liberty to do as they please and make such alliances as they please. Thus the city of the Locrians was ruined from an alliance with Dionysius; which state was neither a democracy nor well-tempered aristocracy. But an aristocracy chiefly approaches to a secret change by its being destroyed by degrees, as we [1307b] have already said of all governments in general; and this happens from the cause of the alteration being trifling; for whenever anything which in the least regards the state is treated with contempt, after that something else, and this of a little more consequence, will be more easily altered, until the whole fabric of government is entirely subverted, which happened in the government of Thurium; for the law being that they should continue soldiers for five years, some young men of a martial disposition, who were in great esteem amongst their officers, despising those who had the management of public affairs, and imagining they could easily accomplish their intention, first endeavoured to abolish this law, with a view of having it lawful to continue the same person perpetually in the military, perceiving that the people would readily appoint them. Upon this, the magistrates who are called counselors first joined together with an intention to oppose it but were afterwards induced to agree to it, from a belief that if that law was not repealed they would permit the management of all other public affairs to remain in their hands; but afterwards, when they endeavoured to restrain some fresh alterations that were making, they found that they could do nothing, for the whole form of government was altered into a dynasty of those who first introduced the innovations. In short, all governments are liable to be destroyed either from within or from without; from without when they have for their neighbour a state whose policy is contrary to theirs, and indeed if it has great power the same thing will happen if it is not their neighbour; of which both the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians are a proof; for the one, when conquerors everywhere destroyed the oligarchies; the other the democracies. These are the chief causes of revolutions and dissensions in governments.

Unrest also arises in aristocracies because so few people hold power. As we have already observed, the same happens in oligarchies. In this respect, an aristocracy most closely resembles an oligarchy, since a few people govern in both. The reasons for rule by the few differ, though this is their main point of resemblance. Such unrest is necessarily most likely when most people are proud and consider themselves equal in merit. This was true of the people at Lacedasmon called the Partheniae. They, like others, were descendants of citizens. After their conspiracy against the state was discovered, they were sent to found Tarentum. Unrest also occurs when great men suffer humiliation from men who have received higher honors but have no greater ability. Lysander, for example, suffered this treatment from the kings. Unrest also occurs when an ambitious man cannot gain power. Cinadon, for example, led a conspiracy against the Spartans during the reign of Agesilaus. Another cause is that some people are too poor and others too rich. This happens most often during war, as at Lacedaemon during the Messenian war. A poem by Tyrtaeus, [1307a] called "Eunomia," provides evidence of this. Some people whom the war had impoverished wanted the land redistributed. Unrest also arises when someone of very high rank could rise still higher by ruling alone. This seemed to be Pausanias's intention at Lacedaemon when he commanded their forces in the Median war. It also seemed to be Anno's intention at Carthage. But free states and aristocracies are mostly destroyed because their government lacks a stable arrangement. In a free state, this problem begins with an improper balance between democratic and oligarchic elements. In an aristocracy, the same imbalance causes trouble, along with a failure to link virtue properly with power. But the chief cause is the first two elements, democracy and oligarchy, being improperly mixed. All free states try to blend these two elements, as do many governments we call aristocracies. These states differ in how they combine the two, and this makes one less stable than the other. A state leaning more toward oligarchy is called an aristocracy. A state leaning more toward democracy is called a free state. For this reason, a free state is more secure than an aristocracy. The broader the foundation, the safer the building, and it is always best to live where equality prevails. But when the community gives the rich high standing, they very often try to mistreat and tyrannize over others. Generally, a government will settle into the form toward which it leans, as each party supports its own interests. Thus, a free state will become a democracy, and an aristocracy will become an oligarchy. Or the reverse may happen: an aristocracy may become a democracy, and a free state an oligarchy. For if the poor think they have been wronged, they immediately join the opposing side. The only stable state gives everyone the equality they are entitled to and full possession of what is theirs. What I have described happened to the Thurians. Officials were elected under a very high property qualification, which was then lowered. The officials were also divided among more courts. But the nobles owned all the land, contrary to law. As a result, the state leaned too far toward oligarchy. This gave the nobles an opportunity to make serious encroachments on the rest of the people. But after the people had gained considerable experience in war, they overcame the nobles' guards. They then expelled everyone who owned more land than they should. Moreover, since all aristocracies are oligarchies that allow freedom, their nobles try to claim rather too much power. At Lacedaemon, for example, property is now held by a few. The nobles have too much freedom to do as they please and form whatever alliances they please. Thus, the city of the Locrians was ruined by an alliance with Dionysius. That state was neither a democracy nor a properly balanced aristocracy. But an aristocracy is especially likely to change unnoticed because its destruction happens gradually. We [1307b] have already made this point about governments in general. This happens because the initial cause of change is small. Once something affecting the state, however slightly, is treated with contempt, another, slightly more important matter becomes easier to change. This continues until the whole structure of government is overturned. This happened in the government of Thurium. The law required soldiers to serve for five years. Some young men with a taste for war were highly regarded by their officers. They despised those who managed public affairs and thought they could easily achieve their aim. They first tried to abolish this law so that the same person could remain in military service indefinitely. They saw that the people would readily appoint them. The officials called counselors initially united to oppose the proposal, but were later persuaded to agree. They believed that, if the law was not repealed, the young men would leave all other public affairs to them. Later, however, the counselors tried to stop further changes and found themselves powerless. The whole government had become the exclusive rule of those who had first introduced the changes. In short, all governments can be destroyed either from within or from outside. Destruction from outside occurs when a neighboring state has an opposing form of government. Indeed, if the opposing state is powerful, the same thing happens even when it is not a neighbor. Both the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians provide evidence of this. Wherever the Athenians conquered, they destroyed oligarchies, while the Lacedaemonians destroyed democracies. These are the chief causes of revolutions and internal conflicts in governments.