Chapter 6

There are two things which of all others most evidently occasion a revolution in an oligarchy; one is, when the people are ill used, for then every individual is ripe for [1305b] sedition; more particularly if one of the oligarchy should happen to be their leader; as Lygdamis, at Naxus, who was afterwards tyrant of that island. Seditions also which arise from different causes will differ from each other; for sometimes a revolution is brought about by the rich who have no share in the administration, which is in the hands of a very few indeed: and this happened at Massilia, Ister, Heraclea, and other cities; for those who had no share in the government ceased not to raise disputes till they were admitted to it: first the elder brothers, and then the younger also: for in some places the father and son are never in office at the same time; in others the elder and younger brother: and where this is observed the oligarchy partakes something of a free state. At Ister it was changed into a democracy; in Heraclea, instead of being in the hands of a few, it consisted of six hundred. At Cnidus the oligarchy was destroyed by the nobles quarrelling with each other, because the government was in the hands of so few: for there, as we have just mentioned, if the father was in office, the son could not; or, if there were many brothers, the eldest only; for the people, taking advantage of their disputes, elected one of the nobles for their general, and got the victory: for where there are seditions government is weak. And formerly at Erithria, during the oligarchy of the Basilides, although the state flourished greatly under their excellent management, yet because the people were displeased that the power should be in the hands of so few, they changed the government. Oligarchies also are subject to revolutions, from those who are in office therein, from the quarrels of the demagogues with each other. The demagogues are of two sorts; one who flatter the few when they are in power: for even these have their demagogues; such was Charicles at Athens, who had great influence over the thirty; and, in the same manner, Phrynichus over the four hundred. The others are those demagogues who have a share in the oligarchy, and flatter the people: such were the state-guardians at Larissa, who flattered the people because they were elected by them. And this will always happen in every oligarchy where the magistrates do not elect themselves, but are chosen out of men either of great fortune or certain ranks, by the soldiers or by the people; as was the custom at Abydos. And when the judicial department is not in the hands of the supreme power, the demagogues, favouring the people in their causes, overturn the government; which happened at Heraclea in Pontus: and also when some desire to contract the power of the oligarchy into fewer hands; for those who endeavour to support an equality are obliged to apply to the people for assistance. An oligarchy is also subject to revolutions when the nobility spend their fortunes by luxury; for such persons are desirous of innovations, and either endeavour to be tyrants themselves or to support others in being so, as [1306a] Hypparinus supported Dionysius of Syracuse. And at Amphipolis one Cleotimus collected a colony of Chalcidians, and when they came set them to quarrel with the rich: and at AEgina a certain person who brought an action against Chares attempted on that account to alter the government. Sometimes they will try to raise commotions, sometimes they will rob the public, and then quarrel with each other, or else fight with those who endeavour to detect them; which was the case at Apollonia in Pontus. But if the members of an oligarchy agree among themselves the state is not very easily destroyed without some external force. Pharsalus is a proof of this, where, though the place is small, yet the citizens have great power, from the prudent use they make of it. An oligarchy also will be destroyed when they create another oligarchy under it; that is, when the management of public affairs is in the hands of a few, and not equally, but when all of them do not partake of the supreme power, as happened once at Elis, where the supreme power in general was in the hands of a very few out of whom a senate was chosen, consisting but of ninety, who held their places for life; and their mode of election was calculated to preserve the power amongst each other's families, like the senators at Lacedaemon. An oligarchy is liable to a revolution both in time of war and peace; in war, because through a distrust in the citizens the government is obliged to employ mercenary troops, and he to whom they give the command of the army will very often assume the tyranny, as Timophanes did at Corinth; and if they appoint more than one general, they will very probably establish a dynasty: and sometimes, through fear of this, they are forced to let the people in general have some share in the government, because they are obliged to employ them. In peace, from their want of confidence in each other, they will entrust the guardianship of the state to mercenaries and their general, who will be an arbiter between them, and sometimes become master of both, which happened at Larissa, when Simos and the Aleuadae had the chief power. The same thing happened at Abydos, during the time of the political clubs, of which Iphiades' was one. Commotions also will happen in an oligarchy from one party's overbearing and insulting another, or from their quarrelling about their law-suits or marriages. How their marriages, for instance, will have that effect has been already shown: and in Eretria, Diagoras destroyed the oligarchy of the knights upon the same account. A sedition also arose at Heraclea, from a certain person being condemned by the court; and at Thebes, in consequence of a man's being guilty of adultery; [1306b] the punishment indeed which Eurytion suffered at Heraclea was just, yet it was illegally executed: as was that at Thebes upon Archias; for their enemies endeavoured to have them publicly bound in the pillory. Many revolutions also have been brought about in oligarchies by those who could not brook the despotism which those persons assumed who were in power, as at Cnidus and Chios. Changes also may happen by accident in what we call a free state and in an oligarchy; wheresoever the senators, judges, and magistrates are chosen according to a certain census; for it often happens that the highest census is fixed at first; so that a few only could have a share in the government, in an oligarchy, or in a free state those of moderate fortunes only; when the city grows rich, through peace or some other happy cause, it becomes so little that every one's fortune is equal to the census, so that the whole community may partake of all the honours of government; and this change sometimes happens by little and little, and insensible approaches, sometimes quicker. These are the revolutions and seditions that arise in oligarchies, and the causes to which they are owing: and indeed both democracies and oligarchies sometimes alter, not into governments of a contrary form, but into those of the same government; as, for instance, from having the supreme power in the law to vest it in the ruling party, or the contrariwise.

Two things stand out above all others as causes of revolution in an oligarchy. One is the mistreatment of the people, because then every individual is ready for [1305b] rebellion. This is especially true if a member of the oligarchy becomes their leader. One example is Lygdamis at Naxus, who later became tyrant of that island. Rebellions also differ according to their causes. Sometimes the rich bring about a revolution because they have no share in a government controlled by very few people. This happened at Massilia, Ister, Heraclea, and other cities. Those excluded from government kept stirring up disputes until they were admitted, first the older brothers, then the younger ones. In some places, a father and son cannot hold office at the same time. In others, an older and younger brother cannot do so. Where these restrictions apply, the oligarchy has some features of a free state. At Ister, the government became a democracy. In Heraclea, power passed from a few people to six hundred. At Cnidus, disputes among the nobles destroyed the oligarchy because so few people controlled the government. As already mentioned, a son could not hold office while his father did. If there were several brothers, only the eldest could serve. The people took advantage of these disputes, elected one of the nobles as their general, and won. For internal conflict weakens a government. Earlier, at Erithria, the state flourished under the excellent management of the Basilides oligarchy. Yet the people resented power being held by so few, and they changed the government. Revolutions in oligarchies also arise among officeholders, through disputes between demagogues. There are two kinds of demagogues. One kind flatters the few who hold power, because even these rulers have their demagogues. Charicles at Athens was one example, with his great influence over the thirty. Phrynichus had similar influence over the four hundred. The other kind belongs to the oligarchy but flatters the people. The state-guardians at Larissa did this because the people elected them. This will always happen in oligarchies where magistrates do not choose their own members. Instead, soldiers or the people choose them from men of great wealth or particular ranks. This was the custom at Abydos. When the courts are not controlled by the supreme governing authority, demagogues overturn the government by supporting the people's lawsuits. This happened at Heraclea in Pontus. The same thing happens when some rulers want to concentrate the oligarchy's power in fewer hands. Those trying to preserve equality must then ask the people for help. An oligarchy also faces revolution when nobles spend their fortunes on luxurious living. Such people want political change. They try either to become tyrants themselves or to help others become tyrants. Thus [1306a] Hypparinus supported Dionysius of Syracuse. At Amphipolis, Cleotimus gathered a colony of Chalcidians. When they arrived, he stirred up conflict between them and the rich. At AEgina, someone who brought a lawsuit against Chares tried, because of that dispute, to change the government. Sometimes such people try to stir up unrest. Sometimes they steal public money and then quarrel among themselves, or fight those who try to expose them. This happened at Apollonia in Pontus. But if an oligarchy's members agree among themselves, the state is not easily overthrown without outside force. Pharsalus demonstrates this. Although the city is small, its citizens have great power because they use it wisely. An oligarchy will also be destroyed when it creates another oligarchy within itself. This happens when a few control public affairs, but do not share power equally. Not all members of the ruling group share supreme power. This once happened at Elis, where supreme power generally belonged to very few people. From that group, a senate of just ninety members was chosen, each serving for life. Their election system was designed to keep power within one another's families, like the senators at Lacedaemon. An oligarchy faces revolution in both war and peace. In war, distrust of the citizens forces the government to employ mercenaries. The army's commander will very often make himself tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth. If the rulers appoint several generals, those generals will very probably establish a ruling dynasty. Sometimes fear of this outcome forces the rulers to give the people a share in government, because they need their service. In peace, mutual distrust leads the rulers to entrust the state's protection to mercenaries and their general. The general becomes an arbitrator between the rival sides and sometimes becomes master of both. This happened at Larissa when Simos and the Aleuadae held the chief power. The same thing happened at Abydos during the period of the political clubs, including the club of Iphiades. Unrest also arises in an oligarchy when one group bullies and insults another, or over disputes involving lawsuits or marriages. How marriages can cause such conflicts has already been shown. At Eretria, Diagoras destroyed the oligarchy of the knights for this same reason. At Heraclea, a court's conviction of a certain person caused a rebellion. At Thebes, a man's adultery caused another. [1306b] Eurytion's punishment at Heraclea was deserved, but it was carried out illegally. The same was true of Archias's punishment at Thebes. Their enemies tried to have them publicly bound in the pillory. Many revolutions in oligarchies have also been led by people who could not tolerate their rulers' despotic behavior. This happened at Cnidus and Chios. Accidental changes can also occur in what we call a free state, as well as in an oligarchy. These changes occur wherever senators, judges, and magistrates must meet a property requirement. Often the requirement is initially set high. In an oligarchy, this allows only a few people to share in government. In a free state, it allows only people of moderate wealth to take part. But peace or some other good fortune may make the city rich. The requirement then becomes so low that everyone's property meets it, allowing the entire community access to every public office. Sometimes this change happens gradually, through barely noticeable steps. Sometimes it happens more quickly. These are the revolutions and rebellions that arise in oligarchies, and their causes. Indeed, both democracies and oligarchies sometimes change without becoming a different kind of government. Instead, they become another version of the same kind. For example, supreme power may pass from the law to the ruling party, or the reverse.