Chapter 5

We ought now to inquire into those events which will arise from these causes in every species of government. Democracies will be most subject to revolutions from the dishonesty of their demagogues; for partly, by informing against men of property, they induce them to join together through self-defence, for a common fear will make the greatest enemies unite; and partly by setting the common people against them: and this is what any one may continually see practised in many states. In the island of Cos, for instance, the democracy was subverted by the wickedness of the demagogues, for the nobles entered into a combination with each other. And at Rhodes the demagogues, by distributing of bribes, prevented the people from paying the trierarchs what was owing to them, who were obliged by the number of actions they were harassed with to conspire together and destroy the popular state. The same thing was brought about at Heraclea, soon after the settlement of the city, by the same persons; for the citizens of note, being ill treated by them, quitted the city, but afterwards joining together they returned and overthrew the popular state. Just in the same manner the democracy was destroyed in Megara; for there the demagogues, to procure money by confiscations, drove out the nobles, till the number of those who were banished was considerable, who, [1305a] returning, got the better of the people in a battle, and established an oligarchy. The like happened at Cume, during the time of the democracy, which Thrasymachus destroyed; and whoever considers what has happened in other states may perceive the same revolutions to have arisen from the same causes. The demagogues, to curry favour with the people, drive the nobles to conspire together, either by dividing their estates, or obliging them to spend them on public services, or by banishing them, that they may confiscate the fortunes of the wealthy. In former times, when the same person was both demagogue and general, the democracies were changed into tyrannies; and indeed most of the ancient tyrannies arose from those states: a reason for which then subsisted, but not now; for at that time the demagogues were of the soldiery; for they were not then powerful by their eloquence; but, now the art of oratory is cultivated, the able speakers are at present the demagogues; but, as they are unqualified to act in a military capacity, they cannot impose themselves on the people as tyrants, if we except in one or two trifling instances. Formerly, too, tyrannies were more common than now, on account of the very extensive powers with which some magistrates were entrusted: as the prytanes at Miletus; for they were supreme in many things of the last consequence; and also because at that time the cities were not of that very great extent, the people in general living in the country, and being employed in husbandry, which gave them, who took the lead in public affairs, an opportunity, if they had a turn for war, to make themselves tyrants; which they all did when they had gained the confidence of the people; and this confidence was their hatred to the rich. This was the case of Pisistratus at Athens, when he opposed the Pediaci: and of Theagenes in Megara, who slaughtered the cattle belonging to the rich, after he had seized those who kept them by the riverside. Dionysius also, for accusing Daphnseus and the rich, was thought worthy of being raised to a tyranny, from the confidence which the people had of his being a popular man in consequence of these enmities. A government shall also alter from its ancient and approved democratic form into one entirely new, if there is no census to regulate the election of magistrates; for, as the election is with the people, the demagogues who are desirous of being in office, to flatter them, will endeavour with all their power to make the people superior even to the laws. To prevent this entirely, or at least in a great measure, the magistrates should be elected by the tribes, and not by the people at large. These are nearly the revolutions to which democracies are liable, and also the causes from whence they arise.

We should now examine what results these causes produce in each form of government. Democracies are most vulnerable to revolutions because of the dishonesty of their demagogues. These leaders bring accusations against property owners, forcing them to unite in self-defense. A shared fear can unite even the bitterest enemies. The demagogues also turn the common people against property owners. Anyone can regularly see these practices in many states. On the island of Cos, for example, the democracy fell because of the demagogues’ wrongdoing. Their actions led the nobles to band together. At Rhodes, the demagogues distributed bribes and prevented the people from paying what they owed the trierarchs. These officials faced so many lawsuits that they were driven to conspire together and overthrow the democracy. Demagogues brought about the same result at Heraclea, soon after the city was founded. Prominent citizens left the city because the demagogues mistreated them. Later, these citizens joined forces, returned, and overthrew the democracy. The democracy at Megara was destroyed in just the same way. To raise money through confiscations, the demagogues drove out the nobles until many had been exiled. These exiles, [1305a] returning, defeated the people in battle and established an oligarchy. Something similar happened at Cume under the democracy that Thrasymachus overthrew. Anyone who examines events in other states may find that the same causes produced the same revolutions. To win popular favor, demagogues drive the nobles to conspire together. They divide the nobles’ estates or force them to spend their wealth on public services. Or they exile wealthy people so they can confiscate their fortunes. In earlier times, democracies became tyrannies when the same person was both a demagogue and a general. Indeed, most ancient tyrannies arose from democracies. There was a reason for this then that no longer applies. At that time, demagogues came from the military, because public speaking had not yet become their source of power. Now that the art of public speaking has developed, skilled speakers have become the demagogues. But because these speakers lack military skills, they cannot establish themselves as tyrants over the people. There have been only one or two minor exceptions. Tyrannies were also more common in earlier times because some officials were entrusted with very broad powers. The prytanes at Miletus, for example, had supreme authority over many matters of the greatest importance. Another reason was that cities were not then very large. Most people lived in the countryside and worked in farming. This gave political leaders an opportunity to make themselves tyrants if they had military ability. All such leaders did so once they had gained the people’s trust. They gained that trust through their hatred of the rich. This was how Pisistratus gained power at Athens when he opposed the Pediaci. Theagenes did the same at Megara. He seized those tending the rich people’s cattle by the riverside and then slaughtered the cattle. Dionysius, too, was considered worthy of being made a tyrant because he accused Daphnseus and the rich. These hostilities convinced the people that Dionysius was on their side. A government can also change from its old, established democratic form into an entirely new one. This can happen if no property qualification governs the election of officials. Since the people choose the officials, demagogues seeking office will flatter the people. These demagogues will do everything they can to place the people above even the laws. To prevent this completely, or at least to a great extent, the tribes should elect officials, not the people as a whole. These are, broadly speaking, the revolutions to which democracies are vulnerable and the causes that produce them.