Chapter 3

What influence ill-treatment and profit have for this purpose, and how they may be the causes of sedition, is almost self-evident; for when the magistrates are haughty and endeavour to make greater profits than their office gives them, they not only occasion seditions amongst each other, but against the state also who gave them their power; and this their avarice has two objects, either private property or the property of the state. What influence honours have, and how they may occasion sedition, is evident enough; for those who are themselves unhonoured while they see others honoured, will be ready for any disturbance: and these things are done unjustly when any one is either honoured or discarded contrary to their deserts, justly when they are according to them. Excessive honours are also a cause of sedition when one person or more are greater than the state and the power of the government can permit; for then a monarchy or a dynasty is usually established: on which account the ostracism was introduced in some places, as at Argos and Athens: though it is better to guard against such excesses in the founding of a state, than when they have been permitted to take place, to correct them afterward. Those who have been guilty of crimes will be the cause of sedition, through fear of punishment; as will those also who expect an injury, that they may prevent it; as was the case at Rhodes, when the nobles conspired against the people on account of the decrees they expected would pass against them. Contempt also is a cause of sedition and conspiracies; as in oligarchies, where there are many who have no share in the administration. The rich also even in democracies, despising the disorder and anarchy which will arise, hope to better themselves by the same means which happened at Thebes after the battle of Oenophyta, where, in consequence of bad administration, the democracy was destroyed; as it was at Megara, where the power of the people was lost through anarchy and disorder; the same thing happened at Syracuse before the tyranny of Gelon; and at Rhodes there was the same sedition before the popular government was overthrown. Revolutions in state will also arise from a disproportionate increase; for as the body consists of many parts, it ought to increase proportion-ably to preserve its symmetry, which would otherwise be destroyed; as if the foot was to be four cubits long, and the rest of the body but two palms; it might otherwise [1303a] be changed into an animal of a different form, if it increase beyond proportion not only in quantity, but also in disposition of parts; so also a city consists of parts, some of which may often increase without notice, as the number of poor in democracies and free states. They will also sometimes happen by accident, as at Tarentum, a little after the Median war, where so many of the nobles were killed in a battle by the lapygi, that from a free state the government was turned into a democracy; and at Argos, where so many of the citizens were killed by Cleomenes the Spartan, that they were obliged to admit several husbandmen to the freedom of the state: and at Athens, through the unfortunate event of the infantry battles, the number of the nobles was reduced by the soldiers being chosen from the list of citizens in the Lacedaemonian wars. Revolutions also sometimes take place in a democracy, though seldomer; for where the rich grow numerous or properties increase, they become oligarchies or dynasties. Governments also sometimes alter without seditions by a combination of the meaner people; as at Hersea: for which purpose they changed the mode of election from votes to lots, and thus got themselves chosen: and by negligence, as when the citizens admit those who are not friends to the constitution into the chief offices of the state, which happened at Orus, when the oligarchy of the archons was put an end to at the election of Heracleodorus, who changed that form of government into a democratic free state. By little and little, I mean by this, that very often great alterations silently take place in the form of government from people's overlooking small matters; as at Ambracia, where the census was originally small, but at last became nothing at all, as if a little and nothing at all were nearly or entirely alike. That state also is liable to seditions which is composed of different nations, till their differences are blended together and undistinguishable; for as a city cannot be composed of every multitude, so neither can it in every given time; for which reason all those republics which have hitherto been originally composed of different people or afterwards admitted their neighbours to the freedom of their city, have been most liable to revolutions; as when the Achaeans joined with the Traezenians in founding Sybaris; for soon after, growing more powerful than the Traezenians, they expelled them from the city; from whence came the proverb of Sybarite wickedness: and again, disputes from a like cause happened at Thurium between the Sybarites and those who had joined with them in building the city; for they assuming upon these, on account of the country being their own, were driven out. And at Byzantium the new citizens, being detected in plots against the state, were driven out of the city by force of arms. The Antisseans also, having taken in those who were banished from Chios, afterwards did the same thing; and also the Zancleans, after having taken in the people of Samos. The Appolloniats, in the Euxine Sea, having admitted their sojourners to the freedom of their city, were troubled with seditions: and the Syracusians, after the expulsion of their tyrants, having enrolled [1303b] strangers and mercenaries amongst their citizens, quarrelled with each other and came to an open rupture: and the people of Amphipolis, having taken in a colony of Chalcidians, were the greater part of them driven out of the city by them. Many persons occasion seditions in oligarchies because they think themselves ill-used in not sharing the honours of the state with their equals, as I have already mentioned; but in democracies the principal people do the same because they have not more than an equal share with others who are not equal to them. The situation of the place will also sometimes occasion disturbances in the state when the ground is not well adapted for one city; as at Clazomene, where the people who lived in that part of the town called Chytrum quarrelled with them who lived in the island, and the Colophonians with the Notians. At Athens too the disposition of the citizens is not the same, for those who live in the Piraeus are more attached to a popular government than those who live in the city properly so called; for as the interposition of a rivulet, however small, will occasion the line of the phalanx to fluctuate, so any trifling disagreement will be the cause of seditions; but they will not so soon flow from anything else as from the disagreement between virtue and vice, and next to that between poverty and riches, and so on in order, one cause having more influence than another; one of which that I last mentioned.

How mistreatment and the pursuit of profit cause rebellion is almost self-evident. When officials are arrogant and seek profits beyond what their office allows, they provoke rebellions. These rebellions arise both among the officials themselves and against the state that gave them power. Their greed targets either private property or state property. How honors cause rebellion is also clear enough. People who receive no honors, while seeing others honored, will be ready for any disturbance. Such treatment is unjust when people receive honors or are rejected contrary to their merits. It is just when the treatment matches their merits. Excessive honors also cause rebellion. This happens when one or more people become more powerful than the state and its government can allow. A monarchy or rule by a powerful family is then usually established. For this reason, some places, including Argos and Athens, introduced ostracism. Yet preventing such excesses when founding a state is better than correcting them after they have arisen. People guilty of crimes will provoke rebellion because they fear punishment. People who expect to suffer harm will also rebel to prevent it. This happened at Rhodes. The nobles conspired against the people because of the decrees they expected would be passed against them. Contempt also causes rebellion and conspiracies. This happens in oligarchies where many people have no share in government. Even in democracies, the rich despise the disorder and anarchy that will arise. They hope to improve their position through rebellion. This happened at Thebes after the battle of Oenophyta, where poor government led to the destruction of democracy. It also happened at Megara, where the people lost power through anarchy and disorder. The same happened at Syracuse before the tyranny of Gelon. At Rhodes, too, a similar rebellion preceded the overthrow of popular government. Political revolutions also arise when one part of the state grows out of proportion to the rest. A body consists of many parts, and these must grow in proportion to preserve its balance. Otherwise, that balance would be destroyed. Imagine a foot four cubits long while the rest of the body measured only two palms. The body might otherwise [1303a] become an animal of a different form. This could happen if its growth became disproportionate not only in size but also in the arrangement of its parts. A city likewise consists of parts, some of which may often grow unnoticed. One example is the number of poor people in democracies and constitutional republics. Such revolutions will also sometimes happen by accident. At Tarentum, shortly after the Median war, the lapygi killed so many nobles in battle that the government changed. What had been a constitutional republic became a democracy. At Argos, Cleomenes the Spartan killed so many citizens that several farmers had to be granted citizenship. At Athens, defeats in infantry battles during the Lacedaemonian wars reduced the number of nobles. This happened because soldiers were drawn from the citizen lists. Revolutions also sometimes occur in democracies, though less often. When the rich grow numerous or property holdings increase, democracies become oligarchies or governments controlled by powerful families. Governments also sometimes change without rebellion, through organized action by ordinary people. This happened at Hersea. To gain office, ordinary people changed the selection process from voting to drawing lots, and so secured their own selection. Governments also change through negligence. Citizens may admit people hostile to the constitution into the highest offices. This happened at Orus when Heracleodorus was elected. His election ended the oligarchy of the archons, and he turned the government into a democratic republic. By gradual change, I mean that major changes in government very often happen unnoticed because people overlook small matters. At Ambracia, for example, the property qualification for citizenship was originally low. Eventually, it disappeared entirely, as if a small qualification and none at all were nearly or entirely the same. A state made up of different peoples is also vulnerable to rebellion until their differences blend together and disappear. Just as not every collection of people can form a city, neither can a city form in any given time. For this reason, all republics founded by different peoples have so far been especially vulnerable to revolution. The same applies to republics that later granted citizenship to their neighbors. For example, the Achaeans joined the Traezenians in founding Sybaris. Soon afterward, the Achaeans grew more powerful and expelled the Traezenians from the city. This gave rise to the proverb about Sybarite wickedness. Disputes arose for a similar reason at Thurium, between the Sybarites and those who joined them in founding the city. The Sybarites claimed superiority because the land belonged to them, and they were driven out. At Byzantium, new citizens were caught plotting against the state and were expelled by force of arms. The Antisseans also admitted exiles from Chios and later expelled them. The Zancleans did the same after admitting the people of Samos. The Appolloniats, on the Euxine Sea, granted citizenship to their foreign residents and were troubled by rebellions. After expelling their tyrants, the Syracusians enrolled [1303b] foreigners and mercenaries as citizens. They then quarreled among themselves and broke into open conflict. The people of Amphipolis admitted a colony of Chalcidians. The Chalcidians then drove most of the original people out of the city. Many people provoke rebellions in oligarchies because they believe they are being treated unfairly, as I have already mentioned. They are denied a share in the state's honors alongside people they consider their equals. In democracies, leading citizens rebel for the opposite reason. They receive only an equal share alongside people they consider unequal to themselves. The location of a state will also sometimes cause unrest when the terrain is poorly suited to a single city. At Clazomene, residents of the district called Chytrum quarreled with those living on the island. The Colophonians likewise quarreled with the Notians. At Athens, too, citizens differ in their political outlook. Those living in the Piraeus favor popular government more than those living in the city proper. Even a tiny stream crossing a phalanx's path can disrupt its line. In the same way, any slight disagreement can cause rebellion. But rebellion arises most readily from the division between virtue and vice, and next from the division between poverty and wealth. Other divisions follow in order, with some causes having greater influence than others. One such cause is the one I mentioned last.