Chapter 14

We will now proceed to make some general reflections upon the governments next in order, and also to consider each of them in particular; beginning with those principles which appertain to each: now there are three things in all states which a careful legislator ought well to consider, which are of great consequence to all, and which properly attended to the state must necessarily be happy; and according to the variation of which the one will differ from the other. The first of these is the [1298a] public assembly; the second the officers of the state, that is, who they ought to be, and with what power they should be entrusted, and in what manner they should be appointed; the third, the judicial department.

We will now make some general observations about the forms of government next in order and examine each one separately. We will begin with the principles belonging to each. Every state has three elements that a careful lawmaker must consider closely. All three are important to every state. If these elements are properly arranged, the state must necessarily flourish. Differences in these elements distinguish one form of government from another. The first is the [1298a] public assembly. The second is the state's officials: who they should be, what powers they should have, and how they should be appointed. The third is the judicial branch.

Now it is the proper business of the public assembly to determine concerning war and peace, making or breaking off alliances, to enact laws, to sentence to death, banishment, or confiscation of goods, and to call the magistrates to account for their behaviour when in office. Now these powers must necessarily be entrusted to the citizens in general, or all of them to some; either to one magistrate or more; or some to one, and some to another, or some to all, but others to some: to entrust all to all is in the spirit of a democracy, for the people aim at equality. There are many methods of delegating these powers to the citizens at large, one of which is to let them execute them by turn, and not altogether, as was done by Tellecles, the Milesian, in his state. In others the supreme council is composed of the different magistrates, and they succeed to the offices of the community by proper divisions of tribes, wards, and other very small proportions, till every one in his turn goes through them: nor does the whole community ever meet together, without it is when new laws are enacted, or some national affair is debated, or to hear what the magistrates have to propose to them. Another method is for the people to meet in a collective body, but only for the purpose of holding the comitia, making laws, determining concerning war or peace, and inquiring into the conduct of their magistrates, while the remaining part of the public business is conducted by the magistrates, who have their separate departments, and are chosen out of the whole community either by vote or ballot. Another method is for the people in general to meet for the choice of the magistrates, and to examine into their conduct; and also to deliberate concerning war and alliances, and to leave other things to the magistrates, whoever happen to be chosen, whose particular employments are such as necessarily require persons well skilled therein. A fourth method is for every person to deliberate upon every subject in public assembly, where the magistrates can determine nothing of themselves, and have only the privilege of giving their opinions first; and this is the method of the most pure democracy, which is analogous to the proceedings in a dynastic oligarchy and a tyrannic monarchy.

The public assembly’s proper role is to decide on war and peace, make or break alliances, and pass laws. It also imposes sentences of death, exile, or confiscation of property, and holds magistrates accountable for their conduct in office. These powers must be entrusted either to the citizens as a whole or to a smaller group. All powers may belong to one magistrate or several. Alternatively, some powers may belong to one magistrate and some to another. Or some may belong to all citizens and others to a smaller group. Entrusting all powers to all citizens reflects the spirit of democracy, because the people aim at equality. There are many ways to give these powers to the citizens as a whole. One is to have citizens exercise them in turns, rather than all together. Tellecles, the Milesian, used this method in his state. In other states, the supreme council consists of the various magistrates. Citizens take turns holding public office through divisions of tribes, wards, and other very small groups. This rotation continues until everyone has served in turn. The whole community meets only to pass new laws, debate a national matter, or hear proposals from the magistrates. Another method is for the people to meet as a body, but only for certain purposes. These are holding elections, making laws, deciding on war or peace, and examining the magistrates’ conduct. The remaining public business is handled by magistrates, each with a separate area of responsibility. These magistrates are chosen from the whole community, either by vote or by lot. Another method is for all the people to meet to choose magistrates and examine their conduct. The people also debate war and alliances. Other matters are left to whichever magistrates are chosen. These magistrates’ particular duties necessarily require people with the relevant expertise. A fourth method is for every citizen to debate every subject in the public assembly. Under this arrangement, magistrates can decide nothing on their own. Their only privilege is to give their opinions first. This is the method of the purest democracy. It resembles the practices of a dynastic oligarchy and a tyrannical monarchy.

These, then, are the methods in which public business is conducted in a democracy. When the power is in the hands of part of the community only, it is an oligarchy and this also admits of different customs; for whenever the officers of the state are chosen out of those who have a moderate fortune, and these from that circumstance are many, and when they depart not from that line which the law has laid down, but carefully follow it, and when all within the census are eligible, certainly it is then an oligarchy, but founded on true principles of government [1298b] from its moderation. When the people in general do not partake of the deliberative power, but certain persons chosen for that purpose, who govern according to law; this also, like the first, is an oligarchy. When those who have the deliberative power elect each other, and the son succeeds to the father, and when they can supersede the laws, such a government is of necessity a strict oligarchy. When some persons determine on one thing, and others on another, as war and peace, and when all inquire into the conduct of their magistrates, and other things are left to different officers, elected either by vote or lot, then the government is an aristocracy or a free state. When some are chosen by vote and others by lot, and these either from the people in general, or from a certain number elected for that purpose, or if both the votes and the lots are open to all, such a state is partly an aristocracy, partly a free government itself. These are the different methods in which the deliberative power is vested in different states, all of whom follow some regulation here laid down. It is advantageous to a democracy, in the present sense of the word, by which I mean a state wherein the people at large have a supreme power, even over the laws, to hold frequent public assemblies; and it will be best in this particular to imitate the example of oligarchies in their courts of justice; for they fine those who are appointed to try causes if they do not attend, so should they reward the poor for coming to the public assemblies: and their counsels will be best when all advise with each other, the citizens with the nobles, the nobles with the citizens. It is also advisable when the council is to be composed of part of the citizens, to elect, either by vote or lot, an equal number of both ranks. It is also proper, if the common people in the state are very numerous, either not to pay every one for his attendance, but such a number only as will make them equal to the nobles, or to reject many of them by lot.

These, then, are the ways public business is conducted in a democracy. When only part of the community holds power, the government is an oligarchy. Oligarchies also take different forms. In one form, state officials are chosen from people with moderate wealth, so many people qualify. The officials carefully follow the limits set by law, and everyone meeting the property requirement is eligible for office. Such a government is certainly an oligarchy. But its moderation means it rests on sound principles of government [1298b]. In another form, the people as a whole have no share in public decision-making. Instead, certain people are chosen for that purpose and govern according to law. This government, like the first, is also an oligarchy. When decision-makers choose one another, sons succeed their fathers, and rulers can override the laws, the government is necessarily a strict oligarchy. When different groups decide different matters, such as war and peace, the government is an aristocracy or a free state. In this arrangement, everyone reviews the conduct of public officials. Other matters are left to different officials, chosen either by vote or by lot. In another arrangement, some are chosen by vote and others by lot. They may be drawn from the whole population or from a group elected for that purpose. Alternatively, both voting and selection by lot may be open to everyone. Such a state is partly an aristocracy and partly a free government. These are the different ways states assign decision-making power. All states follow some arrangement described here. Frequent public assemblies benefit a democracy in the sense I now mean. By democracy here, I mean a state where the people as a whole have supreme power, even over the laws. In this respect, democracies would do best to follow the example of oligarchies in their courts. Oligarchies fine those appointed to hear cases if they fail to attend. Likewise, democracies should pay the poor to attend public assemblies. Deliberations will be best when everyone consults one another, ordinary citizens with nobles and nobles with ordinary citizens. When only some citizens make up the council, it is also advisable to choose equal numbers from both ranks. They should be chosen either by vote or by lot. If the common people are very numerous, it is also appropriate not to pay everyone for attending. Instead, only enough should be paid to equal the number of nobles. Alternatively, many of the common people should be excluded by lot.

In an oligarchy they should either call up some of the common people to the council, or else establish a court, as is done in some other states, whom they call pre-advisers or guardians of the laws, whose business should be to propose first what they should afterwards enact. By this means the people would have a place in the administration of public affairs, without having it in their power to occasion any disorder in the government. Moreover, the people may be allowed to have a vote in whatever bill is proposed, but may not themselves propose anything contrary thereto; or they may give their advice, while the power of determining may be with the magistrates only. It is also necessary to follow a contrary practice to what is established in democracies, for the people should be allowed the power of pardoning, but not of condemning, for the cause should be referred back again to the magistrates: whereas the contrary takes place in republics; for the power of pardoning is with the few, but not of condemning, which is always referred [1299a] to the people at large. And thus we determine concerning the deliberative power in any state, and in whose hands it shall be.

In an oligarchy, some common people should be brought onto the council. Alternatively, a court should be established, as in some other states, whose members are called pre-advisers or guardians of the laws. Their task should be to put forward proposals before those proposals become law. This would give the people a role in public affairs without giving them the power to disrupt the government. Moreover, the people may be allowed to vote on any proposed bill, but not to make proposals against it. Or the people may give advice, while only the magistrates have the power to decide. It is also necessary to follow the opposite practice from that established in democracies. The people should have the power to pardon, but not to condemn. Instead, the case should be referred back to the magistrates. In republics, the opposite happens. The few have the power to pardon, but not to condemn. The decision to condemn is always referred [1299a] to the people as a whole. This concludes our account of the power to deliberate in a state and who should hold it.