Chapter 15

We now proceed to consider the choice of magistrates; for this branch of public business contains many different Parts, as how many there shall be, what shall be their particular office, and with respect to time how long each of them shall continue in place; for some make it six months, others shorter, others for a year, others for a much longer time; or whether they should be perpetual or for a long time, or neither; for the same person may fill the same office several times, or he may not be allowed to enjoy it even twice, but only once: and also with respect to the appointment of magistrates, who are to be eligible, who is to choose them, and in what manner; for in all these particulars we ought properly to distinguish the different ways which may be followed; and then to show which of these is best suited to such and such governments.

We now turn to the choice of public officials, because this area of public affairs involves many different questions. How many officials should there be? What should each official’s duties be? How long should each official serve? Some governments set terms of six months, others shorter terms, others a year, and others much longer. Should officials hold office for life, for a long term, or neither? The same person may hold the same office several times. Or a person may be allowed to hold an office only once, not even twice. There are also questions about appointing officials: who should be eligible, who should choose them, and how? In all these matters, we should carefully distinguish the different approaches available. Then we should show which approach best suits each kind of government.

Now it is not easy to determine to whom we ought properly to give the name of magistrate, for a government requires many persons in office; but every one of those who is either chosen by vote or lot is not to be reckoned a magistrate. The priests, for instance, in the first place; for these are to be considered as very different from civil magistrates: to these we may add the choregi and heralds; nay, even ambassadors are elected: there are some civil employments which belong to the citizens; and these are either when they are all engaged in one thing, as when as soldiers they obey their general, or when part of them only are, as in governing the women or educating the youth; and also some economic, for they often elect corn-meters: others are servile, and in which, if they are rich, they employ slaves. But indeed they are most properly called magistrates, who are members of the deliberative council, or decide causes, or are in some command, the last more especially, for to command is peculiar to magistrates. But to speak truth, this question is of no great consequence, nor is it the province of the judges to decide between those who dispute about words; it may indeed be an object of speculative inquiry; but to inquire what officers are necessary in a state, and how many, and what, though not most necessary, may yet be advantageous in a well-established government, is a much more useful employment, and this with respect to all states in general, as well as to small cities.

It is not easy to decide who should properly be called a magistrate. Government requires many officeholders, but not everyone chosen by vote or lot counts as a magistrate. First, consider priests, who should be regarded as very different from civil magistrates. We can add the choregi, who sponsor choruses, and heralds to this list. Even ambassadors are elected. Some public duties fall to citizens. Sometimes all citizens perform the same duty, as when they serve as soldiers under a general. Sometimes only some citizens perform a duty, such as supervising women or educating the young. Other duties concern economic matters, since states often elect officials to measure grain. Still other duties are menial, and wealthy people employ slaves to perform them. But those most properly called magistrates serve on the deliberative council, decide legal cases, or exercise command. Those who exercise command especially deserve the title, because commanding is the distinctive function of magistrates. In truth, however, this question is not very important. Nor is it the judges’ role to settle disputes over words. The question may indeed be worth studying in theory. But a much more useful task is to ask what offices a state needs, and how many. We should also ask which offices, though not strictly necessary, may benefit a well-established government. These questions apply both to states in general and to small cities.

In extensive governments it is proper to allot one employment to one person, as there are many to serve the public in so numerous a society, where some may be passed over for a long time, and others never be in office but once; and indeed everything is better done which has the whole attention of one person, than when that [1299b] attention is divided amongst many; but in small states it is necessary that a few of the citizens should execute many employments; for their numbers are so small it will not be convenient to have many of them in office at the same time; for where shall we find others to succeed them in turn? Small states will sometimes want the same magistrates and the same laws as large ones; but the one will not want to employ them so often as the other; so that different charges may be intrusted to the same person without any inconvenience, for they will not interfere with each other, and for want of sufficient members in the community it will be necessary. If we could tell how many magistrates are necessary in every city, and how many, though not necessary, it is yet proper to have, we could then the better know how many different offices one might assign to one magistrate. It is also necessary to know what tribunals in different places should have different things under their jurisdiction, and also what things should always come under the cognisance of the same magistrate; as, for instance, decency of manners, shall the clerk of the market take cognisance of that if the cause arises in the market, and another magistrate in another place, or the same magistrate everywhere: or shall there be a distinction made of the fact, or the parties? as, for instance, in decency of manners, shall it be one cause when it relates to a man, another when it relates to a woman?

In large states, it is right to assign one office to each person. Such a large society has many people available for public service. Some may wait a long time to serve, and others may hold office only once. Indeed, every task is done better when one person gives it their full attention [1299b] rather than dividing their attention among many tasks. But in small states, a few citizens must hold several offices. There are so few citizens that having many in office at once would be impractical. Where would we find others to take their turns afterward? Small states will sometimes need the same officials and laws as large states. But small states will not need to use those officials and laws as often. So several duties can be entrusted to one person without difficulty, because the duties will not interfere with one another. The shortage of citizens will also make this arrangement necessary. Suppose we could determine how many officials every city needs, and how many others, though unnecessary, are still desirable. We could then better judge how many different offices to assign to one official. We must also know which courts in different places should have authority over different matters. We must know, too, which matters should always fall under the same official's authority. For example, should the market inspector oversee proper conduct when a case arises in the market, and another official elsewhere? Or should the same official oversee proper conduct everywhere? Or should cases be divided according to the act involved or the people concerned? For example, should cases involving proper conduct be treated differently depending on whether they concern a man or a woman?

In different states shall the magistrates be different or the same? I mean, whether in a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a monarchy, the same persons shall have the same power? or shall it vary according to the different formation of the government? as in an aristocracy the offices of the state are allotted to those who are well educated; in an oligarchy to those who are rich; in a democracy to the freemen? Or shall the magistrates differ as the communities differ? For it may happen that the very same may be sometimes proper, sometimes otherwise: in this state it may be necessary that the magistrate have great powers, in that but small. There are also certain magistrates peculiar to certain states—as the pre-advisers are not proper in a democracy, but a senate is; for one such order is necessary, whose business shall be to consider beforehand and prepare those bills which shall be brought before the people that they may have leisure to attend to their own affairs; and when these are few in number the state inclines to an oligarchy. The pre-advisers indeed must always be few for they are peculiar to an oligarchy: and where there are both these offices in the same state, the pre-adviser's is superior to the senator's, the one having only a democratical power, the other an oligarchical: and indeed the [1300a] power of the senate is lost in those democracies, in which the people, meeting in one public assembly, take all the business into their own hands; and this is likely to happen either when the community in general are in easy circumstances, or when they are paid for their attendance; for they are then at leisure often to meet together and determine everything for themselves. A magistrate whose business is to control the manners of the boys, or women, or who takes any department similar to this, is to be found in an aristocracy, not in a democracy; for who can forbid the wives of the poor from appearing in public? neither is such a one to be met with in an oligarchy; for the women there are too delicate to bear control. And thus much for this subject. Let us endeavour to treat at large of the establishment of magistrates, beginning from first principles. Now, they differ from each other in three ways, from which, blended together, all the varieties which can be imagined arise. The first of these differences is in those who appoint the magistrates, the second consists in those who are appointed, the third in the mode of appointment; and each of these three differ in three manners; for either all the citizens may appoint collectively, or some out of their whole body, or some out of a particular order in it, according to fortune, family, or virtue, or some other rule (as at Megara, where the right of election was amongst those who had returned together to their country, and had reinstated themselves by force of arms) and this either by vote or lot. Again, these several modes may be differently formed together, as some magistrates may be chosen by part of the community, others by the whole; some out of part, others out of the whole; some by vote, others by lot: and each of these different modes admit of a four-fold subdivision; for either all may elect all by vote or by lot; and when all elect, they may either proceed without any distinction, or they may elect by a certain division of tribes, wards, or companies, till they have gone through the whole community: and some magistrates may be elected one way, and others another. Again, if some magistrates are elected either by vote or lot of all the citizens, or by the vote of some and the lot of some, or some one way and some another; that is to say, some by the vote of all, others by the lot of all, there will then be twelve different methods of electing the magistrates, without blending the two together. Of these there are two adapted to a democracy; namely, to have all the magistrates chosen out of all the people, either by vote or lot, or both; that is to say, some of them by lot, some by vote. In a free state the whole community should not elect at the same time, but some out of the whole, or out of some particular rank; and this either by lot, or vote, or both: and they should elect either out of the whole community, or out of some particular persons in it, and this both by lot and vote. In an oligarchy it is proper to choose some magistrates out of the whole body of the citizens, some by vote, some by lot, others by both: by lot is most correspondent to that form of government. In a free aristocracy, some magistrates [1300b] should be chosen out of the community in general, others out of a particular rank, or these by choice, those by lot. In a pure oligarchy, the magistrates should be chosen out of certain ranks, and by certain persons, and some of those by lot, others by both methods; but to choose them out of the whole community is not correspondent to the nature of this government. It is proper in an aristocracy for the whole community to elect their magistrates out of particular persons, and this by vote. These then are all the different ways of electing of magistrates; and they have been allotted according to the nature of the different communities; but what mode of proceeding is proper for different communities, or how the offices ought to be established, or with what powers shall be particularly explained. I mean by the powers of a magistrate, what should be his particular province, as the management of the finances or the laws of the state; for different magistrates have different powers, as that of the general of the army differs from the clerk of the market.

Should different states have different public officials, or the same ones? That is, should the same people have the same powers in a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a monarchy? Or should appointments vary with the form of government? In an aristocracy, for example, public offices go to the well educated. In an oligarchy, they go to the rich, and in a democracy, to free citizens. Or should public offices differ as communities differ? The same arrangement may sometimes be suitable and sometimes not. In one state, an official may need great powers, but in another, only limited powers. Some offices also belong to particular forms of government. For example, pre-advisers are unsuitable for a democracy, but a senate is suitable. Some such body is necessary to consider and prepare bills before they reach the people. This preparation gives the people time to attend to their own affairs. When this body has few members, the state leans toward oligarchy. Pre-advisers must always be few, since their office is characteristic of oligarchy. Where both offices exist, the pre-advisers rank above the senators. The senate has only democratic power, while the pre-advisers have oligarchic power. Indeed, the [1300a] senate loses its power in democracies where the people take all business into their own hands in a public assembly. This is likely to happen when the community is generally prosperous, or when citizens are paid to attend. For then citizens have the leisure to meet frequently and decide everything themselves. Officials who supervise the conduct of boys or women, or have similar duties, belong in an aristocracy, not a democracy. For who can prevent the wives of the poor from appearing in public? Nor are such officials found in an oligarchy, because the women there are too accustomed to luxury to accept control. That is enough on this subject. Let us now examine the appointment of public officials more fully, starting with first principles. Appointments differ in three ways, and combinations of these differences produce every possible variety. The first concerns who appoints the officials. The second concerns who is appointed. The third concerns the method of appointment. Each of these three varies in three ways. Appointments may be made by all citizens together, by some drawn from the whole citizen body, or by a particular class. That class may be defined by wealth, family, virtue, or some other rule. At Megara, for example, voting rights belonged to those who had returned together and regained their position by force of arms. Appointments may be made either by vote or by lot. These methods can also be combined in different ways. Some officials may be chosen by part of the community, and others by the whole community. Some may be chosen from part of the community, and others from the whole. Some may be chosen by vote, and others by lot. Each of these methods allows four subdivisions. All citizens may choose from all citizens, either by vote or by lot. When all citizens choose, they may act together without divisions. Or they may proceed by tribes, wards, or companies, until they have gone through the whole community. Some officials may be chosen one way, and others another. Again, some officials may be chosen by a vote or lottery involving all citizens. Or some citizens may choose by vote, and others by lot. Or some officials may be chosen one way, and others another. That is, some may be chosen by everyone’s vote, and others by a lottery involving everyone. There are thus twelve different methods of appointing officials, without combining the two methods. Of these, two suit a democracy. All officials may be chosen from all the people, either by vote or by lot. Both methods may also be used, with some officials chosen by lot and others by vote. In a free state, the whole community should not elect officials at the same time. Instead, some citizens should make the appointments, drawn either from the whole community or from a particular class. They may choose by lot, by vote, or by both methods. They should choose officials either from the whole community or from particular people within it, using both lot and vote. In an oligarchy, some officials should be chosen from the whole body of citizens. Some should be chosen by vote, some by lot, and others by both methods. Selection by lot best suits this form of government. In a free aristocracy, some officials [1300b] should be chosen from the whole community, and others from a particular class. Some may be chosen by vote, and others by lot. In a pure oligarchy, particular people should choose officials from particular classes. Some should be chosen by lot, and others by both methods. But choosing officials from the whole community does not suit this form of government. In an aristocracy, the whole community should elect officials by vote from a particular group of people. These, then, are all the different ways of appointing officials, assigned according to the character of different communities. We will explain in detail which methods suit different communities, how offices should be organized, and what powers they should have. By an official’s powers, I mean the particular area of responsibility, such as managing finances or administering the state’s laws. Different officials have different powers, just as an army general’s powers differ from those of a market clerk.