Chapter 12

After what has been said, it follows that we should now show what particular form of government is most suitable for particular persons; first laying this down as a general maxim, that that party which desires to support the actual administration of the state ought always to be superior to that which would alter it. Every city is made up of quality and quantity: by quality I mean liberty, riches, education, and family, and by quantity its relative populousness: now it may happen that quality may exist in one of those parts of which the city is composed, and quantity in another; thus the number of the ignoble may be greater than the number of those of family, the number of the poor than that of the rich; but not so that the quantity of the one shall overbalance the quality of the other; those must be properly adjusted to each other; for where the number of the poor exceeds the proportion we have mentioned, there a democracy will rise up, and if the husbandry should have more power than others, it will be a democracy of husbandmen; and the democracy will be a particular species according to that class of men which may happen to be most numerous: thus, should these be the husbandmen, it will be of these, and the best; if of mechanics and those who hire themselves out, the worst possible: in the same manner it may be of any other set between these two. But when the rich and the noble prevail more by their quality than they are deficient in quantity, there an oligarchy ensues; and this oligarchy may be of different species, according to the nature of the prevailing party. Every legislator in framing his constitution ought to have a particular regard to those in the middle rank of life; and if he intends an oligarchy, these should be the object of his laws; if a democracy, to these they should be entrusted; and whenever their number exceeds that of the two others, or at least one of them, they give [1297a] stability to the constitution; for there is no fear that the rich and the poor should agree to conspire together against them, for neither of these will choose to serve the other. If any one would choose to fix the administration on the widest basis, he will find none preferable to this; for to rule by turns is what the rich and the poor will not submit to, on account of their hatred to each other. It is, moreover, allowed that an arbitrator is the most proper person for both parties to trust to; now this arbitrator is the middle rank.

After what we have said, we should now explain which form of government best suits particular groups of people. First, we should establish a general principle. The group supporting the state's existing government must always be stronger than the group seeking to change it. Every city has both quality and quantity. By quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, and noble birth. By quantity I mean the relative size of its population groups. Quality may belong to one group within the city, while another has greater numbers. For example, people without noble birth may outnumber nobles, and the poor may outnumber the rich. Yet the greater numbers of one group may not outweigh the quality of the other. These factors must be properly balanced against each other. Where the poor exceed the proportion we have mentioned, a democracy will arise. If farmers have more power than other groups, the result will be a democracy of farmers. The particular kind of democracy depends on which class happens to be most numerous. If farmers are most numerous, the democracy will be theirs, and it will be the best kind. If artisans and hired workers are most numerous, it will be the worst possible kind. In the same way, other groups between these two may produce other kinds of democracy. But an oligarchy arises when the rich and noble have advantages in quality that outweigh their smaller numbers. This oligarchy may take different forms, depending on the character of the dominant group. Every lawmaker framing a constitution should pay particular attention to the middle class. If the aim is an oligarchy, the laws should focus on the middle class. If the aim is a democracy, the laws should be entrusted to the middle class. Whenever the middle class outnumbers both other classes, or at least one of them, it gives [1297a] stability to the constitution. There is no danger that the rich and poor will agree to conspire against the middle class. Neither the rich nor the poor will choose to serve the other. Anyone wishing to give the government the broadest possible base will find no better arrangement. The rich and poor will not agree to take turns ruling, because they hate each other. Moreover, people agree that an arbitrator is the most suitable person for both sides to trust. The middle class serves as this arbitrator.

Those who would establish aristocratical governments are mistaken not only in giving too much power to the rich, but also in deceiving the common people; for at last, instead of an imaginary good, they must feel a real evil, for the encroachments of the rich are more destructive to the state than those of the poor.

Those who seek to establish aristocratic governments make two mistakes. They give too much power to the rich, and they deceive the common people. For in the end, instead of an imagined benefit, the common people must suffer real harm. The reason is that abuses of power by the rich harm the state more than those by the poor.