Chapter 11

We proceed now to inquire what form of government and what manner of life is best for communities in general, not adapting it to that superior virtue which is above the reach of the vulgar, or that education which every advantage of nature and fortune only can furnish, nor to those imaginary plans which may be formed at pleasure; but to that mode of life which the greater part of mankind can attain to, and that government which most cities may establish: for as to those aristocracies which we have now mentioned, they are either too perfect for a state to support, or one so nearly alike to that state we now going to inquire into, that we shall treat of them both as one.

We now ask what form of government and way of life is best for communities in general. We are not looking for arrangements suited to exceptional virtue beyond the reach of ordinary people. Nor are we considering an education possible only with every advantage of nature and fortune. Nor are we considering imaginary schemes devised as we please. Instead, we seek a way of life most people can achieve and a government most cities can establish. For the aristocracies already mentioned are either too perfect for a state to sustain, or very like the government we will now examine. Because of that similarity, we will treat those aristocracies and this government as one.

The opinions which we form upon these subjects must depend upon one common principle: for if what I have said in my treatise on Morals is true, a happy life must arise from an uninterrupted course of virtue; and if virtue consists in a certain medium, the middle life must certainly be the happiest; which medium is attainable [1295b] by every one. The boundaries of virtue and vice in the state must also necessarily be the same as in a private person; for the form of government is the life of the city. In every city the people are divided into three sorts; the very rich, the very poor, and those who are between them. If this is universally admitted, that the mean is best, it is evident that even in point of fortune mediocrity is to be preferred; for that state is most submissive to reason; for those who are very handsome, or very strong, or very noble, or very rich; or, on the contrary; those who are very poor, or very weak, or very mean, with difficulty obey it; for the one are capricious and greatly flagitious, the other rascally and mean, the crimes of each arising from their different excesses: nor will they go through the different offices of the state; which is detrimental to it: besides, those who excel in strength, in riches, or friends, or the like, neither know how nor are willing to submit to command: and this begins at home when they are boys; for there they are brought up too delicately to be accustomed to obey their preceptors: as for the very poor, their general and excessive want of what the rich enjoy reduces them to a state too mean: so that the one know not how to command, but to be commanded as slaves, the others know not how to submit to any command, nor to command themselves but with despotic power.

Our views on these subjects must rest on one common principle. For if what I said in my treatise on Morals is true, happiness must come from consistently practicing virtue. And if virtue consists in a middle course, a life in the middle must certainly be the happiest. This middle course is within reach [1295b] of everyone. The boundaries of virtue and vice must necessarily be the same for a state as for an individual. For the form of government is the life of the city. In every city, people fall into three groups: the very rich, the very poor, and those in between. If everyone agrees that the middle is best, then a moderate level of wealth must also be preferable. For people in this middle condition are most willing to follow reason. Those with exceptional beauty, strength, noble birth, or wealth find it difficult to follow reason. So do those who are very poor, very weak, or of very low status. The first group is willful and deeply wicked, while the second is dishonest and petty. Each group's crimes arise from its own extremes. Neither group will serve in the various public offices, which harms the state. Besides, those with exceptional strength, wealth, numbers of friends, or similar advantages neither know how nor wish to obey. This begins at home in childhood. They are brought up with too much luxury to become accustomed to obeying their teachers. The very poor, meanwhile, lack so much of what the rich enjoy that they are reduced to an excessively low condition. As a result, the very poor do not know how to command, but only how to obey like slaves. The rich, by contrast, do not know how to obey any command, or how to rule except as despots.

A city composed of such men must therefore consist of slaves and masters, not freemen; where one party must hate, and the other despise, where there could be no possibility of friendship or political community: for community supposes affection; for we do not even on the road associate with our enemies. It is also the genius of a city to be composed as much as possible of equals; which will be most so when the inhabitants are in the middle state: from whence it follows, that that city must be best framed which is composed of those whom we say are naturally its proper members. It is men of this station also who will be best assured of safety and protection; for they will neither covet what belongs to others, as the poor do; nor will others covet what is theirs, as the poor do what belongs to the rich; and thus, without plotting against any one, or having any one plot against them, they will live free from danger: for which reason Phocylides wisely wishes for the middle state, as being most productive of happiness. It is plain, then, that the most perfect political community must be amongst those who are in the middle rank, and those states are best instituted wherein these are a larger and more respectable part, if possible, than both the other; or, if that cannot be, at least than either of them separate; so that being thrown into the balance it may prevent either scale from preponderating.

A city made up of such men must therefore consist of slaves and masters, not free citizens. One group must hate the other, while the other must look down on the first. There can be no friendship or political community between them, because community depends on affection. We do not even travel with our enemies. A city should also, by its nature, consist as far as possible of equals. Equality will be greatest when the inhabitants belong to the middle class. It follows that the best city consists of those we describe as naturally suited to be its members. People in the middle class will also be most secure and protected. They will not covet other people's possessions, as the poor do. Nor will others covet their possessions as the poor covet those of the rich. So, neither plotting against anyone nor facing plots themselves, people in the middle class will live free from danger. For this reason, Phocylides wisely wishes for a middle position in society, as the position most likely to bring happiness. Clearly, then, the most perfect political community must be made up of people in the middle rank. States are best organized when this group is larger and carries more weight than the other two groups combined, if possible. If not, the middle group should at least be larger and carry more weight than either group alone. Then, by adding its weight to the balance, the middle group can prevent either side from outweighing the other.

It is therefore the greatest happiness which the citizens can enjoy to possess a moderate and convenient fortune; for when some possess too much, and others nothing at [1296a] all, the government must either be in the hands of the meanest rabble or else a pure oligarchy; or, from the excesses of both, a tyranny; for this arises from a headstrong democracy or an oligarchy, but very seldom when the members of the community are nearly on an equality with each other. We will assign a reason for this when we come to treat of the alterations which different states are likely to undergo. The middle state is therefore best, as being least liable to those seditions and insurrections which disturb the community; and for the same reason extensive governments are least liable to these inconveniences; for there those in a middle state are very numerous, whereas in small ones it is easy to pass to the two extremes, so as hardly to have any in a medium remaining, but the one half rich, the other poor: and from the same principle it is that democracies are more firmly established and of longer continuance than oligarchies; but even in those when there is a want of a proper number of men of middling fortune, the poor extend their power too far, abuses arise, and the government is soon at an end.

Therefore, the greatest happiness citizens can enjoy is to have a moderate fortune sufficient for their needs. For when some have too much and others have nothing at [1296a] all, government must take one of three forms. Either the lowest rabble rules, or there is a pure oligarchy, or the excesses of either produce a tyranny. Tyranny arises from an unrestrained democracy or an oligarchy, but very rarely when members of the community are nearly equal. We will explain why when we discuss the changes different states are likely to undergo. A society with a strong middle class is therefore best, because it is least vulnerable to civil unrest and uprisings. For the same reason, larger states are least vulnerable to these troubles, because they have very large middle classes. In small states, by contrast, society can easily shift toward the two extremes, leaving hardly anyone in the middle. Instead, one half is rich and the other poor. For the same reason, democracies are more stable and last longer than oligarchies. But even democracies suffer when there are too few people of moderate wealth. Under those conditions, the poor extend their power too far, abuses arise, and the government soon comes to an end.

We ought to consider as a proof of what I now advance, that the best lawgivers themselves were those in the middle rank of life, amongst whom was Solon, as is evident from his poems, and Lycurgus, for he was not a king, and Charondas, and indeed most others. What has been said will show us why of so many free states some have changed to democracies, others to oligarchies: for whenever the number of those in the middle state has been too small, those who were the more numerous, whether the rich or the poor, always overpowered them and assumed to themselves the administration of public affairs; from hence arose either a democracy or an oligarchy. Moreover, when in consequence of their disputes and quarrels with each other, either the rich get the better of the poor, or the poor of the rich, neither of them will establish a free state; but, as the record of their victory, one which inclines to their own principles, and form either a democracy or an oligarchy.

We should take the following as proof of my argument: the best lawgivers themselves came from the middle ranks of society. Among them was Solon, as his poems make clear. Lycurgus also belonged to this group, since he was not a king, as did Charondas and indeed most other lawgivers. What has been said explains why so many free states have become either democracies or oligarchies. Whenever the middle ranks were too small, the larger group, whether rich or poor, always overpowered them. The victorious group took control of public affairs, creating either a democracy or an oligarchy. Moreover, when disputes and conflicts lead the rich to defeat the poor, or the poor to defeat the rich, neither side establishes a free state. Instead, to mark their victory, the winners establish a state that favors their own principles, either a democracy or an oligarchy.

Those who made conquests in Greece, having all of them an eye to the respective forms of government in their own cities, established either democracies or oligarchies, not considering what was serviceable to the state, but what was similar to their own; for which reason a government has never been established where the supreme power has been placed amongst those of the middling rank, or very seldom; and, amongst a few, one man only of those who have yet been conquerors has been persuaded to give the preference to this order of [1296b] men: it is indeed an established custom with the inhabitants of most cities not to desire an equality, but either to aspire to govern, or when they are conquered, to submit.

Those who made conquests in Greece all looked to the forms of government in their own cities. They established either democracies or oligarchies, choosing not what benefited the state, but what resembled their own governments. For this reason, governments giving supreme power to the middle class have never been established, or only very rarely. Of all the conquerors so far, only one man has been persuaded to favor this class of [1296b] people. Indeed, in most cities, people are accustomed not to seek equality, but either to seek power or, when conquered, to submit.

Thus we have shown what the best state is, and why. It will not be difficult to perceive of the many states which there are, for we have seen that there are various forms both of democracies and oligarchies, to which we should give the first place, to which the second, and in the same manner the next also; and to observe what are the particular excellences and defects of each, after we have first described the best possible; for that must be the best which is nearest to this, that worst which is most distant from the medium, without any one has a particular plan of his own which he judges by. I mean by this, that it may happen, that although one form of government may be better than another, yet there is no reason to prevent another from being preferable thereunto in particular circumstances and for particular purposes.

We have now shown what the best state is and why it is best. Ranking the many existing states will not be difficult. As we have seen, there are several forms of both democracy and oligarchy. We can rank these forms first, second, and so on, and identify each form’s particular strengths and weaknesses. But first we must describe the best possible state. The best form must be the one closest to this ideal, and the worst the one furthest from the middle. This ranking holds unless someone judges by a particular plan of their own. By this I mean that one form of government may be better than another overall. Yet another form may still be preferable in particular circumstances and for particular purposes.