Chapter 6

It is also nearly the same in the treatise upon Laws which was writ afterwards, for which reason it will be proper in this place to consider briefly what he has there said upon government, for Socrates has thoroughly settled but very few parts of it; as for instance, in what manner the community of wives and children ought to be regulated, how property should be established, and government conducted.

Much the same is true of the treatise on Laws, which was written later. So it is appropriate here to consider briefly what he says there about government. For Socrates has fully settled only a very few aspects of government. These include how wives and children should be shared, how property should be organized, and how government should be run.

Now he divides the inhabitants into two parts, husbandmen and soldiers, and from these he select a third part who are to be senators and govern the city; but he has not said whether or no the husbandman and artificer shall have any or what share in the government, or whether they shall have arms, and join with the others in war, or not. He thinks also that the women ought to go to war, and have the same education as the soldiers; as to other particulars, he has filled his treatise with matter foreign to the purpose; and with respect to education, he has only said what that of the guards ought to be.

Now he divides the inhabitants into two groups, farmers and soldiers. From these groups, he selects a third group to serve as senators and govern the city. But he has not said whether farmers and craftsmen will have any role in government, or what that role would be. Nor has he said whether farmers and craftsmen will bear arms and fight alongside the others in war. He also thinks women should go to war and receive the same education as soldiers. As for other details, he has filled his treatise with material unrelated to the subject. And on education, he has only described the education the guards should receive.

[1265a] As to his book of Laws, laws are the principal thing which that contains, for he has there said but little concerning government; and this government, which he was so desirous of framing in such a manner as to impart to its members a more entire community of goods than is to be found in other cities, he almost brings round again to be the same as that other government which he had first proposed; for except the community of wives and goods, he has framed both his governments alike, for the education of the citizens is to be the same in both; they are in both to live without any servile employ, and their common tables are to be the same, excepting that in that he says the women should have common tables, and that there should be a thousand men-at-arms, in this, that there should be five thousand.

[1265a] His book Laws deals mainly with laws, for he says little there about government. He wanted the government described there to give its citizens a fuller sharing of property than other cities offered. Yet he brings this government almost back to the form he first proposed. For apart from sharing wives and property, he has designed both governments alike. Citizens are to receive the same education in both. In both, citizens are to be free from menial work and eat at the same common tables. One difference is that he says women should have common tables. Another is that the first government should have a thousand men-at-arms, while the government in Laws should have five thousand.

All the discourses of Socrates are masterly, noble, new, and inquisitive; but that they are all true it may probably be too much to say. For now with respect to the number just spoken of, it must be acknowledged that he would want the country of Babylonia for them, or some one like it, of an immeasurable extent, to support five thousand idle persons, besides a much greater number of women and servants. Every one, it is true, may frame an hypothesis as he pleases, but yet it ought to be possible. It has been said, that a legislator should have two things in view when he frames his laws, the country and the people. He will also do well, if he has some regard to the neighbouring states, if he intends that his community should maintain any political intercourse with them, for it is not only necessary that they should understand that practice of war which is adapted to their own country, but to others also; for admitting that any one chooses not this life either in public or private, yet there is not the less occasion for their being formidable to their enemies, not only when they invade their country, but also when they retire out of it.

All Socrates’ discussions are masterful, noble, original, and searching. But it may well be too much to say that all are true. Consider the number of people just mentioned. We must admit that he would need Babylonia, or some other country of equally vast size, to support them. There would be five thousand people who do no work, besides a much larger number of women and servants. Anyone may, of course, propose whatever arrangement they please, but the arrangement should still be possible. It has been said that a lawgiver should consider two things when making laws: the country and the people. The lawgiver would also do well to consider neighboring states, if the community is to maintain political relations with them. For citizens must understand warfare suited not only to their own country but also to other countries. Even if someone rejects a warlike life, both in public and in private, the need to deter enemies remains. Citizens must be formidable to their enemies, both when those enemies invade their country and when those enemies withdraw.

It may also be considered whether the quantity of each person's property may not be settled in a different manner from what he has done it in, by making it more determinate; for he says, that every one ought to have enough whereon to live moderately, as if any one had said to live well, which is the most comprehensive expression. Besides, a man may live moderately and miserably at the same time; he had therefore better have proposed, that they should live both moderately and liberally; for unless these two conspire, luxury will come in on the one hand, or wretchedness on the other, since these two modes of living are the only ones applicable to the employment of our substance; for we cannot say with respect to a man's fortune, that he is mild or courageous, but we may say that he is prudent and liberal, which are the only qualities connected therewith.

We may also ask whether each person's share of property could be set more precisely than he has proposed. He says everyone should have enough to live moderately. This is like saying they should have enough to live well, the broadest expression of all. Besides, a person can live both moderately and miserably. So he would have done better to propose that people should live both moderately and generously. Unless moderation and generosity go together, the result will be luxury on one side or misery on the other. These are the only two ways of living that concern the use of our wealth. We cannot describe someone as gentle or courageous in the use of wealth. But we can describe someone as prudent and generous, the only qualities connected with its use.

It is also absurd to render property equal, and not to provide for the increasing number of the citizens; but to leave that circumstance uncertain, as if it would regulate itself according to the number of women who [1265b] should happen to be childless, let that be what it would because this seems to take place in other cities; but the case would not be the same in such a state which he proposes and those which now actually unite; for in these no one actually wants, as the property is divided amongst the whole community, be their numbers what they will; but as it could not then be divided, the supernumeraries, whether they were many or few, would have nothing at all. But it is more necessary than even to regulate property, to take care that the increase of the people should not exceed a certain number; and in determining that, to take into consideration those children who will die, and also those women who will be barren; and to neglect this, as is done in several cities, is to bring certain poverty on the citizens; and poverty is the cause of sedition and evil. Now Phidon the Corinthian, one of the oldest legislators, thought the families and the number of the citizens should continue the same; although it should happen that all should have allotments at the first, disproportionate to their numbers.

It is also absurd to equalize property without planning for an increase in the number of citizens. Yet he leaves population growth uncertain, as if it would regulate itself according to how many women [1265b] happened to remain childless. He accepts whatever that number might be because such regulation seems to occur in other cities. But his proposed state would differ from those that now exist. In existing states, no one goes without property, because property is divided among the whole community, whatever its size. But in his proposed state, property could not be divided further. Any citizens beyond the fixed number, whether many or few, would have nothing at all. But limiting population growth to a certain number is even more necessary than regulating property. In setting that number, account must be taken of children who will die and women who will be infertile. Neglecting population limits, as several cities do, is certain to bring poverty upon the citizens. And poverty causes rebellion and wrongdoing. Now Phidon the Corinthian, one of the oldest lawmakers, thought families and the number of citizens should remain unchanged. He held this view even if all families initially received allotments out of proportion to their size.

In Plato's Laws it is however different; we shall mention hereafter what we think would be best in these particulars. He has also neglected in that treatise to point out how the governors are to be distinguished from the governed; for he says, that as of one sort of wool the warp ought to be made, and of another the woof, so ought some to govern, and others to be governed. But since he admits, that all their property may be increased fivefold, why should he not allow the same increase to the country? he ought also to consider whether his allotment of the houses will be useful to the community, for he appoints two houses to each person, separate from each other; but it is inconvenient for a person to inhabit two houses. Now he is desirous to have his whole plan of government neither a democracy nor an oligarchy, but something between both, which he calls a polity, for it is to be composed of men-at-arms. If Plato intended to frame a state in which more than in any other everything should be common, he has certainly given it a right name; but if he intended it to be the next in perfection to that which he had already framed, it is not so; for perhaps some persons will give the preference to the Lacedaemonian form of government, or some other which may more completely have attained to the aristocratic form.

In Plato's Laws, however, things are different. We will explain later what we think would be best in these matters. In that work, Plato also fails to explain how rulers are to be distinguished from those they rule. He says the warp should use one kind of wool and the weft another. In the same way, some people should rule and others should be ruled. But since he allows all their property to increase fivefold, why not allow the country's territory to increase as much? He should also consider whether his allocation of houses will benefit the community. He assigns each person two houses, separate from each other. But living in two houses is inconvenient. Now Plato wants his whole system of government to be neither a democracy nor an oligarchy, but something between them. He calls this a polity, since it is to be made up of armed citizens. If Plato intended to design a state where everything would be shared more than in any other, his name is certainly right. But if he intended this state to rank second in perfection to the one he had already designed, it does not. For perhaps some people will prefer the Lacedaemonian form of government. Or they may prefer another form that has more fully achieved an aristocratic system.

Some persons say, that the most perfect government should be composed of all others blended together, for which reason they commend that of Lacedaemon; for they say, that this is composed of an oligarchy, a monarchy, and a democracy, their kings representing the monarchical part, the senate the oligarchical; and, that in the ephori may be found the democratical, as these are taken from the people. But some say, that in the ephori is absolute power, and that it is their common meal and daily course of life, in which the democratical form is represented. It is also said in this treatise of [1266a] Laws, that the best form of government must, be one composed of a democracy and a tyranny; though such a mixture no one else would ever allow to be any government at all, or if it is, the worst possible; those propose what is much better who blend many governments together; for the most perfect is that which is formed of many parts. But now in this government of Plato's there are no traces of a monarchy, only of an oligarchy and democracy; though he seems to choose that it should rather incline to an oligarchy, as is evident from the appointment of the magistrates; for to choose them by lot is common to both; but that a man of fortune must necessarily be a member of the assembly, or to elect the magistrates, or take part in the management of public affairs, while others are passed over, makes the state incline to an oligarchy; as does the endeavouring that the greater part of the rich may be in office, and that the rank of their appointments may correspond with their fortunes.

Some people say that the most perfect government should blend all other forms of government. For this reason, they praise the government of Lacedaemon. They say it combines oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy. Its kings represent monarchy, its senate represents oligarchy, and its ephori represent democracy, since they come from the people. But some say that the ephori hold absolute power. According to this view, the shared meals and daily way of life represent democracy. The treatise called [1266a] Laws also says that the best government must combine democracy and tyranny. Yet no one else would accept such a mixture as a government at all. Or, if they did, they would consider it the worst possible government. Those who propose blending many forms of government offer something much better. For the most perfect government is one formed from many parts. But Plato's government contains no trace of monarchy, only oligarchy and democracy. Yet he seems to prefer a stronger leaning toward oligarchy, as his method of appointing magistrates shows. Choosing magistrates by lot is common to both forms. But wealthy men must attend the assembly, elect magistrates, or take part in managing public affairs, while others are exempt. This requirement makes the state lean toward oligarchy. So does the effort to have most wealthy men hold office, with the rank of their offices matching their wealth.

The same principle prevails also in the choice of their senate; the manner of electing which is favourable also to an oligarchy; for all are obliged to vote for those who are senators of the first class, afterwards they vote for the same number out of the second, and then out of the third; but this compulsion to vote at the election of senators does not extend to the third and fourth classes and the first and second class only are obliged to vote for the fourth. By this means he says he shall necessarily have an equal number of each rank, but he is mistaken—for the majority will always consist of those of the first rank, and the most considerable people; and for this reason, that many of the commonalty not being obliged to it, will not attend the elections. From hence it is evident, that such a state will not consist of a democracy and a monarchy, and this will be further proved by what we shall say when we come particularly to consider this form of government.

The same principle also applies to choosing their senate. The election process also favors an oligarchy. Everyone must vote for senators from the first class. Then they vote for the same number from the second class, and then from the third. But members of the third and fourth classes are not required to vote in these senate elections. Only members of the first and second classes must vote for senators from the fourth class. He says this process will necessarily produce an equal number of senators from each class. But he is mistaken. The majority will always come from the first class and the most prominent people. This is because many ordinary people will not attend the elections, since they are not required to vote. So it is clear that such a state will not combine democracy and monarchy. We will give further evidence for this conclusion when we examine this form of government in detail.

There will also great danger arise from the manner of electing the senate, when those who are elected themselves are afterwards to elect others; for by this means, if a certain number choose to combine together, though not very considerable, the election will always fall according to their pleasure. Such are the things which Plato proposes concerning government in his book of Laws.

The method of electing the senate will also create great danger, when elected members later elect others themselves. For under this system, if even a fairly small group agrees to act together, elections will always go their way. These are Plato’s proposals for government in his book Laws.