Chapter 7

There are also some other forms of government, which have been proposed either by private persons, or philosophers, or politicians, all of which come much nearer to those which have been really established, or now exist, than these two of Plato's; for neither have they introduced the innovation of a community of wives and children, and public tables for the women, but have been contented to set out with establishing such rules as are absolutely necessary.

Other forms of government have also been proposed by private individuals, philosophers, or politicians. All these proposals are much closer than Plato's two proposals to governments established in the past or existing today. For none proposes sharing wives and children or providing communal meals for women. Instead, their authors have been content to begin by establishing only the rules that are absolutely necessary.

There are some persons who think, that the first object of government should be to regulate well everything relating to private property; for they say, that a neglect herein is the source of all seditions whatsoever. For this reason, Phaleas the Chalcedonian first proposed, that the fortunes of the citizens should be equal, which he thought was not difficult to accomplish when a community was first settled, but that it was a work of greater difficulty in one that had been long established; but yet that it might be effected, and an equality of circumstances introduced by these means, that the rich should give marriage portions, but never receive any, while the poor should always receive, but never give.

Some people think the government's first priority should be to manage all matters concerning private property well. They say that neglect of these matters causes all rebellions. For this reason, Phaleas the Chalcedonian was the first to propose that citizens should have equal wealth. He thought this would be easy to achieve when a community was first established. But he thought equalizing wealth would be harder in a community that had existed for a long time. Even so, he believed equality of wealth could still be achieved through the following arrangement. The rich should give dowries but never receive them, while the poor should always receive dowries but never give them.

But Plato, in his treatise of Laws, thinks that a difference in circumstances should be permitted to a certain degree; but that no citizen should be allowed to possess more than five times as much as the lowest census, as we have already mentioned. But legislators who would establish this principle are apt to overlook what they ought to consider; that while they regulate the quantity of provisions which each individual shall possess, they ought also to regulate the number of his children; for if these exceed the allotted quantity of provision, the law must necessarily be repealed; and yet, in spite of the repeal, it will have the bad effect of reducing many from wealth to poverty, so difficult is it for innovators not to fall into such mistakes. That an equality of goods was in some degree serviceable to strengthen the bands of society, seems to have been known to some of the ancients; for Solon made a law, as did some others also, to restrain persons from possessing as much land as they pleased. And upon the same principle there are laws which forbid men to sell their property, as among the Locrians, unless they can prove that some notorious misfortune has befallen them. They were also to preserve their ancient patrimony, which custom being broken through by the Leucadians, made their government too democratic; for by that means it was no longer necessary to be possessed of a certain fortune to be qualified to be a magistrate. But if an equality of goods is established, this may be either too much, when it enables the people to live luxuriously, or too little, when it obliges them to live hard. Hence it is evident, that it is not proper for the legislator to establish an equality of circumstances, but to fix a proper medium. Besides, if any one should regulate the division of property in such a manner that there should be a moderate sufficiency for all, it would be of no use; for it is of more consequence that the citizen should entertain a similarity of sentiments than an equality of circumstances; but this can never be attained unless they are properly educated under the direction of the law. But probably Phaleas may say, that this in what he himself mentions; for he both proposes a equality of property and one plan of education in his city. But he should have said particularly what education he intended, nor is it of any service to have this to much one; for this education may be one, and yet such as will make the citizens over-greedy, to grasp after honours, or riches, or both. Besides, not only an inequality of possessions, but also of honours, will occasion [1267a] seditions, but this upon contrary grounds; for the vulgar will be seditious if there be an inequality of goods, by those of more elevated sentiments, if there is an equality of honours.

But Plato, in his Laws, thinks differences in wealth should be allowed within certain limits. As we have already mentioned, no citizen should possess more than five times the minimum property qualification. But legislators who adopt this principle often overlook something they ought to consider. When limiting the resources each person may possess, they should also limit the number of children each person has. For if the children outnumber what the allotted resources can support, the law must necessarily be repealed. Yet even after its repeal, the law will have the harmful effect of reducing many people from wealth to poverty. So difficult is it for reformers to avoid such mistakes. Some of the ancients seem to have understood that equality of property could help strengthen social bonds. For Solon, like some others, passed a law limiting how much land people could own. The same principle underlies laws forbidding people to sell their property. Among the Locrians, for example, people may sell only if they can prove that some grave misfortune has struck them. They were also required to preserve their ancestral property. When the Leucadians abandoned this custom, their government became too democratic. For owning a certain amount of property was no longer necessary to qualify for office. But if property is distributed equally, each share may be too large, allowing people to live luxuriously. Or each share may be too small, forcing people to live in hardship. Clearly, then, legislators should not establish equal levels of wealth, but should set a suitable middle level. Besides, even distributing property so that everyone has a modest sufficiency would be useless. For citizens sharing similar attitudes matters more than their having equal wealth. But shared attitudes can never be achieved unless citizens are properly educated under the law’s direction. But Phaleas may perhaps say that he himself makes this point. For he proposes both equal property and a single system of education in his city. But he should have specified what kind of education he intended. Nor is a single system of education useful in itself. For a uniform education may still make citizens excessively eager to pursue honors, riches, or both. Besides, inequality of honors, not just inequality of property, will cause [1267a] rebellions, but for opposite reasons. For ordinary people will rebel if property is unequal, while those with more elevated views will rebel if honors are equal.

For men are not guilty of crimes for necessaries only (for which he thinks an equality of goods would be a sufficient remedy, as they would then have no occasion to steal cold or hunger), but that they may enjoy what they desire, and not wish for it in vain; for if their desire extend beyond the common necessaries of life, they were be wicked to gratify them; and not only so, but if their wishes point that way, they will do the same to enjoy those pleasures which are free from the alloy of pain. What remedy then shall we find for these three disorders. And first, to prevent stealing from necessity, let every one be supplied with a moderate subsistence, which may make the addition of his own industry necessary; second to prevent stealing to procure the luxuries of life, temperance be enjoined; and thirdly, let those who wish for pleasure in itself seek for it only in philosophy, all others want the assistance of men.

People do not commit crimes only to obtain necessities. He thinks equal possessions would solve crimes of necessity, since no one would need to steal because of cold or hunger. But people also commit crimes to satisfy their desires rather than wish in vain. For if their desires go beyond life’s basic necessities, they will do wrong to satisfy those desires. And beyond that, if they desire pleasures free from pain, they will also commit crimes to enjoy those pleasures. What remedies, then, can we find for these three problems? First, to prevent theft out of necessity, everyone should have a modest living, still requiring them to work. Second, to prevent theft for life’s luxuries, self-restraint should be required. Third, those who seek pleasure for its own sake should seek it only in philosophy. All other pleasures require help from other people.

Since then men are guilty of the greatest crimes from ambition, and not from necessity, no one, for instance aims at being a tyrant to keep him from the cold, hence great honour is due to him who kills not a thief, but tyrant; so that polity which Phaleas establishes would only be salutary to prevent little crimes. He has also been very desirous to establish such rules as will conduce to perfect the internal policy of his state, and he ought also to have done the same with respect to its neighbours and all foreign nations; for the considerations of the military establishment should take place in planning every government, that it may not be unprovided in case of a war, of which he has said nothing; so also with respect to property, it ought not only to be adapted to the exigencies of the state, but also to such dangers as may arise from without.

People commit the greatest crimes out of ambition, not necessity. No one, for example, seeks to become a tyrant to escape the cold. So great honor goes to someone who kills a tyrant, not a thief. Thus, the system of government Phaleas proposes would be useful only in preventing minor crimes. He has also been very eager to establish rules to perfect his state's internal government. But he should have done the same concerning its neighbors and all foreign nations. Military needs should be considered when planning every government, so the state is not left unprepared for war. Yet Phaleas has said nothing about military needs. Likewise, property should be suited not only to the state's needs, but also to dangers that may arise from outside.

Thus it should not be so much as to tempt those who are near, and more powerful to invade it, while those who possess it are not able to drive out the invaders, nor so little as that the state should not be able to go to war with those who are quite equal to itself, and of this he has determined nothing; it must indeed be allowed that it is advantageous to a community to be rather rich than poor; probably the proper boundary is this, not to possess enough to make it worth while for a more powerful neighbour to attack you, any more than he would those who had not so much as yourself; thus when Autophradatus proposed to besiege Atarneus, Eubulus advised him to consider what time it would require to take the city, and then would have him determine whether it would answer, for that he should choose, if it would even take less than he proposed, to quit the place; his saying this made Autophradatus reflect upon the business and give over the siege. There is, indeed, some advantage in an equality of goods amongst the citizens to prevent seditions; and yet, to say truth, no very great one; for men of great abilities will stomach their being put upon a level with the rest of the community. For which reason they will very often appear ready for every commotion and sedition; for the wickedness of mankind is insatiable. For though at first two oboli might be sufficient, yet when once it is become customary, they continually want something more, until they set no limits to their expectations; for it is the nature of our desires to be boundless, and many live only to gratify them. But for this purpose the first object is, not so much to establish an equality of fortune, as to prevent those who are of a good disposition from desiring more than their own, and those who are of a bad one from being able to acquire it; and this may be done if they are kept in an inferior station, and not exposed to injustice. Nor has he treated well the equality of goods, for he has extended his regulation only to land; whereas a man's substance consists not only in this, but also in slaves, cattle, money, and all that variety of things which fall under the name of chattels; now there must be either an equality established in all these, or some certain rule, or they must be left entirely at large. It appears too by his laws, that he intends to establish only a small state, as all the artificers are to belong to the public, and add nothing to the complement of citizens; but if all those who are to be employed in public works are to be the slaves of the public, it should be done in the same manner as it is at Epidamnum, and as Diophantus formerly regulated it at Athens. From these particulars any one may nearly judge whether Phaleas's community is well or ill established.

A state should not have so much wealth that stronger neighbors are tempted to invade while its people cannot repel them. Nor should it have so little that it cannot wage war against states equal to itself. He has settled nothing about this. Admittedly, a community is better off being fairly rich than poor. The proper limit is probably this: its wealth should not make attacking it worthwhile for a stronger neighbor. Attacking it should be no more worthwhile than attacking a poorer state. Thus, when Autophradatus proposed to besiege Atarneus, Eubulus advised him to consider how long capturing the city would take. Eubulus then urged him to decide whether the siege would be worthwhile. He said he would choose to leave the place even if capturing it took less time than Autophradatus expected. These words made Autophradatus reconsider the undertaking and abandon the siege. Equal possessions among citizens do offer some protection against civil unrest. Yet, in truth, the advantage is not very great. Men of great ability will resent being placed on the same level as everyone else. For this reason, they will very often be ready to join any disturbance or rebellion. Human wickedness is insatiable. Though two oboli might be enough at first, once people become accustomed to that amount, they continually want more. Eventually, they set no limits on their expectations. Our desires are boundless by nature, and many people live only to satisfy them. To address this, the first aim should not be so much to make wealth equal. Rather, it should be to keep well-disposed people from wanting more than their share. It should also keep badly disposed people from being able to acquire more. This can be done by keeping the latter in a subordinate position without treating them unjustly. Nor has he handled equality of possessions well, because his regulation applies only to land. Yet a person's wealth includes not only land but also slaves, cattle, money, and all kinds of movable property. All these possessions must either be made equal, governed by some definite rule, or left entirely unrestricted. His laws also suggest that he intends to establish only a small state. All craftspeople are to belong to the public and are not to count among the citizens. But suppose everyone employed in public works is to be publicly owned as a slave. Then this should be arranged as it is at Epidamnum, and as Diophantus once arranged it at Athens. From these details, anyone can form a reasonable judgment about whether Phaleas's community is well or badly organized.