Thought and Language

It remains to speak of Diction and Thought, the other parts of Tragedy having been already discussed. Concerning Thought, we may assume what is said in the Rhetoric, to which inquiry the subject more strictly belongs. Under Thought is included every effect which has to be produced by speech, the subdivisions being,—proof and refutation; the excitation of the feelings, such as pity, fear, anger, and the like; the suggestion of importance or its opposite. Now, it is evident that the dramatic incidents must be treated from the same points of view as the dramatic speeches, when the object is to evoke the sense of pity, fear, importance, or probability. The only difference is, that the incidents should speak for themselves without verbal exposition; while the effects aimed at in speech should be produced by the speaker, and as a result of the speech. For what were the business of a speaker, if the Thought were revealed quite apart from what he says?

We still need to discuss Diction and Thought, since we have already discussed the other parts of Tragedy. For Thought, we may take for granted what is said in the Rhetoric, where the subject more properly belongs. Thought includes every effect that speech must produce. These effects include proof and refutation, and arousing feelings such as pity, fear, and anger. They also include making something seem important or unimportant. Clearly, the events of a drama must be handled in the same way as its speeches when the aim is to evoke pity, fear, a sense of importance, or a sense of probability. The only difference is that the events should speak for themselves, without verbal explanation. The effects of a speech, however, should be produced by the speaker through the speech. For what would be the speaker’s role if the Thought were revealed quite apart from what the speaker says?

Next, as regards Diction. One branch of the inquiry treats of the Modes of Utterance. But this province of knowledge belongs to the art of Delivery and to the masters of that science. It includes, for instance,—what is a command, a prayer, a statement, a threat, a question, an answer, and so forth. To know or not to know these things involves no serious censure upon the poet's art. For who can admit the fault imputed to Homer by Protagoras,—that in the words, 'Sing, goddess, of the wrath,' he gives a command under the idea that he utters a prayer? For to tell some one to do a thing or not to do it is, he says, a command. We may, therefore, pass this over as an inquiry that belongs to another art, not to poetry.

Next, let us consider diction. One part of this inquiry concerns modes of utterance. But this subject belongs to the art of delivery and to those who master it. It includes questions such as what makes a command, a prayer, a statement, a threat, a question, or an answer. A poet cannot be seriously criticized for knowing or not knowing these things. For who can accept the fault that Protagoras finds in Homer? Protagoras says that Homer gives a command while thinking he is offering a prayer, in the words, 'Sing, goddess, of the wrath.' For Protagoras says that telling someone to do or not to do something is a command. We may therefore pass over this inquiry, since it belongs to another art, not to poetry.