Book 4, Chapter 6

At this point I will endeavour to explain in what way Socrates fostered this greater "dialectic" capacity among his intimates. ¹ He held firmly to the opinion that if a man knew what each reality was, he would be able to explain this knowledge to others; but, failing the possession of that knowledge, it did not surprise him that men should stumble themselves and cause others to stumble also. ² It was for this reason that he never ceased inquiring with those who were with him into the true nature of things that are. ³ It would be a long business certainly to go through in detail all the definitions at which he arrived; I will therefore content myself with such examples as will serve to show his method of procedure. As a first instance I will take the question of piety. The mode of investigation may be fairly represented as follows.

At this point, I will explain how Socrates developed greater "dialectic" ability among his close companions. ¹ He firmly believed that if a person knew what each thing truly was, they could explain it to others. But without that knowledge, he was not surprised that people stumbled themselves and caused others to stumble too. ² That is why he never stopped exploring the true nature of things with those around him. ³ It would take a long time to discuss all the definitions he arrived at in detail. So I will give only enough examples to show his method. I will begin with the question of piety. His way of investigating it can be fairly represented as follows.

Tell me (said he), Euthydemus, what sort of thing you take piety to be?

He said, “Tell me, Euthydemus, what do you think piety is?”

Something most fair and excellent, no doubt (the other answered). ⁴

Something very beautiful and excellent, no doubt (the other replied). ⁴

Soc. And can you tell me what sort of person the pious man is? ⁵

Soc. And can you tell me what a pious person is like? ⁵

I should say (he answered) he is a man who honours the gods.

He answered, “I would say he is a man who honors the gods.”

Soc. And is it allowable to honour the gods in any mode or fashion one likes?

Soc. And is it allowed to honor the gods however one likes?

Euth. No; there are laws in accordance with which one must do that.

Euth. No; there are laws one must follow when doing that.

Soc. Then he who knows these laws will know how he must honour the gods?

Soc. Then will someone who knows these laws know how to honor the gods?

I think so (he answered).

I think so, he answered.

Soc. And he who knows how he must honour the gods conceives that he ought not to do so except in the manner which accords with his knowledge? ⁶ Is it not so?

Soc. And someone who knows how to honor the gods believes he should honor them only in that way. ⁶ Isn't that so?

Euth. That is so. ⁷

Euth. That's right. ⁷

Soc. And does any man honour the gods otherwise than he thinks he ought? ⁸

Soc. And does anyone honor the gods in a way other than he thinks he should? ⁸

I think not (he answered).

I don't think so, he answered.

Soc. It comes to this then: he who knows what the law requires in reference to the gods will honour the gods in the lawful way? ⁹

Soc. So, a person who knows what the law requires concerning the gods will honor them as the law requires? ⁹

Euth. Certainly.

Euth. Of course.

Soc. But now, he who honours lawfully honours as he ought? ¹⁰

Soc. But someone who gives honor according to the law gives honor as he should? ¹⁰

Euth. I see no alternative.

Euth. I see no other choice.

Soc. And he who honours as he ought is a pious man?

Soc. And a man who honors as he should is pious?

Euth. Certainly.

Euth. Of course.

Soc. It would appear that he who knows what the law requires with respect to the gods will correctly be defined as a pious man, and that is our definition?

Soc. It seems that a man who knows what the law requires regarding the gods can rightly be called pious. Is that our definition?

So it appears to me, at any rate (he replied). ¹¹

At least, that's how it seems to me, he replied. ¹¹

Soc. But now, with regard to human beings; is it allowable to deal with men in any way one pleases? ¹²

Soc. But now, what about human beings? Is it acceptable to treat people however one pleases? ¹²

Euth. No; with regard to men also, he will be a law-observing man ¹³ who knows what things are lawful as concerning men, in accordance with which our dealings with one another must be conducted. ¹⁴

Euth. No. In dealing with others, a man will also be law-abiding ¹³ if he knows the laws governing how people must deal with one another. ¹⁴

Soc. Then those who deal with one another in this way, deal with each other as they ought? ¹⁵

Soc. So, are those who treat each other this way acting as they should? ¹⁵

Obviously (he answered).

Obviously, he answered.

Soc. And they who deal with one another as they ought, deal well and nobly—is it not so?

Soc. And those who treat one another as they should act well and nobly, don't they?

Certainly (he answered).

“Certainly,” he answered.

Soc. And they who deal well and nobly by mankind are well-doers in respect of human affairs?

Soc. And those who treat people well and honorably are good at human affairs?

That would seem to follow (he replied).

That seems to follow, he replied.

Soc. I presume that those who obey the laws do what is just and right?

Soc. I suppose those who obey the laws do what is just and right?

Without a doubt, (he answered).

Without a doubt, he answered.

Soc. And by things right and just you know what sort of things are meant?

Soc. And do you know what people mean by things that are right and just?

What the laws ordain (he answered).

What the laws require (he answered).

Soc. It would seem to follow that they who do what the laws ordain both do what is right and just and what they ought? ¹⁶

Soc. So it seems that those who obey the laws do what is right and just, and what they ought to do? ¹⁶

Euth. I see no alternative.

Euth. I don't see any other choice.

Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just? ¹⁷

Soc. But then, is someone who does what is just and right upright and just? ¹⁷

I should say so myself (he answered).

“I would say so myself,” he answered.

Soc. And should you say that any one obeys the laws without knowing what the laws ordain?

Soc. And would you say anyone obeys the laws without knowing what they require?

I should not (he answered).

I wouldn't, he answered.

Soc. And do you suppose that any one who knows what things he ought to do supposes that he ought not to do them? ¹⁸

Soc. And do you think anyone who knows what they should do thinks they should not do it? ¹⁸

No, I suppose not (he answered).

No, I don't suppose so, he answered.

Soc. And do you know of anybody doing other than what he feels bound to do? ¹⁹

Soc. And do you know anyone who does anything other than what they feel they must do? ¹⁹

No, I do not (he answered).

No, I don't, he answered.

Soc. It would seem that he who knows what things are lawful ²⁰ as concerning men does the things that are just and right?

Soc. It seems that a person who knows what is lawful ²⁰ in dealings with others does what is just and right?

Without a doubt (he answered).

“Without a doubt,” he answered.

Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just? ²¹

Soc. But someone who does what is just and right is upright and just? ²¹

Who else, if not? (he replied).

Who else, if not? he replied.

Soc. It would seem, then, we shall have got to a right definition if we name as just and upright those who know the things which are lawful as concerning men?

Soc. So it seems we will have the right definition if we call those who know the laws concerning people just and upright?

That is my opinion (he answered).

That is what I think, he answered.

Soc. And what shall we say that wisdom is? Tell me, does it seem to you that the wise are wise in what they know, ²² or are there any who are wise in what they know not?

Soc. And what should we say wisdom is? Tell me, do you think wise people are wise about what they know, ²² or can anyone be wise about what they do not know?

Euth. Clearly they are wise in what they know; ²³ for how could a man have wisdom in that which he does not know?

Euth. Clearly, they are wise in what they know. ²³ How could anyone be wise about something they do not know?

Soc. In fact, then, the wise are wise in knowledge?

Soc. So, in fact, wise people are wise in what they know?

Euth. Why, in what else should a man be wise save only in knowledge?

Euth. Well, what else can a man be wise in except what he knows?

Soc. And is wisdom anything else than that by which a man is wise, think you?

Soc. And do you think wisdom is anything other than what makes a person wise?

Euth. No; that, and that only, I think.

Euth. No, I think only that.

Soc. It would seem to follow that knowledge and wisdom are the same?

Soc. So, it seems that knowledge and wisdom are the same?

Euth. So it appears to me.

Euth. That's how it seems to me.

Soc. May I ask, does it seem to you possible for a man to know all the things that are?

Soc. May I ask, do you think a person can know everything that exists?

Euth. No, indeed! not the hundredth part of them, I should say.

Euth. No, certainly not! I would say not even one hundredth of them.

Soc. Then it would seem that it is impossible for a man to be all-wise?

Soc. So it seems impossible for a man to know everything?

Quite impossible (he answered).

“Completely impossible,” he answered.

Soc. It would seem the wisdom of each is limited to his knowledge; each is wise only in what he knows?

Soc. It seems that each person's wisdom is limited to what they know. Is each person wise only in what they know?

Euth. That is my opinion. ²⁴

Euth. That's what I think. ²⁴

Soc. Well! come now, Euthydemus, as concerning the good: ought we to search for the good in this way?

Soc. Well, Euthydemus, should we search for the good in this way?

What way? (he asked).

How? he asked.

Soc. Does it seem to you that the same thing is equally advantageous to all?

Soc. Do you think the same thing is equally beneficial to everyone?

No, I should say not (he answered).

No, I don't think so (he answered).

Soc. You would say that a thing which is beneficial to one is sometimes hurtful to another?

Soc. Would you say that something beneficial to one person is sometimes harmful to another?

Decidedly (he replied).

Definitely (he replied).

Soc. And is there anything else good except that which is beneficial, should you say? ²⁵

Soc. And would you say anything is good except what is beneficial? ²⁵

Nothing else (he answered).

“Nothing else,” he answered.

Soc. It would seem to follow that the beneficial is good relatively to him to whom it is beneficial?

Soc. So it seems that what is beneficial is good for the person it benefits?

That is how it appears to me (he answered).

That's how it seems to me, he answered.

Soc. And the beautiful: can we speak of a thing as beautiful in any other way than relatively? or can you name any beautiful thing, body, vessel, or whatever it be, which you know of as universally beautiful? ²⁶

Soc. And what about beauty? Can we call something beautiful except in relation to something else? Can you name anything you know to be universally beautiful, whether a body, a vessel, or anything else? ²⁶

Euth. I confess I do not know of any such myself. ²⁷

Euth. I admit I don't know of any myself. ²⁷

Soc. I presume to turn a thing to its proper use is to apply it beautifully?

Soc. I suppose using something for its proper purpose is using it beautifully?

Euth. Undoubtedly it is a beautiful appliance. ²⁸

Euth. It is certainly a beautiful tool. ²⁸

Soc. And is this, that, and the other thing beautiful for aught else except that to which it may be beautifully applied?

Soc. And is anything beautiful except for the purpose to which it may be beautifully applied?

Euth. No single thing else.

Euth. Nothing else at all.

Soc. It would seem that the useful is beautiful relatively to that for which it is of use?

Soc. So it seems that something useful is beautiful in relation to what it is useful for?

So it appears to me (he answered).

So it seems to me (he answered).

Soc. And what of courage, ²⁹ Euthydemus? I presume you rank courage among things beautiful? It is a noble quality? ³⁰

Soc. And what about courage, ²⁹ Euthydemus? I assume you count courage among the things that are beautiful? It is a noble quality? ³⁰

Nay, one of the most noble (he answered).

No, one of the noblest, he answered.

Soc. It seems that you regard courage as useful to no mean end?

Soc. It seems you think courage serves an important purpose?

Euth. Nay, rather the greatest of all ends, God knows.

Euth. No, God knows it is the greatest purpose of all.

Soc. Possibly in face of terrors and dangers you would consider it an advantage to be ignorant of them?

Soc. Perhaps, when faced with frightening things and dangers, you would consider it an advantage not to know about them?

Certainly not (he answered).

Certainly not, he answered.

Soc. It seems that those who have no fear in face of dangers, simply because they do not know what they are, are not courageous?

Soc. It seems that people are not courageous if they are unafraid of dangers simply because they do not understand them?

Most true (he answered); or, by the same showing, a large proportion of madmen and cowards would be courageous.

That’s quite true, he replied. Otherwise, by the same reasoning, many madmen and cowards would be courageous.

Soc. Well, and what of those who are in dread of things which are not dreadful, are they—

Soc. Well, what about those who fear things that are not frightening? Are they...

Euth. Courageous, Socrates?—still less so than the former, goodness knows.

Euth. Courageous, Socrates? Even less so than the former, goodness knows.

Soc. Possibly, then, you would deem those who are good in the face of terrors and dangers to be courageous, and those who are bad in the face of the same to be cowards?

Soc. Perhaps, then, you would call those who respond well to fear and danger courageous, and those who respond badly cowards?

Certainly I should (he answered).

Certainly, I would, he answered.

Soc. And can you suppose any other people to be good in respect of such things except those who are able to cope with them and turn them to noble account? ³¹

Soc. And can you think of anyone else who is good at handling such things, apart from those who can deal with them and put them to noble use? ³¹

No; these and these alone (he answered).

No, only these (he answered).

Soc. And those people who are of a kind to cope but badly with the same occurrences, it would seem, are bad?

Soc. And people who cope badly with the same events would seem to be bad?

Who else, if not they? (he asked).

Who else, if not them? (he asked).

Soc. May it be that both one and the other class do use these circumstances as they think they must and should? ³²

Soc. Could both groups use these circumstances as they think they must and should? ³²

Why, how else should they deal with them? (he asked).

Well, how else should they deal with them? (he asked).

Soc. Can it be said that those who are unable to cope well with them or to turn them to noble account know how they must and should deal with them? ³³

Soc. Can people who cannot handle them well or put them to good use be said to know how they should deal with them? ³³

I presume not (he answered).

I don't think so (he answered).

Soc. It would seem to follow that those who have the knowledge how to behave are also those who have the power? ³⁴

Soc. So it would seem that those who know how to behave are also the ones who have the power? ³⁴

Yes; these, and these alone (he said).

Yes, these and only these, he said.

Soc. Well, but now, what of those who have made no egregious blunder (in the matter); can it be they cope ill with the things and circumstances we are discussing?

Soc. But what about those who have made no serious mistake (in this matter)? Could they still handle the things and circumstances we are discussing badly?

I think not (he answered).

I don't think so, he replied.

Soc. It would seem, conversely, that they who cope ill have made some egregious blunder?

Soc. Conversely, it would seem that those who cope poorly have made some serious mistake?

Euth. Probably; indeed, it would appear to follow.

Euth. Probably. In fact, that seems to follow.

Soc. It would seem, then, that those who know ³⁵ how to cope with terrors and dangers well and nobly are courageous, and those who fail utterly of this are cowards?

Soc. So it seems that those who know ³⁵ how to face fear and danger well and nobly are courageous. And those who utterly fail to do so are cowards?

So I judge them to be (he answered). ³⁶

“I think so,” he answered. ³⁶

A kingdom and a tyranny ³⁷ were, he opined, both of them forms of government, but forms which differed from one another, in his belief; a kingdom was a government over willing men in accordance with civil law, whereas a tyranny implied the government over unwilling subjects not according to law, but so as to suit the whims and wishes of the ruler.

He believed that a kingdom and a tyranny ³⁷ were both forms of government, but they differed. A kingdom governed willing people according to civil law. A tyranny, by contrast, governed unwilling subjects, not according to law, but according to the ruler’s whims and wishes.

There were, moreover, three forms of citizenship or polity; in the case where the magistrates were appointed from those who discharged the obligations prescribed by law, he held the polity to be an aristocracy (or rule of the best); ³⁸ where the title to office depended on rateable property, it was a plutocracy (or rule of wealth); and lastly, where all the citizens without distinction held the reins of office, that was a democracy (or rule of the people).

There were also three forms of government. He called it an aristocracy (or rule of the best) when officials were chosen from those who fulfilled their legal obligations. ³⁸ When eligibility for office depended on taxable property, he called it a plutocracy (or rule of wealth). Finally, when all citizens could hold office without distinction, he called it a democracy (or rule of the people).

Let me explain his method of reply where the disputant had no clear statement to make, but without attempt at proof chose to contend that such or such a person named by himself was wiser, or more of a statesman, or more courageous, and so forth, than some other person. ³⁹ Socrates had a way of bringing the whole discussion back to the underlying proposition, ⁴⁰ as thus:

Let me explain how Socrates replied when someone had no clear argument to make. The person might simply claim, without offering proof, that one named person was wiser, a better statesman, or more courageous than another, and so on. ³⁹ Socrates would bring the whole discussion back to the underlying proposition, ⁴⁰ like this:

Soc. You state that so and so, whom you admire, is a better citizen that this other whom I admire?

Soc. You say the person you admire is a better citizen than the person I admire?

The Disputant. Yes; I repeat the assertion.

The Disputant. Yes, I repeat my claim.

Soc. But would it not have been better to inquire first what is the work or function of a good citizen?

Soc. But wouldn't it have been better to ask first what a good citizen's role is?

The Disputant. Let us do so.

The Disputant. Let's do that.

Soc. To begin, then, with the matter of expenditure: his superiority will be shown by his increasing the resources and lightening the expenditure of the state? ⁴¹

Soc. Let’s start with spending. Will he show his superiority by increasing the state’s resources and reducing its spending? ⁴¹

Certainly (the disputant would answer).

Of course (the person arguing would answer).

Soc. And in the event of war, by rendering his state superior to her antagonists?

Soc. And if there is a war, by making his state stronger than its enemies?

The Disputant. Clearly.

The Disputant. Clearly.

Soc. Or on an embassy as a diplomatist, I presume, by securing friends in place of enemies?

Soc. Or as a diplomat on an embassy, I suppose, by turning enemies into friends?

That I should imagine (replies the disputant).

I would think so (replies the disputant).

Soc. Well, and in parliamentary debate, by putting a stop to party strife and fostering civic concord?

Soc. And in political debates, by ending party conflict and promoting harmony among citizens?

The Disputant. That is my opinion.

The Disputant. That's my opinion.

By this method of bringing back the argument to its true starting-point, even the disputant himself would be affected and the truth become manifest to his mind.

By bringing the argument back to its true starting point, even the person arguing would be affected and see the truth.

His own—that is, the Socratic—method of conducting a rational discussion ⁴² was to proceed step by step from one point of general agreement to another: "Herein lay the real security of reasoning," ⁴³ he would say; and for this reason he was more successful in winning the common assent of his hearers than any one I ever knew. He had a saying that Homer had conferred on Odyesseus the title of a safe, unerring orator, ⁴⁴ because he had the gift to lead the discussion from one commonly accepted opinion to another.

His own method, the Socratic method, of conducting a rational discussion ⁴² was to move step by step from one point of general agreement to another. "This is the real security of reasoning," ⁴³ he would say. For this reason, he was more successful at winning his listeners' agreement than anyone I ever knew. He said that Homer had given Odyesseus the title of a safe, unerring speaker, ⁴⁴ because he could lead a discussion from one commonly accepted opinion to another.