Book 4, Chapter 7

4 min

The frankness and simplicity with which Socrates endeavoured to declare his own opinions, in dealing with those who conversed with him, is, I think, conclusively proved by the above instances; at the same time, as I hope now to show, he was no less eager to cultivate a spirit of independence in others, which would enable them to stand alone in all transactions suited to their powers.

I think the examples above conclusively prove how openly and simply Socrates expressed his opinions to those who spoke with him. At the same time, I hope to show that he was equally eager to foster independence in others. He wanted them to stand on their own in all matters within their abilities.

Or, "who frequented his society, is, I hope, clear from what has been said."

Of all the men I have ever known, he was most anxious to ascertain in what any of those about him was really versed; and within the range of his own knowledge he showed the greatest zeal in teaching everything which it befits the true gentleman to know; or where he was deficient in knowledge himself, he would introduce his friends to those who knew. He did not fail to teach them also up to what point it was proper for an educated man to acquire empiric knowledge of any particular matter.

Of all the men I have known, he was most eager to learn what each person around him really knew. He was also eager to teach them everything he knew that a true gentleman should know. When he lacked knowledge himself, he introduced his friends to those who had it. He also taught them how much practical knowledge an educated man should acquire in any particular field.

Literally, "a beautiful and good man."

Or, "where he lacked acquaintance with the matter himself." For an example, see "Econ." iii. 14.

"To those who had the special knowledge", "a connoisseur in the matter."

Or, "of any particular branch of learning", "in each department of things."

To take geometry as an instance: Every one (he would say) ought to be taught geometry so far, at any rate, as to be able, if necessary, to take over or part with a piece of land, or to divide it up or assign a portion of it for cultivation, and in every case by geometric rule. That amount of geometry was so simple indeed, and easy to learn, that it only needed ordinary application of the mind to the method of mensuration, and the student could at once ascertain the size of the piece of land, and, with the satisfaction of knowing its measurement, depart in peace. But he was unable to approve of the pursuit of geometry up to the point at which it became a study of unintelligible diagrams. What the use of these might be, he failed, he said, to see; and yet he was not unversed in these recondite matters himself. These things, he would say, were enough to wear out a man's life, and to hinder him from many other more useful studies.

Take geometry, for example. He would say that everyone should learn enough geometry to handle a piece of land if necessary. They should be able to acquire it, transfer it, divide it, or set aside part of it for cultivation, using geometric methods in every case. This much geometry was simple and easy to learn. A student needed only to pay ordinary attention to the method of measuring land. Then the student could determine the size of a plot and leave satisfied, knowing its measurement. But he could not approve of studying geometry to the point of dealing with incomprehensible diagrams. He said he could not see what use these diagrams were, though he was familiar with such obscure matters himself. He would say that these studies could consume a person's life and prevent them from pursuing many other, more useful studies.

{e ergon apodeixasthai}, or "and to explain the process." Compare Plat. "Rep." vii. 528 D. See R. Kuhner ad loc. for other interpretations of the phrase. Compare Max. Tyr. xxxvii. 7.

Or, "by correct measurement". Literally, "by measurement of the earth."

Compare Aristot. "Pol." v. (viii.) 2 and Cic. "Acad. Post." I. iv. 15. For this attitude, compare that of August Comte, a philosopher otherwise very unlike Socrates. For example, see his view of the futility of sidereal astronomy, "Pos. Pol." i. 412 (Bridges).

Compare Isocr. "On the Antidosis," 258-269, on the proper place of "Eristic" in education. See above, IV. ii. 10.

Compare A. Comte on "perte intellectuelle" in the pursuit of unproductive studies.

Again, a certain practical knowledge of astronomy, a certain skill in the study of the stars, he strongly insisted on. Every one should know enough of the science to be able to discover the hour of the night or the season of the month or year, for the purposes of travel by land or sea—the march, the voyage, and the regulations of the watch; and in general, with regard to all matters connected with the night season, or with the month, or the year, it was well to have such reliable data to go upon as would serve to distinguish the various times and seasons. But these, again, were pieces of knowledge easily learnt from night sportsmen, pilots of vessels, and many others who make it their business to know such things. As to pushing the study of astronomy so far as to include a knowledge of the movements of bodies outside our own orbit, whether planets or stars of eccentric movement, or wearing oneself out endeavouring to discover their distances from the earth, their periods, and their causes, all this he strongly discountenanced; for he saw (he said) no advantage in these any more than in the former studies. And yet he was not unversed in the subtleties of astronomy any more than in those of geometry; only these, again, he insisted, were sufficient to wear out a man's lifetime, and to keep him away from many more useful pursuits.

He also strongly insisted on a practical knowledge of astronomy and some skill in studying the stars. Everyone should know enough to determine the hour of the night or the time of the month or year. This knowledge would be useful for travel by land or sea, for marches and voyages, and for setting watches. More generally, for anything connected with the night, the month, or the year, it was good to have reliable information for distinguishing times and seasons. But this knowledge was easy to learn from night hunters, ship pilots, and many others whose work required it. He strongly discouraged taking astronomy further. He opposed studying the movements of bodies outside our own orbit, whether planets or stars with irregular movements. He also opposed wearing oneself out trying to discover their distances from the earth, their periods, and their causes. He said he saw no more benefit in these studies than in the earlier ones. Yet he was no less familiar with the subtleties of astronomy than with those of geometry. He insisted only that these studies, too, could consume a person's lifetime and keep them from many more useful pursuits.

Schneid. Compare Plat. "Rep." vii. 527 D.

"Occurrences connected with the night, the month, or year." For example, the festival of the Karneia is marked by the full moon of August, its {tekmerion} (point de repere). Cf. Eur. "Alc." 449.

See Plat. "Soph." 220 D, above, III. xi. 8, "Cyrop." I. vi. 40, "Hunting," xii. 6, and Hippocr. "Aer." 28.

See Lewis, "Astron. of the Ancients". Compare Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 144.

Or, "the causes of these."

{oude touton ge anekoos en}. He is said to have "heard" Archelaus, a pupil of Anaxagoras. Cf. Cic. "Tusc." V. iv. 10.

And to speak generally, in regard of things celestial he set his face against attempts to excogitate the machinery by which the divine power formed its several operations. Not only were these matters beyond man's faculties to discover, as he believed, but the attempt to search out what the gods had not chosen to reveal could hardly (he supposed) be well pleasing in their sight. Indeed, the man who tortured his brains about such subjects stood a fair chance of losing his wits entirely, just as Anaxagoras, the headiest speculator of them all, in his attempt to explain the divine mechanism, had somewhat lost his head. Anaxagoras took on himself to assert that sun and fire are identical, ignoring the fact that human beings can easily look at fire, but to gaze steadily into the face of the sun is given to no man; or that under the influence of his rays the colour of the skin changes, but under the rays of fire not. He forgot that no plant or vegetation springs from earth's bosom with healthy growth without the help of sunlight, whilst the influence of fire is to parch up everything, and to destroy life; and when he came to speak of the sun as being a "red-hot stone" he ignored another fact, that a stone in fire neither lights up nor lasts, whereas the sun-god abides for ever with intensist brilliancy undimmed.

More generally, he opposed attempts to work out how divine power produced its various effects in the heavens. He believed that these matters were beyond human understanding. He also supposed that the gods could hardly be pleased by attempts to discover what they had chosen not to reveal. Indeed, anyone who strained his brain over such subjects stood a good chance of losing his mind entirely. Anaxagoras, the most reckless thinker of them all, had somewhat lost his head while trying to explain how divine power worked. Anaxagoras claimed that the sun and fire are the same. He ignored the fact that people can easily look at fire, but no one can stare at the sun. He also ignored the fact that the sun's rays change the color of the skin, while fire's rays do not. He forgot that no plant or vegetation grows healthily from the earth without sunlight. Fire, on the other hand, dries everything up and destroys life. When he called the sun a "red-hot stone", he ignored another fact. A stone in a fire neither shines nor lasts, whereas the sun-god lasts forever, with his intense brilliance undimmed.

Or, "he tried to divert one from becoming overly-wise in heavenly matters and the 'mecanique celeste' of the Godhead in His several operations." See above, I. i. 11. See Grote, "Plato," i. 438.

Of Clazomenae. Compare Plat. "Apol." 14; Diog. Laert. II. vi; Cic. "Tusc." V. iv. 10; Cobet, "Prosop. Xen." s.n.; Grote, "H. G." i. 501.

Or, "that the sun was simply a fire, forgetting so simple a fact as that."

Or, "the skin darkens, but fire does not have that effect."

Socrates inculcated the study of reasoning processes, but in these, equally with the rest, he bade the student beware of vain and idle over-occupation. Up to the limit set by utility, he was ready to join in any investigation, and to follow out an argument with those who were with him; but there he stopped. He particularly urged those who were with him to pay the utmost attention to health. They would learn all it was possible to learn from adepts, and not only so, but each one individually should take pains to discover, by a lifelong observation of his own case, what particular regimen, what meat or drink, or what kind of work, best suited him; these he should turn to account with a view to leading the healthiest possible life. It would be no easy matter for any one who would follow this advice, and study his own idiosyncrasy, to find a doctor to improve either on the diagnosis or the treatment requisite.

Socrates encouraged the study of reasoning, but he warned students not to spend too much time on it to no purpose, just as he did with other studies. He was willing to investigate any question and follow an argument with his companions as far as it was useful. But he went no further. He especially urged his companions to pay the closest attention to their health. They should learn all they could from experts. But each person should also observe himself throughout his life. In this way, he could discover what diet, food, drink, and work suited him best. He should use this knowledge to live as healthily as possible. Anyone who followed this advice and studied his own particular needs would find it hard to find a doctor who could improve on his diagnosis or treatment.

{logismous} = (1) "arithmetic," (2) "calculation," (3) "syllogistic reasoning." See L. Dind. "Index. Gr." s.v., and Kuhner ad loc. Compare Plat. "Gorg." 451 C. It is important to determine which meaning of "logism" is intended here.

Or, "to find a doctor better able than himself to 'diagnose' and prescribe a treatment congenial to health." Cf. Tac. "Ann." vi. 46. Plut. "de San." 136 E, ap. Schneid. ad loc.

Where any one came seeking for help which no human wisdom could supply, he would counsel him to give heed to "divination." He who has the secret of the means whereby the gods give signs to men touching their affairs can never surely find himself bereft of heavenly guidance.

When someone sought help beyond human wisdom, he advised them to pay attention to "divination." Anyone who knows how the gods give people signs about their affairs can never be without divine guidance.