Truth and Falsehood

Of late it has been so common with me to withdraw my Mind from my sences, and I have so throughly consider’d how few things there are appertaining to Bodies that are truly perceived, and that there are more Things touching Mans mind, and yet more concerning God, which are well known; that now without any difficulty I can turn my Thoughts from things sensible, to those which are only Intelligible, and Abstracted from Matter. And truely I have a much more distinct Idea of a Mans mind (as it is a Thinking Thing, having no Corporeal Dimensions of Length, Breadth, and Thickness, nor having any other Corporeal Quality) then the Idea of any Corporeal Thing can be. And when I reflect upon my self, and consider how that I doubt, that is, am an imperfect dependent Being, I from hence Collect such a clear and distinct Idea of an Independent perfect Being, which is God, and from hence only that I have such an Idea, that is, because I that have this Idea do my self Exist; I do so clearly conclude that God also Exists, and that on him my Being depends each Minute; That I am Confident nothing can be known more Evidently and Certainly by Humane Understanding.

Lately, I have often withdrawn my mind from my senses. I have thoroughly considered how few things about bodies are truly perceived. More things about the human mind, and still more about God, are well known. So now I can easily turn my thoughts from sensory things to purely intellectual things, separate from matter. And indeed, I have a much more distinct idea of the human mind than of any bodily thing. I understand the mind as a thinking thing, with no bodily dimensions of length, width, or depth. Nor does it have any other bodily quality. And when I reflect on myself, I consider that I doubt, meaning that I am an imperfect, dependent being. From this, I form a clear and distinct idea of an independent, perfect being, who is God. Simply because I have such an idea, that is, because I who have this idea do myself exist, I draw a conclusion. I conclude so clearly that God also exists and that my existence depends on him at every moment. I am therefore confident that human understanding can know nothing more evidently and certainly.

And now I seem to perceive a Method by which, (from this Contemplation of the true God, in whom the Treasures of Knowledge and Wisdome are Hidden) I may attain the Knowledge of other Things.

And now I seem to see a method. (This method comes from contemplating the true God, in whom the treasures of knowledge and wisdom are hidden.) Through this method, I may gain knowledge of other things.

And first, I know ’tis impossible that this God should deceive me; For in all cheating and deceipt there is something of imperfection; and tho to be able to deceive may seem to be an Argument of ingenuity and power, yet without doubt to have the Will of deceiving is a sign of Malice and Weakness, and therefore is not Incident to God.

First, I know it is impossible for this God to deceive me. For all cheating and deception involve some imperfection. Although being able to deceive may seem to show cleverness and power, there is no doubt about the intention. To have the will to deceive is a sign of malice and weakness. Therefore, such an intention cannot belong to God.

I have also found in my self a Judicative faculty, which certainly (as all other things I possess) I have received from God; and seeing he will not deceive me, he has surely given me such a Judgement, that I can never Err, whilst I make a Right Use of it. Of which truth I can make no doubt, unless it seems, that From hence it will follow, That therefore I can never Err; for if whatever I have, I have from God, and if he gave me no Faculty of Erring, I may seem not to be able to Err. And truly so it is whilst I think upon God, and wholly convert my self to the consideration of him, I find no occasion of Error or Deceit; but yet when I return to the Contemplation of my self, I find my self liable to Innumerable Errors. Enquiring into the cause of which, I find in my self an Idea, not only a real and positive one of a God, that is, of a Being infinitely perfect, but also (as I may so speak) a Negative Idea of Nothing; that is to say, I am so constituted between God and Nothing or between a perfect Being and No-being, that as I am Created by the Highest Being, I have nothing in Me by which I may be deceived or drawn into Error; but as I pertake in a manner of Nothing, or of a No-Being, that is, as I my self am not the Highest Being, and as I want many perfections, ’tis no Wonder that I should be Deceived.

I have also found in myself a faculty of judgment. Like everything else I possess, I have certainly received this faculty from God. Since he will not deceive me, he has surely given me a judgment with which I can never be mistaken, as long as I use it correctly. I cannot doubt this truth, except that it seems to imply that I can never be mistaken. For if everything I have comes from God, and he gave me no faculty for making mistakes, I may seem unable to make mistakes. And indeed, while I think about God and turn my attention entirely to the consideration of him, I find no source of error or deception. But when I return to contemplating myself, I find myself subject to countless errors. When I investigate the cause of these errors, I find within myself an idea of God. This idea is real and positive: God is a supremely perfect being. But I also find, so to speak, a negative idea of nothing. In other words, my nature places me between God and nothing, or between a perfect being and nonbeing. Insofar as I am created by the highest being, I have nothing in me that could deceive me or lead me into error. But I also share, in a sense, in nothing or nonbeing. That is, I myself am not the highest being, and I lack many perfections. Insofar as this is so, it is no wonder that I should be deceived.

By which I understand that Error * (as it is Error) is not any real Being dependant on God, but it is only a Defect; And that therefore to make me Err there is not requisite a faculty of Erring given me by God, but only it so happens that I Err meerly because the Judicative faculty, which he has given me, is not Infinite.

By this I understand that error * (considered as error) is not any real thing dependent on God. Instead, it is only a defect. So, for me to err, God need not have given me a capacity for erring. Rather, I err simply because the faculty of judgment he has given me is not infinite.

But yet this Account is not fully satisfactory; for Error is not only a meer Negation, but ’tis a Privation, or a want of a certain Knowledge, which ought (as it were) to be in me. And when I consider the Nature of God, it seems impossible that he should give me any faculty which is not perfect in its kind, or which should want any of its due perfections; for if by how much the more skilful the Workman is, by so much the Perfecter Works proceed from him. What can be made by the Great Maker of all things which is not fully perfect? For I cannot Doubt but God may Create me so that I may never be deceived, neither can I doubt but that he Wills whatever is Best; Is it therefore better for me to be deceived, or not to be deceived?

But this explanation is still not fully satisfactory. For error is not merely a negation, but a privation, or a lack of certain knowledge. That knowledge ought, so to speak, to be in me. And when I consider the nature of God, it seems impossible that he would give me an imperfect faculty. Each faculty should be perfect in its kind and should not lack any of its proper perfections. For if the more skilled the craftsman, the more perfect the works he produces, what follows? What could the Great Maker of all things make that is not fully perfect? For I cannot doubt that God can create me so that I am never deceived. Nor can I doubt that he wills whatever is best. Is it therefore better for me to be deceived, or not to be deceived?

These things when I Consider more heedfully, it comes into my Mind, First, that ’tis no cause of Admiration that God should do Things whereof I can give no account, nor must I therefore doubt his Being, because there are many things done by him, and I not comprehend Why or How they are done; for seeing I now know that my Nature is very Weak and Finite, and that the Nature of God is Immense, Incomprehensible, Infinite; from hence I must fully, understand, that he can do numberless things, the Causes whereof lie hidden to Me. Upon which account only I esteem all those Causes which are Drawn from the End (viz. Final Causes) as of no use in Natural Philosophy, for I cannot without Rashness Think my self able to Discover Gods Designes.

When I consider these matters more carefully, my first thought is that I should not be surprised. God may do things I cannot explain. Nor should I therefore doubt his Existence because I cannot understand Why or How he does many things. For I now know that my Nature is very Weak and Finite. The Nature of God, however, is Immense, Incomprehensible, and Infinite. So I must fully understand that he can do countless things whose Causes remain hidden from me. For this reason alone, I consider all explanations based on purposes (that is, Final Causes) useless in Natural Philosophy. For I cannot, without being rash, think myself able to discover God's purposes.

I perceive this also, that whenever we endeavour to know whether the Works of God are perfect, we must not Respect any one kind of Creature singly, but the Whole Universe of Beings; for perhaps what (if considered alone) may Deservedly seem Imperfect, yet (as it is a part of the World) is most perfect; and tho since I have doubted of all things, I have discover’d nothing certainly to Exist, but my self, and God, yet since I have Consider’d the Omnipotency of God, I cannot deny, but that many other things are made (or at least, may be made) by him, so that I my self may be a part of this Universe.

I also see that, when judging whether the works of God are perfect, we must consider more than individual creatures. We must not consider any one kind of creature on its own, but the whole universe of beings. For perhaps something may rightly seem imperfect (if considered alone). Yet (as a part of the world) that same thing may be entirely perfect. And although I have doubted everything, I have found nothing certain to exist except myself and God. Yet I have considered the almighty power of God. So I cannot deny that many other things have been made (or at least, may be made) by him. Thus I myself may be a part of this universe.

Furthermore, coming nigher to my self, and enquiring what these Errors of mine, are (which are the Only Arguments of my Imperfection) * I find them to depend on two concurring Causes, on my faculty of Knowing, and on my faculty of Choosing or Freedome of my Will, that is to say, from my Understanding, and my Will together. For by my Understanding alone I only perceive Ideas, whereon I make Judgments, wherein (precisely so taken) there can be no Error, properly so called; for tho perhaps there may be numberless things, whose Ideas I have not in Me, yet I am not properly to be said Deprived of them, but only negatively wanting them; and I cannot prove that God ought to have given me a greater faculty of Knowing. And tho I understand him to be a skilful Workman, yet I cannot Think, that he ought to have put all those perfections in each Work of his singly, with which he might have endowed some of them.

Furthermore, I turn more closely to myself and ask what my errors are (the only evidence of my imperfection). * I find that they depend on two causes working together. These are my ability to know and my ability to choose, or the freedom of my will. In other words, errors arise from my understanding and my will together. Through my understanding alone, I merely perceive ideas on which I base judgments. Understanding, taken in precisely this sense, cannot involve error in the proper sense. For although perhaps there are countless things whose ideas I do not have within me, I am not properly described as deprived of those ideas. Rather, I am simply without them. And I cannot prove that God ought to have given me a greater ability to know. And although I understand him to be a skilled craftsman, I cannot think he ought to have given each of his works individually all those perfections with which he might have endowed some of them.

Neither can I complain that God has not given me a Will, or Freedom of Choise, large and perfect enough; for I have experienced that ’tis Circumscribed by no Bounds.

Nor can I complain that God has not given me a will, or freedom of choice, great and perfect enough. For I have experienced that my will is subject to no limits.

And ’tis worth our taking notice, that I have no other thing in me so perfect and so Great, but I Understand that there may be Perfecter and Greater, for if (for Example) I consider the Faculty of Understanding, I presently perceive that in me ’tis very small and Finite, and also at the same time I form to my self an Idea of an other Understanding not only much Greater, but the Greatest and Infinite, which I perceive to belong to God. In the same manner if I enquire into memory or imagination or any other faculties, I find them in my self Weak and Circumscribed, but in God I Understand them to be Infinite, there is therefore only my Will or Freedome of Choice, which I find to be so Great, that I cannot frame to my self an Idea of One Greater, so that ’tis by this chiefly by which I Understand my self to Bear the likeness and Image of God. For tho the Will in God be without comparison Greater then Mine, both as to the Knowledge and Power which are Joyn’d therewith, which make it more strong and Effective, and also as to the Object thereof, for God can apply himself to more things then I can. Yet being taken Formally and Precisely Gods Will seems no greater then Mine. For the Freedome of Will consists only in this, that we can Do, or not Do such a Thing (that is, affirm or deny, prosecute or avoid) or rather in this Only, that we are so carried to a Thing which is proposed by Our Intellect to Affirm or Deny, Prosecute or Shun, that we are sensible, that we are not Determin’d to the Choice or Aversion thereof, by any outward Force.

It is worth noting that nothing else in me is so perfect or so great that I cannot imagine something more perfect and greater. For example, if I consider my faculty of understanding, I immediately see that my understanding is very small and finite. At the same time, I form an idea of another understanding. This understanding is not only much greater, but the greatest and infinite, and I recognize that it belongs to God. Likewise, if I examine memory, imagination, or any other faculties, I find them weak and limited in myself. But in God, I understand these faculties to be infinite. Only my will, or freedom of choice, seems so great that I cannot form an idea of a greater will. So it is chiefly through my will that I understand myself to bear the likeness and image of God. Although the will in God is incomparably greater than mine, this greatness concerns two things. First, the knowledge and power joined to his will make it stronger and more effective. Second, the scope of his will is greater, since God can apply himself to more things than I can. Yet considered in itself and strictly as will, God’s will seems no greater than mine. For freedom of will consists only in our ability to do or not do something. That is, we can affirm or deny, pursue or avoid. Or rather, freedom consists only in how we are drawn toward something presented by our intellect. We are drawn to affirm or deny it, to pursue or avoid it. Yet we are aware that no external force determines us to choose or reject it.

Neither is it Requisite to make one Free that he should have an Inclination to both sides. For on the contrary, by how much the more strongly I am inclined to one side (whether it be that I evidently perceive therein Good or Evil, or Whether it be that God has so disposed my Inward Thoughts) By so much the more Free am I in my Choice.

Being free does not require an inclination toward both sides. On the contrary, the more strongly I lean toward one side, the more free I am in my choice. This holds whether I clearly see good or evil in that side, or God has shaped my inner thoughts.

Neither truly do Gods Grace or Natural Knowledge take away from my Liberty, but rather encrease and strengthen it. For that indifference which I find in my self, when no Reason inclines me more to one side, then to the other, is the meanest sort of Liberty, and is so far from being a sign of perfection, that it only argues a defect or negation of Knowledge; for if I should always Clearly see what were True and Good I should never deliberate in my Judgement or Choice, and Consequently, tho I were perfectly Free, yet I should never be Indifferent.

Neither God’s grace nor natural knowledge takes away my freedom. Instead, they increase and strengthen my freedom. For the indifference I find in myself when no reason draws me more to one side than the other is the lowest kind of freedom. Far from showing perfection, this indifference only shows a lack or absence of knowledge. For if I always clearly saw what was true and good, I would never deliberate in my judgment or choice. Consequently, though I would be perfectly free, I would never be indifferent.

From all which, I perceive that neither the Power of Willing precisely so taken, which I have from God, is the Cause of my Errors, it being most full and perfect in its kind; Neither also the Power of Understanding, for whatever I Understand (since ’tis from God that I Understand it) I understand aright, nor can I be therein Deceived.

From all this, I see that the power of willing considered on its own, which I receive from God, is not the cause of my errors. This power is entirely complete and perfect of its kind. Nor is my power of understanding the cause of my errors. For whatever I understand, since God enables me to understand it, I understand correctly. I cannot be deceived in what I understand.

From Whence therefore proceed all my Errors? To which, I answer, that they proceed from hence only, that seeing the Will expatiates it self farther then the Understanding, I keep it not within the same bounds with my Understanding, but often extend it to those things which I Understand not, to which things it being Indifferent, it easily Declines from what is True and Good; and consequently I am Deceived and Commit sin. * Thus, for example, when lately I felt my self to enquire, Whether any thing doth Exist, and found that from my setting my self to Examine such a thing, it evidently follows that I my self Exist, I could not but Judge, what I so clearly Understood, to be true, not that I was forced thereto by any outward impulse, but because a strong Propension in my Will did follow this Great Light in my Understanding, so that I believed it so much the more freely and willingly, by how much the less indifferent I was thereto. But now I understand, not only, that I Exist as I am a Thing that Thinks, but I also meet with a certain Idea of a Corporeal Nature, and it so happens that I doubt, whether that Thinking Nature that is in me be Different from that Corporeal Nature, or Whether they are both the same: but in this I suppose that I have found no Argument to incline me either ways, and therefore I am Indifferent to affirm or deny either, or to Judge nothing of either; But this indifferency extends it self not only to those things of which I am clearly ignorant, but generally to all those things which are not so very evidently known to me at the Time when my Will Deliberates of them; for tho never so probable Guesses incline me to one side, yet the Knowing that they are only Conjectures, and not indubitable reasons, is enough to Draw my Assent to the Contrary Part. Which Lately I have sufficiently experienced, when I supposed all those things (which formerly I assented to as most True) as very False, for this Reason only that I found my self able to doubt of them in some manner.

Where, then, do all my errors come from? My answer is that they come only from this: the will reaches further than the understanding. I do not keep my will within the same limits as my understanding. Instead, I often extend it to things I do not understand. Since my will is indifferent toward these things, it easily turns away from what is true and good. As a result, I am deceived and commit sin. * For example, I recently found myself asking whether anything exists. I discovered that my decision to examine this question clearly shows that I myself exist. I could not help but judge that what I understood so clearly was true. No outside influence forced me to judge this way. Rather, this great clarity in my understanding produced a strong inclination in my will. So the less indifferent I was toward this truth, the more freely and willingly I believed it. But now I understand not only that I exist as a thing that thinks. I also find in myself a certain idea of a bodily nature. And I happen to doubt whether the thinking nature within me is different from that bodily nature. Perhaps they are both the same. But here I suppose that I have found no argument to incline me either way. So I am indifferent: I can affirm or deny either possibility, or make no judgment about either. But this indifference extends beyond things about which I am clearly ignorant. It generally extends to everything not so clearly known to me when my will considers it. For although highly probable guesses may incline me toward one side, I know they are only conjectures, not unquestionable reasons. That knowledge alone is enough to draw my assent to the opposite side. I recently experienced this fully when I treated as entirely false everything I had previously accepted as completely true. I did so for this reason alone: I found myself able to doubt those things in some way.

If I abstain from passing my Judgment, when I do not clearly and distinctly enough perceive what is Truth, ’tis evident that I do well, and that I am not deceived: But if I affirm or deny, then ’tis that I abuse the freedome of my will, and if I turn my self to that part which is false, I am deceived; but if I embrace the contrary Part, ’tis but by chance that I light on the Truth, yet I shall not therefore be Blameless, for ’tis Manifest by the light of Nature that the Perception of the Understanding ought to preceed the Determination of the Will. And ’tis in this abuse of Free-Will that That Privation consists, which Constitutes Error; I say there is a Privation in the Action as it proceeds from Me, but not in the Faculty which I have received from God; nor in the Action as it depends on him.

If I avoid making a judgment when I do not clearly and distinctly enough see what is true, I plainly do well. I am not deceived. But if I affirm or deny something, I misuse the freedom of my will. If I choose the false side, I am deceived. But if I accept the opposite side, I reach the truth only by chance. Yet I am not blameless for doing so. For the light of nature makes it clear that the understanding's perception ought to come before the will's decision. This misuse of free will is the deficiency that makes up error. I mean that there is a deficiency in the action insofar as the action comes from me. But there is none in the faculty I received from God, nor in the action insofar as it depends on him.

Neither have I any Reason to Complain that God has not given me a larger Intellective Faculty, or more Natural Light, for ’tis a necessary Incident to a finite Understanding that it should not Understand All things, and ’tis Incident to a Created Understanding to be Finite: and I have more Reason to thank him for what he has bestowed upon me (tho he owed me nothing) then to think my self Robbed by him of those things which he never gave me.

Nor do I have any reason to complain that God has not given me a greater capacity to understand or more natural light. A limited understanding necessarily cannot understand all things, and a created understanding must be limited. And I have more reason to thank him for what he has given me (though he owed me nothing). I have less reason to think he has robbed me of things he never gave me.

Nor have I Reason to Complain that he has given me a Will larger then my Understanding: for seeing the Will Consists in one thing only, and as it were in an Indivisible (viz. to Will, or not to Will) it seems contrary to its nature that it should be less then ’tis; and certainly by how much the Greater it is, so much the more Thankful I ought to be to him; that Gave it me.

Nor do I have reason to complain that he gave me a will greater than my understanding. For the will consists of only one thing, something like an indivisible whole (namely, to will or not to will). So it seems contrary to the will’s nature that it should be less than it is. And certainly, the greater my will is, the more thankful I ought to be to him who gave it to me.

Neither can I Complain that God concurrs with me in the Production of those Voluntary Actions or Judgements in which I am deceived: for those Acts as they depend on God are altogether True and Good; and I am in some measure more perfect in that I can so Act, then if I could not: for that Privation, in which the Ratio Formalis of Falshood and Sin consists, wants not the Concourse of God; For it is not A Thing, and having respect to him as its Cause, ought not to be called Privation, but Negation; for certainly ’tis no Imperfection in God, that he has given me a freedome of Assenting or not Assenting to some things, the clear and distinct Knowledge whereof he has not Imparted to my Understanding; but certainly ’tis an Imperfection in me, that I abuse this liberty, and pass my Judgement on those things which I do not Rightly Understand.

Nor can I complain that God works with me in producing those voluntary actions or judgments in which I am mistaken. For those acts, insofar as they depend on God, are entirely true and good. And I am in some measure more perfect because I can act in this way than if I could not. For the privation, or lack, that constitutes the defining nature of falsehood and sin does not require God's cooperation. For this lack is not a thing. And when considered in relation to him as its cause, it should not be called privation, but negation, or mere absence. For certainly it is no imperfection in God that he has given me freedom to agree or not agree about certain things. This remains true even though he has not given my understanding a clear and distinct knowledge of those things. But it is certainly an imperfection in me that I misuse this freedom. I do so when I make a judgment about things I do not properly understand.

Yet I see that ’tis Possible with God to effect that (tho I should remain Free, and of a Finite Knowledge) I should never Err, that is, if he had endowed my Understanding with a clear and distinct Knowledge of all things whereof I should ever have an Occasion of deliberating; or if he had only so firmly fix’d in my Mind, that I should never forget, this, That I must never Judge of a thing which I do not clearly and distinctly Understand; Either of which things had God done, I easily perceive that I (as consider’d in my self) should be more perfect then now I am, yet nevertheless I cannot deny but that there may be a greater perfection in the whole Universe of Things, for that some of its parts are Obnoxious to Errors, and some not, then if they were all alike. And I have no Reason to Complain, that it has pleased God, that I should Act on the Stage of this World a Part not the chief and most perfect of all; Or that I should not be able to abstain from Error in the first way above specifi’d, which depends upon the Evident Knowledge of those things whereof I deliberate; Yet that I may abstain from Error by the other means abovemention’d, which depends only on this, That I Judge not of any Thing, the truth whereof is not Evident. For tho I have experienced in my self this Infirmity, that I cannot always be intent upon one and the same Knowledge, yet I may by a continued and often repeated Meditation bring this to pass, that as often as I have use of this Rule I may Remember it, by which means I may Get (as it were) an habit of not erring.

Yet I see that God could have ensured that I would never make mistakes. I could still have remained free and had limited knowledge. He could have given my understanding a clear and distinct knowledge of everything I would ever have reason to consider. Or he could have fixed this rule so firmly in my mind that I would never forget it: I must never judge anything I do not clearly and distinctly understand. Had God done either, I readily see that I, considered in myself, would be more perfect than I am now. Nevertheless, I cannot deny that the whole universe may be more perfect because some parts are subject to error. Some parts are not, and this variety may be better than if all parts were alike. And I have no reason to complain that God has chosen for me to play a part on this world’s stage that is not the highest and most perfect of all. Nor have I reason to complain that I cannot avoid error in the first way described above. That way depends on clear knowledge of the things I consider. Yet I can avoid error by the other means mentioned above. That means depends only on this rule: I must not judge anything whose truth is not clear. For although I have experienced this weakness in myself, I cannot always keep my attention on one and the same truth. Yet through continued and often repeated reflection, I can ensure that I remember this rule whenever I need it. In this way, I can develop, as it were, a habit of not making mistakes.

In which thing seeing, the greatest and chief perfection of Man consists, I repute my self to have gain’d much by this days Meditation, for that therein I have discover’d the Cause of Error, and Falshood; which certainly can be no other then what I have now Declared; for whenever in Passing my Judgement, I bridle my Will so that it extend it self only to those things which I clearly and distinctly perceive, it is impossible that I can Err. For doubtless All clear and distinct Perception is something, and therefore cannot proceed from Nothing, but must necessarily have God for its Author (God, I say, Who is infinitely Perfect, and who cannot Deceive) and therefore it Must be True.

Since humanity’s greatest and chief perfection lies in this, I consider myself to have gained much from today’s meditation. For in this meditation, I have discovered the cause of error and falsehood. That cause certainly can be nothing other than what I have just explained. Whenever I pass judgment, I restrain my will so that it extends only to what I clearly and distinctly perceive. When I do so, it is impossible for me to err. For undoubtedly, all clear and distinct perception is something. Therefore, such perception cannot come from nothing, but must necessarily have God as its author. (God, I say, who is infinitely perfect and who cannot deceive.) Therefore, every such perception must be true.

Nor have I this Day learnt only what I must beware off that I be not deceived, but also what I must Do to Discover Truth, for That I shall certainly find, if I fully Apply my self to those things only, which I perfectly understand; and if I distinguish between those and what I apprehend but confusedly and obscurely; Both which hereafter I shall endeavour.

Today I have learned not only what to watch out for so that I am not deceived. I have also learned what I must do to discover truth. For I will certainly find truth if I focus fully on only what I understand perfectly, and if I distinguish those things from what I grasp only confusedly and unclearly. From now on, I will try to do both.