The Essence of Material Things and, Again, God’s Existence

There are yet remaining many Things concerning Gods Attributes, and many things concerning the nature of my self or of my Mind, which ought to be searched into: but these perhaps I shall set upon at some other Opportunity. And at Present nothing seems to me more requisite (feeling I have discover’d what I must avoid, and what I must Do for the Attaining of Truth) then that I imploy my Endeavours to free my self from those doubts into which I have lately fallen, and that I try whether I can have any certainty of Material Things.

Many questions about God’s attributes still need to be explored. So do many questions about the nature of myself or my mind. But perhaps I will take up these questions another time. For now, I have discovered what I must avoid and what I must do to reach the truth. So nothing seems more necessary than working to free myself from the doubts I have recently fallen into. I must also try to find out whether I can be certain of anything about material things.

But before I enquire whether there be any such things Really Existent without Me, I ought to consider the Ideas of those things, as they are in my Thoughts and try which of them are Distinct, which confused.

But before I ask whether any such things really exist outside me, I should examine my ideas of those things. I should consider those ideas as they appear in my thoughts and try to identify which are distinct, which confused.

In which search I find that I distinctly imagine Quantity, that which Philosophers commonly call continued, that is to say, the Extension of that Quantity or thing continued into Length, Breadth, and Thickness, I can count in it divers Parts, to which parts I can assign Bigness, Figure, Position, and Local Motion, to which Local Motion I can assign Duration. Neither are only these Generals plainly discover’d and known by Me, but also by attentive Consideration, I perceive Innumerable particulars concerning the Shapes, Number, and Motion of These Bodies; The Truth whereof is so evident, and agreeable to my Nature, that when I first discover’d them, I seemed not so much to have Learnt any thing that is new, as to have only remembred what I have known before, or only to have thought on those things which were in me before, tho this be the first time that I have examin’d them so diligently.

In this search, I find that I clearly imagine quantity, which philosophers commonly call continuous. By this I mean the extension of that quantity, or continuous thing, in length, width, and depth. I can count various parts in it. To these parts I can assign size, shape, position, and movement from place to place. To this movement I can assign duration. These general features are not the only things I clearly discover and know. Through careful reflection, I also perceive countless particular facts about the shapes, number, and movement of these bodies. The truth of these facts is so clear and so in keeping with my nature that discovering them felt familiar. When I first discovered them, I seemed not so much to have learned anything new. Rather, I seemed only to have remembered what I had known before. Or I seemed merely to have thought about things that were already within me before. This was how it seemed, though this was the first time I had examined them so carefully.

One thing there is worthy my Consideration, which is, that I find in my self innumerable Ideas of certain things, which tho perhaps they exist no where without Me, yet they cannot Be said to be Nothing; and tho they are Thought upon by me at my will and pleasure, yet they are not made by Me, but have their own True and Immutable Natures. As when, for example, * I Imagine a Triangle, tho perhaps such a Figure Exists no where out of my Thoughts, nor ever will Exist, yet the Nature thereof is determinate, and its Essence or Form is Immutable and Eternal, which is neither made by me, nor depends on my mind, as appears for that many properties may be demonstrated of this Triangle, viz. That its three Angles are equal to two right ones, that to its Greatest Angle the Greatest side is subtended, and such like, which I now clearly know whether I will or not, tho before I never thought on them, when I imagine a Triangle, and consequently they could not be invented by Me. And ’tis nothing to the purpose for me to say, that perhaps this Idea of a Triangle came to me by the Organs of sense, because I have sometimes seen bodies of a Triangular Shape; for I can think of Innumerable other Figures, which I cannot suspect to have come in through my senses, and yet I can Demonstrate various properties of them, as well as of a Triangle, which certainly are all true, seeing I know them clearly, and therefore they are something, and not a meer Nothing, for ’tis Evident that what is true is something.

One thing deserves my consideration. I find in myself countless ideas of certain things. Although these things perhaps exist nowhere outside me, they cannot be said to be nothing. And although I think about them at my will and pleasure, they are not made by me. Instead, they have their own true and unchanging natures. For example, * when I imagine a triangle, perhaps such a figure exists nowhere outside my thoughts. Perhaps it never will exist. Yet its nature is definite, and its essence or form is unchanging and eternal. This nature is neither made by me nor dependent on my mind. This is clear because many properties of this triangle can be proved. For example, its three angles equal two right angles, and its longest side lies opposite its largest angle. There are other such properties, too. I now clearly know these properties whether I want to or not. Yet I had never thought about them before, when I imagined a triangle. Consequently, these properties could not have been invented by me. It does not help to say that perhaps this idea of a triangle came through my senses. I might suggest this because I have sometimes seen objects with a triangular shape. But I can think of countless other figures that I have no reason to suspect came through my senses. Yet I can prove various properties of these figures, just as I can with a triangle. These properties are certainly all true, since I know them clearly. Therefore, they are something, not merely nothing, because it is evident that what is true is something.

And now I have sufficiently Demonstrated, that what I clearly perceive, is True; And tho I had not demonstrated it, yet such is the Nature of my Mind, that I could not but give my Assent to what I so perceive, at least, as long as I so perceive it; and I remember (heretofore when I most of all relied on sensible Objects) that I held those Truths for the most certain which I evidently perceived, such as are concerning Figures, Numbers, with other parts of Arithmetick, and Geometry, as also whatever relates to pure and abstracted Mathematicks.

I have now shown clearly enough that what I clearly perceive is true. Even if I had not shown this, the nature of my mind would still compel my agreement. I could not help accepting what I perceive so clearly, at least as long as I perceive it that way. I remember that earlier (when I relied most on objects perceived through the senses), I considered certain truths the most certain. These were the truths I perceived clearly, such as those concerning shapes, numbers, and other parts of arithmetic and geometry. They also included everything relating to pure and abstract mathematics.

Now therefore, if from this alone, That I can frame the Idea of a Thing in my Mind, it follows, That whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive belonging to a thing, does Really belong to it; Cannot I from hence draw an Argument to Prove the Existence of a God? Certainly I find the Idea of a God, or infinitely perfect Being, as naturally in me, as the Idea of any Figure, or Number; and I as clearly and distinctly understand that it appertains to his Nature Always to Be, as I know that what I can demonstrate of a Mathematical Figure or Number belongs to the Nature of that Figure or Number: so that, tho all things which I have Meditated upon these three or four days were not true, yet I may well be as certain of the Existence of a God, as I have hitherto been of Mathematical Truths.

Now, if I can form the idea of a thing in my mind, does this alone imply the following? Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive as belonging to a thing does really belong to it. If so, can I use this to argue for the existence of God? Certainly, I find the idea of God, or an infinitely perfect being, in me as naturally as the idea of any shape or number. And I understand just as clearly and distinctly that always existing belongs to his nature. My understanding is as clear as my knowledge that whatever I can prove about a mathematical shape or number belongs to the nature of that shape or number. So, even if everything I have meditated on over these three or four days were untrue, the following would still hold. I may well be as certain of the existence of God as I have been until now of mathematical truths.

Doubt. Yet this Argument at first sight appears not so evident, but looks rather like a sophism; for seeing I am used in all other things to Distinguish Existence from Essence, I can easily perswade my self that the Existence of God may be distinguish’d from his Essence, so that I may Imagine God not to Exist.

Doubt. Yet at first glance, this argument does not seem so clear, but looks more like a misleading argument. For in all other things, I am used to distinguishing existence from essence. So I can easily convince myself that the existence of God may be separated from his essence. As a result, I may imagine God not to exist.

Solution. But considering it more strictly, ’tis manifest, that the Existence of God can no more be seperated from his Essence, then the Equality of the Three Angles to two right ones can be seperated from the Essence of a Triangle, or then the Idea of a Mountain can be without the Idea of a valley; so that ’tis no less a Repugnancy to think of a God (that is, A Being infinitely perfect) who wants Existence (that is, who wants a Perfection) then to think of a Mountain, to which there is no Valley adjoyning.

Solution. But on closer examination, it is clear that the existence of God cannot be separated from his essence. Neither can the three angles being equal to two right angles be separated from the essence of a triangle. Nor can the idea of a mountain exist without the idea of a valley. So it is no less a contradiction to think of a God (that is, an infinitely perfect being) who lacks existence. To lack existence is to lack a perfection. Thinking of such a God is as contradictory as thinking of a mountain with no adjoining valley.

Doubt. But what if I cannot imagine God but as Existing, or a Mountain without a Vally? yet supposing me to think of a Mountain with a Vally, it does not from thence follow, that there Is a Mountain in the World; so supposing me to think of a God as Existing, yet does it not follow that God Really Exists. For my Thought imposes no necessity on Things, and as I may imagine a Winged Horse, tho no Horse has Wings, so I may imagine an existing God, tho no God exist.

Doubt. But what if I can only imagine God as existing, or cannot imagine a mountain without a valley? Still, suppose I think of a mountain with a valley. The thought does not mean that there is a mountain in the world. Likewise, suppose I think of God as existing. The thought does not mean that God really exists. For my thought imposes no necessity on things. Just as I may imagine a winged horse, though no horse has wings, I may imagine an existing God, though no God exists.

Solution. ’Tis true the Sophism seems to lie in this, yet tho I cannot conceive a Mountain but with a Vally, it does not from hence follow, that a Mountain or Vally do Exist, but this will follow, that whether a Mountain or a Vally do or do not Exist, yet they cannot be seperated: so from hence that I cannot think of God but as Existing, it follows that Existence is Inseperable from God, and therefore that he Really Exists; Not because my Thought does all this, or Imposes any necessity on any Thing, but contrarily, because the necessity of the thing it self (viz. of Gods Existence) Determines me to think thus; for ’tis not in my Power to think a God without Existence (that is, A Being absolutely perfect without the Cheif Perfection) as it is in my Power to imagine a Horse either with or without Wings.

Solution. It is true that the flawed reasoning seems to lie here. Yet although I cannot conceive of a mountain without a valley, neither must therefore exist. But the following does follow: whether a mountain or a valley exists or does not exist, the two cannot be separated. Similarly, I cannot think of God except as existing. From this it follows that existence is inseparable from God, and therefore that he really exists. This is not because my thought makes this happen or imposes any necessity on anything. On the contrary, the necessity of the thing itself (namely, God’s existence) determines how I think. For I cannot think of God without existence. That would mean thinking of an absolutely perfect being without the chief perfection. By contrast, I can imagine a horse either with or without wings.

Doubt. And here it cannot be said, that I am forced to suppose God Existing, after I have supposed him endowed with all Perfections, seeing Existence is one of them; but that my First Position (viz. His Absolute Perfection) is not necessary. Thus, for example, ’tis not necessary for me to think all Quadrilateral Figures inscribed in a Circle; But supposing that I think so, I am then necessitated to Confess a Rhombe Inscribed therein, and yet this is evidently False.

Doubt. And here one cannot raise the following objection: I must suppose God exists once I have supposed him endowed with all perfections, since existence is one of them. But my first assumption (namely, his absolute perfection) is not necessary. For example, I do not have to think that all four-sided figures are inscribed in a circle. But if I think so, I am then forced to admit that a rhombus is inscribed in that circle. Yet this conclusion is clearly false.

Solution. For tho I am not forced at any time to think of a God; yet as often as I cast my Thoughts on a First and Cheif Being, and as it were bring forth out of the Treasury of my Mind an Idea thereof, I must of necessity attribute thereto all Manner of Perfections, tho I do not at that time count them over, or Remark each single One; which necessity is sufficient to make me hereafter (when I come to consider Existence to be a Perfection) conclude Rightly, That the First and Chief Being does Exist. Thus, for example, I am not obliged at any time to imagine a Triangle, yet whenever I please to Consider of a Right-lined Figure having only three Angles, I am then necessitated to allow it all those Requisites from which I may argue rightly, That the Three Angles thereof are not Greater then Two Right Ones, Tho upon the first consideration this came not into my Thought. But when I enquire what Figures may be inscribed within a Circle, I am not at all necessitated to think that all Quadrilateral Figures are of that sort; neither can I possibly imagine this, whilst I admit of nothing, but what I clearly and distinctly Understand: and therefore there is a great Difference between these False suppositions, and True natural Ideas, the first and Chief; whereof is that of a God; For by many wayes I understand That not to be a Fiction depending on my Thought, but an Image of a True and Immutable Nature; As first, because I can think of no other thing but God to Whose Essence Existence belongs. Next because I cannot Imagine Two or More Gods, and supposing that he is now only One, I may plainly perceive it necessary for Him to Have been from Eternity, and will Be to Eternity; And Lastly because I perceive many Other Things in God, Which I cannot Change, and from which I cannot Detract.

Solution. Although I am never forced to think of God, I sometimes turn my thoughts to a first and supreme being. I draw an idea of that being, as it were, from the storehouse of my mind. Whenever I do, I must attribute to that being every kind of perfection. This is so even though I do not then count those perfections or consider each one separately. This necessity is enough for me to reach a later conclusion. When I consider existence to be a perfection, I can conclude correctly that the first and supreme being exists. For example, I am never obliged to imagine a triangle. Yet whenever I choose to consider a figure made of straight lines with only three angles, certain consequences follow. I am then required to grant that figure all the properties from which I can correctly draw this conclusion: its three angles are no greater than two right angles. This holds even though I did not think of that conclusion when I first considered the triangle. But suppose I ask which figures can be inscribed in a circle. I am not at all required to think that all four-sided figures can be inscribed in a circle. Nor can I possibly imagine this while accepting only what I clearly and distinctly understand. There is therefore a great difference between these false assumptions and true natural ideas. The first and foremost of these ideas is the idea of God. For I understand in many ways that this idea is not a fiction dependent on my thought. Rather, it is an image of a true and unchanging nature. First, I can think of nothing except God whose essence includes existence. Next, I cannot imagine two or more Gods. And supposing that he is now only one, I can plainly see something necessary about him: he must have existed from eternity and will exist for eternity. Finally, I perceive many other things in God that I cannot change and from which I cannot take anything away.

But whatever way of Argumentation I use, it comes All at last to this one Thing, That I am fully perswaded of the Truth of those things only, which appear to me clearly and distinctly. And tho some of those things, which I so perceive, are obvious to every Man, and some are only discover’d by Those that search more nighly, and enquire more carefully, yet when such truths are discover’d, they are esteem’d no less certain than the Others. For Example, Tho it do not so easily appear, that in a Rightangled Triangle, the square of the Base is equal to the squares of the sides, as it appears, that the Base is suspended under its Largest Angle, yet the first Proposition is no less certainly believed when once ’tis perceived, then this Last.

But whatever argument I use, it all comes down to one thing. I am fully convinced of the truth only of things I perceive clearly and distinctly. Some things I perceive this way are obvious to everyone. Others are discovered only by people who look more closely and investigate more carefully. Yet once these truths are discovered, they are considered no less certain than the others. For example, consider a right triangle. The square of its hypotenuse equals the sum of the squares of its other two sides. This is less obvious than the fact that the hypotenuse lies opposite the triangle’s largest angle. Yet once the first statement is understood, it is believed no less certainly than the last.

Thus in Reference to God; certainly, unless I am overrun with Prejudice, or have my thoughts begirt on all sides with sensible Objects, I should acknowledge nothing before or easier then him; For what is more self-evident then that there is a Chief Being, or then that a God (to whose essence alone Existence appertains) does Exist? And tho serious Consideration is required to perceive thus much, yet Now, I am not only equally certain of it, as of what seems most certain, but I perceive also that the Truth of other Things so depends on it, that without it nothing can ever be perfectly known.

So, regarding God, unless prejudice overwhelms me or objects of the senses surround my thoughts, I should recognize nothing sooner or more easily than him. For what is more self-evident than the existence of a supreme being? Or than the fact that God (whose essence alone includes existence) does exist? Although recognizing this requires serious thought, now I am as certain of God's existence as of whatever seems most certain. But I also see that the truth of other things so depends on God's existence that, without it, nothing can ever be perfectly known.

For tho my nature be such, that during the time of my Clear and Distinct Perception, I cannot but believe it true; yet my Nature is such also, that I cannot fix the Intention of my Mind upon one and the same thing alwayes, so as to perceive it clearly, and the Remembrance of what Judgement I have formerly made is often stirred up, when I cease attending to those reasons for which I passed such a Judgment, other Reasons may then be produced, which (if I did not know God) may easily move me in my Opinion; and by this means I shall never attain to the true and certain Knowledge of any Thing, but Wandring and Unstable opinions. So, for example, when I consider the Nature of a Triangle, it plainly appears to me (as understanding the Principles of Geometry) that its three Angles are equal to two right ones; And this I must of necessity think True as long as I attend to the Demonstration thereof; but as soon as ever I withdraw my Mind from the Consideration of its Proof (altho I remember that I have once Clearly perceived it) yet perhaps I may doubt of Its Truth, being as yet Ignorant of a God; For I may perswade my self, that I am so framed by Nature, as to be deceived in those things which I imagine my self to perceive most evidently, Especially when I recollect, that heretofore I have often accounted many things True and Certain, which afterward upon other Reasons I have Judged as False. But when I perceive that there is a God; because at the same time I also Understand that all things Depend on Him, and that he is not a Deceiver; and when from hence I Collect that all those Things which I clearly and distinctly perceive are necessarily True; tho I have no further Respects to those Reasons which induced me to believe it True, yet if I do but remember, that I have once clearly and distinctly perceived it, no Argument can be brought on the contrary, that shall make me doubt, but that I have true and certain Knowledge thereof; and not onely of that, but of all other Truths also which I remember that I have once Demonstrated, such as are Geometrical Propositions and the like.

For although my nature is such that I must believe whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly to be true while perceiving it, my nature has another limitation. I cannot always keep my mind’s attention fixed on one thing so as to perceive it clearly. I often remember a judgment I made earlier after I stop attending to the reasons for that judgment. Other reasons may then arise that could easily change my opinion if I did not know God. So I would never reach true and certain knowledge of anything, but only shifting and unstable opinions. For example, when I consider the nature of a triangle, I plainly see that its three angles equal two right angles. I see this because I understand the principles of geometry. I must think this true as long as I attend to its proof. But as soon as I turn my mind away from considering the proof, perhaps I may doubt its truth. This may happen even though I remember having once clearly perceived it, while I remain unaware that God exists. For I may convince myself that nature has made me liable to error about whatever I think I perceive most clearly. This is especially so when I recall how often I have considered things true and certain in the past. Later, other reasons led me to judge those same things false. But when I perceive that God exists, I also understand that all things depend on him. I understand, too, that he is not a deceiver. From this I conclude that everything I perceive clearly and distinctly is necessarily true. Even if I no longer attend to the reasons that led me to believe something true, my memory is enough. If I simply remember having once clearly and distinctly perceived it, no opposing argument can make me doubt my knowledge. I have true and certain knowledge of it. And this applies not only to that truth, but also to all other truths I remember having once proved. These include geometrical propositions and the like.

What now can be Objected against me? shall I say, that I am so made by Nature, as to be often deceived? No; For I now Know that I cannot be deceived in those Things, which I clearly Understand. Shall I say, that at other times I have esteem’d many Things True and Certain, which afterwards I found to be falsities? No; for I perceived none of those things clearly and distinctly, but being Ignorant of this Rule of Truth, I took them up for Reasons, which Reasons I afterward found to be Weak. What then can be said? Shall, I say, (as lately I objected) that Perhaps I am asleep, and that what I now think of is no more True, then the Dreams of People asleep? But this it self moves not my Opinion; for certainly tho I were asleep, if any thing appear’d evident to my Understanding, ’twould be True.

What objection can now be raised against me? Should I say that nature made me so that I am often deceived? No, because I now know I cannot be deceived about things I understand clearly. Should I say I once considered many things true and certain, but later found them to be false? No, because I perceived none of those things clearly and distinctly. Instead, not knowing this rule of truth, I accepted them for reasons I later found to be weak. What else can be said? Should I raise my earlier objection? Perhaps I am asleep, and what I now think is no more true than the dreams of people asleep. But even this possibility does not shake my conviction. For certainly, even if I were asleep, anything that appeared evident to my understanding would be true.

And Thus I Plainly see, that the Certainty and Truth of all Science Depends on the Knowledge of the True God, so that before I had Known Him, I did Know nothing; But now many things both of God himself, and of other Intellectual Things, as also of Corporeal nature, which is the Object of Mathematicks, may be Plainly Known and Certain to me.

And so I clearly see that the certainty and truth of all knowledge depend on knowledge of the true God. So before I had known him, I knew nothing. But now many things about God himself, other things understood by the intellect, and physical nature may be clearly known and certain to me. Physical nature is the subject of mathematics.