God and His Existence

Now will I shut my eyes, I will stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses, I will blot out the Images of corporeal things clearly from my mind, or (because that can scarce be accomplish’d) I will give no heed to them, as being vain and false, and by discoursing with my self, and prying more rightly into my own Nature, will endeavour to make my self by degrees more known and familiar to my self.

Now I will close my eyes, block my ears, and withdraw all my senses. I will erase all images of physical things from my mind. Or, because I can hardly do so, I will ignore those images as empty and false. By talking with myself and examining my own nature more carefully, I will gradually try to know myself more fully.

I am a Thinking Thing, that is to say, doubting, affirming, denying, understanding few things, ignorant of many things, willing, nilling, imagining also, and sensitive. For (as before I have noted) though perhaps whatever I imagine, or am sensible of, as without me, Is not; yet that manner of thinking which I call sense and imagination (as they are only certain Modes of Thinking) I am certain are in Me. So that in these few Words I have mention’d whatever I know, or at least Whatever as yet I perceive my self to know.

I am a Thinking Thing. That is, I doubt, affirm, and deny. I understand few things and am ignorant of many things. I will and refuse, and I also imagine and sense. For, as I noted before, perhaps whatever I imagine or sense as existing outside me does not exist. Yet I am certain that the way of thinking I call sensation and imagination exists in me. (Sensation and imagination are only certain forms of thinking.) So, in these few words, I have mentioned everything I know, or at least everything I so far perceive myself to know.

Now will I look about me more carefully to see Whether there Be not some other Thing in Me, of Which I have not yet taken Notice. I am sure That I am a Thinking Thing, and therefore Do not I know what is Required to make certain of any Thing? I Answer, that in this My first knowledge ’tis Nothing but a clear, and distinct perception of What I affirm, Which would not be sufficient to make me certain of the Truth of a Thing, if it were Possible that any thing that I so clearly and distinctly Perceive should be false. Wherefore I may lay this Down as a Principle. Whatever I Clearly and Distinctly perceive is certainly True.

Now I will look more carefully to see whether there is anything else in me I have not yet noticed. I am sure that I am a thinking thing. So do I not know what is needed to be certain of anything? My answer is that my first knowledge rests only on a clear and distinct perception of what I affirm. Such a perception would not be enough to make me certain of the truth of something under one condition: if it were possible for anything I perceive so clearly and distinctly to be false. Therefore, I may set down this principle: Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive is certainly true.

But I have formerly Admitted of many Things as very Certain and manifest, Which I afterwards found to be doubtful. Therefore What sort of Things were they? Viz. Heaven, Earth, Stars, and all other things which I perceived by my Senses. But What did I Perceive of These Clearly? Viz. That I had the Ideas or Thoughts of these things in my mind, and at Present I cannot deny that I have these Ideas in Me. But there was some other thing Which I affirm’d, and Which (by Reason of the common Way of Belief) I thought that I Clearly Perceived; Which nevertheless, I did not really Perceive; And that was, that there were Certain Things Without Me from whence these Ideas Proceeded, and to which they were exactly like. And this it was, Wherein I was either Deceived, or if by Chance I Judged truly, yet it Proceeded not from the strength of my Perception.

But I once accepted many things as very certain and obvious that I later found to be doubtful. So what kinds of things were they? Namely, the heavens, Earth, stars, and all other things I perceived through my senses. But what did I perceive clearly about these things? Namely, that I had ideas or thoughts of these things in my mind. And at present I cannot deny that I have these ideas within me. But I also claimed something else, which, out of habit, I thought I clearly perceived. Yet I did not really perceive it. I claimed that certain things existed outside me, that these ideas came from them, and that the ideas resembled them exactly. And in making this claim, I was either mistaken or, if by chance I judged correctly, my judgment still did not rest on the strength of my perception.

But When I was exercised about any single and easie Proposition in Arithmetick or Geometry, as that two and three added make five, Did not I Perceive them Clearly enough to make me affirm them True? Truly concerning these I had no other Reason afterwards to Doubt, but That I thought Perhaps there may be a God who might have so created me, that I should be Deceived even in those things which seem’d most Clear to me. And as often as this Pre-conceived opinion of Gods great Power comes into my Mind, I cannot but Confess that he may easily cause me to Err even in those things which I Think I perceive most Evidently with my Mind; yet as often as I Consider the Things themselves, which I Judge my self to perceive so Clearly, I am so fully Perswaded by them, that I easily Break out into these Expressions, Let Who can Deceive Me, yet he shall never Cause me Not to Be whilst I think that I Am, or that it shall ever be True, that I never was, Whilst at Present ’tis True that I am, or Perhaps, that Two and Three added make More or Less then Five; for in These things I Percieve a Manifest Repugnancy; And truely seeing I have no reason to Think any God a Deceiver, Nor as yet fully know Whether there Be any God, or Not, ’Tis but a slight and (as I may say) Metaphysical Reason of Doubt, which depends only on that opinion of which I am not yet Perswaded.

But when I considered a single, simple proposition in arithmetic or geometry, such as two plus three equals five, what happened? Did I not perceive such truths clearly enough to affirm them? Indeed, I later had only one reason to doubt them. I thought that perhaps there might be a God who had created me so that I could be deceived even about what seemed most clear to me. Whenever this preconceived idea of God’s great power comes to mind, I must admit that he could easily make me wrong. This could happen even about what I think I perceive most clearly with my mind. Yet whenever I consider the things themselves that I believe I perceive so clearly, they convince me completely. I readily declare: Let whoever can deceive me do so. He can never cause me not to exist while I think that I exist. Nor can he ever make it true that I never existed while it is now true that I exist. Nor, perhaps, can he make two plus three equal more or less than five. For I see an obvious contradiction in these things. And indeed, I have no reason to think that any God is a deceiver. Nor do I yet fully know whether there is any God or not. So this reason for doubt is slight and, if I may put it this way, metaphysical. It depends entirely on an opinion that I am not yet convinced is true.

Wherefore That this Hindrance may be taken away, When I have time I ought to Enquire, Whether there Be a God, And if there be One, Whether he can be a Deceiver, For whilst I am Ignorant of this, I cannot possibly be fully Certain of any Other thing.

So, to remove this obstacle, I should investigate whether God exists when I have time. And if he exists, I should investigate whether he can be a deceiver. For as long as I remain ignorant of these matters, I cannot possibly be fully certain of anything else.

But now Method seems to Require Me to Rank all My Thoughts under certain Heads, and to search in Which of them Truth or Falshood properly Consists. Some of them are (as it were) the Images of Things, and to these alone the Name of an Idea properly belongs, as When I think upon a Man, A Chimera or Monster, Heaven, an Angel, or God. But there are others of them, that have superadded Forms to them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny. I know I have alwayes (when ever I think) some certain Thing as the subject or object of my Thought, but in this last sort of thoughts there is something more which I Think upon then Barely the likeness of the Thing. And of these Thoughts some are called Wills and Affections, and Others of them Judgments.

But now my method seems to require me to sort all my thoughts into categories. I must then examine which categories properly contain truth or falsehood. Some thoughts are, so to speak, images of things, and only these are properly called ideas. Examples include my thoughts of a man, a Chimera or monster, heaven, an angel, or God. But other thoughts have additional forms, as when I will, fear, affirm, or deny. I know that whenever I think, I always have some particular thing as the subject or object of my thought. But in this last kind of thought, I think something more than merely the likeness of the thing. Some of these thoughts are called acts of will and feelings, and others are called judgments.

Now as touching Ideas, if they be Consider’d alone as they are in themselves, without Respect to any other Things, they cannot Properly be false; for Whether I Imagine a Goat or a Chimera, ’tis as Certain that I Imagine one as t’other. Also in the Will and Affections I need not Fear any Falshood, For tho I should Wish for evil Things, or Things that are Not, it is not therefore Not true that I Wish for them.

Now, ideas cannot properly be called false if considered on their own, without reference to anything else. Whether I imagine a goat or a Chimera, it is equally certain that I imagine either one. Nor need I fear any falsehood in my will and feelings. For even if I should wish for evil things or things that do not exist, my wish remains real. It is not therefore untrue that I wish for them.

Wherefore there onely Remains my Judgments of Things, in which I must take Care that I be not deceived. Now the Chief and most usual Error that I discover in them is, That I Judge Those Ideas that are within me to be Conformable and like to certain things that are without Me; for truely if I Consider those Ideas as certain Modes of my Thought, without Respect to any other Thing, they will scarce afford me an Occasion of Erring.

So only my judgments about things remain. In these judgments, I must take care not to be deceived. The main and most common error I find in them is this: I judge the ideas within me to correspond to and resemble certain things outside me. For if I consider these ideas as particular forms of my thought, without reference to anything else, they offer hardly any opportunity for error.

Of these Ideas some are Innate, some Adventitious, and some Others seem to Me as Created by my self; For that I understand what A Thing Is, What is Truth, What a Thought, seems to Proceed meerly from my own Nature. But that I now hear a Noise, see the Sun, or feel heat, I have alwayes Judged to Proceed from Things External. But Lastly, Mermaids, Griffins, and such like Monsters, are made meerly by My self. And yet I may well think all of them either Adventitious, or all of them Innate, or all of them made by my self, for I have not as yet discover’d their true Original.

Of these ideas, some are innate, some come from outside, and some others seem to me to be created by myself. For my understanding of what a thing is, what truth is, and what a thought is seems to come solely from my own nature. But I have always judged that hearing a noise, seeing the sun, or feeling heat comes from external things. I now hear a noise, see the sun, or feel heat. Finally, mermaids, griffins, and similar monsters are made entirely by me. And yet I may well think all these ideas either come from outside, are all innate, or are all made by me. For I have not yet discovered their true origin.

But I ought cheifly to search after those of them which I count Adventitious, and which I consider as coming from outward objects, that I may know what reason I have to think them like the things themselves, which they represent. Viz. Nature so teaches Me; and also I know that they depend not on my Will, and therefore not on me; for they are often present with me against my inclinations, or (as they say) in spite of my teeth, as now whether I will or no I feel heat, and therefore I think that the sense or Idea of heat is propagated to me by a thing really distinct from my self, and that is by the heat of the Fire at which I sit; And nothing is more obvious then for me to judge that That thing should transmit its own Likeness into me, rather then that any other thing should be transmitted by it. Which sort of arguments whether firme enough or not I shall now Trie.

But I should chiefly examine the ideas that I count as Adventitious, considering them to come from external objects. I want to know my reasons for thinking these ideas are like the things they represent. First, nature teaches me this. Also, I know these ideas do not depend on my will, and therefore not on me. For these ideas often come to me against my wishes, or, as people say, despite my best efforts. For example, whether I want to or not, I now feel heat. So I think the sensation or idea of heat comes from a thing truly distinct from myself. Specifically, it comes from the heat of the fire beside which I sit. And nothing seems more obvious than judging that this thing sends its own likeness into me, rather than anything else. I will now test whether arguments of this kind are sound enough.

When I here say, that nature so teaches me, I understand only, that I am as it were willingly forced to beleive it, and not that ’tis discover’d to me to be true by any natural light; for these two differ very much. For whatever is discover’d to me by the Light of nature (as that it necessarily Follows that I am, because I think) cannot possibly be doubted; Because I am endowed with no other Faculty, in which I may put so great confidence, as I can in the Light of nature; or which can possibly tell me, that those things are false, which natural light teaches me to be true; and as to my natural Inclinations, I have heretofore often judged my self led by them to the election of the worst part, when I was in the choosing one of two Goods; and therefore I see no reason why I should ever trust them in any other thing.

When I say here that nature teaches me this, I mean only that I feel willingly compelled to believe it. I do not mean that any natural light has revealed the belief to be true. These two things are very different. For whatever the light of nature reveals to me cannot possibly be doubted. For example, because I think, it necessarily follows that I exist. I have no other faculty I can trust as much as the light of nature. Nor do I have another faculty that could tell me that what natural light teaches me is true is actually false. As for my natural inclinations, I have often judged that they led me to choose the worse option. This happened when I was choosing one of two good things. So I see no reason ever to trust these inclinations in anything else.

And then, tho these Ideas depend not on my will, it does not therefore follow that they necessarily proceed from things external. For as, Altho those Inclinations (which I but now mention’d) are in me, yet they seem distinct and different from my will; so perhaps there may be in me some other faculty (to me unknown) which may prove the Efficient cause of these Ideas, as hitherto I have observed them to be formed in me whilst I dream, without the help of any External Object.

And although these ideas do not depend on my will, they do not necessarily come from external things. For although the inclinations I just mentioned are within me, they seem distinct and different from my will. So perhaps I have some other ability (unknown to me) that may be the efficient cause of these ideas. After all, I have observed these ideas forming in me while I dream, without help from any external object.

And last of all, tho they should proceed from things which are different from me, it does not therefore follow that they must be like those things. For often times I have found the thing and the Idea differing much. As for example, I find in my self two divers Ideas of the Sun, one as received by my senses (and which cheifly I reckon among those I call adventitious) by which it appears to me very smal, * another as taken from the arguments of Astronomers (that is to say, consequentially collected, or some other ways made by me from certain natural notions) by which ’tis rendred something bigger then the Globe of the Earth. Certainly both of these cannot be like that sun which is without me, and my reason perswades me, that that Idea is most unlike the Sun, which seems to proceed Immediately from it self.

Finally, even if these ideas come from things different from me, the ideas do not necessarily resemble those things. For I have often found that the thing and the idea differ greatly. For example, I find within myself two different ideas of the Sun. One is received through my senses (and I chiefly count this among the ideas I call adventitious). This idea makes the Sun appear very small. * Another comes from astronomers’ arguments. That is, I have deduced this idea, or formed it in some other way from certain natural notions. This idea represents the Sun as somewhat larger than the Earth. Certainly, both ideas cannot resemble the Sun that exists outside me. And my reason convinces me that the idea most unlike the Sun is the one that seems to come directly from the Sun itself.

All which things sufficiently prove, that I have hitherto (not from a true judgement, but from a blind impulse) beleived that there are certain things different from my self, and which have sent their Ideas or Images into me by the Organs of my senses, or some other way.

All these things sufficiently prove that my belief until now came (not from true judgment, but from blind impulse). I believed that certain things different from myself existed. I also believed those things sent their Ideas or Images into me through the organs of my senses or some other way.

But I have yet an other Way of inquiring, whether any of those Things (whose Ideas I have within Me) are Really Existent without Me; And that is Thus: As those Ideas are only Modes of Thinking, I acknowledge no Inequality between them, and they all proceed from me in the same Manner. But as one Represents one thing, an other, an other Thing, ’tis Evident there is a Great difference between them. * For without doubt, Those of them which Represent Substances are something More, or (as I may say) have More of Objective Reallity in them, then those that Represent only Modes or Accidents; and again, That by Which I understand a Mighty God, Eternal, Infinite, Omniscient, Omnipotent Creatour of all things besides himself, has certainly in it more Objective Reallity, then Those Ideas by which Finite Substances are Exhibited.

But I have another way to ask whether the things whose ideas I have within me really exist outside me. The method is this: considered only as modes of thinking, these ideas have no differences that I recognize. They all come from me in the same way. But since one represents one thing and another represents another thing, there is clearly a great difference between them. * For undoubtedly, ideas that represent substances are something more than ideas that represent only modes or accidents. Or, as I may put it, they contain more objective reality. And again, consider the idea through which I understand a mighty God, eternal, infinite, all-knowing, the all-powerful Creator of everything besides himself. This idea certainly contains more objective reality than the ideas that represent finite substances.

But Now, it is evident by the Light of Nature that there must be as much at least in the Total efficient Cause, as there is in the Effect of that Cause; For from Whence can the effect have its Reallity, but from the Cause? and how can the Cause give it that Reallity, unless it self have it?

But now, the light of nature makes this clear: the total efficient cause must contain at least as much reality as the effect of that cause. For where else can the effect get its reality but from the cause? And how can the cause give the effect that reality unless the cause itself has that reality?

And from hence it follows, that neither a Thing can be made out of Nothing, Neither a Thing which is more Perfect (that is, Which has in it self more Reallity) proceed from That Which is Less Perfect.

It follows from this that no thing can be made from nothing. Nor can something more perfect (that is, something with more reality) come from something less perfect.

And this is Clearly True, not only in those Effects whose Actual or Formal Reallity is Consider’d, But in Those Ideas also, Whose Objective Reallity is only Respected; That is to say, for Example of Illustration, it is not only impossible that a stone, Which was not, should now begin to Be, unless it were produced by something, in Which, Whatever goes to the Making a Stone, is either Formally or Virtually; neither can heat be Produced in any Thing, which before was not hot, but by a Thing which is at least of as equal a degree of Perfection as heat is; But also ’tis Impossible that I should have an Idea of Heat, or of a Stone, unless it were put into me by some Cause, in which there is at Least as much Reallity, as I Conceive there is in heat or a Stone. For tho that Cause transfers none of its own Actual or Formal Reality into my Idea, I must not from thence conclude that ’tis less real; but I may think that the nature of the Idea it self is such, that of it self it requires no other formal reality, but what it has from my thought, of which ’tis a mode. But that this Idea has this or that objective reallity, rather then any other, proceeds clearly from some cause, in which there ought to be at least as much formal reallity, as there is of objective reallity in the Idea it self. For if we suppose any thing in the Idea, which was not in its cause, it must of necessity have this from nothing; but (tho it be a most Imperfect manner of existing, by which the thing is objectively in the Intellect by an Idea, yet) it is not altogether nothing, and therefore cannot proceed from nothing.

And this is clearly true, not only of effects considered in terms of their actual or formal reality. It also applies to ideas considered only in terms of their objective reality. To illustrate, a stone that did not exist cannot now begin to exist unless something produces it. Whatever goes into making a stone must exist in that cause, either formally or virtually. Nor can heat be produced in anything that was previously not hot except by something with sufficient perfection. That cause must have at least the same degree of perfection as heat. But it is also impossible for me to have an idea of heat or a stone without a cause. That cause must put the idea into me and contain at least as much reality as I conceive in heat or a stone. Although that cause transfers none of its own actual or formal reality into my idea, I must not conclude that the cause is less real. But I may think that the nature of the idea itself requires no other formal reality than my thought provides. The idea is a mode, or form, of that thought. But the idea’s having this or that objective reality, rather than any other, clearly comes from some cause. That cause must contain at least as much formal reality as the idea itself contains objective reality. For if we suppose that anything in the idea was not in its cause, that element must necessarily come from nothing. A thing’s objective existence in the intellect through an idea is a most imperfect way of existing. Yet such existence is not nothing at all, and therefore cannot come from nothing.

Neither ought I to doubt, seeing the reallity which I perceive in my Ideas is only an objective reallity, that therefore it must of necessity follow, that the same reallity should be in the causes of these Ideas formally. But I may conclude, that ’tis sufficient that this reallity be in the very causes only objectively. For as that objective manner of being appertains to the very nature of an Idea, so that formal manner of being appertains to the very nature of a cause of Ideas, at least to the first and chiefest causes of them; For tho perhaps one Idea may receive its birth from an other, yet we cannot proceed in Infinitum, but at last we must arrive at some first Idea, whose cause is (as it were) an Original copy, in which all the objective reallity of the Idea is formally contain’d. So that I plainly discover by the light of nature, that the Ideas, which are in me, are (as it were) Pictures, which may easily come short of the perfection of those things from whence they are taken, but cannot contain any thing greater or more perfect then them: And the longer and more diligently I pry into these things, so much the more clearly and distinctly do I discover them to be true.

Nor should I doubt that the reality I perceive in my ideas must exist formally in their causes. This must necessarily follow, even though I perceive only objective reality in my ideas. But I may conclude that it is enough for this reality to exist only objectively in the causes themselves. For the objective way of being belongs to the very nature of an idea. In the same way, the formal way of being belongs to the very nature of a cause of ideas. This applies at least to their first and principal causes. For although perhaps one idea may arise from another, we cannot go on to infinity. We must eventually reach some first idea, whose cause is, so to speak, an original model. All the objective reality of the idea is formally contained in that model. So I clearly see by the light of nature that the ideas within me are, so to speak, pictures. These pictures may easily fall short of the perfection of the things they are drawn from. But they cannot contain anything greater or more perfect than those things. And the longer and more carefully I examine these matters, the more clearly and distinctly I see their truth.

But what shall I conclude from hence? Thus, that if the objective reallity of any of my Ideas be such, that it cannot be in me either formally or eminently, and that therefore I cannot be the cause of that Idea, from hence it necessarily Follows, that I alone do not only exist, but that some other thing, which is cause of that Idea, does exist also.

But what should I conclude from this? If the objective reality of any of my ideas is such that it cannot exist in me either formally or eminently, then I cannot be the cause of that idea. It necessarily follows that I alone do not account for everything that exists. Some other thing, which is the cause of that idea, must also exist.

But if I can find no such Idea in me, I have no argument to perswade me of the existence of any thing besides my self for I have diligently enquired, and hitherto I could discover no other perswasive.

But if I can find no such idea within me, I have no argument for the existence of anything besides myself. For I have searched carefully, and so far I have found no other convincing argument.

Some of these Ideas there are (besides that which represents my self to my self, of which in this place I cannot doubt) which represent to me, one of them a God, others of them Corporeal and Inanimate things, some of them Angels, others Animals, and lastly some of them which exhibite to me men like my self.

Some of these ideas represent things besides the idea that represents myself to myself. At this point, I cannot doubt that idea of myself. One of these other ideas represents a God, while others represent physical and lifeless things. Some represent Angels, others Animals, and finally some show me people like myself.

As touching those that represent Men or Angels or Animals, I easily understand that they may be made up of those Ideas which I have of my self, of Corporeal things, and of God, tho there were neither man (but my self) nor Angel, nor Animal in being.

I easily understand that ideas representing men, angels, or animals may be made up of other ideas I have. These are my ideas of myself, physical things, and God. Such combinations would be possible even if no man (except myself), angel, or animal existed.

And as to the Ideas of Corporeal things, I find nothing in them of that perfection, but it may proceed from my self; for if I look into them more narrowly, and examine them more particularly, as yesterday (in the second Medit.) I did the Idea of Wax, I find there are but few things which I perceive clearly and distinctly in them, viz. Magnitude or extension in Longitude, Latitude, and Profundity, the Figure or shape which arises from the termination of that Extension, the Position or place which divers Figured Bodies have in respect of each other, their motion or change of place; to which may be added, their substance, continuance, and number; as to the other, such as are, Light, Colours, Sounds, Smels, Tasts, Heat, and Cold, with the other tactile qualities, I have but very obscure and confused thoughts of them, so that I know not, whether they are true or false, that is to say, whether the Ideas I have of them are the Ideas of things which really are, or are not. For altho falshood formally and properly so called, consists only in the judgement (as before I have observed) yet there is an other sort of material falshood in Ideas, when they represent a thing as really existent, tho it does not exist; so, for example, the Ideas I have of heat and cold are so obscure and confused, that I cannot collect from them, whether cold be a privation of heat, or heat a privation of cold, or whether either of them be a real quality, or whether neither of them be real. And since every Idea must be like the thing it represents, if it be true that cold is nothing but the privation of heat, that Idea which represents it to me as a thing real and positive may deservedly be called false. The same may be apply’d to other Ideas.

As for the ideas of physical things, I find no perfection in them that could not come from myself. For if I examine these ideas more closely, I find only a few things I perceive clearly and distinctly. Yesterday (in the second Meditation), I examined the idea of wax in this way. These few things are size or extension in length, width, and depth. There is also the figure or shape formed by the boundaries of that extension. Then there is the position or place of various shaped bodies in relation to one another. There is also their motion, or change of place. To these we may add their substance, duration, and number. As for other qualities, I have only very obscure and confused thoughts about them. These include light, colors, sounds, smells, tastes, heat, and cold, along with other qualities perceived by touch. So I do not know whether these ideas are true or false. That is, I do not know whether my ideas represent things that really exist or do not exist. For although falsity in the strict and proper sense belongs only to judgment, ideas can contain another kind of falsity. As I observed earlier, falsity in the strict sense belongs only to judgment. But ideas contain material falsity when they represent a thing as really existing, though that thing does not exist. For example, my ideas of heat and cold are so obscure and confused that I cannot settle several questions. I cannot tell whether cold is a lack of heat, or heat a lack of cold. Nor can I tell whether either is a real quality, or whether neither is real. And every idea must be like the thing it represents. So suppose it is true that cold is nothing but the lack of heat. Then the idea that represents cold to me as something real and positive can rightly be called false. The same applies to other ideas.

And now I see no necessity why I should assigne any other Author of these Ideas but my self; for if they are false, that is, represent things that are not, I know by the light of nature that they proceed from nothing; that is to say, I harbour them upon no other account, but because my nature is deficient in something, and imperfect. But if they are true, yet seeing I discover so little reality in them, that that very reality scarce seems to be realy, I see no reason why I my self should not be the Author of them.

And now I see no need to name any source of these ideas other than myself. For if these ideas are false, they represent things that do not exist. I know by the light of nature that such ideas come from nothing. That is, I have these ideas only because my nature is lacking in something and imperfect. But if these ideas are true, I still find so little reality in them that it hardly seems to be real. So I see no reason why I myself should not be their source.

But also some of those very Ideas of Corporeal things which are clear and distinct, I may seem to have borrow’d from the Idea I have of my self, viz. Substance, duration, number, and the like; For when I conceive a stone to be a substance (that is, a thing apt of it self to exist) and also that I my self am a substance, tho I conceive my self a thinking substance and not extended, and the stone an extended substance and not thinking, by which there is a great diversity between both the conceptions, yet they agree in this, that they are both substances. So when I conceive my self as now in being, and also remember, that heretofore I have been; and since I have divers thoughts, which I can number or count; from hence it is that I come by the notions of duration and number; which afterwards I apply to other things.

But some of these very ideas of physical things, even those that are clear and distinct, may seem borrowed. They may come from the idea I have of myself, namely substance, duration, number, and the like. For I conceive of a stone as a substance (that is, a thing capable of existing in its own right). I also conceive of myself as a substance. Although I conceive of myself as a thinking substance that is not extended, the stone is different. I conceive of it as an extended substance that is not thinking. These two conceptions are therefore very different, yet they agree in this respect: both are conceptions of substances. Likewise, I conceive of myself as existing now, and I also remember that I existed before. I also have various thoughts, which I can number or count. From these experiences I gain the notions of duration and number, which I later apply to other things.

As to those other things, of which the Idea of a body is made up, as extension, figure, place and motion, they are not formally in me, seeing I am only a thinking thing; yet seeing they are only certain modes of substance, and I my self also am a substance, they may seem to be in me eminently.

The other features making up the Idea of a body are extension, figure, place and motion. These features are not formally present in me, since I am only a thinking thing. Yet these features are only particular modes of substance, and I myself am also a substance. For that reason, these features may seem to be present in me eminently.

* Wherefore there only Remains the Idea of a God, wherein I must consider whether there be not something included, which cannot possibly have its original from me. By the word God, I mean a certain Infinite Substance, Independent, Omniscient, Almighty, by whom both I my self, and every thing else that is (if any thing do Actualy exist) was created. All which Attributes are of such an high nature, that the more attentively I consider them, the less I conceive my self possible to be the Author of these notions.

* So only the idea of God remains. I must consider whether this idea contains anything that could not possibly have its origin in me. By God, I mean an infinite substance, independent, all-knowing, and all-powerful. He created both me myself and everything else that exists (if anything does actually exist). All these attributes are so exalted that the more closely I consider them, the less possible it seems that I could be the source of these ideas.

From what therefore has been said I must conclude that there is a God; for tho the Idea of substance may arise in me, because that I my self am a substance, yet I could not have the Idea of an Infinite substance (seeing I my self am finite) unless it proceeded from a substance which is really Infinite. Neither ought I to think that I have no true Idea of Infinity, or that I perceive it only by the negation of what is finite, as I conceive rest and darkness by the negation or absence of motion or light. But on the contrary I plainly understand, that there is more reality in an Infinite substance, then in a Finite; and that therefore the perception of an Infinite (as God) is antecedent to the notion I have of a finite (as my self). For how should I know that I doubt or desire, that is to say, that I want something, and that I am not altogether perfect, unless I had the Idea of a being more perfect then my self, by comparing my self to which I may discover my own Imperfections.

From what has been said, I must therefore conclude that there is a God. The idea of substance may arise in me because I myself am a substance. Yet I could not have the idea of an infinite substance unless it came from a substance that is truly infinite. This is because I myself am finite. Nor should I think that I have no true idea of infinity. I should not think I perceive infinity only through the negation of what is finite. That would be like understanding rest and darkness through the negation or absence of motion or light. On the contrary, I clearly understand that an infinite substance has more reality than a finite one. Therefore, my perception of an infinite being, such as God, comes before my notion of a finite being, such as myself. For how could I know that I doubt or desire, meaning that I lack something and am not completely perfect? How could I know this unless I had the idea of a being more perfect than myself? Only by comparing myself with that being can I discover my own imperfections.

Neither can it be said that this Idea of God is false Materialiter, and that therefore it proceeds from nothing, as before I observed of the Ideas of heat and cold, &c. For on the contrary, seeing this notion is most clear and distinct, and contains in it self more objective reality then any other Idea, none can be more true in it self, nor in which less suspition of falshood can be found. This Idea (I say) of a being infinitely perfect is most true, for tho it may be supposed that such a being does not exist, yet it cannot be supposed that the Idea of such a being exhibites to me nothing real, as before I have said of the Idea of cold. This Idea also is most clear and distinct, for whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly to be real, and true, and perfect, is wholy contain’d in this Idea of God.

Nor can we say that this idea of God is materially false and therefore comes from nothing. I previously noted this possibility for the ideas of heat and cold, and so on. On the contrary, this notion is supremely clear and distinct. It also contains more objective reality than any other idea. Therefore, no idea can be more true in itself or leave less room for suspicion of falsehood. This idea of an infinitely perfect being, I say, is supremely true. For although we may suppose that such a being does not exist, we cannot suppose the following: that the idea of such a being presents nothing real to me. I previously said that this was possible with the idea of cold. This idea is also supremely clear and distinct. For everything I perceive clearly and distinctly as real, true, and perfect is entirely contained in this idea of God.

Neither can it be objected, that I cannot comprehend an Infinite, or that there are innumerable other things in God, which I can neither conceive, nor in the least think upon; for it is of the very nature of an Infinite not to be apprehendable by me who am finite. And ’tis sufficient to me to prove this my Idea of God to be the most true, the most clear, and the most distinct Idea of all those Ideas I have, upon this account, that I understand that God is not to be understood, and that I judge that whatever I clearly perceive and know Implys any perfection, as also perhaps other innumerable perfections, which I am ignorant of, are in God either formally or eminently.

Nor is it an objection that I cannot fully understand an infinite being. Nor that there are countless other things in God I can neither conceive nor even think about. For an infinite being, by its very nature, cannot be fully grasped by me, since I am finite. The following reason is enough to prove that my idea of God is the most true, clear, and distinct idea of all my ideas. I understand that God cannot be fully understood. And I judge that whatever I clearly perceive and know involves any perfection exists in God. So too, perhaps, do countless other perfections I know nothing about. These perfections exist in God either in their own form or in a higher form.

Doubt. But perhaps I am something more then I take my self to be, and perhaps all these perfections which I attribute to God, are potentially in me, tho at present they do not shew themselves, and break into action. For I am now fully experienced that my Knowledge may be encreased, and I see nothing that hinders why it may not encrease by degrees in Infinitum, nor why by my knowledge so encreased I may not attain to the other perfections of God; nor lastly, why the power or aptitude of having these perfections may not be sufficient to produce the Idea of them in me.

Doubt. But perhaps I am something more than I take myself to be. And perhaps all these perfections I attribute to God are potentially in me. Though at present, these perfections do not reveal themselves or become active. For I now know from experience that my Knowledge can be increased. And I see no reason why my knowledge may not increase gradually to Infinity. Nor do I see why, with my knowledge so increased, I may not attain the other perfections of God. Nor, finally, do I see why the power or capacity to have these perfections may not be enough to produce the Idea of them in me.

Solution. But none of these will do; for first, tho it be true that my Knowledge is capable of being increased, and that many things are in me potentially, which actually are not, yet none of these go to the making an Idea of God, in which I conceive nothing potentially, for tis a certain argument of imperfection that a thing may be encreased Gradually. Moreover, tho my knowledge may be more and more encreased, yet I know that it can never be actually Infinite, for it can never arrive to that height of perfection, which admits not of an higher degree. But I conceive God to be actually so Infinite, that nothing can be added to his perfections. And lastly, I perceive that the objective being of an Idea cannot be produced only by the potential being of a thing (which in proper speech is nothing) but requires an actual or formal being to its production.

Answer. But none of these explanations will do. First, although my knowledge can be increased, many things exist in me potentially that do not exist actually. Yet none of these contributes to my idea of God, in whom I conceive nothing potentially. For the fact that something can grow gradually is a sure sign of imperfection. Moreover, although my knowledge may increase more and more, I know it can never be actually infinite. For my knowledge can never reach a level of perfection beyond which no higher degree is possible. But I conceive God as actually so infinite that nothing can be added to his perfections. Finally, I see that the objective being of an idea cannot be produced solely by a thing’s potential being. Such potential being is, strictly speaking, nothing. Instead, producing the idea requires actual or formal being.

Of all which forementioned things there is nothing that is not evident by the light of reason to any one that will diligently consider them. Yet because that (when I am careless, and the Images of sensible things blind my understanding) I do not so easily call to mind the reasons, why the Idea of a being more perfect then my self should of necessity proceed from a being which is really more perfect; It will be requisite to enquire further, whether I, who have this Idea, can possibly be, unless such a being did exist. To which end let me aske, from whence should I be? From my self? or from my Parents? or from any other thing less perfect then God? for nothing can be thought or supposed more perfect, or equally perfect with God.

Everything mentioned above is evident by the light of reason to anyone who considers it carefully. Yet when I am careless, the images of sensory things blind my understanding. Because of this, I find it harder to recall the reasons for the following conclusion. The idea of a being more perfect than myself must come from a being who is really more perfect. So I must investigate further whether I, who have this idea, could possibly exist unless such a being existed. To do so, let me ask: where could I come from? From myself? Or from my parents? Or from anything else less perfect than God? For nothing can be thought of or supposed to be more perfect than, or equally perfect with, God.

But first, If I were from my self, I should neither doubt, nor desire, nor want any thing, for I should have given my self all those perfections, of which I have any Idea, and consequently I my self should be God; and I cannot think that those things I want, are to be acquired with greater difficulty then those things I have; but on the contrary, ’tis manifest, that it were much more difficult that I (that is, a substance that thinks) should arise out of nothing, then that I should acquire the knowledge of many things whereof I am Ignorant, which is only the accident of that substance. And certainly if I had that greater thing (viz being) from my self, I should not have denyed my self (not only, those things which may be easier acquired, but also) All those things, which I perceived are contain’d in the Idea of a God; and the reason is, for that no other things seem to me to be more difficultly done, and certainly if they were Really more difficult, they would seem more difficult to me (if whatever I have, I have from my self) for in those things I should find my Power put to a stop.

But first, if I owed my existence to myself, I would neither doubt, nor desire, nor lack anything. For I would have given myself all the perfections of which I have any idea. Consequently, I myself would be God. And I cannot think that acquiring what I lack is more difficult than acquiring what I have. On the contrary, clearly it would be much more difficult for me to come from nothing. By me, I mean a substance that thinks. This would be harder than acquiring knowledge of many things about which I am ignorant. Such knowledge is only an attribute of that substance. And certainly, if I owed that greater thing (namely, existence) to myself, I would not have denied myself anything easier to acquire. Nor would I have denied myself all the things I perceived as contained in the idea of God. The reason is that no other things seem to me more difficult to accomplish. And certainly, if those things were really more difficult, they would seem more difficult to me. This follows if whatever I have, I have from myself. For in those things I would find the limits of my power.

Neither can I Evade the force of these Arguments by supposing my self to have alwaies Been, what now I am, and that therefore I need not seek for an Author of my Being. For the Duration or Continuance of my life may be divided into Innumerable Parts, each of which does not at all depend on the Other Parts; Therefore it will not follow, that because a while ago, I was, I must of necessity now Be. I say, this will not follow, Unless, I suppose some Cause to Create me (as it were) anew for this Moment (that is, Conserve me). For ’tis evident to one that Considers the Nature of Duration, that the same Power and Action is requisite to the Conservation of a Thing each Moment of its Being, as there is to the Creation of that Thing anew, if it did not exist. So that ’tis one of those Principles which are Evident by the Light of Nature: that the Act of Conservation differs only Ratione (as the Philosophers term it) from the Act of Creation.

Nor can I escape these arguments by supposing I have always been what I am now. That would not remove my need to seek a Creator of my existence. For the duration or continuation of my life can be divided into countless parts. Each part does not depend at all on the other parts. So, because I existed a moment ago, it does not follow that I must necessarily exist now. That conclusion follows only if I suppose some cause to create me, so to speak, anew for this moment. In other words, that cause must preserve me. Anyone who considers the nature of duration can see why. The same power and action are needed for the preservation of something at each moment of its existence as for the creation of that thing anew, if it did not exist. So one of the principles that are evident through the light of natural reason is this: the act of preservation differs only in thought (as philosophers put it) from the act of creation.

Wherefore I ought to ask my self this Question, whether I, who now Am; have any Power to Cause my self to Be hereafter? (for had I any such power, I should certainly know of it, seeing I am nothing but a Thinking Thing, or at least at present I onely treat of that part of me, which is a Thing that Thinks) to which, I answer, that I can discover no such Power in Me; And consequently, I evidently know that I depend on some Other being distinct from my self.

So I should ask myself this question: Do I, who exist now, have any power to cause myself to continue existing? (If I had such power, I would certainly know I had it, since I am nothing but a thinking thing. Or at least, for now, I am considering only the part of me that is a thing that thinks.) My answer is that I can find no such power in myself. Consequently, I clearly know that I depend on some other being distinct from myself.

But what if I say that perhaps this Being is not God, but that I am produced either by my Parents, or some other Causes less perfect then God? In answer to which let me consider (as I have said before) that ’tis manifest that whatever is in the effect, so much at least ought to be in the cause; and therefore seeing I am a thing that thinks, and have in me an Idea of God, it will confessedly follow, that whatever sort of cause I assign of my own Being, it also must be a Thinking Thing, and must have an Idea of all those Perfections, which I attribute to God; Of which Cause it may be again Asked, whether it be from it self, or from any other Cause? If from it self, ’tis evident (from what has been said) that it must be God; For seeing it has the Power of Existing of it self, without doubt it has also the power of actually Possessing all those Perfections whereof it has an Idea in it self, that is, all those Perfections which I conceive in God. But if it Be from an other Cause, it may again be asked of that Cause whether it be of it self, or from an other; Till at length We arrive at the Last Cause of All, Which will Be God. For ’tis evident, that this Enquiry will not admit of Progressus in Infinitum, especially when at Present I treat not only of that Cause which at first made Me; But chiefly of that which conserves me in this Instant time.

But what if I say that perhaps this being is not God? Perhaps I was produced by my parents, or by some other causes less perfect than God. To answer this, let me consider what I have said before. It is clear that whatever is in the effect must also be present, at least to the same degree, in the cause. Now, I am a thing that thinks, and I have in me an idea of God. So it must be admitted that whatever cause I assign to my own existence must also be a thinking thing. This cause must have an idea of all the perfections that I attribute to God. We can then ask whether this cause exists through itself or through some other cause. If it exists through itself, then clearly, from what has been said, it must be God. For since it has the power to exist through itself, it undoubtedly also has the power to actually possess all the perfections of which it has an idea within itself. These are all the perfections that I conceive in God. But if it exists through another cause, we can ask the same question about that cause. Does it exist through itself or through another? We continue until we reach the ultimate cause of everything, which will be God. For clearly, this inquiry cannot involve an infinite regress. This is especially clear because I am not considering only the cause that first made me. Above all, I am considering the cause that preserves me in this very instant.

Neither can it be supposed that many partial Causes have concurred to the making Me, and that I received the Idea of one of Gods perfections from One of them, and from an other of them the Idea of an other; and that therefore all these Perfections are to be found scattered in the World, but not all of them Joyn’d in any one which may Be God. For on the contrary, Unity, Simplicity, or the inseparability of All Gods Attributes is one of the chief Perfections which I conceive in Him; and certainly the Idea of the Unity of the Divine Perfections could not be created in me by any other cause, then by That, from whence I have received the Ideas of his other perfections; For ’tis Impossible to make me conceive these perfections, conjunct and inseparable, unless he should also make me know what perfections these are.

Nor can we suppose that many partial causes worked together to make me. I cannot have received the idea of one of God’s perfections from one cause, and from another the idea of another perfection. Nor can we therefore suppose that all these perfections are scattered throughout the world, but not all united in any single being who could be God. On the contrary, unity, simplicity, or the inseparability of all God’s attributes is one of the chief perfections I conceive in him. Certainly, the idea of the unity of the divine perfections could not be created in me by any other cause. It must come from the same cause from which I received the ideas of his other perfections. For it is impossible for that cause to make me conceive these perfections as united and inseparable, unless he also makes me know what perfections they are.

Lastly as touching my having my Being from my Parents. Tho whatever Thoughts I have heretofore harbour’d of Them were True, yet certainly they contribute nothing to my conservation, neither proceed I from them as I am a Thing that Thinks, for they have onely predisposed that material Thing, wherein I, that is, my mind (which only at present I take for my self) Inhabits. Wherefore I cannot now Question that I am sprung from them. But I must of necessity conclude that because I am, and because I have an Idea of a Being most perfect, that is, of God, it evidently follows that there is a God.

Finally, consider my having my existence from my parents. Although all my past thoughts about them may have been true, my parents certainly contribute nothing to keeping me in existence. Nor do I come from them insofar as I am a thing that thinks. My parents only prepared the material thing in which I, that is, my mind, live. (My mind is what alone I currently take to be myself.) Therefore, I cannot now doubt that I came from my parents. But I must necessarily conclude that because I exist, and because I have an idea of a supremely perfect being, that is, God, it clearly follows that God exists.

* Now it only remains for me to examine, how I have received this Idea of God. For I have neither received it by means of my Senses, neither comes it to me without my Forethought, as the Ideas of sensible things use to do, when such things Work on the Organs of my Sense, or at least seem so to work; Neither is this Idea framed by my self, for I can neither detract from, nor add any thing thereto. Wherefore I have only to conclude that it is Innate, even as the Idea of me my self is Natural to my self.

* Now I only need to examine how I came to have this idea of God. I did not receive this idea through the use of my senses. Nor does this idea come to me without prior thought, as ideas of things perceived by the senses usually do. Those ideas arise when such things act on my sense organs, or at least seem to act on them. Nor did I create this idea myself, for I can neither take anything away from nor add anything to it. So I can only conclude that this idea is innate, just as the idea of myself is natural to me.

And truly ’tis not to be Admired that God in Creating me should Imprint this Idea in me, that it may there remain as a stamp impressed by the Workman God on me his Work, neither is it requisite that this stamp should be a Thing different from the Work it self, but ’tis very Credible (from hence only that God Created me) that I am made as it were according to his likeness and Image, and that the same likeness, in which the Idea of God is contain’d, is perceived by Me with the same faculty, with which I perceive my Self; That is to say, whilst I reflect upon my self, I do not only perceive that I am an Imperfect thing, having my dependance upon some other thing, and that I am a Thing that Desires more and better things Indefinitely; But also at the same time I understand, that He on whom I depend contains in him all those wish’d for things (not only Indefinitely and Potentially, but) Really, Indefinitely; and that therefore he is God. The whole stress of which * Argument lies thus, because I know it Impossible for Me to Be of the same Nature I am, Viz. Having the Idea of a God in me, unless really there were a God, a God (I say) that very same God, whose Idea I have in my Mind (that is, Having all those perfections, which I cannot comprehend, but can as it were think upon them) and who is not subject to any Defects.

And truly, it is no surprise that God, in creating me, should imprint this idea in me. The idea may remain as a stamp impressed by God the craftsman on me, his work. Nor must this stamp be something different from the work itself. Simply because God created me, it is very believable that I am made, as it were, in his likeness and image. And I perceive this same likeness, which contains the idea of God, with the same faculty that I use to perceive myself. That is, when I reflect on myself, I not only perceive that I am an imperfect thing, dependent on something else. I also perceive that I desire more and better things indefinitely. But at the same time, I understand that he on whom I depend contains all those desired things. He contains them not merely indefinitely and potentially, but actually and indefinitely. And therefore he is God. The whole force of this * argument is this: I know I could not possibly exist with my present nature, namely, with the idea of a God in me, unless a God really existed. I mean the very same God whose idea I have in my mind. That is, he has all those perfections that I cannot fully understand, but can, as it were, think about. And he is not subject to any defects.

By which ’tis evident that God is no Deceiver; for ’tis manifest by the Light of Nature, that all fraud and deceit depends on some defect. But before I prosecute this any farther, or pry into other Truthes which may be deduced from this, I am willing here to stop, and dwell upon the Contemplation of this God, to Consider with my self His Divine Attributes, to behold, admire, and adore the Loveliness of this Immense light, as much as possibly I am able to accomplish with my dark Understanding. For as by Faith we believe that the greatest happiness of the next Life consists alone in the Contemplation of the Divine Majesty, so we find by Experience that now we receive from thence the greatest pleasure, whereof we are capable in this Life; Tho it be much more Imperfect then that in the Next.

From this, it is clear that God is no deceiver. For the light of nature makes clear that all fraud and deceit depend on some defect. But before I explore this further, or examine other truths that may follow, I want to pause here. I want to dwell on this God and consider his divine attributes. I want to behold, admire, and adore the beauty of this immense light, as fully as my dark understanding allows. For just as through faith we believe that the greatest happiness of the next life consists solely in contemplating the divine majesty, so experience shows us that such contemplation gives us the greatest pleasure we can enjoy in this life. Yet this pleasure is much more imperfect than the pleasure of the next life.