Punishments and Rewards

“A PUNISHMENT, is an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority to be a Transgression of the Law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience.”

“Punishment is harm inflicted by public authority on someone for an action or a failure to act. The same authority judges that action or failure to act to be a violation of the law. The purpose is to make people more willing to obey.”

Before I inferre any thing from this definition, there is a question to be answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the Right, or Authority of Punishing in any case, came in. For by that which has been said before, no man is supposed bound by Covenant, not to resist violence; and consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person. In the making of a Common-wealth, every man giveth away the right of defending another; but not of defending himselfe. Also he obligeth himselfe, to assist him that hath the Soveraignty, in the Punishing of another; but of himselfe not. But to covenant to assist the Soveraign, in doing hurt to another, unlesse he that so covenanteth have a right to doe it himselfe, is not to give him a Right to Punish. It is manifest therefore that the Right which the Common-wealth (that is, he, or they that represent it) hath to Punish, is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the Subjects. But I have also shewed formerly, that before the Institution of Common-wealth, every man had a right to every thing, and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto. And this is the foundation of that right of Punishing, which is exercised in every Common-wealth. For the Subjects did not give the Soveraign that right; but onely in laying down theirs, strengthned him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him onely; and (excepting the limits set him by naturall Law) as entire, as in the condition of meer Nature, and of warre of every one against his neighbour.

Before drawing any conclusions from this definition, I must answer a very important question. Where did the right or authority to punish anyone come from? As I said earlier, no one is considered bound by an agreement not to resist violence. So we cannot assume that anyone gave another person the right to use violence against him. In establishing a Commonwealth, everyone gives up the right to defend others, but not the right to defend himself. Each person also agrees to help the holder of sovereign power punish others, but not himself. But agreeing to help the Sovereign harm another person does not itself give the Sovereign a right to punish. The person making that agreement must himself have the right to inflict that harm. Clearly, then, the Commonwealth's right to punish does not rest on any grant or gift from its subjects. By the Commonwealth, I mean the person or people who represent it. But I have also shown that, before the Commonwealth was established, everyone had a right to everything. Everyone could do whatever he thought necessary to preserve his own life. This included subduing, harming, or killing anyone for that purpose. This is the foundation of the right to punish exercised in every Commonwealth. The subjects did not give the Sovereign that right. Rather, by giving up their own rights, they strengthened the Sovereign's ability to exercise his own right. He could exercise that right as he thought fit, to preserve them all. So the right was not given to him, but left to him, and to him alone. Except for the limits imposed by natural law, his right remained as complete as in the state of nature. That was the condition of war of everyone against his neighbor.

From the definition of Punishment, I inferre, First, that neither private revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be stiled Punishment; because they proceed not from publique Authority.

From the definition of punishment, I draw my first conclusion. Neither private revenge nor harm inflicted by private individuals can properly be called punishment, because neither comes from public authority.

Secondly, that to be neglected, and unpreferred by the publique favour, is not a Punishment; because no new evill is thereby on any man Inflicted; he is onely left in the estate he was in before.

Secondly, being overlooked and passed over for public favor is not a punishment, because no new harm is inflicted. The person is simply left in the same position as before.

Thirdly, that the evill inflicted by publique Authority, without precedent publique condemnation, is not to be stiled by the name of Punishment; but of an hostile act; because the fact for which a man is Punished, ought first to be Judged by publique Authority, to be a transgression of the Law.

Thirdly, harm inflicted by public authority without a prior public judgment of guilt must not be called punishment. Instead, such harm is an act of hostility. This is because public authority must first judge the act for which a person is punished to violate the law.

Fourthly, that the evill inflicted by usurped power, and Judges without Authority from the Soveraign, is not Punishment; but an act of hostility; because the acts of power usurped, have not for Author, the person condemned; and therefore are not acts of publique Authority.

Fourthly, harm inflicted by usurped power, or by judges without authority from the sovereign, is not punishment. Instead, such harm is an act of hostility, because the condemned person has not authorized acts of usurped power. Such acts are therefore not acts of public authority.

Fifthly, that all evill which is inflicted without intention, or possibility of disposing the Delinquent, or (by his example) other men, to obey the Lawes, is not Punishment; but an act of hostility; because without such an end, no hurt done is contained under that name.

Fifth, no harm inflicted without the intention or possibility of encouraging obedience to the laws counts as punishment. The aim must be to encourage the offender to obey, or others through the offender’s example. Without such an aim, the harm is an act of hostility, because no harm counts as punishment without that purpose.

Sixthly, whereas to certain actions, there be annexed by Nature, divers hurtfull consequences; as when a man in assaulting another, is himselfe slain, or wounded; or when he falleth into sicknesse by the doing of some unlawfull act; such hurt, though in respect of God, who is the author of Nature, it may be said to be inflicted, and therefore a Punishment divine; yet it is not contaned in the name of Punishment in respect of men, because it is not inflicted by the Authority of man.

Sixthly, certain actions naturally have various harmful consequences. For example, a man may be killed or wounded while attacking another, or become sick through an unlawful act. Such harm may be said to be inflicted by God, the author of Nature, and therefore to be divine punishment. But in human terms, such harm does not count as punishment, because no human authority inflicts it.

Seventhly, If the harm inflicted be lesse than the benefit, or contentment that naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm is not within the definition; and is rather the Price, or Redemption, than the Punishment of a Crime: Because it is of the nature of Punishment, to have for end, the disposing of men to obey the Law; which end (if it be lesse that the benefit of the transgression) it attaineth not, but worketh a contrary effect.

Seventh, if the harm inflicted is less than the benefit or satisfaction naturally gained from the crime, it is not punishment. Instead, the harm is the price paid for the crime, or the cost of buying exemption from punishment. This is because punishment, by its nature, aims to make people obey the law. If the harm is less than the benefit of breaking the law, punishment fails to achieve that aim. Instead, it has the opposite effect.

Eighthly, If a Punishment be determined and prescribed in the Law it selfe, and after the crime committed, there be a greater Punishment inflicted, the excesse is not Punishment, but an act of hostility. For seeing the aym of Punishment is not a revenge, but terrour; and the terrour of a great Punishment unknown, is taken away by the declaration of a lesse, the unexpected addition is no part of the Punishment. But where there is no Punishment at all determined by the Law, there whatsoever is inflicted, hath the nature of Punishment. For he that goes about the violation of a Law, wherein no penalty is determined, expecteth an indeterminate, that is to say, an arbitrary Punishment.

Eighth, if the law itself sets a punishment, but a greater punishment is imposed after the crime, the excess is not punishment. The excess is an act of hostility. For the aim of punishment is not revenge, but fear. Announcing a lesser punishment removes the fear of a greater, unknown punishment. So the unexpected addition is no part of the punishment. But where the law sets no punishment at all, whatever is imposed has the nature of punishment. For anyone who sets out to break a law with no fixed penalty expects an unspecified punishment. In other words, the offender expects a punishment left to the discretion of whoever imposes it.

Ninthly, Harme inflicted for a Fact done before there was a Law that forbad it, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: For before the Law, there is no transgression of the Law: But Punishment supposeth a fact judged, to have been a transgression of the Law; Therefore Harme inflicted before the Law made, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility.

Ninth, harm inflicted for an act committed before any law prohibited that act is not punishment, but an act of hostility. For before a law exists, no one can break that law. But punishment assumes that an act has been judged to have broken the law. Therefore, harm inflicted before the law was made is not punishment, but an act of hostility.

Tenthly, Hurt inflicted on the Representative of the Common-wealth, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: Because it is of the nature of Punishment, to be inflicted by publique Authority, which is the Authority only of the Representative it self.

Tenth, harm inflicted on the commonwealth’s representative is not punishment, but an act of hostility. This is because punishment, by its nature, must be inflicted by public authority. That authority belongs only to the representative.

Lastly, Harme inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, fals not under the name of Punishment: Because seeing they were either never subject to the Law, and therefore cannot transgresse it; or having been subject to it, and professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny they can transgresse it, all the Harmes that can be done them, must be taken as acts of Hostility. But in declared Hostility, all infliction of evill is lawfull. From whence it followeth, that if a subject shall by fact, or word, wittingly, and deliberatly deny the authority of the Representative of the Common-wealth, (whatsoever penalty hath been formerly ordained for Treason,) he may lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever the Representative will: For in denying subjection, he denyes such Punishment as by the Law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers as an enemy of the Common-wealth; that is, according to the will of the Representative. For the Punishments set down in the Law, are to Subjects, not to Enemies; such as are they, that having been by their own act Subjects, deliberately revolting, deny the Soveraign Power.

Finally, harm inflicted on a declared enemy does not count as punishment. Such enemies either were never subject to the law, and therefore cannot break it, or were once subject to it. In the latter case, they declare themselves no longer subject to the law and consequently deny they can break it. All harm done to them must therefore be treated as acts of hostility. But in declared hostility, all infliction of harm is lawful. It follows that a subject who knowingly and deliberately denies the Commonwealth’s Representative’s authority, through actions or words, becomes an enemy. Whatever penalty has previously been set for treason, that subject may lawfully be made to suffer whatever the Representative wishes. For by denying obedience, the subject rejects the punishment established by law. The subject therefore suffers as an enemy of the Commonwealth, according to the Representative’s will. For the punishments set out in law apply to subjects, not enemies. These enemies include people who became subjects by their own act, then deliberately rebelled and denied the Sovereign Power.

The first, and most generall distribution of Punishments, is into Divine, and Humane. Of the former I shall have occasion, to speak, in a more convenient place hereafter.

The first and broadest division of punishments is into divine and human punishments. I will discuss divine punishments later, in a more suitable place.

Humane, are those Punishments that be inflicted by the Commandement of Man; and are either Corporall, or Pecuniary, or Ignominy, or Imprisonment, or Exile, or mixt of these.

Human punishments are those inflicted by human command. They include bodily punishment, fines, public disgrace, imprisonment, exile, or a combination of these.

Corporall Punishment is that, which is inflicted on the body directly, and according to the intention of him that inflicteth it: such as are stripes, or wounds, or deprivation of such pleasures of the body, as were before lawfully enjoyed.

Corporal punishment is punishment inflicted directly on the body, as intended by the person imposing it. Examples include beatings, wounds, or the loss of bodily pleasures that were previously enjoyed lawfully.

And of these, some be Capitall, some Lesse than Capitall. Capitall, is the Infliction of Death; and that either simply, or with torment. Lesse than Capitall, are Stripes, Wounds, Chains, and any other corporall Paine, not in its own nature mortall. For if upon the Infliction of a Punishment death follow not in the Intention of the Inflicter, the Punishment is not be bee esteemed Capitall, though the harme prove mortall by an accident not to be foreseen; in which case death is not inflicted, but hastened.

Some of these punishments are capital, and some are less than capital. Capital punishment means causing death, either with or without torture. Punishments less than capital include beatings, wounds, chains, and any other bodily pain that is not inherently fatal. For if death follows a punishment but was not intended by the person imposing it, the punishment is not capital. This holds even if the harm proves fatal through an accident that could not have been foreseen. In that case, death is not inflicted but hastened.

Pecuniary Punishment, is that which consisteth not only in the deprivation of a Summe of Mony, but also of Lands, or any other goods which are usually bought and sold for mony. And in case the Law, that ordaineth such a punishment, be made with design to gather mony, from such as shall transgresse the same, it is not properly a Punishment, but the Price of priviledge, and exemption from the Law, which doth not absolutely forbid the fact, but only to those that are not able to pay the mony: except where the Law is Naturall, or part of Religion; for in that case it is not an exemption from the Law, but a transgression of it. As where a Law exacteth a Pecuniary mulct, of them that take the name of God in vaine, the payment of the mulct, is not the price of a dispensation to sweare, but the Punishment of the transgression of a Law undispensable. In like manner if the Law impose a Summe of Mony to be payd, to him that has been Injured; this is but a satisfaction for the hurt done him; and extinguisheth the accusation of the party injured, not the crime of the offender.

Financial punishment involves taking away not only money but also land or other goods normally bought and sold for money. But suppose a law imposing such a punishment is designed to collect money from those who break it. In that case, the payment is not properly a punishment, but the price of a privilege and exemption from the law. Such a law does not forbid the act outright, but only forbids it to those unable to pay. There is an exception when the law is a law of nature or part of religion. In that case, paying does not exempt the offender from the law. The act remains a violation of the law. For example, suppose a law imposes a fine on those who take the name of God in vain. Paying the fine does not buy permission to swear. Rather, the fine punishes a violation of a law from which no exemption can be granted. Likewise, if the law requires payment to someone who has been injured, the payment merely compensates for the harm done. The payment settles the injured person's accusation, but does not erase the offender's crime.

Ignominy, is the infliction of such Evill, as is made Dishonorable; or the deprivation of such Good, as is made Honourable by the Common-wealth. For there be some things Honorable by Nature; as the effects of Courage, Magnanimity, Strength, Wisdome, and other abilities of body and mind: Others made Honorable by the Common-wealth; as Badges, Titles, Offices, or any other singular marke of the Soveraigns favour. The former, (though they may faile by nature, or accident,) cannot be taken away by a Law; and therefore the losse of them is not Punishment. But the later, may be taken away by the publique authority that made them Honorable, and are properly Punishments: Such are degrading men condemned, of their Badges, Titles, and Offices; or declaring them uncapable of the like in time to come.

Public disgrace means inflicting a harm that the state has made dishonorable, or removing a benefit it has made honorable. Some things are honorable by nature, such as the results of courage, generosity of spirit, strength, wisdom, and other physical and mental abilities. Other things are made honorable by the state, such as badges, titles, offices, or any other special sign of the sovereign’s favor. Natural sources of honor may fail through nature or accident, but no law can take them away. Therefore, losing them is not a punishment. But honors granted by the state can be taken away by the public authority that made them honorable. Removing these honors does count as punishment. Examples include stripping convicted people of their badges, titles, and offices, or declaring them ineligible for similar honors in the future.

Imprisonment, is when a man is by publique Authority deprived of liberty; and may happen from two divers ends; whereof one is the safe custody of a man accused; the other is the inflicting of paine on a man condemned. The former is not Punishment; because no man is supposed to be Punisht, before he be Judicially heard, and declared guilty. And therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds, or restraint, before his cause be heard, over and above that which is necessary to assure his custody, is against the Law of Nature. But the Later is Punishment, because Evill, and inflicted by publique Authority, for somewhat that has by the same Authority been Judged a Transgression of the Law. Under this word Imprisonment, I comprehend all restraint of motion, caused by an externall obstacle, be it a House, which is called by the generall name of a Prison; or an Iland, as when men are said to be confined to it; or a place where men are set to worke, as in old time men have been condemned to Quarries, and in these times to Gallies; or be it a Chaine, or any other such impediment.

Imprisonment is when a person is deprived of liberty by public authority. It may serve two different purposes: keeping an accused person securely in custody, or inflicting pain on a convicted person. The first is not punishment, because no one is considered punished before being heard in court and found guilty. Therefore, before a person's case is heard, any harm from chains or confinement beyond what secure custody requires violates natural law. But the second is punishment because it inflicts harm by public authority. That same authority has judged the act being punished to be a violation of the law. By imprisonment, I mean all restrictions on movement caused by an external obstacle. The obstacle may be a building, generally called a prison, or an island to which people are confined. It may also be a place where people are put to work. In earlier times, people were sentenced to work in quarries, and in our own time, on galleys. Or the obstacle may be a chain or any other such barrier.

Exile, (Banishment) is when a man is for a crime, condemned to depart out of the dominion of the Common-wealth, or out of a certaine part thereof; and during a prefixed time, or for ever, not to return into it: and seemeth not in its own nature, without other circumstances, to be a Punishment; but rather an escape, or a publique commandement to avoid Punishment by flight. And Cicero sayes, there was never any such Punishment ordained in the City of Rome; but cals it a refuge of men in danger. For if a man banished, be neverthelesse permitted to enjoy his Goods, and the Revenue of his Lands, the meer change of ayr is no punishment; nor does it tend to that benefit of the Common-wealth, for which all Punishments are ordained, (that is to say, to the forming of mens wils to the observation of the Law;) but many times to the dammage of the Common-wealth. For a Banished man, is a lawfull enemy of the Common-wealth that banished him; as being no more a Member of the same. But if he be withall deprived of his Lands, or Goods, then the Punishment lyeth not in the Exile, but is to be reckoned amongst Punishments Pecuniary.

Exile (banishment) is when a man is sentenced for a crime to leave the territory of the Commonwealth. He may be ordered to leave only a certain part of that territory. He is forbidden to return for a fixed time or forever. Exile by itself, without other circumstances, seems not to be a punishment. Rather, it seems an escape, or an official order to avoid punishment by fleeing. And Cicero says that no such punishment was ever established in the city of Rome. Instead, he calls exile a refuge for men in danger. For if a banished man can still enjoy his possessions and the income from his lands, merely relocating is no punishment. Nor does exile serve the public benefit for which all punishments are established (namely, shaping men's wills to obey the law). Instead, exile often harms the Commonwealth. For a banished man is a lawful enemy of the Commonwealth that banished him, since he is no longer a member. But if he also loses his lands or possessions, the punishment lies not in exile. Instead, the loss must be counted among financial punishments.

All Punishments of Innocent subjects, be they great or little, are against the Law of Nature; For Punishment is only of Transgression of the Law, and therefore there can be no Punishment of the Innocent. It is therefore a violation, First, of that Law of Nature, which forbiddeth all men, in their Revenges, to look at any thing but some future good: For there can arrive no good to the Common-wealth, by Punishing the Innocent. Secondly, of that, which forbiddeth Ingratitude: For seeing all Soveraign Power, is originally given by the consent of every one of the Subjects, to the end they should as long as they are obedient, be protected thereby; the Punishment of the Innocent, is a rendring of Evill for Good. And thirdly, of the Law that commandeth Equity; that is to say, an equall distribution of Justice; which in Punishing the Innocent is not observed.

All punishments of innocent subjects, whether great or small, violate the law of nature. Punishment is only for breaking the law, so there can be no punishment of the innocent. Punishing the innocent therefore violates three laws of nature. First, it violates the law forbidding anyone seeking revenge from aiming at anything but some future good. For no good can come to the commonwealth from punishing the innocent. Second, it violates the law forbidding ingratitude. For all sovereign power originally comes from the consent of every subject. The subjects give this consent so that sovereign power will protect them as long as they remain obedient. Punishing the innocent therefore means returning evil for good. Third, punishing the innocent violates the law requiring fairness, meaning an equal distribution of justice. Punishing the innocent does not uphold that fairness.

But the Infliction of what evill soever, on an Innocent man, that is not a Subject, if it be for the benefit of the Common-wealth, and without violation of any former Covenant, is no breach of the Law of Nature. For all men that are not Subjects, are either Enemies, or else they have ceased from being so, by some precedent covenants. But against Enemies, whom the Common-wealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawfull by the originall Right of Nature to make warre; wherein the Sword Judgeth not, nor doth the Victor make distinction of Nocent and Innocent, as to the time past; nor has other respect of mercy, than as it conduceth to the good of his own People. And upon this ground it is, that also in Subjects, who deliberatly deny the Authority of the Common-wealth established, the vengeance is lawfully extended, not onely to the Fathers, but also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being, and consequently innocent of the fact, for which they are afflicted: because the nature of this offence, consisteth in the renouncing of subjection; which is a relapse into the condition of warre, commonly called Rebellion; and they that so offend, suffer not as Subjects, but as Enemies. For Rebellion, is but warre renewed.

But inflicting any harm on an innocent person who is not a subject does not violate the law of nature. This holds if the harm benefits the commonwealth and violates no earlier agreement. For all people who are not subjects are either enemies or have ceased to be enemies through earlier agreements. But the original right of nature permits war against enemies whom the commonwealth judges capable of harming it. In war, the sword passes no judgment. Nor does the victor distinguish between those guilty and innocent of past actions. The victor shows mercy only insofar as mercy serves the good of the victor’s own people. On the same grounds, vengeance may lawfully extend beyond subjects who deliberately reject the authority of the established commonwealth. It may reach not only the fathers but also the third and fourth generations, who are not yet born. Those descendants are therefore innocent of the act for which they suffer. This is because the offense consists in rejecting subjection to the commonwealth. Such rejection is a return to the state of war, commonly called rebellion. Those who commit this offense suffer not as subjects but as enemies. For rebellion is nothing but renewed war.

REWARD, is either of Gift, or by Contract. When by Contract, it is called Salary, and Wages; which is benefit due for service performed, or promised. When of Gift, it is benefit proceeding from the Grace of them that bestow it, to encourage, or enable men to do them service. And therefore when the Soveraign of a Common-wealth appointeth a Salary to any publique Office, he that receiveth it, is bound in Justice to performe his office; otherwise, he is bound onely in honour, to acknowledgement, and an endeavour of requitall. For though men have no lawfull remedy, when they be commanded to quit their private businesse, to serve the publique, without Reward, or Salary; yet they are not bound thereto, by the Law of Nature, nor by the institution of the Common-wealth, unlesse the service cannot otherwise be done; because it is supposed the Soveraign may make use of all their means, insomuch as the most common Souldier, may demand the wages of his warrefare, as a debt.

REWARD is either a gift or a payment under a contract. A contractual reward is called a salary or wages. It is a benefit owed for service performed or promised. A gift is a benefit freely granted to encourage or enable people to serve those who give it. Therefore, when the sovereign of a commonwealth assigns a salary to a public office, justice requires the recipient to perform its duties. Otherwise, only honor requires the recipient to acknowledge the gift and try to repay it. People have no legal remedy when ordered to leave their private business to serve the public without reward or salary. Yet neither the law of nature nor the founding of the commonwealth obliges them to serve without payment. The exception is when the service cannot otherwise be performed, because the sovereign is understood to have access to all their resources. Thus, even the lowest-ranking soldier may demand his wages for military service as a debt.

The benefits which a Soveraign bestoweth on a Subject, for fear of some power, and ability he hath to do hurt to the Common-wealth, are not properly Rewards; for they are not Salaryes; because there is in this case no contract supposed, every man being obliged already not to do the Common-wealth disservice: nor are they Graces; because they be extorted by feare, which ought not to be incident to the Soveraign Power: but are rather Sacrifices, which the Soveraign (considered in his naturall person, and not in the person of the Common-wealth) makes, for the appeasing the discontent of him he thinks more potent than himselfe; and encourage not to obedience, but on the contrary, to the continuance, and increasing of further extortion.

Benefits a sovereign gives a subject out of fear of that subject’s power to harm the commonwealth are not true rewards. Such benefits are not wages, because no contract is assumed here. Every person is already obliged not to harm the commonwealth. Nor are these benefits freely given favors, because they are forced from the sovereign by fear. Sovereign power ought not to be subject to such fear. Instead, these benefits are sacrifices the sovereign makes as a private individual, not as the representative of the commonwealth. The sovereign makes these sacrifices to appease the discontent of someone he considers more powerful than himself. Such sacrifices do not encourage obedience. On the contrary, they encourage continued and increasing extortion.

And whereas some Salaries are certain, and proceed from the publique Treasure; and others uncertain, and casuall, proceeding from the execution of the Office for which the Salary is ordained; the later is in some cases hurtfull to the Common-wealth; as in the case of Judicature. For where the benefit of the Judges, and Ministers of a Court of Justice, ariseth for the multitude of Causes that are brought to their cognisance, there must needs follow two Inconveniences: One, is the nourishing of sutes; for the more sutes, the greater benefit: and another that depends on that, which is contention about Jurisdiction; each Court drawing to it selfe, as many Causes as it can. But in offices of Execution there are not those Inconveniences; because their employment cannot be encreased by any endeavour of their own. And thus much shall suffice for the nature of Punishment, and Reward; which are, as it were, the Nerves and Tendons, that move the limbes and joynts of a Common-wealth.

Some salaries are fixed and paid from the public treasury. Others vary and depend on the work done in the office for which the salary is paid. The latter arrangement sometimes harms the commonwealth, as in the administration of justice. When judges and court officials earn more from hearing more cases, two problems must follow. One is the encouragement of lawsuits, because more lawsuits mean greater earnings. The other problem follows from the first: disputes over jurisdiction, as each court tries to attract as many cases as possible. But offices responsible for carrying out orders do not have these problems, because their own efforts cannot increase their workload. This is enough to say about the nature of punishment and reward. Punishment and reward are, so to speak, the nerves and tendons that move the commonwealth’s limbs and joints.

Hitherto I have set forth the nature of Man, (whose Pride and other Passions have compelled him to submit himselfe to Government;) together with the great power of his Governour, whom I compared to Leviathan, taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the one and fortieth of Job; where God having set forth the great power of Leviathan, called him King of the Proud. “There is nothing,” saith he, “on earth, to be compared with him. He is made so as not be afraid. Hee seeth every high thing below him; and is King of all the children of pride.” But because he is mortall, and subject to decay, as all other Earthly creatures are; and because there is that in heaven, (though not on earth) that he should stand in fear of, and whose Lawes he ought to obey; I shall in the next following Chapters speak of his Diseases, and the causes of his Mortality; and of what Lawes of Nature he is bound to obey.

So far, I have described human nature, including the pride and other passions that have forced people to accept government. I have also described the great power of their ruler, whom I compared to Leviathan. I took this comparison from the last two verses of chapter forty-one of Job. There, after describing Leviathan’s great power, God called him King of the Proud. “There is nothing,” he says, “on earth that can compare with him. He is made to fear nothing. He looks down on every high thing and is King of all the children of pride.” But the ruler is mortal and subject to decay, like all other earthly creatures. And although nothing on earth should make him afraid, there is one in heaven whom he should fear and whose laws he must obey. Because of this, in the following chapters I will discuss the ruler’s diseases and the causes of his mortality. I will also discuss the laws of nature he is bound to obey.