What Weakens or Threatens to Dissolve a State

Dissolution Of Common-wealths Proceedeth From Imperfect Institution

The Collapse of States Results from Flaws in Their Founding

Though nothing can be immortall, which mortals make; yet, if men had the use of reason they pretend to, their Common-wealths might be secured, at least, from perishing by internall diseases. For by the nature of their Institution, they are designed to live, as long as Man-kind, or as the Lawes of Nature, or as Justice it selfe, which gives them life. Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by externall violence, but intestine disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the Matter; but as they are the Makers, and orderers of them. For men, as they become at last weary of irregular justling, and hewing one another, and desire with all their hearts, to conforme themselves into one firme and lasting edifice; so for want, both of the art of making fit Laws, to square their actions by, and also of humility, and patience, to suffer the rude and combersome points of their present greatnesse to be taken off, they cannot without the help of a very able Architect, be compiled, into any other than a crasie building, such as hardly lasting out their own time, must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity.

Though nothing made by mortals can be immortal, commonwealths could at least be protected from dying through internal disease. This would be possible if people used reason as well as they claim to. By their very design, commonwealths are meant to last as long as humankind, the laws of nature, or justice itself. Justice is what gives commonwealths life. So when commonwealths collapse through internal disorder rather than outside violence, people are not at fault as their raw material. People are at fault as their builders and organizers. People eventually grow tired of chaotically jostling and hacking at one another. They long with all their hearts to join together into one solid, lasting building. But they lack the skill to make suitable laws by which to shape their actions. They also lack the humility and patience to have the rough, awkward edges of their present greatness trimmed away. So without a highly skilled architect, they can be assembled only into an unsound building. Such a building barely lasts their own lifetimes and is certain to fall on the heads of their descendants.

Amongst the Infirmities therefore of a Common-wealth, I will reckon in the first place, those that arise from an Imperfect Institution, and resemble the diseases of a naturall body, which proceed from a Defectuous Procreation.

Among the weaknesses of a commonwealth, then, I will first list those caused by flaws in its founding. These weaknesses resemble diseases in a human body that result from defects at conception.

Of which, this is one, “That a man to obtain a Kingdome, is sometimes content with lesse Power, than to the Peace, and defence of the Common-wealth is necessarily required.” From whence it commeth to passe, that when the exercise of the Power layd by, is for the publique safety to be resumed, it hath the resemblance of as unjust act; which disposeth great numbers of men (when occasion is presented) to rebell; In the same manner as the bodies of children, gotten by diseased parents, are subject either to untimely death, or to purge the ill quality, derived from their vicious conception, by breaking out into biles and scabbs. And when Kings deny themselves some such necessary Power, it is not alwayes (though sometimes) out of ignorance of what is necessary to the office they undertake; but many times out of a hope to recover the same again at their pleasure: Wherein they reason not well; because such as will hold them to their promises, shall be maintained against them by forraign Common-wealths; who in order to the good of their own Subjects let slip few occasions to Weaken the estate of their Neighbours. So was Thomas Beckett Archbishop of Canterbury, supported against Henry the Second, by the Pope; the subjection of Ecclesiastiques to the Common-wealth, having been dispensed with by William the Conqueror at his reception, when he took an Oath, not to infringe the liberty of the Church. And so were the Barons, whose power was by William Rufus (to have their help in transferring the Succession from his Elder brother, to himselfe,) encreased to a degree, inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, maintained in their Rebellion against King John, by the French. Nor does this happen in Monarchy onely. For whereas the stile of the antient Roman Common-wealth, was, The Senate, and People of Rome; neither Senate, nor People pretended to the whole Power; which first caused the seditions, of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius Saturnius, and others; and afterwards the warres between the Senate and the People, under Marius and Sylla; and again under Pompey and Caesar, to the Extinction of their Democraty, and the setting up of Monarchy.

One of these is: “To gain a kingdom, a man sometimes accepts less power than the commonwealth needs for peace and defense.” As a result, when public safety requires him to exercise the power he set aside, doing so seems unjust. This appearance of injustice makes large numbers of people ready to rebel when the opportunity arises. Similarly, children born to diseased parents are liable to die young. Or their bodies may purge the harmful condition inherited from their unhealthy conception by breaking out in boils and scabs. When kings deny themselves such necessary power, ignorance of their duties is not always the reason, though sometimes it is. Often, kings hope to recover that power whenever they please. But this reasoning is mistaken. Foreign commonwealths will support those who insist that kings keep their promises. To benefit their own subjects, these foreign states miss few opportunities to weaken their neighbors. Thus, the Pope supported Thomas Beckett, Archbishop of Canterbury, against Henry the Second. William the Conqueror had exempted the clergy from subjection to the commonwealth when he became king. At that time, William swore not to infringe the Church’s freedom. Similarly, the French supported the Barons in their rebellion against King John. William Rufus had increased the Barons’ power to gain their help in transferring the succession from his elder brother to himself. Their power had grown to a level incompatible with sovereign power. Nor does this happen only in monarchies. The ancient Roman commonwealth was officially called The Senate, and People of Rome. Neither the Senate nor the People claimed full power. This division first caused the uprisings of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius Saturnius, and others. Later, it caused wars between the Senate and the People under Marius and Sylla, and again under Pompey and Caesar. These wars ended their democracy and established a monarchy.

The people of Athens bound themselves but from one onely Action; which was, that no man on pain of death should propound the renewing of the warre for the Island of Salamis; And yet thereby, if Solon had not caused to be given out he was mad, and afterwards in gesture and habit of a mad-man, and in verse, propounded it to the People that flocked about him, they had had an enemy perpetually in readinesse, even at the gates of their Citie; such dammage, or shifts, are all Common-wealths forced to, that have their Power never so little limited.

The people of Athens bound themselves to avoid just one action. No one could propose renewing the war over the Island of Salamis, on pain of death. Yet this restriction would have left an enemy always ready at their city gates, if Solon had not intervened. Solon had word spread that he was mad. Then, dressed and behaving like a madman, he proposed renewing the war in verse to the people gathered around him. All commonwealths whose power is limited even slightly are forced to suffer such harm or resort to such tricks.

In the second place, I observe the Diseases of a Common-wealth, that proceed from the poyson of seditious doctrines; whereof one is, “That every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions.” This is true in the condition of meer Nature, where there are no Civill Lawes; and also under Civill Government, in such cases as are not determined by the Law. But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of Good and Evill actions, is the Civill Law; and the Judge the Legislator, who is alwayes Representative of the Common-wealth. From this false doctrine, men are disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the Common-wealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their private judgements they shall think fit. Whereby the Common-wealth is distracted and Weakened.

Second, I consider the diseases of a commonwealth caused by the poison of doctrines that encourage rebellion. One such doctrine is, “Every private individual is the judge of good and evil actions.” This claim is true in the state of nature, where there are no civil laws. It is also true under civil government in cases the law does not settle. But in all other cases, civil law is clearly the standard for judging good and evil actions. The judge is the lawmaker, who always represents the commonwealth. This false doctrine encourages people to question and challenge the commonwealth’s commands. People then obey or disobey those commands as they see fit according to their private judgment. As a result, the commonwealth is divided and weakened.

Another doctrine repugnant to Civill Society, is, that “Whatsoever a man does against his Conscience, is Sinne;” and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge of Good and Evill. For a mans Conscience, and his Judgement is the same thing; and as the Judgement, so also the Conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is subject to no Civill Law, sinneth in all he does against his Conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a Common-wealth; because the Law is the publique Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which are but private opinions, the Common-wealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the Soveraign Power, farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes.

Another doctrine harmful to civil society is that “Whatever a man does against his conscience is a sin.” This doctrine rests on the presumption that a man can make himself the judge of good and evil. For a man’s conscience and his judgment are the same thing. Just as his judgment can be wrong, so can his conscience. Therefore, although a man subject to no civil law sins whenever he acts against his conscience, his circumstances are different. He has no rule to follow except his own reason. But a man living in a commonwealth does not sin whenever he acts against his conscience. For the law is the public conscience, and he has already agreed to be guided by the law. Otherwise, with so many different private consciences, which are only private opinions, the commonwealth would necessarily be torn apart. No man would dare obey the sovereign power beyond what seemed good in his own eyes.

It hath been also commonly taught, “That Faith and Sanctity, are not to be attained by Study and Reason, but by supernaturall Inspiration, or Infusion,” which granted, I see not why any man should render a reason of his Faith; or why every Christian should not be also a Prophet; or why any man should take the Law of his Country, rather than his own Inspiration, for the rule of his action. And thus wee fall again into the fault of taking upon us to Judge of Good and Evill; or to make Judges of it, such private men as pretend to be supernaturally Inspired, to the Dissolution of all Civill Government. Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by those accidents, which guide us into the presence of them that speak to us; which accidents are all contrived by God Almighty; and yet are not supernaturall, but onely, for the great number of them that concurre to every effect, unobservable. Faith, and Sanctity, are indeed not very frequent; but yet they are not Miracles, but brought to passe by education, discipline, correction, and other naturall wayes, by which God worketh them in his elect, as such time as he thinketh fit. And these three opinions, pernicious to Peace and Government, have in this part of the world, proceeded chiefly from the tongues, and pens of unlearned Divines; who joyning the words of Holy Scripture together, otherwise than is agreeable to reason, do what they can, to make men think, that Sanctity and Naturall Reason, cannot stand together.

It has also been commonly taught, “Faith and holiness cannot be gained through study and reason, but only through supernatural inspiration or infusion.” If we accept this teaching, I see no reason why anyone should explain the grounds of his faith. Nor do I see why every Christian should not also be a prophet. Or why anyone should follow his country’s law rather than his own inspiration as his guide to action. So we again fall into the error of claiming the right to judge good and evil for ourselves. Or we make private individuals who claim supernatural inspiration the judges of good and evil, destroying all civil government. Faith comes through hearing. And hearing comes through the circumstances that bring us into the presence of those who speak to us. God Almighty arranges all these circumstances. Yet these circumstances are not supernatural. They merely escape our notice because so many come together to produce each effect. Faith and holiness are indeed uncommon. Yet faith and holiness are not miracles. They come about through education, discipline, correction, and other natural means. Through these means, God produces faith and holiness in his chosen people whenever he thinks fit. And these three opinions, harmful to peace and government, have chiefly come from unlearned theologians in this part of the world. These theologians combine the words of Holy Scripture in ways that conflict with reason. They do all they can to make people think holiness and natural reason cannot coexist.

A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a Common-wealth, is this, “That he that hath the Soveraign Power, is subject to the Civill Lawes.” It is true, that Soveraigns are all subjects to the Lawes of Nature; because such lawes be Divine, and cannot by any man, or Common-wealth be abrogated. But to those Lawes which the Soveraign himselfe, that is, which the Common-wealth maketh, he is not subject. For to be subject to Lawes, is to be subject to the Common-wealth, that is to the Soveraign Representative, that is to himselfe; which is not subjection, but freedome from the Lawes. Which errour, because it setteth the Lawes above the Soveraign, setteth also a Judge above him, and a Power to punish him; which is to make a new Soveraign; and again for the same reason a third, to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the Confusion, and Dissolution of the Common-wealth.

A fourth opinion contrary to the nature of a commonwealth is this: “The holder of sovereign power is subject to civil laws.” It is true that all sovereigns are subject to the laws of nature, because those laws are divine. No person or commonwealth can abolish them. But the sovereign is not subject to the laws he himself makes, that is, the laws the commonwealth makes. For being subject to laws means being subject to the commonwealth, or to its sovereign representative. For the sovereign, that means being subject to himself, which is not subjection but freedom from the laws. Because this mistaken opinion places the laws above the sovereign, it also places a judge above him. It also establishes a power to punish him, which amounts to creating a new sovereign. By the same reasoning, a third sovereign must then be created to punish the second. This process continues without end, leading to the confusion and dissolution of the commonwealth.

A Fifth doctrine, that tendeth to the Dissolution of a Common-wealth, is, “That every private man has an absolute Propriety in his Goods; such, as excludeth the Right of the Soveraign.” Every man has indeed a Propriety that excludes the Right of every other Subject: And he has it onely from the Soveraign Power; without the protection whereof, every other man should have equall Right to the same. But if the Right of the Soveraign also be excluded, he cannot performe the office they have put him into; which is, to defend them both from forraign enemies, and from the injuries of one another; and consequently there is no longer a Common-wealth.

A fifth doctrine that tends to destroy a commonwealth is: “Every private person has absolute ownership of his goods, excluding any right of the sovereign.” Each person does indeed own his goods to the exclusion of every other subject. And that ownership comes only from the sovereign power. Without the sovereign’s protection, every other person would have an equal right to those same goods. But if the sovereign’s right is also excluded, the sovereign cannot carry out the duty the subjects have assigned him. That duty is to defend them against both foreign enemies and harm from one another. As a result, there is no longer a commonwealth.

And if the Propriety of Subjects, exclude not the Right of the Soveraign Representative to their Goods; much lesse to their offices of Judicature, or Execution, in which they Represent the Soveraign himselfe.

And if subjects’ property rights do not exclude the sovereign representative’s right to their goods, even less do they exclude his right to their judicial or executive offices. In these offices, subjects represent the sovereign himself.

There is a Sixth doctrine, plainly, and directly against the essence of a Common-wealth; and ’tis this, “That the Soveraign Power may be divided.” For what is it to divide the Power of a Common-wealth, but to Dissolve it; for Powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for these doctrines, men are chiefly beholding to some of those, that making profession of the Lawes, endeavour to make them depend upon their own learning, and not upon the Legislative Power.

A sixth doctrine plainly and directly opposes the very nature of a commonwealth: “Sovereign power may be divided.” For what does dividing a commonwealth’s power mean but dissolving the commonwealth? Divided powers destroy one another. And for these doctrines, people chiefly have some legal professionals to thank. These professionals try to make the laws depend on their own expertise rather than on the lawmaking power.

And as False Doctrine, so also often-times the Example of different Government in a neighbouring Nation, disposeth men to alteration of the forme already setled. So the people of the Jewes were stirred up to reject God, and to call upon the Prophet Samuel, for a King after the manner of the Nations; So also the lesser Cities of Greece, were continually disturbed, with seditions of the Aristocraticall, and Democraticall factions; one part of almost every Common-wealth, desiring to imitate the Lacedaemonians; the other, the Athenians. And I doubt not, but many men, have been contented to see the late troubles in England, out of an imitation of the Low Countries; supposing there needed no more to grow rich, than to change, as they had done, the forme of their Government. For the constitution of mans nature, is of it selfe subject to desire novelty: When therefore they are provoked to the same, by the neighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is almost impossible for them, not to be content with those that solicite them to change; and love the first beginnings, though they be grieved with the continuance of disorder; like hot blouds, that having gotten the itch, tear themselves with their own nayles, till they can endure the smart no longer.

Like false doctrine, the example of a neighboring nation’s different government often leads people to want their own government changed. Thus the Jews were stirred to reject God and ask the Prophet Samuel for a king like other nations. Likewise, the smaller cities of Greece were constantly troubled by rebellions among aristocratic and democratic factions. One side in almost every state wanted to imitate the Lacedaemonians, and the other, the Athenians. And I have no doubt that many men were content to see the recent troubles in England. They wanted to imitate the Low Countries. They supposed that becoming rich required nothing more than changing their form of government, as the Low Countries had done. For human nature is itself inclined to desire novelty. When neighboring people have also grown rich through change, their example encourages that desire. Then people find it almost impossible not to welcome those who urge them to change their government. They love the first beginnings of change, though the continuing disorder causes them distress. They are like hot-blooded people who catch an itch and tear themselves with their own nails. They keep scratching until they can no longer bear the pain.

And as to Rebellion in particular against Monarchy; one of the most frequent causes of it, is the Reading of the books of Policy, and Histories of the antient Greeks, and Romans; from which, young men, and all others that are unprovided of the Antidote of solid Reason, receiving a strong, and delightfull impression, of the great exploits of warre, atchieved by the Conductors of their Armies, receive withall a pleasing Idea, of all they have done besides; and imagine their great prosperity, not to have proceeded from the aemulation of particular men, but from the vertue of their popular form of government: Not considering the frequent Seditions, and Civill Warres, produced by the imperfection of their Policy. From the reading, I say, of such books, men have undertaken to kill their Kings, because the Greek and Latine writers, in their books, and discourses of Policy, make it lawfull, and laudable, for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant. For they say not Regicide, that is, killing of a King, but Tyrannicide, that is, killing of a Tyrant is lawfull. From the same books, they that live under a Monarch conceive an opinion, that the Subjects in a Popular Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves. I say, they that live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion; not they that live under a Popular Government; for they find no such matter. In summe, I cannot imagine, how anything can be more prejudiciall to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publikely read, without present applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to take away their Venime; Which Venime I will not doubt to compare to the biting of a mad Dogge, which is a disease the Physicians call Hydrophobia, or Fear Of Water. For as he that is so bitten, has a continuall torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; and is in such an estate, as if the poyson endeavoured to convert him into a Dogge: So when a Monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those Democraticall writers, that continually snarle at that estate; it wanteth nothing more than a strong Monarch, which neverthelesse out of a certain Tyrannophobia, or feare of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhorre.

One of the most frequent causes of rebellion against monarchy is reading ancient Greek and Roman political writings and histories. Young men, and all others without the antidote of sound reason, find these books deeply stirring and delightful. They admire the great military feats of Greek and Roman commanders. They also form a favorable impression of everything else those commanders did. They imagine that Greek and Roman prosperity came not from competition among individuals, but from the merits of popular government. They overlook the frequent rebellions and civil wars caused by flaws in those political systems. Reading such books, I say, has led men to undertake to kill their kings. Greek and Latin writers, in their political books and discussions, call such killing lawful and praiseworthy for anyone. The only condition is that the killer first call the king a tyrant. For these writers do not say that regicide, meaning the killing of a king, is lawful. Instead, they say that tyrannicide, meaning the killing of a tyrant, is lawful. These same books lead people living under a monarch to believe that subjects under popular government enjoy liberty. Under monarchy, by contrast, they believe all subjects are slaves. I say that people living under monarchy form this opinion, not people living under popular government. Those living under popular government find no such thing. In short, I cannot imagine anything more harmful to monarchy than allowing these books to be read publicly without correction. Wise teachers must immediately provide suitable corrections to remove the books’ poison. I do not hesitate to compare this poison to the bite of a rabid dog. The resulting disease is what physicians call Hydrophobia, or Fear of Water. A person bitten by such a dog suffers constant, agonizing thirst, yet recoils from water. The sufferer seems as if the poison were trying to turn him into a dog. So it is when a monarchy is bitten to the bone by democratic writers who continually snarl at that government. The monarchy then needs nothing more urgently than a strong monarch. Yet when the people have a strong monarch, they recoil from him out of a certain Tyrannophobia. This is a fear of being strongly governed.

As here have been Doctors, that hold there be three Soules in a man; so there be also that think there may be more Soules, (that is, more Soveraigns,) than one, in a Common-wealth; and set up a Supremacy against the Soveraignty; Canons against Lawes; and a Ghostly Authority against the Civill; working on mens minds, with words and distinctions, that of themselves signifie nothing, but bewray (by their obscurity) that there walketh (as some think invisibly) another Kingdome, as it were a Kingdome of Fayries, in the dark. Now seeing it is manifest, that the Civill Power, and the Power of the Common-wealth is the same thing; and that Supremacy, and the Power of making Canons, and granting Faculties, implyeth a Common-wealth; it followeth, that where one is Soveraign, another Supreme; where one can make Lawes, and another make Canons; there must needs be two Common-wealths, of one & the same Subjects; which is a Kingdome divided in it selfe, and cannot stand. For notwithstanding the insignificant distinction of Temporall, and Ghostly, they are still two Kingdomes, and every Subject is subject to two Masters. For seeing the Ghostly Power challengeth the Right to declare what is Sinne it challengeth by consequence to declare what is Law, (Sinne being nothing but the transgression of the Law;) and again, the Civill Power challenging to declare what is Law, every Subject must obey two Masters, who bothe will have their Commands be observed as Law; which is impossible. Or, if it be but one Kingdome, either the Civill, which is the Power of the Common-wealth, must be subordinate to the Ghostly; or the Ghostly must be subordinate to the Temporall and then there is no Supremacy but the Temporall. When therefore these two Powers oppose one another, the Common-wealth cannot but be in great danger of Civill warre, and Dissolution. For the Civill Authority being more visible, and standing in the cleerer light of naturall reason cannot choose but draw to it in all times a very considerable part of the people: And the Spirituall, though it stand in the darknesse of Schoole distinctions, and hard words; yet because the fear of Darknesse, and Ghosts, is greater than other fears, cannot want a party sufficient to Trouble, and sometimes to Destroy a Common-wealth. And this is a Disease which not unfitly may be compared to the Epilepsie, or Falling-sicknesse (which the Jewes took to be one kind of possession by Spirits) in the Body Naturall. For as in this Disease, there is an unnaturall spirit, or wind in the head that obstructeth the roots of the Nerves, and moving them violently, taketh away the motion which naturally they should have from the power of the Soule in the Brain, and thereby causeth violent, and irregular motions (which men call Convulsions) in the parts; insomuch as he that is seized therewith, falleth down sometimes into the water, and sometimes into the fire, as a man deprived of his senses; so also in the Body Politique, when the Spirituall power, moveth the Members of a Common-wealth, by the terrour of punishments, and hope of rewards (which are the Nerves of it,) otherwise than by the Civill Power (which is the Soule of the Common-wealth) they ought to be moved; and by strange, and hard words suffocates the people, and either Overwhelm the Common-wealth with Oppression, or cast it into the Fire of a Civill warre.

Just as some scholars have held that a person has three souls, others think a state may have several souls. By souls, they mean sovereign rulers. They set up a supreme religious authority against sovereign power, church rules against laws, and spiritual authority against civil authority. They work on people’s minds with words and distinctions that mean nothing in themselves. Yet the obscurity of these words reveals another kingdom lurking in the dark, supposedly invisible, like a kingdom of fairies. Now civil power and the power of the state are clearly the same thing. And supreme religious authority, including the power to make church rules and grant special permissions, implies a state. So suppose one ruler is sovereign while another claims supreme religious authority. Suppose one can make laws while another can make church rules. There must then be two states governing the very same subjects. This is a kingdom divided against itself, and it cannot stand. The meaningless distinction between worldly and spiritual power does not change this. There are still two kingdoms, and every subject serves two masters. Spiritual power claims the right to declare what is sinful. It therefore also claims the right to declare what is law, since sin is nothing but breaking the law. Civil power also claims the right to declare what is law. So every subject must obey two masters, both demanding that their commands be followed as law. This is impossible. Or, if there is only one kingdom, civil power, the power of the state, must be subordinate to spiritual power. Otherwise, spiritual power must be subordinate to worldly power, leaving worldly power alone supreme. When these two powers oppose each other, the state must face great danger of civil war and collapse. Civil authority is more visible and stands in the clearer light of natural reason. It therefore cannot fail, at all times, to attract a very considerable share of the people. Spiritual authority, by contrast, stands in the darkness of scholastic distinctions and difficult words. Yet fear of darkness and ghosts is greater than other fears. So spiritual authority cannot lack enough supporters to trouble a state, and sometimes destroy it. This disease of the state can fittingly be compared to epilepsy, or the falling sickness, in the human body. The Jews regarded epilepsy as a kind of possession by spirits. In this disease, an unnatural spirit, or wind, in the head blocks the roots of the nerves. It shakes the nerves violently, interrupting the movement they should naturally receive from the soul in the brain. This causes violent, irregular movements in parts of the body, which people call convulsions. The sufferer sometimes falls into water and sometimes into fire, like someone deprived of their senses. The same happens in the body politic when spiritual power moves the members of a state through fear of punishments and hope of rewards. These punishments and rewards are the state’s nerves. Spiritual power makes those members move differently from how civil power, the state’s soul, should direct them. Through strange and difficult words, spiritual power chokes the people. It either overwhelms the state with oppression or throws it into the fire of civil war.

Sometimes also in the meerly Civill government, there be more than one Soule: As when the Power of levying mony, (which is the Nutritive faculty,) has depended on a generall Assembly; the Power of conduct and command, (which is the Motive Faculty,) on one man; and the Power of making Lawes, (which is the Rationall faculty,) on the accidentall consent, not onely of those two, but also of a third; This endangereth the Common-wealth, somtimes for want of consent to good Lawes; but most often for want of such Nourishment, as is necessary to Life, and Motion. For although few perceive, that such government, is not government, but division of the Common-wealth into three Factions, and call it mixt Monarchy; yet the truth is, that it is not one independent Common-wealth, but three independent Factions; nor one Representative Person, but three. In the Kingdome of God, there may be three Persons independent, without breach of unity in God that Reigneth; but where men Reigne, that be subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so. And therefore if the King bear the person of the People, and the generall Assembly bear also the person of the People, and another assembly bear the person of a Part of the people, they are not one Person, nor one Soveraign, but three Persons, and three Soveraigns.

Sometimes even a purely civil government has more than one soul. For example, the power to raise money may depend on a general assembly. This is the government's nourishing faculty. The power to direct and command may depend on one man. This is its faculty of movement. And the power to make laws may depend on the chance agreement of both these authorities and a third. This is its rational faculty. Such an arrangement endangers the commonwealth, sometimes because the authorities fail to agree on good laws. But most often, the danger comes from lacking the nourishment necessary for life and movement. Few people recognize that such an arrangement is not government, but a division of the commonwealth into three factions. Instead, they call it a mixed monarchy. Yet the truth is that this is not one independent commonwealth, but three independent factions. Nor is there one representative person, but three. In the Kingdom of God, three independent Persons may exist without breaking the unity of God who reigns. But where human beings rule, with their differing opinions, such unity cannot exist. So suppose the King represents the People, and the general assembly also represents the People. Suppose another assembly represents part of the people. These representatives are not one person or one sovereign, but three persons and three sovereigns.

To what Disease in the Naturall Body of man, I may exactly compare this irregularity of a Common-wealth, I know not. But I have seen a man, that had another man growing out of his side, with an head, armes, breast, and stomach, of his own: If he had had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact.

I do not know what disease in the human body exactly resembles this disorder in a commonwealth. But I have seen a man with another man growing out of his side. The second man had his own head, arms, chest, and stomach. If the first man had had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might have been exact.

Hitherto I have named such Diseases of a Common-wealth, as are of the greatest, and most present danger. There be other, not so great; which neverthelesse are not unfit to be observed. As first, the difficulty of raising Mony, for the necessary uses of the Common-wealth; especially in the approach of warre. This difficulty ariseth from the opinion, that every Subject hath of a Propriety in his lands and goods, exclusive of the Soveraigns Right to the use of the same. From whence it commeth to passe, that the Soveraign Power, which foreseeth the necessities and dangers of the Common-wealth, (finding the passage of mony to the publique Treasure obstructed, by the tenacity of the people,) whereas it ought to extend it selfe, to encounter, and prevent such dangers in their beginnings, contracteth it selfe as long as it can, and when it cannot longer, struggles with the people by strategems of Law, to obtain little summes, which not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way for present supply, or Perish; and being put often to these extremities, at last reduceth the people to their due temper; or else the Common-wealth must perish. Insomuch as we may compare this Distemper very aptly to an Ague; wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed, or by venomous matter obstructed; the Veins which by their naturall course empty themselves into the Heart, are not (as they ought to be) supplyed from the Arteries, whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contraction, and trembling of the limbes; and afterwards a hot, and strong endeavour of the Heart, to force a passage for the Bloud; and before it can do that, contenteth it selfe with the small refreshments of such things as coole of a time, till (if Nature be strong enough) it break at last the contumacy of the parts obstructed, and dissipateth the venome into sweat; or (if Nature be too weak) the Patient dyeth.

So far, I have named the diseases of a commonwealth that pose the greatest and most immediate danger. Others are less serious, but still worth noting. The first is the difficulty of raising money for the commonwealth’s necessary expenses, especially when war approaches. This difficulty arises because every subject believes his ownership of land and goods excludes the sovereign’s right to use them. The sovereign power foresees the commonwealth’s needs and dangers. But the people’s unwillingness to part with money blocks its flow into the public treasury. The sovereign should expand its efforts to confront these dangers and prevent them at the outset. Instead, the sovereign holds back as long as possible. When holding back is no longer possible, the sovereign struggles against the people through legal maneuvers to obtain small sums. These sums are insufficient. So the sovereign must finally force a way to obtain immediate funds, or perish. Repeatedly driven to these extremes, the sovereign eventually brings the people into the proper state of obedience. Otherwise, the commonwealth must perish. We may aptly compare this disorder to a fever with chills. In such a fever, the fleshy parts become congealed or blocked by poisonous matter. The veins naturally empty into the heart, but the arteries fail to replenish them as they should. First come cold contractions and trembling limbs. Then the heart makes a hot, forceful effort to open a passage for the blood. Before the heart can open that passage, it makes do with the slight relief of things that cool temporarily. Finally, if nature is strong enough, it overcomes the resistance of the blocked parts and expels the poison through sweat. But if nature is too weak, the patient dies.

Again, there is sometimes in a Common-wealth, a Disease, which resembleth the Pleurisie; and that is, when the Treasure of the Common-wealth, flowing out of its due course, is gathered together in too much abundance, in one, or a few private men, by Monopolies, or by Farmes of the Publique Revenues; in the same manner as the Blood in a Pleurisie, getting into the Membrane of the breast, breedeth there an Inflammation, accompanied with a Fever, and painfull stitches.

Again, a state sometimes suffers from a disease resembling pleurisy. This happens when the state’s wealth flows out of its proper channels and accumulates excessively in one or a few private individuals. They gain this wealth through monopolies or contracts to collect public revenue. In the same way, blood entering the membrane of the chest during pleurisy causes inflammation, with fever and sharp pains.

Also, the Popularity of a potent Subject, (unlesse the Common-wealth have very good caution of his fidelity,) is a dangerous Disease; because the people (which should receive their motion from the Authority of the Soveraign,) by the flattery, and by the reputation of an ambitious man, are drawn away from their obedience to the Lawes, to follow a man, of whose vertues, and designes they have no knowledge. And this is commonly of more danger in a Popular Government, than in a Monarchy; as it may easily be made believe, they are the People. By this means it was, that Julius Caesar, who was set up by the People against the Senate, having won to himselfe the affections of his Army, made himselfe Master, both of Senate and People. And this proceeding of popular, and ambitious men, is plain Rebellion; and may be resembled to the effects of Witchcraft.

Also, the popularity of a powerful subject is a dangerous disease unless the state has strong assurances of his loyalty. The people should be guided by the sovereign’s authority. But an ambitious man’s flattery and reputation draw them away from obeying the laws. Instead, they follow a man whose virtues and intentions they know nothing about. This danger is usually greater in a popular government than in a monarchy. For people can easily be persuaded that such men are the People. This was how Julius Caesar came to power. The People supported Julius Caesar against the Senate. After winning the loyalty of his army, he made himself master of both the Senate and the People. Such conduct by popular and ambitious men is outright rebellion and can be compared to the effects of witchcraft.

Another infirmity of a Common-wealth, is the immoderate greatnesse of a Town, when it is able to furnish out of its own Circuit, the number, and expence of a great Army: As also the great number of Corporations; which are as it were many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of a greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man.

Another weakness of a Commonwealth is a town that grows excessively large. Such a town can supply and pay for a large army entirely from within its own boundaries. Another weakness is the large number of chartered organizations. These are like many smaller Commonwealths inside a larger one, like worms in the intestines of a human body.

To which may be added, the Liberty of Disputing against absolute Power, by pretenders to Politicall Prudence; which though bred for the most part in the Lees of the people; yet animated by False Doctrines, are perpetually medling with the Fundamentall Lawes, to the molestation of the Common-wealth; like the little Wormes, which Physicians call Ascarides.

To this may be added the freedom to argue against absolute power, claimed by those who pretend to political wisdom. Although these people mostly come from the dregs of society, false doctrines embolden them. They constantly meddle with the fundamental laws, troubling the commonwealth like the little worms that doctors call Ascarides.

We may further adde, the insatiable appetite, or Bulimia, of enlarging Dominion; with the incurable Wounds thereby many times received from the enemy; And the Wens, of ununited conquests, which are many times a burthen, and with lesse danger lost, than kept; As also the Lethargy of Ease, and Consumption of Riot and Vain Expence.

We may also add the insatiable appetite, or Bulimia, for expanding dominion. Such expansion often brings incurable wounds inflicted by the enemy. There are also the swellings of conquered territories not integrated into the state. Such conquests are often a burden, and losing them is less dangerous than keeping them. There is also the lethargy of easy living and the wasting disease of excess and pointless spending.

Lastly, when in a warre (forraign, or intestine,) the enemies got a final Victory; so as (the forces of the Common-wealth keeping the field no longer) there is no farther protection of Subjects in their loyalty; then is the Common-wealth DISSOLVED, and every man at liberty to protect himselfe by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him. For the Soveraign, is the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the Common-wealth; which expiring, the Members are governed by it no more, than the Carcasse of a man, by his departed (though Immortal) Soule. For though the Right of a Soveraign Monarch cannot be extinguished by the act of another; yet the Obligation of the members may. For he that wants protection, may seek it anywhere; and when he hath it, is obliged (without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himselfe out of fear,) to protect his Protection as long as he is able. But when the Power of an Assembly is once suppressed, the Right of the same perisheth utterly; because the Assembly it selfe is extinct; and consequently, there is no possibility for the Soveraignty to re-enter.

Finally, suppose the enemy wins a final victory in a foreign or civil war. The commonwealth’s forces no longer hold the field, so loyal subjects can no longer receive protection. Then the commonwealth is DISSOLVED. Everyone is free to protect himself by whatever means his own judgment suggests. For the sovereign is the public soul, giving life and movement to the commonwealth. When that soul expires, the commonwealth’s members are no longer governed by the sovereign. They are like a human corpse, no longer governed by its departed soul, even though that soul is immortal. For although another person’s actions cannot extinguish a sovereign monarch’s right to rule, they may end the subjects’ obligation. Anyone who lacks protection may seek it anywhere. Once he receives protection, he must defend his protector as long as he can. He cannot evade this duty by falsely claiming that he submitted out of fear. But when an assembly’s power is suppressed, its right to rule dies completely, because the assembly itself no longer exists. Consequently, there is no possibility of the assembly regaining sovereignty.