The Duties of the Sovereign Representative

The OFFICE of the Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly,) consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign Power, namely the procuration of the Safety Of The People; to which he is obliged by the Law of Nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the Author of that Law, and to none but him. But by Safety here, is not meant a bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments of life, which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt to the Common-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe.

The sovereign’s duty, whether the sovereign is a monarch or an assembly, is to fulfill the purpose of sovereign power. That power was entrusted to the sovereign to ensure the safety of the people. The law of nature requires the sovereign to fulfill this duty. The sovereign answers for this duty to God, the author of that law, and to no one else. But safety here means more than merely staying alive. Safety also includes all other comforts of life that each person can gain through lawful work without endangering or harming the commonwealth.

And this is intended should be done, not by care applyed to Individualls, further than their protection from injuries, when they shall complain; but by a generall Providence, contained in publique Instruction, both of Doctrine, and Example; and in the making, and executing of good Lawes, to which individuall persons may apply their own cases.

And this is meant to be done not through individual attention, except to protect people from harm when they complain. Instead, it should be done through general oversight, including public instruction through both teaching and example. It should also include making and enforcing good laws that individuals may apply to their own cases.

And because, if the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty (specified before in the eighteenth Chapter) be taken away, the Common-wealth is thereby dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition, and calamity of a warre with every other man, (which is the greatest evill that can happen in this life;) it is the Office of the Soveraign, to maintain those Rights entire; and consequently against his duty, First, to transferre to another, or to lay from himselfe any of them. For he that deserteth the Means, deserteth the Ends; and he deserteth the Means, that being the Soveraign, acknowledgeth himselfe subject to the Civill Lawes; and renounceth the Power of Supreme Judicature; or of making Warre, or Peace by his own Authority; or of Judging of the Necessities of the Common-wealth; or of levying Mony, and Souldiers, when, and as much as in his own conscience he shall judge necessary; or of making Officers, and Ministers both of Warre, and Peace; or of appointing Teachers, and examining what Doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the Defence, Peace, and Good of the people. Secondly, it is against his duty, to let the people be ignorant, or mis-in-formed of the grounds, and reasons of those his essentiall Rights; because thereby men are easie to be seduced, and drawn to resist him, when the Common-wealth shall require their use and exercise.

If the essential rights of sovereignty are taken away, the commonwealth is dissolved. These rights were listed earlier in Chapter Eighteen. Everyone then returns to the misery of war against everyone else, the greatest evil possible in this life. Because losing these rights has such consequences, the sovereign has a duty to preserve them in full. First, therefore, the sovereign violates his duty if he transfers any of these rights to another or gives them up. Whoever abandons the means also abandons the ends. A sovereign abandons the means if he accepts that he is subject to civil laws. He also abandons the means if he gives up any of the following powers: acting as the highest judge, making war or peace on his own authority, or judging the commonwealth’s needs. The same applies if he gives up his power to raise money and soldiers. He must retain that power whenever, and in whatever amounts, he judges necessary in his own conscience. He must also retain the power to appoint officers and ministers for both war and peace. The same applies to appointing teachers and examining doctrines. He must judge whether those doctrines support or oppose the people’s defense, peace, and welfare. Second, the sovereign violates his duty if he lets the people remain ignorant or misinformed about the basis and reasons for his essential rights. Such ignorance or misinformation makes people easy to mislead into resisting him when the commonwealth requires him to exercise those rights.

And the grounds of these Rights, have the rather need to be diligently, and truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any Civill Law, or terrour of legal punishment. For a Civill Law, that shall forbid Rebellion, (and such is all resistance to the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty,) is not (as a Civill Law) any obligation, but by vertue onely of the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth the violation of Faith; which naturall obligation if men know not, they cannot know the Right of any Law the Soveraign maketh. And for the Punishment, they take it but for an act of Hostility; which when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavour by acts of Hostility, to avoyd.

The reasons for these rights need to be taught all the more carefully and accurately. This is because neither civil law nor fear of legal punishment can uphold these rights. For a civil law forbidding rebellion has no binding force simply because it is a civil law. All resistance to the essential rights of sovereignty is rebellion. Such a law binds people only through the law of nature, which forbids breaking promises. If people do not understand this natural obligation, they cannot understand the authority of any law the sovereign makes. As for punishment, they regard it merely as an act of hostility. When they think they are strong enough, they will try to avoid punishment through hostile acts of their own.

As I have heard some say, that Justice is but a word, without substance; and that whatsoever a man can by force, or art, acquire to himselfe, (not onely in the condition of warre, but also in a Common-wealth,) is his own, which I have already shewed to be false: So there be also that maintain, that there are no grounds, nor Principles of Reason, to sustain those essentiall Rights, which make Soveraignty absolute. For if there were, they would have been found out in some place, or other; whereas we see, there has not hitherto been any Common-wealth, where those Rights have been acknowledged, or challenged. Wherein they argue as ill, as if the Savage people of America, should deny there were any grounds, or Principles of Reason, so to build a house, as to last as long as the materials, because they never yet saw any so well built. Time, and Industry, produce every day new knowledge. And as the art of well building, is derived from Principles of Reason, observed by industrious men, that had long studied the nature of materials, and the divers effects of figure, and proportion, long after mankind began (though poorly) to build: So, long time after men have begun to constitute Common-wealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder, there may, Principles of Reason be found out, by industrious meditation, to make use of them, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my particular interest, at this day, very little. But supposing that these of mine are not such Principles of Reason; yet I am sure they are Principles from Authority of Scripture; as I shall make it appear, when I shall come to speak of the Kingdome of God, (administred by Moses,) over the Jewes, his peculiar people by Covenant.

I have heard some people say that justice is only a word, with no substance. They claim that whatever a man can gain by force or cunning is his own. They say this applies not only in a state of war, but also in a commonwealth. I have already shown this claim to be false. Similarly, some maintain that no rational grounds or principles support the essential rights that make sovereignty absolute. If such principles existed, they argue, someone somewhere would have discovered them. Yet so far, no commonwealth has acknowledged or claimed those rights. Their reasoning is as poor as if the uncivilized peoples of America made a similar argument about building houses. Suppose they denied that rational grounds or principles could guide the construction of a house lasting as long as its materials. Their reason would be that they had never seen a house built so well. Time and hard work produce new knowledge every day. The art of building well comes from rational principles identified by diligent people. These people had long studied the nature of materials and the various effects of shape and proportion. This knowledge came long after people first began to build, though their buildings were poor. Similarly, people have long been establishing imperfect commonwealths, prone to falling back into disorder. Yet rational principles may still be discovered through diligent thought. Whether people use these principles or neglect them matters very little to my personal interests today. But suppose the principles I offer are not rational principles. Even so, I am sure they rest on the authority of Scripture. I will demonstrate this when I discuss the Kingdom of God, administered by Moses, over the Jews. They were God's own people through a covenant.

But they say again, that though the Principles be right, yet Common people are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them. I should be glad, that the Rich, and Potent Subjects of a Kingdome, or those that are accounted the most Learned, were no lesse incapable than they. But all men know, that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine, proceed not so much from the difficulty of the matter, as from the interest of them that are to learn. Potent men, digest hardly any thing that setteth up a Power to bridle their affections; and Learned men, any thing that discovereth their errours, and thereby lesseneth their Authority: whereas the Common-peoples minds, unlesse they be tainted with dependance on the Potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of their Doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by Publique Authority shall be imprinted in them. Shall whole Nations be brought to Acquiesce in the great Mysteries of Christian Religion, which are above Reason; and millions of men be made believe, that the same Body may be in innumerable places, at one and the same time, which is against Reason; and shall not men be able, by their teaching, and preaching, protected by the Law, to make that received, which is so consonant to Reason, that any unprejudicated man, needs no more to learn it, than to hear it? I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in the Essentiall Rights (which are the Naturall, and Fundamentall Lawes) of Soveraignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a Soveraign has his Power entire,) but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the Common-wealth; and consequently, it is his Duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security, against the danger that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall Person, from Rebellion.

But they object again that, although the principles are correct, ordinary people lack the ability to understand them. I would be glad if the kingdom’s rich and powerful subjects, or its supposedly most learned people, were no less incapable. But everyone knows that the obstacles to this teaching come less from its difficulty than from the learners’ interests. Powerful people can hardly stomach anything that establishes a power to restrain their passions. Learned people can hardly stomach anything that exposes their errors and so reduces their authority. By contrast, ordinary people’s minds are like clean paper, ready to receive whatever the public authority prints on them. This is true unless dependence on the powerful has tainted those minds, or their teachers’ opinions have scribbled over them. Can whole nations be brought to accept the great mysteries of the Christian religion, which are beyond reason? Can millions be made to believe that the same body can exist in countless places at once, contrary to reason? Yet can teachers and preachers, protected by law, not win acceptance for something so consistent with reason? An unprejudiced person needs only to hear this teaching to understand it. I therefore conclude that teaching people the essential rights of sovereignty presents no difficulty while a sovereign retains his full power. These rights are the natural and fundamental laws of sovereignty. Any difficulty comes from the sovereign’s own fault, or that of those he trusts to govern the commonwealth. Consequently, he has a duty to ensure that the people receive this instruction. Such instruction is not only his duty but also serves his interests. It also protects him against the danger that rebellion may pose to his own person.

And (to descend to particulars) the People are to be taught, First, that they ought not to be in love with any forme of Government they see in their neighbour Nations, more than with their own, nor (whatsoever present prosperity they behold in Nations that are otherwise governed than they,) to desire change. For the prosperity of a People ruled by an Aristocraticall, or Democraticall assembly, commeth not from Aristocracy, nor from Democracy, but from the Obedience, and Concord of the Subjects; nor do the people flourish in a Monarchy, because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in any kind of State, the Obedience, (and consequently the Concord of the People,) and they shall not onely not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience, to doe no more than reforme the Common-wealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of Peleus (in the fable;) which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit Father, did by the Counsell of Medea, cut him in pieces, and boyle him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man. This desire of change, is like the breach of the first of Gods Commandements: For there God says, Non Habebis Deos Alienos; Thou shalt not have the Gods of other Nations; and in another place concerning Kings, that they are Gods.

To turn to specific points, the people must first be taught not to prefer their neighbors’ forms of government to their own. Nor should they desire change, whatever prosperity they see in nations governed differently from their own. A people governed by an aristocratic or democratic assembly does not prosper because of aristocracy or democracy. Instead, prosperity comes from the subjects’ obedience and unity. Nor do people flourish under a monarchy because one man has the right to rule them. They flourish because they obey him. Remove obedience from any state, and with it the people’s unity, and the state will not merely fail to flourish. It will soon fall apart. Those who use disobedience merely to reform the commonwealth will find that they are destroying it instead. They are like the foolish daughters of Peleus in the fable. Wishing to restore their elderly father’s youth, they followed Medea’s advice. They cut him into pieces and boiled him with strange herbs, but failed to make him young again. This desire for change is like breaking the first of God’s Commandments. For there God says, Non Habebis Deos Alienos: You shall not have the gods of other nations. And elsewhere, speaking of kings, he says that they are gods.

Secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led with admiration of the vertue of any of their fellow Subjects, how high soever he stand, nor how conspicuously soever he shine in the Common-wealth; nor of any Assembly, (except the Soveraign Assembly,) so as to deferre to them any obedience, or honour, appropriate to the Soveraign onely, whom (in their particular stations) they represent; nor to receive any influence from them, but such as is conveighed by them from the Soveraign Authority. For that Soveraign, cannot be imagined to love his People as he ought, that is not Jealous of them, but suffers them by the flattery of Popular men, to be seduced from their loyalty, as they have often been, not onely secretly, but openly, so as to proclaime Marriage with them In Facie Ecclesiae by Preachers; and by publishing the same in the open streets: which may fitly be compared to the violation of the second of the ten Commandements.

Secondly, people must be taught not to let admiration for any fellow subject’s virtue lead them astray. This applies however high that subject’s rank or however prominently he stands out in the Commonwealth. Nor should admiration for any assembly lead them astray (except the Sovereign Assembly). Such admiration must not lead people to give these subjects or assemblies obedience or honor reserved for the sovereign alone. These subjects and assemblies represent the sovereign in their particular roles. People must accept no influence from them except what they pass on from the sovereign authority. For a sovereign cannot be thought to love his people as he should unless he jealously guards their loyalty. He must not let popular men flatter his people into abandoning their loyalty. People have often been led astray in this way, not only secretly but openly. Preachers have even proclaimed their marriage to these men before the congregation, and the marriage has been announced in public streets. This may fittingly be compared to breaking the second of the Ten Commandments.

Nor To Dispute The Soveraign Power

Nor to Challenge the Sovereign’s Power

Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed, how great fault it is, to speak evill of the Soveraign Representative, (whether One man, or an Assembly of men;) or to argue and dispute his Power, or any way to use his Name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into Contempt with his People, and their Obedience (in which the safety of the Common-wealth consisteth) slackened. Which doctrine the third Commandement by resemblance pointeth to.

Thirdly, as a result, they should be taught how wrong it is to speak ill of the sovereign representative. The sovereign may be one man or an assembly of men. They should also be taught how wrong it is to challenge or debate the sovereign’s power, or use his name disrespectfully. Such conduct may bring the sovereign into contempt among his people and weaken their obedience. The safety of the commonwealth depends on that obedience. The third Commandment points to this teaching by analogy.

Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when ’tis taught, remember it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom the Soveraign Power is placed, without setting a part from their ordinary labour, some certain times, in which they may attend those that are appointed to instruct them; It is necessary that some such times be determined, wherein they may assemble together, and (after prayers and praises given to God, the Soveraign of Soveraigns) hear those their Duties told them, and the Positive Lawes, such as generally concern them all, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the Authority that maketh them Lawes. To this end had the Jewes every seventh day, a Sabbath, in which the Law was read and expounded; and in the solemnity whereof they were put in mind, that their King was God; that having created the world in six days, he rested the seventh day; and by their resting on it from their labour, that that God was their King, which redeemed them from their servile, and painfull labour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after they had rejoyced in God, to take joy also in themselves, by lawfull recreation. So that the first Table of the Commandements, is spent all, in setting down the summe of Gods absolute Power; not onely as God, but as King by pact, (in peculiar) of the Jewes; and may therefore give light, to those that have the Soveraign Power conferred on them by the consent of men, to see what doctrine they Ought to teach their Subjects.

Fourthly, people cannot learn this unless they set aside regular times away from their ordinary work to hear appointed instructors. Without these times, people cannot remember what they have learned. Nor, after one generation has passed, can people even know who holds sovereign power. So fixed times must be established for people to gather together. After offering prayers and praise to God, the Sovereign of Sovereigns, people must hear their duties explained. The enacted laws that concern everyone must also be read and explained. People must also be reminded of the authority that makes these laws binding. For this purpose, the Jews observed a Sabbath every seventh day, when the Law was read and explained. The solemn observance reminded the Jews that their King was God. Having created the world in six days, he rested on the seventh. By resting from work that day, the Jews remembered that their King had freed them from slavery and painful labour in Egypt. God also gave them time, after rejoicing in him, to enjoy themselves through lawful recreation. So the entire first Table of the Commandments sets out the main points of God's absolute power. This is his power not only as God, but also as King by covenant, specifically of the Jews. The first Table may therefore guide those given sovereign power by human consent in what they ought to teach their subjects.

And because the first instruction of Children, dependeth on the care of their Parents; it is necessary that they should be obedient to them, whilest they are under their tuition; and not onely so, but that also afterwards (as gratitude requireth,) they acknowledge the benefit of their education, by externall signes of honour. To which end they are to be taught, that originally the Father of every man was also his Soveraign Lord, with power over him of life and death; and that the Fathers of families, when by instituting a Common-wealth, they resigned that absolute Power, yet it was never intended, they should lose the honour due unto them for their education. For to relinquish such right, was not necessary to the Institution of Soveraign Power; nor would there be any reason, why any man should desire to have children, or take the care to nourish, and instruct them, if they were afterwards to have no other benefit from them, than from other men. And this accordeth with the fifth Commandement.

Because children’s early education depends on their parents’ care, children must obey their parents while under their guidance. Even afterward, gratitude requires children to acknowledge the benefits of their upbringing through outward signs of respect. To this end, children must be taught that originally every person’s father was also that person’s sovereign ruler. The father had power over his child’s life and death. When fathers established a commonwealth, they gave up this absolute power as heads of their families. But they never intended to lose the respect owed to them for raising and educating their children. Giving up this right to respect was not necessary to establish sovereign power. Nor would anyone have reason to want children, or take care to feed and educate them, under the following condition: if afterward parents were to receive no more benefit from their children than from other people. And this agrees with the fifth Commandment.

Again, every Soveraign Ought to cause Justice to be taught, which (consisting in taking from no man what is his) is as much as to say, to cause men to be taught not to deprive their Neighbour, by violence, or fraud, of any thing which by the Soveraign Authority is theirs. Of things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own life, & limbs; and in the next degree, (in most men,) those that concern conjugall affection; and after them riches and means of living. Therefore the People are to be taught, to abstain from violence to one anothers person, by private revenges; from violation of conjugall honour; and from forcibly rapine, and fraudulent surreption of one anothers goods. For which purpose also it is necessary they be shewed the evill consequences of false Judgement, by corruption either of Judges or Witnesses, whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away, and Justice becomes of no effect: all which things are intimated in the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth Commandements.

Again, every sovereign ought to ensure that justice is taught. Justice means taking from no one what belongs to them. People must therefore be taught not to use violence or fraud to take anything the sovereign’s authority recognizes as another’s. Of all that belongs to a person, nothing is dearer than their own life and limbs. For most people, matters of marital affection come next, followed by wealth and the means of making a living. Therefore, people must be taught not to harm one another through acts of private revenge. They must also be taught not to violate marital honor or take one another’s goods by force or deception. For the same purpose, people must also be shown the harmful consequences of false judgments caused by corrupt judges or witnesses. Such judgments erase the distinction between what belongs to one person and what belongs to another, making justice ineffective. All these matters are indicated in the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth Commandments.

Lastly, they are to be taught, that not onely the unjust facts, but the designes and intentions to do them, (though by accident hindred,) are Injustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will, as well as in the irregularity of the act. And this is the intention of the tenth Commandement, and the summe of the Second Table; which is reduced all to this one Commandement of mutuall Charity, “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy selfe:” as the summe of the first Table is reduced to “the love of God;” whom they had then newly received as their King.

Lastly, they must be taught that not only unjust acts, but also plans and intentions to commit them, are injustice. This remains true even when those plans are accidentally prevented. Injustice lies in the corruption of the will as well as in the wrongness of the act. This is the meaning of the tenth Commandment and the summary of the Second Table of the Ten Commandments. The whole Second Table comes down to this one commandment of mutual love: “You shall love your neighbour as yourself.” In the same way, the First Table comes down to “the love of God.” They had then only just accepted God as their King.

As for the Means, and Conduits, by which the people may receive this Instruction, wee are to search, by what means so may Opinions, contrary to the peace of Man-kind, upon weak and false Principles, have neverthelesse been so deeply rooted in them. I mean those, which I have in the precedent Chapter specified: as That men shall Judge of what is lawfull and unlawfull, not by the Law it selfe, but by their own private Judgements; That Subjects sinne in obeying the Commands of the Common-wealth, unlesse they themselves have first judged them to be lawfull: That their Propriety in their riches is such, as to exclude the Dominion, which the Common-wealth hath over the same: That it is lawfull for Subjects to kill such, as they call Tyrants: That the Soveraign Power may be divided, and the like; which come to be instilled into the People by this means. They whom necessity, or covetousnesse keepeth attent on their trades, and labour; and they, on the other side, whom superfluity, or sloth carrieth after their sensuall pleasures, (which two sorts of men take up the greatest part of Man-kind,) being diverted from the deep meditation, which the learning of truth, not onely in the matter of Naturall Justice, but also of all other Sciences necessarily requireth, receive the Notions of their duty, chiefly from Divines in the Pulpit, and partly from such of their Neighbours, or familiar acquaintance, as having the Faculty of discoursing readily, and plausibly, seem wiser and better learned in cases of Law, and Conscience, than themselves. And the Divines, and such others as make shew of Learning, derive their knowledge from the Universities, and from the Schooles of Law, or from the Books, which by men eminent in those Schooles, and Universities have been published. It is therefore manifest, that the Instruction of the people, dependeth wholly, on the right teaching of Youth in the Universities. But are not (may some men say) the Universities of England learned enough already to do that? or is it you will undertake to teach the Universities? Hard questions. Yet to the first, I doubt not to answer; that till towards the later end of Henry the Eighth, the Power of the Pope, was alwayes upheld against the Power of the Common-wealth, principally by the Universities; and that the doctrines maintained by so many Preachers, against the Soveraign Power of the King, and by so many Lawyers, and others, that had their education there, is a sufficient argument, that though the Universities were not authors of those false doctrines, yet they knew not how to plant the true. For in such a contradiction of Opinions, it is most certain, that they have not been sufficiently instructed; and ’tis no wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that subtile liquor, wherewith they were first seasoned, against the Civill Authority. But to the later question, it is not fit, nor needfull for me to say either I, or No: for any man that sees what I am doing, may easily perceive what I think.

How can this instruction reach the people? To answer, we must ask how so many opinions opposed to human peace have become so deeply rooted. These opinions rest on weak and false principles. I mean the opinions I listed in the previous chapter. People should judge what is lawful and unlawful by their private judgment, rather than by the law itself. Subjects sin by obeying the state's commands unless they have first judged those commands lawful. Their ownership of their wealth excludes the state's authority over that wealth. Subjects may lawfully kill those they call tyrants. Sovereign power can be divided. These and similar opinions are instilled in the people in the following way. Necessity or greed keeps some people occupied with their trades and labor. Others are drawn to sensual pleasures by an excess of wealth or by laziness. These two groups make up most of humanity. Both are distracted from the deep reflection needed to learn the truth. Such reflection is necessary not only for understanding natural justice, but also for learning every other science. These people learn their duties chiefly from clergy preaching from the pulpit. They also learn partly from neighbors or acquaintances who can speak fluently and persuasively. These speakers seem wiser and better informed than themselves about questions of law and conscience. The clergy and others who present themselves as learned gain their knowledge from universities and schools of law. They also learn from books published by men distinguished in those institutions. Clearly, then, the people's instruction depends entirely on teaching young people correctly in universities. But some may ask whether the universities of England are not already learned enough to do this. Or do I intend to teach the universities? These are hard questions. Yet I have no hesitation in answering the first. Until near the end of Henry the Eighth's reign, universities were the chief defenders of papal power against state power. Many preachers have upheld doctrines against the King's sovereign power. So have many lawyers and others educated at those universities. This is sufficient evidence that, although the universities did not originate those false doctrines, they could not establish true ones. With such conflicting opinions, those educated there certainly have not been adequately instructed. Nor is it surprising if they still retain a taste of that subtle liquor first used to season them against civil authority. But as for the second question, it is neither fitting nor necessary for me to answer yes or no. Anyone who sees what I am doing can easily tell what I think.

The safety of the People, requireth further, from him, or them that have the Soveraign Power, that Justice be equally administred to all degrees of People; that is, that as well the rich, and mighty, as poor and obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done them; so as the great, may have no greater hope of impunity, when they doe violence, dishonour, or any Injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these, does the like to one of them: For in this consisteth Equity; to which, as being a Precept of the Law of Nature, a Soveraign is as much subject, as any of the meanest of his People. All breaches of the Law, are offences against the Common-wealth: but there be some, that are also against private Persons. Those that concern the Common-wealth onely, may without breach of Equity be pardoned; for every man may pardon what is done against himselfe, according to his own discretion. But an offence against a private man, cannot in Equity be pardoned, without the consent of him that is injured; or reasonable satisfaction.

The people’s safety also requires whoever holds sovereign power to administer justice equally to people of every rank. The rich and powerful, as well as the poor and unknown, must receive redress for injuries done to them. When powerful people commit violence, insults, or other injuries against ordinary people, they must have no greater hope of escaping punishment than ordinary people who do the same to the powerful. Equal treatment of this kind is what fairness requires. Fairness is a rule of natural law, binding the sovereign as much as the humblest subject. All violations of the law are offenses against the commonwealth, but some are also offenses against private individuals. Offenses against the commonwealth alone may be pardoned without violating fairness. For everyone may, at their own discretion, pardon wrongs done to themselves. But an offense against a private individual cannot fairly be pardoned without the injured person’s consent or reasonable compensation.

The Inequality of Subjects, proceedeth from the Acts of Soveraign Power; and therefore has no more place in the presence of the Soveraign; that is to say, in a Court of Justice, then the Inequality between Kings, and their Subjects, in the presence of the King of Kings. The honour of great Persons, is to be valued for their beneficence, and the aydes they give to men of inferiour rank, or not at all. And the violences, oppressions, and injuries they do, are not extenuated, but aggravated by the greatnesse of their persons; because they have least need to commit them. The consequences of this partiality towards the great, proceed in this manner. Impunity maketh Insolence; Insolence Hatred; and Hatred, an Endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatnesse, though with the ruine of the Common-wealth.

Inequality among subjects comes from acts of sovereign power. It therefore has no place before the sovereign, that is, in a court of justice. This is just as inequality between kings and their subjects has no place before the King of Kings. People of high rank deserve honor for their generosity and the help they give people of lower rank, or not at all. Their high rank does not lessen their acts of violence, oppression, and injustice, but makes those acts worse. This is because people of high rank have the least need to commit such acts. Favoritism toward the powerful has the following consequences. Freedom from punishment breeds arrogance. Arrogance breeds hatred. Hatred breeds an effort to bring down all oppressive and insulting power, even at the cost of ruining the commonwealth.

To Equall Justice, appertaineth also the Equall imposition of Taxes; the equality whereof dependeth not on the Equality of riches, but on the Equality of the debt, that every man oweth to the Common-wealth for his defence. It is not enough, for a man to labour for the maintenance of his life; but also to fight, (if need be,) for the securing of his labour. They must either do as the Jewes did after their return from captivity, in re-edifying the Temple, build with one hand, and hold the Sword in the other; or else they must hire others to fight for them. For the Impositions that are layd on the People by the Soveraign Power, are nothing else but the Wages, due to them that hold the publique Sword, to defend private men in the exercise of severall Trades, and Callings. Seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby, is the enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor, and rich; the debt which a poor man oweth them that defend his life, is the same which a rich man oweth for the defence of his; saving that the rich, who have the service of the poor, may be debtors not onely for their own persons, but for many more. Which considered, the Equality of Imposition, consisteth rather in the Equality of that which is consumed, than of the riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is there, that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little, should be more charged, then he that living idlely, getteth little, and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no more protection from the Common-wealth, then the other? But when the Impositions, are layd upon those things which men consume, every man payeth Equally for what he useth: Nor is the Common-wealth defrauded, by the luxurious waste of private men.

Equal justice also requires taxes to be imposed equally. This equality depends not on equal wealth, but on the equal debt everyone owes the Commonwealth for protection. It is not enough to work to support your life. You must also fight, if necessary, to protect the fruits of your work. People must either follow the example of the Jews rebuilding the Temple after their return from captivity. They built with one hand and held a sword in the other. Or people must hire others to fight for them. For taxes imposed by the sovereign power are simply the wages owed to those who wield the public sword. These defenders protect individuals as they pursue their various trades and occupations. The benefit everyone receives from this protection is the enjoyment of life, equally dear to rich and poor. So a poor person owes the defenders of his life the same debt a rich person owes for his protection. There is one exception. The rich, who receive the services of the poor, may owe not only for themselves but for many others. Given this, equal taxation depends more on equal consumption than on the wealth of those who consume. Why should someone who works hard, saves the fruits of his work, and consumes little pay more in taxes? Why should he pay more than someone who lives idly, earns little, and spends everything he earns? The Commonwealth gives the first person no more protection than the second. But when taxes are imposed on the things people consume, everyone pays equally for what they use. Nor does the wasteful luxury of private individuals deprive the Commonwealth of its revenue.

And whereas many men, by accident unevitable, become unable to maintain themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the Charity of private persons; but to be provided for, (as far-forth as the necessities of Nature require,) by the Lawes of the Common-wealth. For as it is Uncharitablenesse in any man, to neglect the impotent; so it is in the Soveraign of a Common-wealth, to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain Charity.

Many people become unable to support themselves through work because of unavoidable misfortune. They should not be left to depend on private charity. Instead, the laws of the state should provide for them (as far as their basic needs require). For just as neglecting those unable to support themselves is uncharitable in any person, so is leaving them to uncertain charity uncharitable in the state's ruler.

But for such as have strong bodies, the case is otherwise: they are to be forced to work; and to avoyd the excuse of not finding employment, there ought to be such Lawes, as may encourage all manner of Arts; as Navigation, Agriculture, Fishing, and all manner of Manifacture that requires labour. The multitude of poor, and yet strong people still encreasing, they are to be transplanted into Countries not sufficiently inhabited: where neverthelesse, they are not to exterminate those they find there; but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not range a great deal of ground, to snatch what they find; but to court each little Plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance in due season. And when all the world is overchargd with Inhabitants, then the last remedy of all is Warre; which provideth for every man, by Victory, or Death.

But the case is different for people with strong bodies: they must be forced to work. To prevent the excuse that no work is available, laws should encourage all kinds of trades and skills. These include navigation, agriculture, fishing, and all kinds of manufacturing that require labor. As the number of poor but strong people continues to grow, they must be moved to countries with too few inhabitants. There, however, the newcomers must not exterminate the people they find. Instead, they must force the inhabitants to live closer together, rather than roaming over large areas, grabbing whatever they find. The inhabitants must instead cultivate each little plot with skill and labor, so it provides food in the proper season. And when the whole world is overcrowded, the last remedy of all is war. War provides for everyone, through victory or death.

To the care of the Soveraign, belongeth the making of Good Lawes. But what is a good Law? By a Good Law, I mean not a Just Law: for no Law can be Unjust. The Law is made by the Soveraign Power, and all that is done by such Power, is warranted, and owned by every one of the people; and that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust. It is in the Lawes of a Common-wealth, as in the Lawes of Gaming: whatsoever the Gamesters all agree on, is Injustice to none of them. A good Law is that, which is Needfull, for the Good Of The People, and withall Perspicuous.

The sovereign is responsible for making good laws. But what is a good law? By a good law, I do not mean a just law, because no law can be unjust. Laws are made by the sovereign power. Everything done by that power is authorized and accepted as their own act by every one of the people. And no one can call unjust what everyone wishes to be so. The laws of a commonwealth are like the rules of a game. Whatever all the players agree to is unjust to none of them. A good law is necessary for the good of the people and is also clear.

For the use of Lawes, (which are but Rules Authorised) is not to bind the People from all Voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashnesse, or indiscretion, as Hedges are set, not to stop Travellers, but to keep them in the way. And therefore a Law that is not Needfull, having not the true End of a Law, is not Good. A Law may be conceived to be Good, when it is for the benefit of the Soveraign; though it be not Necessary for the People; but it is not so. For the good of the Soveraign and People, cannot be separated. It is a weak Soveraign, that has weak Subjects; and a weak People, whose Soveraign wanteth Power to rule them at his will. Unnecessary Lawes are not good Lawes; but trapps for Mony: which where the right of Soveraign Power is acknowledged, are superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged, unsufficient to defend the People.

Laws are simply authorized rules. Their purpose is not to prevent people from taking any voluntary action, but to guide and restrain their actions. Laws keep people from harming themselves through their own uncontrolled desires, rashness, or poor judgment. Similarly, hedges are set up not to stop travelers, but to keep them on the road. So an unnecessary law is not a good law, because it does not serve the true purpose of law. A law may seem good when it benefits the sovereign, even though the people do not need it. But such a law is not good, because the good of the sovereign and the people cannot be separated. A sovereign whose subjects are weak is weak. And a people whose sovereign lacks the power to rule them as he wishes is weak. Unnecessary laws are not good laws, but traps for extracting money. Where the right of sovereign power is acknowledged, such traps are needless. Where that right is not acknowledged, such traps are not enough to defend the people.

The Perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the Law it selfe, as in a Declaration of the Causes, and Motives, for which it was made. That is it, that shewes us the meaning of the Legislator, and the meaning of the Legislator known, the Law is more easily understood by few, than many words. For all words, are subject to ambiguity; and therefore multiplication of words in the body of the Law, is multiplication of ambiguity: Besides it seems to imply, (by too much diligence,) that whosoever can evade the words, is without the compasse of the Law. And this is a cause of many unnecessary Processes. For when I consider how short were the Lawes of antient times; and how they grew by degrees still longer; me thinks I see a contention between the Penners, and Pleaders of the Law; the former seeking to circumscribe the later; and the later to evade their circumscriptions; and that the Pleaders have got the Victory. It belongeth therefore to the Office of a Legislator, (such as is in all Common-wealths the Supreme Representative, be it one Man, or an Assembly,) to make the reason Perspicuous, why the Law was made; and the Body of the Law it selfe, as short, but in as proper, and significant termes, as may be.

Clarity depends less on the words of the law itself than on an explanation of why the law was made. Such an explanation shows us the lawmaker’s intent. Once that intent is known, the law is easier to understand in fewer words than in many. For all words can be ambiguous, so multiplying words in the law multiplies ambiguity. Besides, excessive care with wording seems to imply that anyone who can evade the words falls outside the law’s scope. This implication causes many unnecessary lawsuits. For when I consider how short ancient laws were, and how they gradually grew longer, I seem to see a contest. The contest is between those who write laws and the lawyers who argue cases. The writers try to hem the lawyers in, and the lawyers try to evade those limits. And the lawyers have won. The lawmaker therefore has a duty to make clear why the law was made. In every commonwealth, the lawmaker is the supreme representative, whether one person or an assembly. The lawmaker must also keep the law itself as short as possible, using the most precise and meaningful terms possible.

It belongeth also to the Office of the Soveraign, to make a right application of Punishments, and Rewards. And seeing the end of punishing is not revenge, and discharge of choler; but correction, either of the offender, or of others by his example; the severest Punishments are to be inflicted for those Crimes, that are of most Danger to the Publique; such as are those which proceed from malice to the Government established; those that spring from contempt of Justice; those that provoke Indignation in the Multitude; and those, which unpunished, seem Authorised, as when they are committed by Sonnes, Servants, or Favorites of men in Authority: For Indignation carrieth men, not onely against the Actors, and Authors of Injustice; but against all Power that is likely to protect them; as in the case of Tarquin; when for the Insolent act of one of his Sonnes, he was driven out of Rome, and the Monarchy it selfe dissolved. But Crimes of Infirmity; such as are those which proceed from great provocation, from great fear, great need, or from ignorance whether the Fact be a great Crime, or not, there is place many times for Lenity, without prejudice to the Common-wealth; and Lenity when there is such place for it, is required by the Law of Nature. The Punishment of the Leaders, and teachers in a Commotion; not the poore seduced People, when they are punished, can profit the Common-wealth by their example. To be severe to the People, is to punish that ignorance, which may in great part be imputed to the Soveraign, whose fault it was, they were no better instructed.

The sovereign’s duties also include properly applying punishments and rewards. Punishment aims not at revenge or venting anger, but at correcting offenders or others through their example. So the severest punishments should apply to crimes that pose the greatest danger to the public. These include crimes driven by hostility toward the established government or contempt for justice. They also include crimes that stir public outrage, and crimes that seem officially approved if left unpunished. This can happen when crimes are committed by the sons, servants, or favorites of those in authority. For outrage turns people not only against those who commit or instigate injustice. It also turns people against all power likely to protect those responsible. This happened to Tarquin. Because of an outrageous act by one of his sons, Tarquin was driven out of Rome, and the monarchy itself ended. But crimes arising from human weakness often allow room for mercy without harming the commonwealth. Such crimes may result from extreme provocation, great fear, desperate need, or ignorance about whether the act is a serious crime. When there is room for mercy, the law of nature requires mercy. In an uprising, punishing the leaders and teachers can benefit the commonwealth by setting an example. Punishing the poor, misled people cannot. Treating the people harshly means punishing ignorance that may largely be blamed on the sovereign. For the sovereign was at fault for not ensuring that the people were better instructed.

In like manner it belongeth to the Office, and Duty of the Soveraign, to apply his Rewards alwayes so, as there may arise from them benefit to the Common-wealth: wherein consisteth their Use, and End; and is then done, when they that have well served the Common-wealth, are with as little expence of the Common Treasure, as is possible, so well recompenced, as others thereby may be encouraged, both to serve the same as faithfully as they can, and to study the arts by which they may be enabled to do it better. To buy with Mony, or Preferment, from a Popular ambitious Subject, to be quiet, and desist from making ill impressions in the mindes of the People, has nothing of the nature of Reward; (which is ordained not for disservice, but for service past;) nor a signe of Gratitude, but of Fear: nor does it tend to the Benefit, but to the Dammage of the Publique. It is a contention with Ambition, like that of Hercules with the Monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every one that was vanquished, there grew up three. For in like manner, when the stubbornnesse of one Popular man, is overcome with Reward, there arise many more (by the Example) that do the same Mischiefe, in hope of like Benefit: and as all sorts of Manifacture, so also Malice encreaseth by being vendible. And though sometimes a Civill warre, may be differred, by such wayes as that, yet the danger growes still the greater, and the Publique ruine more assured. It is therefore against the Duty of the Soveraign, to whom the Publique Safety is committed, to Reward those that aspire to greatnesse by disturbing the Peace of their Country, and not rather to oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little danger, than after a longer time with greater.

Likewise, the sovereign’s role and duty include giving rewards in ways that benefit the commonwealth. Such benefit is the purpose of rewards. The sovereign fulfills this purpose by adequately rewarding those who have served the commonwealth well, at the lowest possible public expense. These rewards should encourage others to serve the commonwealth as faithfully as they can. They should also encourage others to learn the skills needed to serve it better. Paying a popular, ambitious subject with money or promotion to keep quiet and stop turning people against the government is no reward. Rewards are meant for past service, not harm done. Nor is such payment a sign of gratitude, but of fear. It harms the public rather than benefiting it. This struggle against ambition resembles the struggle of Hercules against the monster Hydra. The Hydra had many heads, and for every head defeated, three more grew. Likewise, when rewards overcome one popular man’s defiance, his example encourages many more to cause the same trouble. They hope to gain the same benefits. Like all kinds of manufactured goods, malice increases when it can be sold. Although such methods may sometimes delay a civil war, the danger keeps growing, and public ruin becomes more certain. The sovereign is entrusted with public safety. Rewarding those who seek greatness by disturbing their country’s peace therefore violates the sovereign’s duty. Instead, the sovereign should oppose such men when they first begin, at some small risk, rather than later, at greater risk.

Another Businesse of the Soveraign, is to choose good Counsellours; I mean such, whose advice he is to take in the Government of the Common-wealth. For this word Counsell, Consilium, corrupted from Considium, is a large signification, and comprehendeth all Assemblies of men that sit together, not onely to deliberate what is to be done hereafter, but also to judge of Facts past, and of Law for the present. I take it here in the first sense onely: And in this sense, there is no choyce of Counsell, neither in a Democracy, nor Aristocracy; because the persons Counselling are members of the person Counselled. The choyce of Counsellours therefore is to Monarchy; In which, the Soveraign that endeavoureth not to make choyce of those, that in every kind are the most able, dischargeth not his Office as he ought to do. The most able Counsellours, are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evill Counsell, and most knowledge of those things that conduce to the Peace, and Defence of the Common-wealth. It is a hard matter to know who expecteth benefit from publique troubles; but the signes that guide to a just suspicion, is the soothing of the people in their unreasonable, or irremediable grievances, by men whose estates are not sufficient to discharge their accustomed expences, and may easily be observed by any one whom it concerns to know it. But to know, who has most knowledge of the Publique affaires, is yet harder; and they that know them, need them a great deale the lesse. For to know, who knowes the Rules almost of any Art, is a great degree of the knowledge of the same Art; because no man can be assured of the truth of anothers Rules, but he that is first taught to understand them. But the best signes of Knowledge of any Art, are, much conversing in it, and constant good effects of it. Good Counsell comes not by Lot, nor by Inheritance; and therefore there is no more reason to expect good Advice from the rich, or noble, in matter of State, than in delineating the dimensions of a fortresse; unlesse we shall think there needs no method in the study of the Politiques, (as there does in the study of Geometry,) but onely to be lookers on; which is not so. For the Politiques is the harder study of the two. Whereas in these parts of Europe, it hath been taken for a Right of certain persons, to have place in the highest Councell of State by Inheritance; it is derived from the Conquests of the antient Germans; wherein many absolute Lords joyning together to conquer other Nations, would not enter in to the Confederacy, without such Priviledges, as might be marks of difference in time following, between their Posterity, and the posterity of their Subjects; which Priviledges being inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, by the favour of the Soveraign, they may seem to keep; but contending for them as their Right, they must needs by degrees let them go, and have at last no further honour, than adhaereth naturally to their abilities.

Another duty of the sovereign is to choose good advisers. I mean advisers whose guidance he will take in governing the commonwealth. For the word “counsel,” Consilium, a corrupted form of Considium, has a broad meaning. It includes all assemblies of people who sit together, not only to discuss what should be done in the future. Such assemblies also judge past events and present questions of law. Here I use the word only in the first sense. In this sense, neither a democracy nor an aristocracy chooses its advisers. This is because the advisers are themselves members of the governing body they advise. Choosing advisers therefore belongs to monarchy. A monarch fails in his duty unless he tries to choose the most capable advisers in every field. The most capable advisers have the least hope of benefiting from bad advice. They also know most about what promotes the commonwealth’s peace and defence. It is hard to know who expects to benefit from public unrest. But certain signs justify suspicion. These include pandering to people’s unreasonable grievances, or grievances that cannot be remedied, by men living beyond their means. Anyone who needs to know can easily observe these signs. But identifying those who know most about public affairs is even harder. And those who can recognize such knowledgeable advisers need their advice much less. For recognizing who knows the rules of almost any skill requires considerable knowledge of that skill. No one can be certain that another person’s rules are correct without first learning to understand them. But the best signs of knowledge in any skill are extensive practice and consistently good results. Good advice does not come by chance or inheritance. So there is no more reason to expect good advice from the rich or noble about affairs of state than about drawing up a fortress’s dimensions. We could expect otherwise only if politics required no systematic study, as geometry does, but merely observation. Yet that is not so. For politics is the harder of the two subjects. In these parts of Europe, certain people have been considered entitled to seats on the highest council of state by inheritance. This claim comes from the conquests of the ancient Germans. Many independent lords joined together to conquer other nations. These lords would not join the alliance without privileges distinguishing their descendants from the descendants of their subjects. Such privileges are incompatible with sovereign power. Through the sovereign’s favour, these lords’ descendants may appear to retain those privileges. But if they insist on the privileges as a right, they must inevitably lose them by degrees. In the end, they will have no honour beyond what their abilities naturally earn them.

And how able soever be the Counsellours in any affaire, the benefit of their Counsell is greater, when they give every one his Advice, and reasons of it apart, than when they do it in an Assembly, by way of Orations; and when they have praemeditated, than when they speak on the sudden; both because they have more time, to survey the consequences of action; and are lesse subject to be carried away to contradiction, through Envy, Emulation, or other Passions arising from the difference of opinion.

However capable advisers are in any matter, their advice is more useful when each gives advice and reasons separately. This is better than giving speeches in an assembly. Their advice is also more useful when prepared beforehand than when given on the spot. Both approaches give advisers more time to consider the consequences of action. Both also make advisers less likely to be drawn into disagreement by envy, rivalry, or other passions arising from differences of opinion.

The best Counsell, in those things that concern not other Nations, but onely the ease, and benefit the Subjects may enjoy, by Lawes that look onely inward, is to be taken from the generall informations, and complaints of the people of each Province, who are best acquainted with their own wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing in derogation of the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty, to be diligently taken notice of. For without those Essentiall Rights, (as I have often before said,) the Common-wealth cannot at all subsist.

Some matters do not concern other nations, but only the comfort and benefits subjects may enjoy under domestic laws. On these matters, the best advice comes from the general reports and complaints of the people in each province. These people know their own needs best. Their concerns should therefore receive careful attention, provided their demands do not undermine the essential rights of sovereignty. For without these essential rights, as I have often said before, the commonwealth cannot exist at all.

A Commander of an Army in chiefe, if he be not Popular, shall not be beloved, nor feared as he ought to be by his Army; and consequently cannot performe that office with good successe. He must therefore be Industrious, Valiant, Affable, Liberall and Fortunate, that he may gain an opinion both of sufficiency, and of loving his Souldiers. This is Popularity, and breeds in the Souldiers both desire, and courage, to recommend themselves to his favour; and protects the severity of the Generall, in punishing (when need is) the Mutinous, or negligent Souldiers. But this love of Souldiers, (if caution be not given of the Commanders fidelity,) is a dangerous thing to Soveraign Power; especially when it is in the hands of an Assembly not popular. It belongeth therefore to the safety of the People, both that they be good Conductors, and faithfull subjects, to whom the Soveraign Commits his Armies.

An army’s commander-in-chief, if he is not popular, will neither be loved nor feared by his soldiers as he should be. As a result, he cannot carry out his duties successfully. He must therefore be hardworking, brave, friendly, generous, and fortunate. These qualities will earn him a reputation for both competence and love for his soldiers. This is popularity. It gives soldiers both the desire and the courage to earn his favor. It also supports the general’s harshness when he needs to punish mutinous or negligent soldiers. But the soldiers’ love is dangerous to the sovereign power unless safeguards ensure the commander’s loyalty. The danger is especially great when sovereign power belongs to an assembly that is not popular. Public safety therefore requires that those entrusted with the sovereign’s armies be both capable commanders and loyal subjects.

But when the Soveraign himselfe is Popular, that is, reverenced and beloved of his People, there is no danger at all from the Popularity of a Subject. For Souldiers are never so generally unjust, as to side with their Captain; though they love him, against their Soveraign, when they love not onely his Person, but also his Cause. And therefore those, who by violence have at any time suppressed the Power of their Lawfull Soveraign, before they could settle themselves in his place, have been alwayes put to the trouble of contriving their Titles, to save the People from the shame of receiving them. To have a known Right to Soveraign Power, is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no more, for his own part, to turn the hearts of his Subjects to him, but that they see him able absolutely to govern his own Family: Nor, on the part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their Armies. For the greatest and most active part of Mankind, has never hetherto been well contented with the present.

But when the sovereign himself is popular, meaning respected and loved by his people, a subject’s popularity poses no danger at all. For soldiers as a whole are never unjust enough to support their captain against their sovereign, though they love their captain. This holds when they love not only the sovereign himself but also his cause. Therefore, those who have violently overthrown their lawful sovereign have always had to invent claims to his authority. Before they could establish themselves in his place, they needed these claims to spare the people the shame of accepting them. A recognized right to sovereign power wins such popular support that its holder needs little else to win his subjects’ hearts. On his own side, he need only show that he can exercise complete control over his own household. On his enemies’ side, nothing more is needed than the disbanding of their armies. For the largest and most active part of humanity has never yet been content with the present state of affairs.

Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, which are comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations, I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every Soveraign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body. And the same Law, that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the same to Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences of Soveraign Princes, and Soveraign Assemblies; there being no Court of Naturall Justice, but in the Conscience onely; where not Man, but God raigneth; whose Lawes, (such of them as oblige all Mankind,) in respect of God, as he is the Author of Nature, are Naturall; and in respect of the same God, as he is King of Kings, are Lawes. But of the Kingdome of God, as King of Kings, and as King also of a peculiar People, I shall speak in the rest of this discourse.

I need not discuss here the duties one sovereign owes another, covered by what is commonly called the Law of Nations. This is because the Law of Nations and the Law of Nature are the same thing. Every sovereign has the same right to secure the safety of his people as any individual has to protect his own body. The same law tells people without civil government what to do and avoid in their dealings with one another. That law gives the same guidance to commonwealths, meaning the consciences of sovereign rulers and sovereign assemblies. For there is no court of natural justice except within the conscience, where God, not man, rules. God’s laws that bind all humanity are natural because God is the author of nature. Those same laws are laws because God is the King of Kings. But in the rest of this work, I shall discuss the Kingdom of God. I shall consider God both as King of Kings and as king of a particular people.