The Freedom of Subjects

Liberty, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion;) and may be applyed no lesse to Irrational, and Inanimate creatures, than to Rationall. For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move, but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilest they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or chayns; and of the water whilest it is kept in by banks, or vessels, that otherwise would spread it selfe into a larger space, we use to say, they are not at Liberty, to move in such manner, as without those externall impediments they would. But when the impediment of motion, is in the constitution of the thing it selfe, we use not to say, it wants the Liberty; but the Power to move; as when a stone lyeth still, or a man is fastned to his bed by sicknesse.

Liberty, or freedom, properly means the absence of opposition. (By opposition, I mean external obstacles to movement.) The term applies just as much to irrational beings and lifeless things as to rational beings. Anything tied up or enclosed can move only within a certain space, limited by some external object. We say such a thing has no liberty to go farther. So we say that all living creatures imprisoned or restrained by walls or chains are not free to move. We say the same of water held in by banks or containers, which would otherwise spread over a larger area. Neither the creatures nor the water are free to move as they would without those external obstacles. But when an obstacle to movement lies in the thing’s own nature or condition, we do not say it lacks liberty. Instead, we say it lacks the power to move, as when a stone lies still or sickness confines someone to bed.

And according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the word, A FREE-MAN, is “he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will to.” But when the words Free, and Liberty, are applyed to any thing but Bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to Motion, is not subject to Impediment: And therefore, when ’tis said (for example) The way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop. And when we say a Guift is free, there is not meant any liberty of the Guift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any law, or Covenant to give it. So when we Speak Freely, it is not the liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise then he did. Lastly, from the use of the word Freewill, no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe.

According to the proper and generally accepted meaning of the word, a FREE MAN is “someone who faces no obstacles to doing what he wants, within the limits of his strength and intelligence.” But the words Free and Liberty are misused when applied to anything other than physical bodies. For whatever cannot move cannot have its movement blocked. So when we say, for example, that a path is free, we do not mean the path has liberty. We mean that people can walk along the path without being stopped. And when we say a gift is free, we do not mean the gift has liberty. We mean the giver was not bound by any law or agreement to give the gift. Likewise, when we speak freely, the freedom belongs not to the voice or its sounds, but to the speaker. No law required the speaker to speak differently. Finally, using the word Freewill does not imply that the will, desire, or inclination has liberty. The liberty belongs to the person. That liberty consists in facing no obstacles to doing what he wills, desires, or feels inclined to do.

Feare and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into the Sea for Feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse very willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will: It is therefore the action, of one that was Free; so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for Feare of Imprisonment, which because no body hindred him from detaining, was the action of a man at Liberty. And generally all actions which men doe in Common-wealths, for Feare of the law, or actions, which the doers had Liberty to omit.

Fear and freedom are compatible. For example, a man throws his goods into the sea because he fears the ship will sink. Even so, he acts very willingly and may refuse if he chooses. His action is therefore the action of a free man. Similarly, a man sometimes pays his debt only because he fears imprisonment. Because no one prevented him from keeping the money, paying was the action of a free man. In general, all actions people take in states out of fear of the law are actions they were free to omit.

Liberty and Necessity are Consistent: As in the water, that hath not only Liberty, but a Necessity of descending by the Channel: so likewise in the Actions which men voluntarily doe; which (because they proceed from their will) proceed from Liberty; and yet because every act of mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, which causes in a continuall chaine (whose first link in the hand of God the first of all causes) proceed from Necessity. So that to him that could see the connexion of those causes, the Necessity of all mens voluntary actions, would appeare manifest. And therefore God, that seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth also that the Liberty of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the Necessity of doing that which God will, & no more, nor lesse. For though men may do many things, which God does not command, nor is therefore Author of them; yet they can have no passion, nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods will is not the cause. And did not his will assure the Necessity of mans will, and consequently of all that on mans will dependeth, the Liberty of men would be a contradiction, and impediment to the omnipotence and Liberty of God. And this shall suffice, (as to the matter in hand) of that naturall Liberty, which only is properly called Liberty.

Liberty and Necessity Are Compatible: Water is not only free to flow down a channel but must necessarily do so. The same is true of the actions people perform voluntarily. Because these actions come from their will, they come from liberty. Yet every act of human will, every desire, and every inclination comes from some cause. These causes form an unbroken chain, whose first link is in the hand of God, the first of all causes. Because of this chain of causes, voluntary actions also follow from necessity. So anyone who could see how these causes connect would clearly see the necessity of all voluntary human actions. God sees and governs all things. Therefore, he also sees that human freedom to do what people will goes together with necessity. People necessarily do what God wills, no more and no less. For although people may do many things God does not command, God is not therefore the author of those actions. Yet people can have no passion or desire for anything unless God's will is the cause of that desire. If God's will did not make human will necessary, it would not make everything depending on human will necessary either. Human liberty would then contradict and obstruct God's unlimited power and liberty. This is enough, for the subject at hand, about natural liberty, the only liberty properly called liberty.

But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so also have they made Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes, which they themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the other end to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature but weak, may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.

But just as people have created an artificial man called a Commonwealth to achieve peace and preserve themselves through peace, they have also created artificial chains called civil laws. By mutual agreements, people have fastened one end of these chains to the lips of the sovereign man or assembly. They have fastened the other end to their own ears. These bonds are weak by nature. Nevertheless, the danger of breaking them may make them hold, though breaking them is not difficult.

In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the Liberty of Subjects. For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world, for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being a thing impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of actions, by the laws praetermitted, men have the Liberty, of doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves. For if wee take Liberty in the proper sense, for corporall Liberty; that is to say, freedome from chains, and prison, it were very absurd for men to clamor as they doe, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Againe, if we take Liberty, for an exemption from Lawes, it is no lesse absurd, for men to demand as they doe, that Liberty, by which all other men may be masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they demand; not knowing that the Lawes are of no power to protect them, without a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution. The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath praetermitted; such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; & the like.

I will now discuss the liberty of subjects only in relation to these bonds. No commonwealth in the world regulates all human actions and words, because doing so is impossible. It necessarily follows that people are free to act wherever the laws say nothing. In such matters, people may do whatever their own reason suggests will benefit them most. If we take liberty in its proper sense, as bodily freedom, we mean freedom from chains and prison. Then people are being very absurd when they clamor, as they do, for the liberty they so clearly enjoy. Again, if we take liberty to mean exemption from laws, demanding such liberty is no less absurd. Such freedom would allow everyone else to become masters of their lives. Yet, absurd as this demand is, people make it nonetheless. They do not understand that laws have no power to protect them without force to enforce those laws. That force must be in the hands of one person or several people. A subject’s liberty therefore lies only in matters the sovereign has left unregulated. These include the freedom to buy, sell, and make other contracts with one another. Subjects may choose where to live, what to eat, and how to earn their living. They may also educate their children as they think fit, and enjoy similar freedoms.

Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the Soveraign Power of life, and death, is either abolished, or limited. For it has been already shewn, that nothing the Soveraign Representative can doe to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called Injustice, or Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth; so that he never wanteth Right to any thing, otherwise, than as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the laws of Nature. And therefore it may, and doth often happen in Common-wealths, that a Subject may be put to death, by the command of the Soveraign Power; and yet neither doe the other wrong: as when Jeptha caused his daughter to be sacrificed: In which, and the like cases, he that so dieth, had Liberty to doe the action, for which he is neverthelesse, without Injury put to death. And the same holdeth also in a Soveraign Prince, that putteth to death an Innocent Subject. For though the action be against the law of Nature, as being contrary to Equitie, (as was the killing of Uriah, by David;) yet it was not an Injurie to Uriah; but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to doe what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself; And yet to God, because David was Gods Subject; and prohibited all Iniquitie by the law of Nature. Which distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact, evidently confirmed, saying, “To thee only have I sinned.” In the same manner, the people of Athens, when they banished the most potent of their Common-wealth for ten years, thought they committed no Injustice; and yet they never questioned what crime he had done; but what hurt he would doe: Nay they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom; and every Citizen bringing his Oystershell into the market place, written with the name of him he desired should be banished, without actuall accusing him, sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of Justice; And sometimes a scurrilous Jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a Jest of it. And yet a man cannot say, the Soveraign People of Athens wanted right to banish them; or an Athenian the Libertie to Jest, or to be Just.

Nevertheless, we should not understand this liberty as abolishing or limiting the sovereign’s power over life and death. For, as already shown, nothing the sovereign representative does to a subject can properly be called injustice or injury. This holds whatever reason the sovereign gives, because every subject authorizes every act the sovereign performs. So the sovereign never lacks the right to do anything, except as a subject of God. As God’s subject, the sovereign is bound to obey the laws of nature. Therefore, a subject may be put to death by the sovereign’s command, yet neither wrongs the other. This can happen, and often does happen, in commonwealths. One example is when Jeptha had his daughter sacrificed. In such cases, the person who dies was free to perform the action for which they are nevertheless executed without injustice. The same holds when a sovereign prince puts an innocent subject to death. The act violates the law of nature because it goes against fairness, as David’s killing of Uriah did. Yet the wrong was not against Uriah, but against God. It was not against Uriah because Uriah himself had given David the right to do whatever David pleased. But it was against God because David was God’s subject, and the law of nature forbade him all wrongdoing. David himself clearly confirmed this distinction when he repented of the act, saying, “Against you alone have I sinned.” Similarly, the people of Athens thought they committed no injustice when they banished their commonwealth’s most powerful citizens for ten years. Yet they never asked what crime a person had committed, but what harm that person would do. Indeed, they ordered a banishment without knowing whom they would banish. Each citizen brought an oyster shell to the marketplace, bearing the name of the person they wanted banished. No actual accusation was made against that person. Sometimes they banished an Aristides because of his reputation for justice. Sometimes they banished a crude jester like Hyperbolus, to make a joke of the banishment. Yet no one can say that the sovereign people of Athens lacked the right to banish these men. Nor can anyone say that an Athenian lacked the liberty to joke or to be just.

The Libertie, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable mention, in the Histories, and Philosophy of the Antient Greeks, and Romans, and in the writings, and discourse of those that from them have received all their learning in the Politiques, is not the Libertie of Particular men; but the Libertie of the Common-wealth: which is the same with that, which every man then should have, if there were no Civil Laws, nor Common-wealth at all. And the effects of it also be the same. For as amongst masterlesse men, there is perpetuall war, of every man against his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to the Son, nor to expect from the Father; no propriety of Goods, or Lands; no security; but a full and absolute Libertie in every Particular man: So in States, and Common-wealths not dependent on one another, every Common-wealth, (not every man) has an absolute Libertie, to doe what it shall judge (that is to say, what that Man, or Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing to their benefit. But withall, they live in the condition of a perpetuall war, and upon the confines of battel, with their frontiers armed, and canons planted against their neighbours round about. The Athenians, and Romanes, were free; that is, free Common-wealths: not that any particular men had the Libertie to resist their own Representative; but that their Representative had the Libertie to resist, or invade other people. There is written on the Turrets of the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence inferre, that a particular man has more Libertie, or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth there, than in Constantinople. Whether a Common-wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the Freedome is still the same.

The ancient Greeks and Romans often praised liberty in their histories and philosophy. So do writers and speakers who learned all their politics from the Greeks and Romans. But this liberty belongs not to individuals, but to the commonwealth. It is the same liberty every person would have if there were no civil laws and no commonwealth. Its effects are also the same. People who have no ruler live in constant war, each against their neighbor. They have no inheritance to pass to a son or expect from a father. They have no ownership of goods or land, and no security. But every individual has full and absolute liberty. Likewise, among states and commonwealths independent of one another, every commonwealth, not every individual, has absolute liberty. Each commonwealth may do whatever it judges will best serve its interests. That judgment belongs to the man or assembly representing the commonwealth. But these commonwealths also live in a state of constant war, always on the brink of battle. Their borders are armed, and their cannons point at their neighbors on every side. The Athenians and Romans were free, meaning that their commonwealths were free. This did not mean that individuals had the liberty to resist their own representative. It meant that their representative had the liberty to resist or invade other peoples. To this day, the word LIBERTAS appears in large letters on the towers of the city of Luca. Yet no one can conclude from that inscription that an individual has more liberty there than in Constantinople. Nor can anyone conclude that individuals in Luca are more exempt from service to the commonwealth. Whether a commonwealth is ruled by a monarch or by the people, its freedom remains the same.

But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name of Libertie; and for want of Judgement to distinguish, mistake that for their Private Inheritance, and Birth right, which is the right of the Publique only. And when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of men in reputation for their writings in this subject, it is no wonder if it produce sedition, and change of Government. In these westerne parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning the Institution, and Rights of Common-wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and other men, Greeks and Romanes, that living under Popular States, derived those Rights, not from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them into their books, out of the Practice of their own Common-wealths, which were Popular; as the Grammarians describe the Rules of Language, out of the Practise of the time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the Poems of Homer and Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught, (to keep them from desire of changing their Government,) that they were Freemen, and all that lived under Monarchy were slaves; therefore Aristotle puts it down in his Politiques,(lib.6.cap.2) “In democracy, Liberty is to be supposed: for ’tis commonly held, that no man is Free in any other Government.” And as Aristotle; so Cicero, and other Writers have grounded their Civill doctrine, on the opinions of the Romans, who were taught to hate Monarchy, at first, by them that having deposed their Soveraign, shared amongst them the Soveraignty of Rome; and afterwards by their Successors. And by reading of these Greek, and Latine Authors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit (under a false shew of Liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions of their Soveraigns; and again of controlling those controllers, with the effusion of so much blood; as I think I may truly say, there was never any thing so deerly bought, as these Western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and Latine tongues.

But people are easily deceived by the appealing name of liberty. Without the judgment to tell the difference, they mistake the public’s rights for their own personal inheritance and birthright. When respected writers on this subject reinforce the same error, no wonder it leads to rebellion and changes of government. In these western parts of the world, we are taught to take our views on states’ foundations and rights from ancient writers. These include Aristotle, Cicero, and other Greeks and Romans who lived under popular governments. These writers derived those rights not from the principles of nature, but from the practices of their own popular governments. They copied those practices into their books. In the same way, grammarians describe language rules from current usage, or poetry rules from Homer’s and Virgil’s poems. The Athenians were taught that they were free men, while all who lived under monarchy were slaves. They were taught this to keep them from wanting to change their government. Because of this teaching, Aristotle writes in his Politics (book 6, chapter 2): “Democracy is assumed to mean liberty. For it is commonly held that no one is free under any other government.” Like Aristotle, Cicero and other writers based their political teachings on the opinions of the Romans. The Romans were taught to hate monarchy, first by those who overthrew their sovereign and divided Rome’s sovereign power among themselves. Later, their successors continued that teaching. By reading these Greek and Latin authors, people have developed certain habits from childhood, under a false appearance of liberty. They have learned to favor unrest and to place lawless restraints on their sovereigns’ actions. Then they turn against those who imposed those restraints, spilling so much blood in the process. I think I may truly say that nothing has ever cost so much as learning Greek and Latin has cost these western lands.

To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject; that is to say, what are the things, which though commanded by the Soveraign, he may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider, what Rights we passe away, when we make a Common-wealth; or (which is all one,) what Liberty we deny our selves, by owning all the Actions (without exception) of the Man, or Assembly we make our Soveraign. For in the act of our Submission, consisteth both our Obligation, and our Liberty; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from thence; there being no Obligation on any man, which ariseth not from some Act of his own; for all men equally, are by Nature Free. And because such arguments, must either be drawn from the expresse words, “I Authorise all his Actions,” or from the Intention of him that submitteth himselfe to his Power, (which Intention is to be understood by the End for which he so submitteth;) The Obligation, and Liberty of the Subject, is to be derived, either from those Words, (or others equivalent;) or else from the End of the Institution of Soveraignty; namely, the Peace of the Subjects within themselves, and their Defence against a common Enemy.

Let us now consider the details of a subject’s true liberty. What may a subject refuse to do without injustice, even when the sovereign commands it? To answer, we must consider what rights we give up when we establish a commonwealth. Or, to put the same question another way, what freedom do we deny ourselves by accepting responsibility for the sovereign’s actions? We accept responsibility for all actions, without exception, of the man or assembly we make our sovereign. Both our obligation and our liberty lie in our act of submission. We must therefore establish both by reasoning from that act. No one has any obligation that does not arise from some act of their own. For all people are equally free by nature. Such reasoning must begin either with the explicit words, “I authorize all his actions,” or with the intention of the person submitting to the sovereign’s power. That intention must be understood through the purpose for which the person submits. The subject’s obligation and liberty must therefore follow either from those words (or equivalent words), or from the purpose of establishing sovereignty. That purpose is peace among the subjects and their defense against a common enemy.

First therefore, seeing Soveraignty by Institution, is by Covenant of every one to every one; and Soveraignty by Acquisition, by Covenants of the Vanquished to the Victor, or Child to the Parent; It is manifest, that every Subject has Liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred. I have shewn before in the 14. Chapter, that Covenants, not to defend a mans own body, are voyd. Therefore,

First, sovereignty by institution rests on a covenant between every person and every other person. Sovereignty by acquisition rests on covenants made by the defeated with the victor, or by children with their parents. So every subject clearly has freedom in all matters where the right cannot be transferred by covenant. As I showed earlier in Chapter 14, covenants not to defend one's own body are invalid. Therefore,

If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill, wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.

If the sovereign orders a man to kill, wound, or maim himself, the man is free to disobey. This is true even if the man has been justly condemned. He is also free to disobey an order not to resist those who attack him. The same applies to orders to go without food, air, medicine, or anything else he needs to stay alive.

If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign, or his Authority, concerning a crime done by himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon) to confesse it; because no man (as I have shewn in the same Chapter) can be obliged by Covenant to accuse himselfe.

If a man is questioned by the sovereign or the sovereign’s representatives about a crime he has committed, he need not confess unless assured of a pardon. This is because no one can be bound by an agreement to accuse himself. As I have shown in the same chapter, no agreement can impose that obligation.

Again, the Consent of a Subject to Soveraign Power, is contained in these words, “I Authorise, or take upon me, all his actions;” in which there is no restriction at all, of his own former naturall Liberty: For by allowing him to Kill Me, I am not bound to Kill my selfe when he commands me. “’Tis one thing to say ‘Kill me, or my fellow, if you please;’ another thing to say, ‘I will kill my selfe, or my fellow.’” It followeth therefore, that

Again, a subject’s consent to sovereign power is contained in these words: “I authorize, or accept responsibility for, all his actions.” These words place no restriction at all on the subject’s previous natural liberty. For allowing the sovereign to kill me does not bind me to kill myself when he commands me. “It is one thing to say, ‘Kill me, or my fellow subject, if you please.’ It is another to say, ‘I will kill myself, or my fellow subject.’” It therefore follows that

No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe, or any other man; And consequently, that the Obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the Command of the Soveraign to execute any dangerous, or dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the Words of our Submission; but on the Intention; which is to be understood by the End thereof. When therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise there is.

The words themselves do not bind anyone to kill himself or anyone else. A person may sometimes be obliged to perform a dangerous or dishonorable duty at the sovereign’s command. But that obligation therefore depends not on the words of our submission, but on the intention behind our submission. That intention must be understood through the purpose of our submission. So, if our refusal to obey defeats the purpose for which sovereign power was established, we have no freedom to refuse. Otherwise, we do.

Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight against the enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his refusall with death, may neverthelesse in many cases refuse, without Injustice; as when he substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place: for in this case he deserteth not the service of the Common-wealth. And there is allowance to be made for naturall timorousnesse, not onely to women, (of whom no such dangerous duty is expected,) but also to men of feminine courage. When Armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of trechery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoyd battell, is not Injustice, but Cowardise. But he that inrowleth himselfe a Souldier, or taketh imprest mony, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature; and is obliged, not onely to go to the battell, but also not to run from it, without his Captaines leave. And when the Defence of the Common-wealth, requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear Arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the Institution of the Common-wealth, which they have not the purpose, or courage to preserve, was in vain.

On this basis, a man ordered to fight the enemy as a soldier may, in many cases, refuse without injustice. This is true even though his sovereign has every right to punish his refusal with death. For example, he may provide a capable soldier to take his place. In that case, he does not abandon his service to the commonwealth. Allowances must also be made for natural fearfulness. This applies not only to women, who are not expected to undertake such dangerous duties, but also to men with womanly courage. When armies fight, soldiers on one or both sides run away. Yet if they flee from fear rather than treachery, their conduct is considered dishonourable, not unjust. For the same reason, avoiding battle is not injustice but cowardice. But a man who enlists as a soldier or accepts enlistment money gives up the excuse of natural fearfulness. He is obliged not only to enter battle but also not to flee without his captain’s permission. And when defending the commonwealth requires the help of everyone able to bear arms at once, everyone is obliged to serve. Otherwise, the commonwealth was established in vain, since its members lack the resolve or courage to preserve it.

To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of another man, guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such Liberty, takes away from the Soveraign, the means of Protecting us; and is therefore destructive of the very essence of Government. But in case a great many men together, have already resisted the Soveraign Power Unjustly, or committed some Capitall crime, for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the Liberty then to joyn together, and assist, and defend one another? Certainly they have: For they but defend their lives, which the guilty man may as well do, as the Innocent. There was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; Their bearing of Arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act. And if it be onely to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all. But the offer of Pardon taketh from them, to whom it is offered, the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting, or defending the rest, unlawfull.

No one has the right to resist the armed force of the commonwealth to defend another person, guilty or innocent. Such a right would take away the sovereign’s means of protecting us. It would therefore destroy the very foundation of government. But suppose many people together have already unjustly resisted the sovereign power or committed a crime punishable by death. Suppose each of them expects to die for it. Do they then have the right to join together and help and defend one another? Certainly they do. They are only defending their lives, which guilty people may do just as innocent people may. Their first breach of duty was indeed unjust. But taking up arms afterward is no new act of injustice, even if they aim to uphold what they have done. And if they take up arms only to defend themselves, doing so is not unjust at all. But an offer of pardon removes the claim of self-defense from those who receive the offer. It becomes unlawful for them to continue helping or defending the others.

As for other Lyberties, they depend on the silence of the Law. In cases where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the Subject hath the liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion. And therefore such Liberty is in some places more, and in some lesse; and in some times more, in other times lesse, according as they that have the Soveraignty shall think most convenient. As for Example, there was a time, when in England a man might enter in to his own Land, (and dispossesse such as wrongfully possessed it) by force. But in after-times, that Liberty of Forcible entry, was taken away by a Statute made (by the King) in Parliament. And is some places of the world, men have the Liberty of many wives: in other places, such Liberty is not allowed.

Other freedoms depend on what the law leaves unregulated. Where the sovereign has set no rule, subjects are free to act or refrain from acting as they see fit. So these freedoms are greater in some places and smaller in others, and greater at some times than at others. The extent of these freedoms depends on what those holding sovereign power think most convenient. For example, there was a time when a man in England could enter his own land by force. He could also forcibly remove anyone who wrongfully occupied it. But later, this freedom of forcible entry was taken away by a law made by the King in Parliament. And in some parts of the world, men are free to have several wives. In other places, this freedom is not allowed.

If a Subject have a controversie with his Soveraigne, of Debt, or of right of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service required at his hands, or concerning any penalty corporall, or pecuniary, grounded on a precedent Law; He hath the same Liberty to sue for his right, as if it were against a Subject; and before such Judges, as are appointed by the Soveraign. For seeing the Soveraign demandeth by force of a former Law, and not by vertue of his Power; he declareth thereby, that he requireth no more, than shall appear to be due by that Law. The sute therefore is not contrary to the will of the Soveraign; and consequently the Subject hath the Liberty to demand the hearing of his Cause; and sentence, according to that Law. But if he demand, or take any thing by pretence of his Power; there lyeth, in that case, no action of Law: for all that is done by him in Vertue of his Power, is done by the Authority of every subject, and consequently, he that brings an action against the Soveraign, brings it against himselfe.

If a subject has a dispute with his sovereign, the dispute may concern a debt or ownership of land or goods. It may also concern a service demanded of him, or a physical or financial penalty based on an existing law. The subject has the same freedom to sue for his rights as if the dispute were with another subject. He must bring the case before judges appointed by the sovereign. For when the sovereign makes a demand under an existing law, rather than through his sovereign power, he declares his intention. He requires no more than what is shown to be due under that law. The lawsuit therefore does not oppose the sovereign’s will. So the subject is free to demand a hearing and a judgment according to that law. But if the sovereign demands or takes anything by claiming his sovereign power, no legal action can be brought. For everything he does through his sovereign power is done with the authority of every subject. Consequently, anyone who brings a legal action against the sovereign brings it against himself.

If a Monarch, or Soveraign Assembly, grant a Liberty to all, or any of his Subjects; which Grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their safety, the Grant is voyd; unlesse he directly renounce, or transferre the Soveraignty to another. For in that he might openly, (if it had been his will,) and in plain termes, have renounced, or transferred it, and did not; it is to be understood it was not his will; but that the Grant proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy between such a Liberty and the Soveraign Power; and therefore the Soveraignty is still retayned; and consequently all those Powers, which are necessary to the exercising thereof; such as are the Power of Warre, and Peace, of Judicature, of appointing Officers, and Councellours, of levying Mony, and the rest named in the 18th Chapter.

If a monarch or sovereign assembly grants a freedom to all or any of its subjects, the following rule applies. If that grant prevents the sovereign from providing for the subjects’ safety, the grant is void. The only exception is if the sovereign explicitly gives up sovereignty or transfers sovereignty to another. For the sovereign could have openly given up or transferred sovereignty in plain terms, if that had been its intention. Since the sovereign did not do so, we must understand that giving up or transferring sovereignty was not its intention. Instead, the grant arose from ignorance of the conflict between such a freedom and sovereign power. Sovereignty therefore remains with the sovereign, along with all the powers necessary to exercise sovereignty. These include the powers to wage war and make peace, administer justice, appoint officers and counsellors, and raise money. They also include the other powers listed in Chapter 18.

The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by Nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished. The Soveraignty is the Soule of the Common-wealth; which once departed from the Body, the members doe no more receive their motion from it. The end of Obedience is Protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own, or in anothers sword, Nature applyeth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintaine it. And though Soveraignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortall; yet is it in its own nature, not only subject to violent death, by forreign war; but also through the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very institution, many seeds of a naturall mortality, by Intestine Discord.

Subjects are obliged to obey their sovereign only as long as he has the power to protect them. For no agreement can take away people's natural right to protect themselves when no one else can protect them. Sovereignty is the soul of the commonwealth. Once that soul leaves the body, the body's members no longer receive their movement from the soul. The purpose of obedience is protection. Wherever a person finds protection, whether through his own sword or another's, nature directs him to obey that protective power. Nature also directs him to work to preserve that power. And although those who establish sovereignty intend it to last forever, sovereignty is by nature subject to death. Foreign war can cause its violent death. But from its very beginning, human ignorance and passions also plant many seeds of its natural death through internal conflict.

If a Subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means of life be within the Guards of the enemy, and hath his life and corporall Libertie given him, on condition to be Subject to the Victor, he hath Libertie to accept the condition; and having accepted it, is the subject of him that took him; because he had no other way to preserve himselfe. The case is the same, if he be deteined on the same termes, in a forreign country. But if a man be held in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the libertie of his bodie; he cannot be understood to be bound by Covenant to subjection; and therefore may, if he can, make his escape by any means whatsoever.

If a subject is taken prisoner in war, or the enemy controls his person or his means of survival, the following applies. If he is granted life and physical freedom on condition of becoming the victor’s subject, he may accept those terms. Once he accepts, he becomes the subject of his captor, because he had no other way to preserve himself. The same applies if he is detained on those terms in a foreign country. But if a man is kept in prison or chains, or is not trusted with physical freedom, the case is different. He cannot be considered bound by an agreement to submit. He may therefore escape by any means whatsoever, if he can.

If a Monarch shall relinquish the Soveraignty, both for himself, and his heires; His Subjects returne to the absolute Libertie of Nature; because, though Nature may declare who are his Sons, and who are the nerest of his Kin; yet it dependeth on his own will, (as hath been said in the precedent chapter,) who shall be his Heyr. If therefore he will have no Heyre, there is no Soveraignty, nor Subjection. The case is the same, if he dye without known Kindred, and without declaration of his Heyre. For then there can no Heire be known, and consequently no Subjection be due.

If a monarch gives up sovereign power for himself and his heirs, his subjects regain the complete freedom of nature. This is because, although nature may show who his sons and closest relatives are, he alone chooses his heir. As explained in the previous chapter, that choice depends on his own will. So if he chooses to have no heir, there is no sovereign power and no duty to obey. The same applies if he dies without any known relatives and without naming his heir. For then no heir can be identified, and so no obedience is owed.

If the Soveraign Banish his Subject; during the Banishment, he is not Subject. But he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travell, is still Subject; but it is, by Contract between Soveraigns, not by vertue of the covenant of Subjection. For whosoever entreth into anothers dominion, is Subject to all the Lawes thereof; unless he have a privilege by the amity of the Soveraigns, or by speciall licence.

If a sovereign banishes a subject, that person is no longer a subject during the banishment. But someone sent on a mission, or given permission to travel, remains a subject. This status, however, rests on an agreement between sovereigns, not on the covenant of submission. For anyone who enters another sovereign’s territory is subject to all its laws. The only exceptions are privileges granted through friendship between the sovereigns or by special permission.

If a Monarch subdued by war, render himself Subject to the Victor; his Subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and become obliged to the Victor. But if he be held prisoner, or have not the liberty of his own Body; he is not understood to have given away the Right of Soveraigntie; and therefore his Subjects are obliged to yield obedience to the Magistrates formerly placed, governing not in their own name, but in his. For, his Right remaining, the question is only of the Administration; that is to say, of the Magistrates and Officers; which, if he have not means to name, he is supposed to approve those, which he himself had formerly appointed.

If a monarch defeated in war submits to the victor, his subjects are freed from their former obligation. They then owe obedience to the victor. But if the monarch is held prisoner or is not physically free, he has not surrendered his sovereign authority. His subjects must therefore obey the officials he previously appointed, who govern in his name, not their own. Since his authority remains, the only question concerns its administration, meaning the magistrates and officers who carry it out. If he cannot appoint these officials, he is assumed to approve those he previously appointed.