Subordinate Groups, Political and Private

Having spoken of the Generation, Forme, and Power of a Common-wealth, I am in order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of Systemes, which resemble the similar parts, or Muscles of a Body naturall. By SYSTEMES; I understand any numbers of men joyned in one Interest, or one Businesse. Of which, some are Regular, and some Irregular. Regular are those, where one Man, or Assembly of men, is constituted Representative of the whole number. All other are Irregular.

Having discussed the origin, form, and power of a commonwealth, I will next discuss its parts. First come systems, which resemble the corresponding parts, or muscles, of a natural body. By SYSTEMS, I mean any number of people united by one interest or one business. Some systems are regular, and some are irregular. Regular systems have one person or an assembly appointed to represent the whole group. All other systems are irregular.

Of Regular, some are Absolute, and Independent, subject to none but their own Representative: such are only Common-wealths; Of which I have spoken already in the 5. last preceding chapters. Others are Dependent; that is to say, Subordinate to some Soveraign Power, to which every one, as also their Representative is Subject.

Among regular groups, some are absolute and independent, subject only to their own representative. Only commonwealths are of this kind. I have already discussed commonwealths in the preceding five chapters. Other regular groups are dependent, meaning they are subordinate to a sovereign power. Every member of a dependent group, as well as its representative, is subject to that sovereign power.

Of Systemes subordinate, some are Politicall, and some Private. Politicall (otherwise Called Bodies Politique, and Persons In Law,) are those, which are made by authority from the Soveraign Power of the Common-wealth. Private, are those, which are constituted by Subjects amongst themselves, or by authoritie from a stranger. For no authority derived from forraign power, within the Dominion of another, is Publique there, but Private.

Of subordinate groups, some are political and some are private. Political groups are also called bodies politic and persons in law. They are established under authority granted by the sovereign power of the commonwealth. Private groups are formed by subjects among themselves or under authority granted by a foreign power. For within another state's territory, no authority derived from a foreign power is public. Such authority is private.

And of Private Systemes, some are Lawfull; some Unlawfull: Lawfull, are those which are allowed by the Common-wealth: all other are Unlawfull. Irregular Systemes, are those which having no Representative, consist only in concourse of People; which if not forbidden by the Common-wealth, nor made on evill designe, (such as are conflux of People to markets, or shews, or any other harmelesse end,) are Lawfull. But when the Intention is evill, or (if the number be considerable) unknown, they are Unlawfull.

Some private groups are lawful, and some are unlawful. Lawful groups are those allowed by the commonwealth. All others are unlawful. Irregular groups have no representative and consist only of people gathering together. Such gatherings are lawful if the commonwealth has not forbidden them and they have no harmful purpose. Examples include people gathering at markets, shows, or for any other harmless purpose. But gatherings are unlawful when their purpose is harmful or, if the crowd is large, unknown.

In Bodies Politique, the power of the Representative is alwaies Limited: And that which prescribeth the limits thereof, is the Power Soveraign. For Power Unlimited, is absolute Soveraignty. And the Soveraign, in every Commonwealth, is the absolute Representative of all the Subjects; and therefore no other, can be Representative of any part of them, but so far forth, as he shall give leave; And to give leave to a Body Politique of Subjects, to have an absolute Representative to all intents and purposes, were to abandon the Government of so much of the Commonwealth, and to divide the Dominion, contrary to their Peace and Defence, which the Soveraign cannot be understood to doe, by any Grant, that does not plainly, and directly discharge them of their subjection. For consequences of words, are not the signes of his will, when other consequences are signes of the contrary; but rather signes of errour, and misreckoning; to which all mankind is too prone.

In political bodies, the representative’s power is always limited. The sovereign power sets those limits, because unlimited power is absolute sovereignty. And in every commonwealth, the sovereign is the absolute representative of all subjects. Therefore, no one else can represent any group of subjects except as far as the sovereign allows. Allowing a political body of subjects an absolute representative for all purposes would mean surrendering government over that part of the commonwealth. It would also divide sovereign authority, undermining the subjects’ peace and defense. The sovereign cannot be understood to do this through any grant unless the grant plainly and directly releases those subjects from obedience. For implications drawn from the sovereign’s words do not show his intention when other implications show the opposite. Rather, such conflicting implications show error and miscalculation, failings to which all humanity is far too prone.

The bounds of that Power, which is given to the Representative of a Bodie Politique, are to be taken notice of, from two things. One is their Writt, or Letters from the Soveraign: the other is the Law of the Common-wealth.

Two things define the limits of the power granted to the representative of a political body. One is the written order or letters from the sovereign. The other is the law of the commonwealth.

For though in the Institution or Acquisition of a Common-wealth, which is independent, there needs no Writing, because the Power of the Representative has there no other bounds, but such as are set out by the unwritten Law of Nature; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such diversities of Limitation necessary, concerning their businesses, times, and places, as can neither be remembred without Letters, nor taken notice of, unlesse such Letters be Patent, that they may be read to them, and withall sealed, or testified, with the Seales, or other permanent signes of the Authority Soveraign.

Although establishing or acquiring an independent commonwealth requires no written document, subordinate bodies do need one. In an independent commonwealth, the representative’s power has no limits except those set by the unwritten law of nature. But subordinate bodies need many different limits on their business, times, and places. These limits cannot be remembered unless written down, or known unless the documents are publicly accessible and can be read aloud. The documents must also bear seals or other lasting marks attesting to the sovereign authority.

And because such Limitation is not alwaies easie, or perhaps possible to be described in writing; the ordinary Lawes, common to all Subjects, must determine, that the Representative may lawfully do, in all Cases, where the Letters themselves are silent. And therefore

And because such limits are not always easy, or perhaps even possible, to set out in writing, ordinary laws must apply. These laws, common to all subjects, must determine what the representative may lawfully do whenever the letters themselves say nothing. And therefore

In a Body Politique, if the Representative be one man, whatsoever he does in the Person of the Body, which is not warranted in his Letters, nor by the Lawes, is his own act, and not the act of the Body, nor of any other Member thereof besides himselfe: Because further than his Letters, or the Lawes limit, he representeth no mans person, but his own. But what he does according to these, is the act of every one: For of the Act of the Soveraign every one is Author, because he is their Representative unlimited; and the act of him that recedes not from the Letters of the Soveraign, is the act of the Soveraign, and therefore every member of the Body is Author of it.

In a political body, if the representative is one man, he may act on the body's behalf. Any action not authorized by his written commission or the laws is his own act alone. It is not the act of the body or of any other member. This is because, beyond the limits of his commission or the laws, he represents no one but himself. But whatever he does within those limits is the act of every member. For everyone is responsible as author for the sovereign's actions, because the sovereign represents them without limit. An act by a representative who stays within the sovereign's written commission is an act of the sovereign. Therefore, every member of the body is responsible as author for that act.

But if the Representative be an Assembly, whatsoever that Assembly shall Decree, not warranted by their Letters, or the Lawes, is the act of the Assembly, or Body Politique, and the act of every one by whose Vote the Decree was made; but not the act of any man that being present Voted to the contrary; nor of any man absent, unlesse he Voted it by procuration. It is the act of the Assembly, because Voted by the major part; and if it be a crime, the Assembly may be punished, as farre-forth as it is capable, as by dissolution, or forfeiture of their Letters (which is to such artificiall, and fictitious Bodies, capitall,) or (if the Assembly have a Common stock, wherein none of the Innocent Members have propriety,) by pecuniary Mulct. For from corporall penalties Nature hath exempted all Bodies Politique. But they that gave not their Vote, are therefore Innocent, because the Assembly cannot Represent any man in things unwarranted by their Letters, and consequently are not involved in their Votes.

But if the representative is an assembly, the assembly may issue a decree not authorized by its charter or the laws. Such a decree is the act of the assembly, or body politic, and of everyone whose vote passed it. But it is not the act of anyone present who voted against it. Nor is it the act of anyone absent, unless that person voted for it by proxy. The decree is the assembly’s act because the majority voted for it. And if the decree is a crime, the assembly may be punished as far as its nature allows. Such punishment may include dissolution or the loss of its charter. For such artificial and fictional bodies, these punishments amount to death. Or the assembly may be fined if it has a common fund in which no innocent member owns a share. For nature has exempted all bodies politic from bodily punishment. But those who did not vote for the decree are innocent for the following reason. The assembly cannot represent anyone in matters not authorized by its charter. Consequently, those people are not implicated in the assembly’s votes.

When The Representative Is One Man, If He Borrow Mony, Or Owe It, By Contract; He Is Lyable Onely, The Members Not If the person of the Body Politique being in one man, borrow mony of a stranger, that is, of one that is not of the same Body, (for no Letters need limit borrowing, seeing it is left to mens own inclinations to limit lending) the debt is the Representatives. For if he should have Authority from his Letters, to make the members pay what he borroweth, he should have by consequence the Soveraignty of them; and therefore the grant were either voyd, as proceeding from Errour, commonly incident to humane Nature, and an unsufficient signe of the will of the Granter; or if it be avowed by him, then is the Representer Soveraign, and falleth not under the present question, which is onely of Bodies subordinate. No member therefore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed, but the Representative himselfe: because he that lendeth it, being a stranger to the Letters, and to the qualification of the Body, understandeth those onely for his debtors, that are engaged; and seeing the Representer can ingage himselfe, and none else, has him onely for Debtor; who must therefore pay him, out of the common stock (if there be any), or (if there be none) out of his own estate.

When the Representative Is One Man, Only He Is Liable for Money He Borrows or Owes by Contract, Not the Members If a political body is represented by one man, he may borrow money from an outsider. An outsider is someone who does not belong to that body. (The charter need not limit borrowing, since people are free to set their own limits on lending.) The debt belongs to the representative. For suppose his charter authorized him to make the members repay whatever he borrowed. That authority would, as a result, give him sovereign power over the members. The grant would therefore be invalid, because it arose from an error of the kind common to human nature. Such an error would not sufficiently express the will of the person making the grant. But if that person confirms the grant, then the representative is sovereign. He would then fall outside the present discussion, which concerns only subordinate bodies. No member, therefore, is obliged to repay money borrowed in this way. Only the representative himself is obliged to pay. This is because the lender is an outsider to the charter and the terms defining the body's powers. The lender understands that only those who have bound themselves to repay are his debtors. And since the representative can bind only himself, and no one else, the representative alone is the lender's debtor. The representative must therefore repay the lender from the body's common funds, if there are any. If there are none, he must pay from his own property.

If he come into debt by Contract, or Mulct, the case is the same.

If he falls into debt through a contract or a fine, the case is the same.

But when the Representative is an Assembly, and the debt to a stranger; all they, and onely they are responsible for the debt, that gave their votes to the borrowing of it, or to the Contract that made it due, or to the fact for which the Mulct was imposed; because every one of those in voting did engage himselfe for the payment: For he that is author of the borrowing, is obliged to the payment, even of the whole debt, though when payd by any one, he be discharged.

But when the representative is an assembly and the debt is owed to an outsider, responsibility falls only on certain members. All members who voted for the borrowing are responsible. So are all who voted for the contract that created the debt, or for the act that brought the fine. No other members are responsible, because each member who voted committed himself to paying. For anyone who authorizes borrowing is obliged to repay even the whole debt. But once any one of them pays the debt, his obligation is discharged.

But if the debt be to one of the Assembly, the Assembly onely is obliged to the payment, out of their common stock (if they have any:) For having liberty of Vote, if he Vote the Mony, shall be borrowed, he Votes it shall be payd; If he Vote it shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet because in lending, he voteth the borrowing, he contradicteth his former Vote, and is obliged by the later, and becomes both borrower and lender, and consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man, but from the common Treasure onely; which fayling he hath no remedy, nor complaint, but against himselfe, that being privy to the acts of the Assembly, and their means to pay, and not being enforced, did neverthelesse through his own folly lend his mony.

But if the debt is owed to a member of the Assembly, only the Assembly must repay it. Payment must come from the Assembly’s shared funds (if it has any). For the member is free to vote. If he votes to borrow the money, he also votes to repay it. If he votes against borrowing, or is absent, his act of lending still counts as a vote for borrowing. He therefore contradicts his earlier vote and is bound by his later one. He becomes both borrower and lender. Consequently, he cannot demand payment from any individual, but only from the common treasury. If the treasury cannot pay, he has no remedy and no one to blame but himself. For he knew the Assembly’s actions and its means of repayment. Yet, without being forced, he lent his money through his own folly.

Sometimes Lawful; But Against Soveraign Power Never It is manifest by this, that in Bodies Politique subordinate, and subject to a Soveraign Power, it is sometimes not onely lawfull, but expedient, for a particular man to make open protestation against the decrees of the Representative Assembly, and cause their dissent to be Registred, or to take witnesse of it; because otherwise they may be obliged to pay debts contracted, and be responsible for crimes committed by other men: But in a Soveraign Assembly, that liberty is taken away, both because he that protesteth there, denies their Soveraignty; and also because whatsoever is commanded by the Soveraign Power, is as to the Subject (though not so alwayes in the sight of God) justified by the Command; for of such command every Subject is the Author.

Sometimes Lawful, but Never Against Sovereign Power. This shows that in political bodies subject to a sovereign power, an individual may openly protest the representative assembly’s decisions. Such protest is sometimes not only lawful but advisable. The individual may have the dissent officially recorded or witnessed. Otherwise, the individual may be required to pay debts incurred by others and answer for crimes others committed. But in a sovereign assembly, there is no such freedom. One reason is that anyone protesting there denies the assembly’s sovereignty. Another is that whatever the sovereign power commands is justified by that command as far as the subject is concerned. This is not always so in God’s sight. For every subject is the author of every such command.

The variety of Bodies Politique, is almost infinite; for they are not onely distinguished by the severall affaires, for which they are constituted, wherein there is an unspeakable diversitie; but also by the times, places, and numbers, subject to many limitations. And as to their affaires, some are ordained for Government; As first, the Government of a Province may be committed to an Assembly of men, wherein all resolutions shall depend on the Votes of the major part; and then this Assembly is a Body Politique, and their power limited by Commission. This word Province signifies a charge, or care of businesse, which he whose businesse it is, committeth to another man, to be administred for, and under him; and therefore when in one Common-wealth there be divers Countries, that have their Lawes distinct one from another, or are farre distant in place, the Administration of the Government being committed to divers persons, those Countries where the Soveraign is not resident, but governs by Commission, are called Provinces. But of the government of a Province, by an Assembly residing in the Province it selfe, there be few examples. The Romans who had the Soveraignty of many Provinces; yet governed them alwaies by Presidents, and Praetors; and not by Assemblies, as they governed the City of Rome, and Territories adjacent. In like manner, when there were Colonies sent from England, to Plant Virginia, and Sommer-Ilands; though the government of them here, were committed to Assemblies in London, yet did those Assemblies never commit the Government under them to any Assembly there; but did to each Plantation send one Governour; For though every man, where he can be present by Nature, desires to participate of government; yet where they cannot be present, they are by Nature also enclined, to commit the Government of their common Interest rather to a Monarchicall, then a Popular form of Government: which is also evident in those men that have great private estates; who when they are unwilling to take the paines of administring the businesse that belongs to them, choose rather to trust one Servant, than a Assembly either of their friends or servants. But howsoever it be in fact, yet we may suppose the Government of a Province, or Colony committed to an Assembly: and when it is, that which in this place I have to say, is this; that whatsoever debt is by that Assembly contracted; or whatsoever unlawfull Act is decreed, is the Act onely of those that assented, and not of any that dissented, or were absent, for the reasons before alledged. Also that an Assembly residing out of the bounds of that Colony whereof they have the government, cannot execute any power over the persons, or goods of any of the Colonie, to seize on them for debt, or other duty, in any place without the Colony it selfe, as having no Jurisdiction, nor Authoritie elsewhere, but are left to the remedie, which the Law of the place alloweth them. And though the Assembly have right, to impose a Mulct upon any of their members, that shall break the Lawes they make; yet out of the Colonie it selfe, they have no right to execute the same. And that which is said here, of the Rights of an Assembly, for the government of a Province, or a Colony, is appliable also to an Assembly for the Government of a Town, or University, or a College, or a Church, or for any other Government over the persons of men.

The variety of political bodies is almost infinite. They differ not only in their purposes, which are too varied to describe. They also differ in their duration, location, and membership, all subject to many restrictions. As for their purposes, some are established to govern. First, the government of a Province may be entrusted to an assembly whose decisions depend on a majority vote. Such an assembly is a political body, and its powers are limited by its commission. The word Province means a responsibility or business that someone entrusts to another person to manage under their authority. A commonwealth may contain several countries with different laws, or countries that are far apart. The administration of these countries may be entrusted to different people. Those countries where the sovereign does not reside, but governs through a commission, are called Provinces. But there are few examples of a Province governed by an assembly located within the Province itself. The Romans held sovereignty over many Provinces. Yet they always governed those Provinces through Presidents and Praetors, not through assemblies as they governed Rome and its surrounding territories. Similarly, colonists were sent from England to establish settlements in Virginia and Sommer-Ilands. Although their government was entrusted to assemblies in London, those assemblies never delegated government to an assembly in the colonies. Instead, they sent one governor to each settlement. For everyone naturally wants a share in government where they can be personally present. Yet where people cannot be present, they also naturally prefer government by one person to government by the people. They prefer this form of government for managing their common interests. The same preference is evident among people with large private estates. When unwilling to take the trouble of managing their affairs, they prefer to trust one servant rather than an assembly. This holds whether the assembly consists of their friends or their servants. But whatever happens in practice, we may suppose that an assembly is entrusted with governing a Province or colony. When this happens, my point here is as follows. Any debt the assembly contracts, or any unlawful act it orders, is the act only of those who agreed. It is not the act of those who disagreed or were absent, for the reasons already given. Also, an assembly may reside outside the colony it governs. Such an assembly cannot seize any colonist or their property outside the colony for a debt or other obligation. The assembly has no jurisdiction or authority elsewhere. Instead, it must rely on whatever remedy the law of that place allows. And although the assembly may rightfully fine members who break its laws, it cannot enforce those fines outside the colony. What I have said about an assembly’s rights in governing a Province or colony also applies to other governing assemblies. These include assemblies governing a town, university, college, or church, or exercising any other government over people.

And generally, in all Bodies Politique, if any particular member conceive himself Injured by the Body it self, the Cognisance of his cause belongeth to the Soveraign, and those the Soveraign hath ordained for Judges in such causes, or shall ordaine for that particular cause; and not to the Body it self. For the whole Body is in this case his fellow subject, which in a Soveraign Assembly, is otherwise: for there, if the Soveraign be not Judge, though in his own cause, there can be no Judge at all.

In general, in all political bodies, any member who believes the body itself has wronged him must have his case heard by the sovereign. The case may also be heard by judges the sovereign has appointed for such cases or appoints for that particular case. The political body itself must not judge the case. For in such a case, the whole body is a fellow subject of the injured member. But the situation is different in an assembly that holds sovereign power. There, unless the sovereign acts as judge, even in its own case, there can be no judge at all.

In a Bodie Politique, for the well ordering of forraigne Traffique, the most commodious Representative is an Assembly of all the members; that is to say, such a one, as every one that adventureth his mony, may be present at all the Deliberations, and Resolutions of the Body, if they will themselves. For proof whereof, we are to consider the end, for which men that are Merchants, and may buy and sell, export, and import their Merchandise, according to their own discretions, doe neverthelesse bind themselves up in one Corporation. It is true, there be few Merchants, that with the Merchandise they buy at home, can fraight a Ship, to export it; or with that they buy abroad, to bring it home; and have therefore need to joyn together in one Society; where every man may either participate of the gaine, according to the proportion of his adventure; or take his own; and sell what he transports, or imports, at such prices as he thinks fit. But this is no Body Politique, there being no Common Representative to oblige them to any other Law, than that which is common to all other subjects. The End of their Incorporating, is to make their gaine the greater; which is done two wayes; by sole buying, and sole selling, both at home, and abroad. So that to grant to a Company of Merchants to be a Corporation, or Body Politique, is to grant them a double Monopoly, whereof one is to be sole buyers; another to be sole sellers. For when there is a Company incorporate for any particular forraign Country, they only export the Commodities vendible in that Country; which is sole buying at home, and sole selling abroad. For at home there is but one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth: both which is gainfull to the Merchant, because thereby they buy at home at lower, and sell abroad at higher rates: And abroad there is but one buyer of forraign Merchandise, and but one that sels them at home; both which againe are gainfull to the adventurers.

In a body politic, the best representative body for managing foreign trade is an assembly of all its members. In such an assembly, everyone who invests money may attend all discussions and decisions if they wish. To see why, consider why merchants join together in a corporation. These merchants can already buy, sell, export, and import goods as they see fit. Yet few merchants can fill a ship with goods bought at home for export, or goods bought abroad for import. They therefore need to join together in a trading association. Each merchant may share in the profits according to the amount invested. Or each may keep their own goods and sell their exports or imports at whatever prices they think fit. But such an association is not a body politic. It has no common representative empowered to bind its members to laws beyond those applying to all other subjects. The purpose of forming a corporation is to increase the merchants’ profits. They achieve this in two ways: by being the only buyers and the only sellers, both at home and abroad. So granting a company of merchants the status of a corporation, or body politic, grants its members a double monopoly. One makes them the only buyers, and the other makes them the only sellers. When a company is incorporated to trade with a particular foreign country, only that company exports goods saleable there. This makes the company the only buyer at home and the only seller abroad. At home, there is just one buyer, and abroad, just one seller. Both monopolies benefit the merchants because they can buy at lower prices at home and sell at higher prices abroad. Likewise, abroad there is only one buyer of foreign goods, and at home only one seller of those goods. Both monopolies again benefit the investors.

Of this double Monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at home, the other to forraigners. For at home by their sole exportation they set what price they please on the husbandry and handy-works of the people; and by the sole importation, what price they please on all forraign commodities the people have need of; both which are ill for the people. On the contrary, by the sole selling of the native commodities abroad, and sole buying the forraign commodities upon the place, they raise the price of those, and abate the price of these, to the disadvantage of the forraigner: For where but one selleth, the Merchandise is the dearer; and where but one buyeth the cheaper: Such Corporations therefore are no other then Monopolies; though they would be very profitable for a Common-wealth, if being bound up into one body in forraigne Markets they were at liberty at home, every man to buy, and sell at what price he could.

One part of this double monopoly harms people at home, while the other harms foreigners. At home, these corporations alone export the people’s farm products and manufactured goods, setting whatever prices they please. These corporations also control all imports, setting whatever prices they please for all foreign goods the people need. Both practices harm the people. By contrast, these corporations alone sell domestic goods abroad and buy foreign goods in foreign markets. This allows the corporations to raise prices for domestic goods and lower prices for foreign goods, to foreigners’ disadvantage. For when only one seller exists, goods cost more, and when only one buyer exists, goods cost less. Such corporations are therefore nothing but monopolies. Yet these corporations would be very profitable for a commonwealth under one condition. While united as one body in foreign markets, their members must remain free at home. Each member must be free to buy and sell at whatever price he can get.

The end then of these Bodies of Merchants, being not a Common benefit to the whole Body, (which have in this case no common stock, but what is deducted out of the particular adventures, for building, buying, victualling and manning of Ships,) but the particular gaine of every adventurer, it is reason that every one be acquainted with the employment of his own; that is, that every one be of the Assembly, that shall have the power to order the same; and be acquainted with their accounts. And therefore the Representative of such a Body must be an Assembly, where every member of the Body may be present at the consultations, if he will.

The purpose of these merchant companies, then, is not a shared benefit for the whole company. In this case, their only shared funds come from deductions from individual investments to build, buy, supply, and crew ships. Instead, their purpose is the individual profit of each investor. So it is reasonable that each investor should know how his own money is used. That is, each investor should belong to the assembly empowered to manage his investment and should have access to its accounts. Therefore, such a company must be represented by an assembly where every member may attend the discussions if he wishes.

If a Body Politique of Merchants, contract a debt to a stranger by the act of their Representative Assembly, every Member is lyable by himself for the whole. For a stranger can take no notice of their private Lawes, but considereth them as so many particular men, obliged every one to the whole payment, till payment made by one dischargeth all the rest: But if the debt be to one of the Company, the creditor is debter for the whole to himself, and cannot therefore demand his debt, but only from the common stock, if there be any.

If a merchants’ corporation takes on a debt to an outsider through its representative assembly, each member owes the full amount. For an outsider cannot be expected to know the corporation’s internal rules. Instead, the outsider treats the members as individuals, each responsible for paying the whole debt. Once one member pays, all the others are released from the debt. But if the corporation owes money to one of its own members, the creditor owes himself the whole amount. He therefore cannot demand payment except from the corporation’s common funds, if there are any.

If the Common-wealth impose a Tax upon the Body, it is understood to be layd upon every member proportionably to his particular adventure in the Company. For there is in this case no other common stock, but what is made of their particular adventures.

If the state taxes the company as a whole, the tax is understood to apply to every member. Each member’s share is proportional to their individual investment in the company. This is because, in this case, the company’s only common funds come from its members’ individual investments.

If a Mulct be layd upon the Body for some unlawfull act, they only are lyable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it was executed; for in none of the rest is there any other crime but being of the Body; which if a crime, (because the Body was ordeyned by the authority of the Common-wealth,) is not his.

If an organization is fined for an unlawful act, only certain members are liable. These are the members who voted for the act or helped carry it out. For the other members, the only crime is belonging to the organization. If membership is a crime, it is not the individual member’s fault, because the Commonwealth authorized the organization.

If one of the Members be indebted to the Body, he may be sued by the Body; but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person imprisoned by the authority of the Body; but only by Authority of the Common-wealth: for if they can doe it by their own Authority, they can by their own Authority give judgement that the debt is due, which is as much as to be Judge in their own Cause.

If a member owes money to the body, the body may sue him. But the body cannot use its own authority to seize his goods or imprison him. Only the state has that authority. For if the body could enforce payment on its own authority, it could also decide that the debt was owed. That would amount to acting as judge in its own case.

These Bodies made for the government of Men, or of Traffique, be either perpetuall, or for a time prescribed by writing. But there be Bodies also whose times are limited, and that only by the nature of their businesse. For example, if a Soveraign Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, shall think fit to give command to the towns, and other severall parts of their territory, to send to him their Deputies, to enforme him of the condition, and necessities of the Subjects, or to advise with him for the making of good Lawes, or for any other cause, as with one Person representing the whole Country, such Deputies, having a place and time of meeting assigned them, are there, and at that time, a Body Politique, representing every Subject of that Dominion; but it is onely for such matters as shall be propounded unto them by that Man, or Assembly, that by the Soveraign Authority sent for them; and when it shall be declared that nothing more shall be propounded, nor debated by them, the Body is dissolved. For if they were the absolute Representative of the people, then were it the Soveraign Assembly; and so there would be two Soveraign Assemblies, or two Soveraigns, over the same people; which cannot consist with their Peace. And therefore where there is once a Soveraignty, there can be no absolute Representation of the people, but by it. And for the limits of how farre such a Body shall represent the whole People, they are set forth in the Writing by which they were sent for. For the People cannot choose their Deputies to other intent, than is in the Writing directed to them from their Soveraign expressed.

These bodies, formed to govern people or manage trade, are either permanent or established for a period specified in writing. But some bodies last only as long as the nature of their business requires. For example, a sovereign monarch or assembly may order towns and other parts of their territory to send deputies. These deputies may be called to report on the subjects’ condition and needs. Or they may be called to advise the sovereign on making good laws, or for any other purpose. The deputies act as one person representing the whole country. At the assigned meeting place and time, these deputies form a political body representing every subject in that dominion. But they represent those subjects only on matters raised by the monarch or assembly that summoned them through sovereign authority. Once it is declared that no further matters will be raised or debated, the body is dissolved. For if these deputies represented the people without limits, their body would be the sovereign assembly. There would then be two sovereign assemblies, or two sovereigns, over the same people. Such an arrangement is incompatible with peace among those people. Therefore, once a sovereign power exists, only that power can represent the people without limits. The written summons sets the limits on how far such a body represents the whole people. For the people cannot choose their deputies for any purpose other than those stated in their sovereign’s written instructions.

Private Bodies Regular, and Lawfull, are those that are constituted without Letters, or other written Authority, saving the Lawes common to all other Subjects. And because they be united in one Person Representative, they are held for Regular; such as are all Families, in which the Father, or Master ordereth the whole Family. For he obligeth his Children, and Servants, as farre as the Law permitteth, though not further, because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions, which the Law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during the time they are under domestique government, they are subject to their Fathers, and Masters, as to their immediate Soveraigns. For the Father, and Master being before the Institution of Common-wealth, absolute Soveraigns in their own Families, they lose afterward no more of their Authority, than the Law of the Common-wealth taketh from them.

Regular and lawful private bodies are groups formed without charters or other written authority, except the laws governing all subjects. Because each group is united under one representative, such groups are considered regular. All families are examples, with the father or master governing the whole household. The father or master binds his children and servants to obedience as far as the law permits, but no further. For neither children nor servants must obey commands to do anything the law forbids. In all other actions, while under household government, children and servants are subject to their fathers and masters as their immediate sovereigns. For before the commonwealth was established, fathers and masters were absolute sovereigns within their own families. Afterward, fathers and masters lose no more authority than the law of the commonwealth takes from them.

Private Bodies Regular, but Unlawfull, are those that unite themselves into one person Representative, without any publique Authority at all; such as are the Corporations of Beggars, Theeves and Gipsies, the better to order their trade of begging, and stealing; and the Corporations of men, that by Authority from any forraign Person, unite themselves in anothers Dominion, for easier propagation of Doctrines, and for making a party, against the Power of the Common-wealth.

Organized but unlawful private bodies unite under a single representative without any public authority at all. Examples include associations of beggars, thieves, and Gipsies, formed to better organize their begging and stealing. Other examples include associations formed under a foreign person's authority within another ruler's territory. These associations unite to spread doctrines more easily and build a faction against the power of the commonwealth.

Irregular Systemes, in their nature, but Leagues, or sometimes meer concourse of people, without union to any particular designe, not by obligation of one to another, but proceeding onely from a similitude of wills and inclinations, become Lawfull, or Unlawfull, according to the lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse of every particular mans design therein: And his designe is to be understood by the occasion.

Irregular groups are, by nature, only alliances, or sometimes mere gatherings of people not united around any particular purpose. People in these gatherings are not bound to one another, but come together only through similar wishes and inclinations. Such groups are lawful or unlawful depending on whether each person’s purpose within the group is lawful or unlawful. Each person’s purpose must be understood from the circumstances.

The Leagues of Subjects, (because Leagues are commonly made for mutuall defence,) are in a Common-wealth (which is no more than a League of all the Subjects together) for the most part unnecessary, and savour of unlawfull designe; and are for that cause Unlawfull, and go commonly by the name of factions, or Conspiracies. For a League being a connexion of men by Covenants, if there be no power given to any one Man or Assembly, (as in the condition of meer Nature) to compell them to performance, is so long onely valid, as there ariseth no just cause of distrust: and therefore Leagues between Common-wealths, over whom there is no humane Power established, to keep them all in awe, are not onely lawfull, but also profitable for the time they last. But Leagues of the Subjects of one and the same Common-wealth, where every one may obtain his right by means of the Soveraign Power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of Peace and Justice, and (in case the designe of them be evill, or Unknown to the Common-wealth) unlawfull. For all uniting of strength by private men, is, if for evill intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the Publique, and unjustly concealed.

Alliances among subjects are mostly unnecessary within a commonwealth, since alliances are usually formed for mutual defense. A commonwealth is itself nothing more than an alliance of all its subjects. Such private alliances suggest unlawful aims and are unlawful for that reason. They are commonly called factions or conspiracies. An alliance binds people together through agreements. Suppose no individual or assembly has been given power to enforce those agreements, as in the state of nature. In that case, the alliance remains valid only as long as no reasonable cause for distrust arises. Therefore, alliances between commonwealths are not only lawful but also beneficial for as long as they last. No human authority stands above those commonwealths to keep them all in check. But alliances among subjects of the same commonwealth are unnecessary for maintaining peace and justice. In that commonwealth, everyone can secure their rights through the sovereign power. Such alliances are unlawful if their aims are evil or unknown to the commonwealth. For whenever private individuals join forces for an evil purpose, their alliance is unjust. If their purpose is unknown, their alliance endangers the public, and concealing that purpose is unjust.

If the Soveraign Power be in a great Assembly, and a number of men, part of the Assembly, without authority, consult a part, to contrive the guidance of the rest; This is a Faction, or Conspiracy unlawfull, as being a fraudulent seducing of the Assembly for their particular interest. But if he, whose private interest is to be debated, and judged in the Assembly, make as many friends as he can; in him it is no Injustice; because in this case he is no part of the Assembly. And though he hire such friends with mony, (unlesse there be an expresse Law against it,) yet it is not Injustice. For sometimes, (as mens manners are,) Justice cannot be had without mony; and every man may think his own cause just, till it be heard, and judged.

If sovereign power rests with a large assembly, some members may meet separately, without authority, to plan how to direct the rest. Such a group is an unlawful faction or conspiracy, because its members deceive the assembly to serve their own interests. But if a man's private interests are to be debated and judged by the assembly, he may seek all the friends he can. He commits no injustice, because in this case he is not part of the assembly. Even if he pays these friends, he commits no injustice, unless a law expressly forbids such payments. For sometimes, given how people behave, justice cannot be obtained without money. And every man may believe his own case is just until the case has been heard and judged.

In all Common-wealths, if a private man entertain more servants, than the government of his estate, and lawfull employment he has for them requires, it is Faction, and unlawfull. For having the protection of the Common-wealth, he needeth not the defence of private force. And whereas in Nations not throughly civilized, severall numerous Families have lived in continuall hostility, and invaded one another with private force; yet it is evident enough, that they have done unjustly; or else that they had no Common-wealth.

In all commonwealths, a private citizen may keep more servants than managing his estate and his lawful work require. If he does, he is forming an unlawful faction. Because the commonwealth protects him, he does not need a private force to defend himself. In nations not fully civilized, large families have lived in constant hostility and attacked one another with private forces. Yet clearly, either these families acted unjustly, or they had no commonwealth.

And as Factions for Kindred, so also Factions for Government of Religion, as of Papists, Protestants, &c. or of State, as Patricians, and Plebeians of old time in Rome, and of Aristocraticalls and Democraticalls of old time in Greece, are unjust, as being contrary to the peace and safety of the people, and a taking of the Sword out of the hand of the Soveraign.

Just as factions based on kinship are unjust, so are factions seeking control over religion or the state. Religious factions include Papists, Protestants, and others. Political factions include the Patricians and Plebeians in ancient Rome, and aristocrats and democrats in ancient Greece. Such factions are unjust because they threaten the people's peace and safety and take the sword from the sovereign's hand.

Concourse of people, is an Irregular Systeme, the lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse, whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the number of them that are assembled. If the occasion be lawfull, and manifest, the Concourse is lawfull; as the usuall meeting of men at Church, or at a publique Shew, in usuall numbers: for if the numbers be extraordinarily great, the occasion is not evident; and consequently he that cannot render a particular and good account of his being amongst them, is to be judged conscious of an unlawfull, and tumultuous designe. It may be lawfull for a thousand men, to joyn in a Petition to be delivered to a Judge, or Magistrate; yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is a tumultuous Assembly; because there needs but one or two for that purpose. But in such cases as these, it is not a set number that makes the Assembly Unlawfull, but such a number, as the present Officers are not able to suppresse, and bring to Justice.

A gathering of people is an irregular system. Whether the gathering is lawful depends on its purpose and the number of people assembled. If the purpose is lawful and clear, the gathering is lawful. Examples include the usual gatherings at church or a public show, with the usual numbers attending. For if the numbers are unusually large, the purpose is not clear. Consequently, anyone unable to give a specific, good reason for being there must be judged knowingly involved in an unlawful plan to cause disorder. It may be lawful for a thousand people to join in a petition for delivery to a judge or magistrate. Yet if a thousand people come to present the petition, the gathering is disorderly, because only one or two are needed. But in such cases, no fixed number makes the gathering unlawful. Rather, the gathering is unlawful when those assembled outnumber what the officers present can subdue and bring to justice.

When an unusuall number of men, assemble against a man whom they accuse; the Assembly is an Unlawfull tumult; because they may deliver their accusation to the Magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was the case of St. Paul at Ephesus; where Demetrius, and a great number of other men, brought two of Pauls companions before the Magistrate, saying with one Voyce, “Great is Diana of the Ephesians;” which was their way of demanding Justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine, as was against their Religion, and Trade. The occasion here, considering the Lawes of that People, was just; yet was their Assembly Judged Unlawfull, and the Magistrate reprehended them for it, in these words,(Acts 19. 40) “If Demetrius and the other work-men can accuse any man, of any thing, there be Pleas, and Deputies, let them accuse one another. And if you have any other thing to demand, your case may be judged in an Assembly Lawfully called. For we are in danger to be accused for this dayes sedition, because, there is no cause by which any man can render any reason of this Concourse of People.” Where he calleth an Assembly, whereof men can give no just account, a Sedition, and such as they could not answer for. And this is all I shall say concerning Systemes, and Assemblyes of People, which may be compared (as I said,) to the Similar parts of mans Body; such as be Lawfull, to the Muscles; such as are Unlawfull, to Wens, Biles, and Apostemes, engendred by the unnaturall conflux of evill humours.

When an unusually large number of men gather against a man they accuse, the gathering is an unlawful disturbance. This is because one man, or a few, could bring their accusation to the magistrate. Such was the case of St. Paul at Ephesus. Demetrius and many other men brought two of Paul’s companions before the magistrate, shouting together, “Great is Diana of the Ephesians.” This was their way of demanding justice against Paul’s companions for teaching doctrines that opposed their religion and trade. Under the laws of those people, the grounds for the complaint were just. Yet the gathering was judged unlawful, and the magistrate rebuked the crowd in these words (Acts 19. 40): “If Demetrius and the other workmen have any accusation against anyone, there are courts and magistrates. Let them bring charges against one another. And if you have any other demand, your case may be judged in a lawfully called assembly. For we are in danger of being accused of rebellion because of today’s events. There is no cause that anyone can give to justify this gathering of people.” Here the magistrate calls a gathering that people cannot justify a rebellion for which they could not answer. This is all I shall say about organized groups and gatherings of people. As I said, these may be compared to the uniform tissues of the human body. Lawful groups resemble muscles. Unlawful groups resemble swellings, boils, and abscesses caused by an unnatural accumulation of unhealthy bodily fluids.