Rights of Sovereigns Established by Agreement

A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do Agree, and Covenant, Every One With Every One, that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly Of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted For It, as he that Voted Against It, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.

A commonwealth is established when a group of people make an agreement, each person with every other person. They agree that the majority will give one person or an assembly the right to represent them all. Everyone must authorize all the actions and judgments of that person or assembly as if those actions and judgments were their own. This applies both to those who voted for the choice and to those who voted against it. The purpose of this agreement is to live peacefully together and be protected against other people.

From this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the Rights, and Facultyes of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred by the consent of the People assembled.

All the sovereign’s rights and powers come from establishing a commonwealth in this way. The sovereign is the person or group given supreme power by the consent of the assembled people.

First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by former Covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And Consequently they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth, being thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements of one, cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude; nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it, to another Man, or other Assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man, to Own, and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their Soveraigne, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have also every man given the Soveraignty to him that beareth their Person; and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice. Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his Soveraign, be killed, or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the Institution, Author of all his Soveraign shall do: And because it is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their Soveraign, a new Covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust: for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but Gods Lieutenant, who hath the Soveraignty under God. But this pretence of Covenant with God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own consciences, that it is not onely an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.

First, because they make this covenant, we must understand that no earlier covenant binds them to anything contrary to it. Consequently, people who have already established a commonwealth are bound by covenant to accept one ruler’s actions and judgments as their own. They cannot lawfully make a new covenant among themselves to obey anyone else in anything without that ruler’s permission. Therefore, a monarch’s subjects cannot reject monarchy without his permission and return to the confusion of a divided multitude. Nor can they transfer their collective identity from their present representative to another man or assembly. For each person has promised every other person to accept responsibility for everything their existing sovereign does or judges necessary. Each has agreed to be regarded as the author of those actions. So if even one person dissents, all the others would break their covenant with that person, which is unjust. Each has also given sovereign power to the ruler who represents them. Therefore, if they depose him, they take away what belongs to him, which is also unjust. Besides, if someone attempts to depose his sovereign and the sovereign kills or punishes him for it, he authorizes his own punishment. This is because, in establishing the commonwealth, he authorized everything his sovereign would do. And it is unjust to do anything for which a person may be punished by his own authority. So the person attempting to depose his sovereign is unjust on that ground too. Some people have justified disobedience to their sovereign by claiming a new covenant, made not with men but with God. This claim is also unjust. For no covenant can be made with God except through someone who represents God. Only God’s deputy, who holds sovereign power under God, represents him. But this claim of a covenant with God is so plainly a lie that even those making it know as much. Making this claim therefore shows not only an unjust character, but also a vile and unmanly one.

Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given to him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection. That he which is made Soveraigne maketh no Covenant with his Subjects beforehand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the Covenant; or he must make a severall Covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one Person: and if he make so many severall Covenants as there be men, those Covenants after he hath the Soveraignty are voyd, because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is the act both of himselfe, and of all the rest, because done in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular. Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant made by the Soveraigne at his Institution; and others, or one other of his Subjects, or himselfe alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case, no Judge to decide the controversie: it returns therefore to the Sword again; and every man recovereth the right of Protecting himselfe by his own strength, contrary to the designe they had in the Institution. It is therefore in vain to grant Soveraignty by way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easie truth, that Covenants being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the publique Sword; that is, from the untyed hands of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath the Soveraignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. But when an Assembly of men is made Soveraigne; then no man imagineth any such Covenant to have past in the Institution; for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the People of Rome, made a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such or such conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman People. That men see not the reason to be alike in a Monarchy, and in a Popular Government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that are kinder to the government of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.

Secondly, the sovereign receives the right to represent everyone through an agreement each person makes with the others. The sovereign makes no agreement with any of them. Therefore, the sovereign cannot break the agreement. Consequently, no subject can escape obedience by claiming that the sovereign has forfeited his authority. Clearly, whoever becomes sovereign makes no agreement with his subjects beforehand. Such an agreement would have to be made either with the whole population as one party, or with each person separately. An agreement with the whole population as one party is impossible, because they do not yet form a single person. And if the sovereign makes separate agreements with every individual, those agreements become void once he gains sovereignty. Any action someone might claim breaks an agreement is also that person's own action, and everyone else's. This is because the sovereign acts as the representative of every individual and with each individual's authority. Besides, suppose one or more subjects claim that the sovereign has broken an agreement made when he took power. Suppose other subjects, even one other subject, or the sovereign alone, deny that any breach occurred. There is then no judge to settle the dispute. So the dispute returns to armed conflict. Everyone regains the right to protect himself by his own strength, contrary to their purpose in establishing sovereignty. It is therefore pointless to grant sovereignty through a prior agreement. Some believe that a monarch receives his power through an agreement, meaning that his power is conditional. This opinion comes from failing to understand a simple truth. Agreements are only words and breath. They have no power to bind, restrain, compel, or protect anyone except through the public sword. That means the unrestricted power of the man or assembly holding sovereignty. Everyone authorizes the sovereign's actions, which are carried out through everyone's combined strength, united in the sovereign. But when an assembly becomes sovereign, no one imagines that any such agreement was made when sovereignty was established. For example, no one is foolish enough to say that the People of Rome made an agreement with the Romans. Under such an agreement, the People of Rome would hold sovereignty on certain conditions. If those conditions went unmet, the Romans could lawfully remove the Roman People from power. Some people fail to see that the same reasoning applies to monarchy and popular government. Their failure comes from ambition. They favor government by an assembly, in which they may hope to share power. They favor it over monarchy, whose power they have no hope of gaining.

Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a Soveraigne; he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the Congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore tacitely covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne: and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make Protestation against any of their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant, and therfore unjustly. And whether he be of the Congregation, or not; and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.

Thirdly, because the majority has voted to declare a sovereign, anyone who dissented must now agree with the rest. He must accept responsibility for all the sovereign’s actions, or the rest may justly destroy him. For if he voluntarily joined the assembled group, he sufficiently showed his willingness to accept whatever the majority decided. By doing so, he made an unspoken agreement to accept those decisions. Therefore, if he refuses to accept those decisions or protests against any of their decrees, he breaks his agreement. He therefore acts unjustly. Whether he belongs to the assembly or not, and whether his consent is asked or not, he must submit to their decrees. Otherwise, he must remain in his previous state of war, in which anyone could destroy him without injustice.

Fourthly, because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the Actions, and Judgements of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice. For he that doth any thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: But by this Institution of a Common-wealth, every particular man is Author of all the Soveraigne doth; and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraigne, complaineth of that whereof he himselfe is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because to do injury to ones selfe, is impossible. It is true that they that have Soveraigne power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in the proper signification.

Fourthly, by establishing the sovereign in this way, every subject authorizes all the sovereign’s actions and judgments. It follows that nothing the sovereign does can wrong any subject. Nor should any subject accuse the sovereign of injustice. For someone acting on another person’s authority does no wrong to the person who gave that authority. But when a commonwealth is established in this way, every individual authorizes everything the sovereign does. Consequently, anyone who complains of being wronged by the sovereign complains about something he himself has authorized. He should therefore blame no one but himself. Yet he should not even accuse himself of wrongdoing against himself, because wronging oneself is impossible. It is true that those with sovereign power may act wickedly. But they cannot commit injustice or wrong anyone in the strict sense of those terms.

Fiftly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that hath Soveraigne power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject is author of the actions of his Soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions committed by himselfe.

Fifth, as a consequence of the previous point, no sovereign can justly be executed or otherwise punished by his subjects. For every subject is responsible for the actions of his sovereign. So a subject who punishes his sovereign punishes another for actions the subject himself has authorized.

And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of them all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence; and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of discord at home and Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same. And therefore,

And the purpose of this institution is the peace and defense of all its members. Whoever has the right to achieve an end also has the right to use the means needed to achieve it. So any man or assembly holding sovereign power has the right to judge the means of peace and defense. The sovereign also has the right to judge what obstructs or disrupts peace and defense. The sovereign therefore has the right to do whatever the sovereign considers necessary to preserve peace and security in advance. This includes preventing conflict at home and hostility from abroad. When peace and security are lost, the sovereign may do whatever the sovereign considers necessary to restore them. And therefore,

Sixtly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall, in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines of all bookes before they be published. For the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions; and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth the well governing of mens Actions, in order to their Peace, and Concord. And though in matter of Doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded but the Truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by Peace. For Doctrine Repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace and Concord can be against the Law of Nature. It is true, that in a Common-wealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfullnesse of Governours, and Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally received; the contrary Truths may be generally offensive; Yet the most sudden, and rough busling in of a new Truth, that can be, does never breake the Peace, but onely somtimes awake the Warre. For those men that are so remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend, or introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and their condition not Peace, but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another; and they live as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually. It belongeth therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power, to be Judge, or constitute all Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to Peace, thereby to prevent Discord and Civill Warre.

Sixth, sovereign power includes the right to judge which opinions and teachings threaten peace and which promote it. Consequently, the sovereign decides when people may be trusted to address crowds, on what subjects, and with what limits. The sovereign also decides who will examine the teachings in all books before publication. For people’s actions arise from their opinions. Governing opinions well is therefore essential to governing people’s actions so that they live in peace and harmony. Although truth alone should matter in questions of doctrine, regulating doctrine to preserve peace does not contradict that principle. For a doctrine opposed to peace can no more be true than peace and harmony can violate natural law. It is true that false doctrines may become widely accepted over time in a commonwealth through rulers’ and teachers’ neglect or incompetence. In such a commonwealth, the opposing truths may offend people generally. Yet even the most sudden and forceful introduction of a new truth never breaks the peace. Such an introduction only sometimes reawakens war. For people governed so loosely that they dare take up arms to defend or introduce an opinion remain at war. Their condition is not peace, but only a halt in fighting because they fear one another. They live as though constantly drawn up for battle. The holder of sovereign power must therefore judge opinions and doctrines, or appoint all who judge them. This authority is necessary for peace, to prevent discord and civil war.

Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may enjoy and what Actions he may doe, without being molested by any of his fellow Subjects: And this is it men Call Propriety. For before constitution of Soveraign Power (as hath already been shewn) all men had right to all things; which necessarily causeth Warre: and therefore this Proprietie, being necessary to Peace, and depending on Soveraign Power, is the Act of the Power, in order to the publique peace. These Rules of Propriety (or Meum and Tuum) and of Good, Evill, Lawfull and Unlawfull in the actions of subjects, are the Civill Lawes, that is to say, the lawes of each Commonwealth in particular; though the name of Civill Law be now restrained to the antient Civill Lawes of the City of Rome; which being the head of a great part of the World, her Lawes at that time were in these parts the Civill Law.

Seventh, sovereignty includes full power to set rules defining what goods each person may possess and what actions each may take. Under these rules, no fellow subject may interfere with those possessions or actions. This is what people call property. For before sovereign power was established, everyone had a right to everything, as already shown. Such a right necessarily causes war. Property is therefore necessary for peace and depends on sovereign power. Establishing property is an act of that power for the sake of public peace. These rules define property (or Meum and Tuum, meaning mine and yours). They also define what is good, evil, lawful, and unlawful in subjects’ actions. These are civil laws, meaning the laws of each particular Commonwealth. Yet the name “civil law” is now limited to the ancient civil laws of the City of Rome. Because Rome ruled a great part of the world, Roman laws were then the civil law in these regions.

Eightly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the Right of Judicature; that is to say, of hearing and deciding all Controversies, which may arise concerning Law, either Civill, or naturall, or concerning Fact. For without the decision of Controversies, there is no protection of one Subject, against the injuries of another; the Lawes concerning Meum and Tuum are in vaine; and to every man remaineth, from the naturall and necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting himselfe by his private strength, which is the condition of Warre; and contrary to the end for which every Common-wealth is instituted.

Eighth, sovereignty includes the right to judge disputes. This means hearing and deciding all disputes that may arise about civil law, natural law, or matters of fact. For without decisions on disputes, no subject is protected against harm from another. Laws about what belongs to whom are then useless. And every person retains the right to protect himself by his own strength, from the natural and necessary urge to survive. This is a state of war, contrary to the purpose for which every commonwealth is established.

Ninthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the Right of making Warre, and Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that is to say, of Judging when it is for the publique good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and payd for that end; and to levy mony upon the Subjects, to defray the expenses thereof. For the Power by which the people are to be defended, consisteth in their Armies; and the strength of an Army, in the union of their strength under one Command; which Command the Soveraign Instituted, therefore hath; because the command of the Militia, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it Soveraign. And therefore whosoever is made Generall of an Army, he that hath the Soveraign Power is alwayes Generallissimo.

Ninth, sovereignty includes the right to make war and peace with other nations and commonwealths. The sovereign judges when war or peace serves the public good. The sovereign also decides how large a force to assemble, arm, and pay for that purpose. The sovereign can also tax the subjects to cover those expenses. For the power to defend the people lies in their armies. An army’s strength lies in uniting its forces under one command. The appointed sovereign therefore holds that command, because commanding the armed forces alone makes whoever commands them sovereign. No further appointment is needed. Therefore, whoever is appointed general of an army, the holder of sovereign power is always the supreme commander.

Tenthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the choosing of all Councellours, Ministers, Magistrates, and Officers, both in peace, and War. For seeing the Soveraign is charged with the End, which is the common Peace and Defence; he is understood to have Power to use such Means, as he shall think most fit for his discharge.

Tenth, the sovereign has the right to choose all counselors, ministers, magistrates, and officers, in both peace and war. For the sovereign is responsible for the goal of peace and defense for all. He is therefore understood to have the power to use whatever means he thinks best to fulfill that responsibility.

Eleventhly, to the Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding with riches, or honour; and of Punishing with corporall, or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy every Subject according to the Lawe he hath formerly made; or if there be no Law made, according as he shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the Common-wealth, or deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same.

Eleventh, the sovereign has the power to reward any subject with wealth or honor. He also has the power to punish any subject physically, with fines, or with public disgrace. These rewards and punishments must follow the laws he has already made. If no law exists, he may act as he judges best to encourage people to serve the commonwealth. Or he may act as he judges best to deter them from harming the commonwealth.

Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them, Emulation, Quarrells, Factions, and at last Warre, to the destroying of one another, and diminution of their strength against a Common Enemy; It is necessary that there be Lawes of Honour, and a publique rate of the worth of such men as have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the Common-wealth; and that there be force in the hands of some or other, to put those Lawes in execution. But it hath already been shown, that not onely the whole Militia, or forces of the Common-wealth; but also the Judicature of all Controversies, is annexed to the Soveraignty. To the Soveraign therefore it belongeth also to give titles of Honour; and to appoint what Order of place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what signes of respect, in publique or private meetings, they shall give to one another.

Finally, consider how highly people naturally value themselves, how much respect they expect, and how little they value others. These attitudes continually lead to rivalry, quarrels, factions, and finally war. People destroy one another and weaken their strength against a common enemy. Laws governing honour are therefore necessary. So is a public standard for valuing people who have served the commonwealth well or can do so. Someone must also have the power to enforce these laws. But, as already shown, sovereignty includes command of all the commonwealth’s military forces and the authority to settle all disputes. The sovereign therefore also has the right to grant titles of honour and assign each person’s precedence and rank. The sovereign must also determine what signs of respect people must show one another in public or private gatherings.

These are the Rights, which make the Essence of Soveraignty; and which are the markes, whereby a man may discern in what Man, or Assembly of men, the Soveraign Power is placed, and resideth. For these are incommunicable, and inseparable. The Power to coyn Mony; to dispose of the estate and persons of Infant heires; to have praeemption in Markets; and all other Statute Praerogatives, may be transferred by the Soveraign; and yet the Power to protect his Subject be retained. But if he transferre the Militia, he retains the Judicature in vain, for want of execution of the Lawes; Or if he grant away the Power of raising Mony; the Militia is in vain: or if he give away the government of doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the feare of Spirits. And so if we consider any one of the said Rights, we shall presently see, that the holding of all the rest, will produce no effect, in the conservation of Peace and Justice, the end for which all Common-wealths are Instituted. And this division is it, whereof it is said, “A kingdome divided in it selfe cannot stand:” For unlesse this division precede, division into opposite Armies can never happen. If there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of England, that these Powers were divided between the King, and the Lords, and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided, and fallen into this Civill Warre; first between those that disagreed in Politiques; and after between the Dissenters about the liberty of Religion; which have so instructed men in this point of Soveraign Right, that there be few now (in England,) that do not see, that these Rights are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged, at the next return of Peace; and so continue, till their miseries are forgotten; and no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have hetherto been.

These are the rights that form the essence of sovereignty. They show which person or assembly holds sovereign power. For these rights cannot be transferred or separated from one another. The sovereign may transfer the power to coin money, control the property and persons of underage heirs, and buy first in markets. He may also transfer all other privileges granted by law, while keeping the power to protect his subjects. But if he transfers control of the armed forces, keeping the power to judge cases is useless. He will have no means to enforce the laws. Or if he gives away the power to raise money, control of the armed forces is useless. Or if he gives away control over doctrines, people will be frightened into rebellion by fear of spirits. Consider any one of these rights being given away. We will immediately see that keeping all the others cannot preserve peace and justice, the purpose of all commonwealths. This division of power is what the saying means: “A kingdom divided against itself cannot stand.” For unless power is divided first, division into opposing armies can never happen. Most people in England first accepted that these powers were divided between the King, the Lords, and the House of Commons. Without that belief, the people would never have divided and fallen into this Civil War. The war began between those who disagreed about politics, and later continued between those who disagreed about religious liberty. These conflicts have taught people so much about sovereign rights that few now in England fail to see their inseparability. When peace next returns, these rights will be generally acknowledged as inseparable. That recognition will last until people forget their miseries, and no longer, unless ordinary people are better taught than before.

And because they are essentiall and inseparable Rights, it follows necessarily, that in whatsoever, words any of them seem to be granted away, yet if the Soveraign Power it selfe be not in direct termes renounced, and the name of Soveraign no more given by the Grantees to him that Grants them, the Grant is voyd: for when he has granted all he can, if we grant back the Soveraignty, all is restored, as inseparably annexed thereunto.

And because these rights are essential and inseparable, the following conclusion necessarily follows. Whatever words seem to give away any of these rights, the grant is void unless sovereign power is explicitly renounced. Those receiving the rights must also stop calling the person granting them their sovereign. For even after the sovereign has granted everything he can, if we give him back sovereignty, all is restored. These rights are inseparably attached to sovereignty.

This great Authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the Soveraignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of Soveraign Kings, though they be Singulis Majores, of greater Power than every one of their Subjects, yet they be Universis Minores, of lesse power than them all together. For if by All Together, they mean not the collective body as one person, then All Together, and Every One, signifie the same; and the speech is absurd. But if by All Together, they understand them as one Person (which person the Soveraign bears,) then the power of all together, is the same with the Soveraigns power; and so again the speech is absurd; which absurdity they see well enough, when the Soveraignty is in an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch they see it not; and yet the power of Soveraignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed.

This great authority cannot be divided or separated from sovereignty. So there is little basis for saying that sovereign kings, though stronger than each subject, are weaker than all subjects together. For if “all together” does not mean the collective body acting as one person, it means the same as “each subject.” In that case, the claim is absurd. But if “all together” means the subjects united as one person, the sovereign represents that person. Then the power of all subjects together is the same as the sovereign’s power. So again, the claim is absurd. Those making this claim see the absurdity clearly enough when sovereignty belongs to an assembly of the people. But they fail to see the absurdity when sovereignty belongs to a monarch. Yet the power of sovereignty is the same, whoever holds it.

And as the Power, so also the Honour of the Soveraign, ought to be greater, than that of any, or all the Subjects. For in the Soveraignty is the fountain of Honour. The dignities of Lord, Earle, Duke, and Prince are his Creatures. As in the presence of the Master, the Servants are equall, and without any honour at all; So are the Subjects, in the presence of the Soveraign. And though they shine some more, some lesse, when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the Starres in presence of the Sun.

The sovereign’s power should exceed that of any one subject or all subjects together. So too should the sovereign’s honor. For sovereignty is the source of honor. The titles of Lord, Earl, Duke, and Prince are his creations. In their master’s presence, servants are equal and have no honor at all. So too are subjects in the sovereign’s presence. Although some subjects shine more brightly than others when out of his sight, in his presence their brilliance disappears. They shine no more than stars in the presence of the sun.

But a man may here object, that the Condition of Subjects is very miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions of him, or them that have so unlimited a Power in their hands. And commonly they that live under a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy; and they that live under the government of Democracy, or other Soveraign Assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that forme of Common-wealth; whereas the Power in all formes, if they be perfect enough to protect them, is the same; not considering that the estate of Man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest, that in any forme of Government can possibly happen to the people in generall, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a Civill Warre; or that dissolute condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a coercive Power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge: nor considering that the greatest pressure of Soveraign Governours, proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect in the dammage, or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth their own selves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it necessary for their Governours to draw from them what they can in time of Peace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on their Enemies. For all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, (that is their Passions and Self-love,) through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, (namely Morall and Civill Science,) to see a farre off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such payments be avoyded.

But someone may object that subjects live in misery. They are exposed to the desires and other uncontrolled passions of whoever holds such unlimited power. People living under a monarch commonly blame monarchy. People living under a democracy or another sovereign assembly blame all their troubles on that form of government. Yet every form of government has the same power if it is strong enough to protect its subjects. Those who complain fail to consider that human life can never be free of every hardship. Even the greatest hardship any government could impose on the people as a whole is hardly noticeable by comparison. Far worse are the miseries and horrible disasters of civil war. So is the lawless condition of people without a ruler. Such people have no laws or enforcing power to restrain them from plunder and revenge. Those who complain also fail to consider where the heaviest burdens imposed by sovereign rulers come from. Rulers do not impose these burdens because they expect pleasure or profit from harming or weakening their subjects. The rulers themselves depend on their subjects’ strength. Rather, the burdens come from the subjects themselves, who are unwilling to contribute to their own defense. Their reluctance forces rulers to collect what they can in peacetime. The rulers can then have the resources to resist their enemies or gain an advantage over them in an emergency. For all people are naturally equipped with powerful magnifying glasses: their passions and self-love. Through these glasses, every small payment looks like a great injustice. But people lack telescopes, namely moral and political science, to see the miseries threatening them in the distance. Without such payments, those miseries cannot be avoided.