Types of Commonwealths by Agreement and Sovereign Succession

The difference of Common-wealths, consisteth in the difference of the Soveraign, or the Person representative of all and every one of the Multitude. And because the Soveraignty is either in one Man, or in an Assembly of more than one; and into that Assembly either Every man hath right to enter, or not every one, but Certain men distinguished from the rest; it is manifest, there can be but Three kinds of Common-wealth. For the Representative must needs be One man, or More: and if more, then it is the Assembly of All, or but of a Part. When the Representative is One man, then is the Common-wealth a MONARCHY: when an Assembly of All that will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or Popular Common-wealth: when an Assembly of a Part onely, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY. Other kind of Common-wealth there can be none: for either One, or More, or All must have the Soveraign Power (which I have shewn to be indivisible) entire.

Commonwealths differ according to their sovereign, the person or body representing each and every member of the population. Sovereignty belongs either to one man or to an assembly of more than one. Either every man has the right to join that assembly, or only certain men set apart from the rest do. Because of these differences, there can clearly be only three kinds of commonwealth. For the representative must be either one man or more than one. If more than one, the assembly must include either everyone or only part of the population. When the representative is one man, the commonwealth is a MONARCHY. When the representative is an assembly of everyone willing to gather, the commonwealth is a DEMOCRACY, or popular commonwealth. When the representative is an assembly of only part of the population, the commonwealth is called an ARISTOCRACY. There can be no other kind of commonwealth. For sovereign power must belong entirely to one man, to more than one, or to everyone. As I have shown, sovereign power cannot be divided.

There be other names of Government, in the Histories, and books of Policy; as Tyranny, and Oligarchy: But they are not the names of other Formes of Government, but of the same Formes misliked. For they that are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that are displeased with Aristocracy, called it Oligarchy: so also, they which find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy, (which signifies want of Government;) and yet I think no man believes, that want of Government, is any new kind of Government: nor by the same reason ought they to believe, that the Government is of one kind, when they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the Governours.

History books and books on politics use other names for government, such as Tyranny and Oligarchy. But these names do not describe different forms of government. They describe the same forms when people dislike them. For people dissatisfied with Monarchy call it Tyranny, and people displeased with Aristocracy call it Oligarchy. Likewise, people who feel wronged under a Democracy call it Anarchy (meaning the absence of government). Yet I think no one believes that the absence of government is a new kind of government. By the same reasoning, people should not believe that a government changes its kind depending on their approval. It is not one kind when they like it and another when they dislike it or their rulers oppress them.

It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they please, give Authority to One Man, to represent them every one; as well as give such Authority to any Assembly of men whatsoever; and consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a Monarch, as absolutely, as to any other Representative. Therefore, where there is already erected a Soveraign Power, there can be no other Representative of the same people, but onely to certain particular ends, by the Soveraign limited. For that were to erect two Soveraigns; and every man to have his person represented by two Actors, that by opposing one another, must needs divide that Power, which (if men will live in Peace) is indivisible, and thereby reduce the Multitude into the condition of Warre, contrary to the end for which all Soveraignty is instituted. And therefore as it is absurd, to think that a Soveraign Assembly, inviting the People of their Dominion, to send up their Deputies, with power to make known their Advise, or Desires, should therefore hold such Deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute Representative of the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same in a Monarchy. And I know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little observed; that in a Monarchy, he that had the Soveraignty from a descent of 600 years, was alone called Soveraign, had the title of Majesty from every one of his Subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them for their King; was notwithstanding never considered as their Representative; that name without contradiction passing for the title of those men, which at his command were sent up by the people to carry their Petitions, and give him (if he permitted it) their advise. Which may serve as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute Representative of a People, to instruct men in the nature of that Office, and to take heed how they admit of any other generall Representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge the truth committed to them.

Clearly, people who are completely free may, if they choose, authorize one man to represent every one of them. They may just as readily give that authority to any assembly of men. So, if they wish, they may submit as completely to a monarch as to any other representative. Therefore, once a sovereign power has been established, no other representative of the same people can exist. The only exception is a representative serving specific purposes within limits set by the sovereign. Otherwise, there would be two sovereigns, and each person would be represented by two actors. By opposing each other, these representatives would necessarily divide the sovereign power. Yet that power must remain indivisible if people are to live in peace. Dividing it would return the people to a state of war, defeating the purpose for which all sovereignty is established. Suppose a sovereign assembly invites the people it governs to send deputies to present their advice or wishes. It would be absurd to think the assembly therefore regarded those deputies, rather than itself, as the people's absolute representative. It is just as absurd to think so in a monarchy. I do not know how such an obvious truth has lately been so little recognized. In a monarchy, one man held sovereignty through a line of succession stretching back 600 years. He alone was called sovereign. Every one of his subjects addressed him as Majesty, and all unquestionably accepted him as their king. Yet he was never regarded as their representative. Instead, that title went unchallenged to the men whom the people sent at his command to present their petitions. These men could also give him advice, if he permitted it. This example may serve as a warning to those who truly and absolutely represent a people. They should teach people the nature of that office. They should also be careful about allowing any other general representation on any occasion whatsoever. Such care is necessary if they mean to fulfill the trust placed in them.

The difference between these three kindes of Common-wealth, consisteth not in the difference of Power; but in the difference of Convenience, or Aptitude to produce the Peace, and Security of the people; for which end they were instituted. And to compare Monarchy with the other two, we may observe; First, that whosoever beareth the Person of the people, or is one of that Assembly that bears it, beareth also his own naturall Person. And though he be carefull in his politique Person to procure the common interest; yet he is more, or no lesse carefull to procure the private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the publique interest chance to crosse the private, he preferrs the private: for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent than their Reason. From whence it follows, that where the publique and private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the publique prosperity conferres not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a Civill warre.

The difference between these three kinds of commonwealth is not their power. Rather, it is how well they can provide peace and security for the people, the purpose for which they were established. To compare monarchy with the other two forms, we may first observe the following. Whoever represents the people, or belongs to an assembly that represents them, is also a private individual. Although he takes care to serve the common interest in his public role, he cares more, or no less, about private interests. These are the interests of himself, his family, his relatives, and his friends. For the most part, if the public interest conflicts with his private interest, he puts his private interest first. This is because people's passions are usually stronger than their reason. It follows that the public interest advances most where public and private interests are most closely united. Now, in a monarchy, the monarch's private interest is the same as the public interest. A monarch's wealth, power, and honor come only from the wealth, strength, and reputation of his subjects. For no king can be wealthy, glorious, or secure if his subjects are poor or held in contempt. Nor can he be so if poverty or internal divisions leave his subjects too weak to wage war against their enemies. In a democracy or aristocracy, by contrast, public prosperity contributes less to a corrupt or ambitious individual's private fortune. Dishonest advice, a treacherous act, or a civil war often contributes more.

Secondly, that a Monarch receiveth counsell of whom, when, and where he pleaseth; and consequently may heare the opinion of men versed in the matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and as long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will. But when a Soveraigne Assembly has need of Counsell, none are admitted but such as have a Right thereto from the beginning; which for the most part are of those who have beene versed more in the acquisition of Wealth than of Knowledge; and are to give their advice in long discourses, which may, and do commonly excite men to action, but not governe them in it. For the Understanding is by the flame of the Passions, never enlightned, but dazled: Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an Assemblie can receive Counsell with secrecie, because of their owne Multitude.

Secondly, a monarch can seek advice from anyone he chooses, whenever and wherever he pleases. So he can hear from people with expertise in the matter he is considering, whatever their rank or status. He can consult them as long before taking action, and with as much secrecy, as he wishes. But when a sovereign assembly needs advice, only those entitled from the outset to give advice are admitted. Most have more experience in acquiring wealth than in acquiring knowledge. They must give their advice in long speeches. Such speeches can, and commonly do, stir people to action, but cannot guide them in acting. For the flame of the passions never enlightens the understanding, but dazzles it. Nor can an assembly receive advice secretly at any time or place, because of its many members.

Thirdly, that the Resolutions of a Monarch, are subject to no other Inconstancy, than that of Humane Nature; but in Assemblies, besides that of Nature, there ariseth an Inconstancy from the Number. For the absence of a few, that would have the Resolution once taken, continue firme, (which may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments,) or the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes to day, all that was concluded yesterday.

Thirdly, a monarch’s decisions are subject only to the inconsistency of human nature. But assemblies face another source of inconsistency besides human nature: the number of people involved. A few members who want a decision to stand may be absent through complacency, negligence, or personal obstacles. Or a few members with the opposite view may make a point of attending. Either can undo today all that was decided yesterday.

Fourthly, that a Monarch cannot disagree with himselfe, out of envy, or interest; but an Assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce a Civill Warre.

Fourthly, a monarch cannot disagree with himself out of envy or self-interest. But an assembly may disagree within itself, and the disagreement may grow so intense that it causes civil war.

Fifthly, that in Monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any Subject, by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer, may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confesse is a great and inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the Soveraigne Power is in an Assembly: for their power is the same; and they are as subject to evill Counsell, and to be seduced by Orators, as a Monarch by Flatterers; and becoming one an others Flatterers, serve one anothers Covetousnesse and Ambition by turnes. And whereas the Favorites of an Assembly, are many; and the Kindred much more numerous, than of any Monarch. Besides, there is no Favourite of a Monarch, which cannot as well succour his friends, as hurt his enemies: But Orators, that is to say, Favourites of Soveraigne Assemblies, though they have great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse, requires lesse Eloquence (such is mans Nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution more resembles Justice.

Fifth, monarchy has this disadvantage: any subject may lose everything he owns through one man’s power, to enrich a favorite or flatterer. I admit this is a great and unavoidable disadvantage. But the same may just as easily happen when an assembly holds supreme power. An assembly has the same power as a monarch. Its members are as vulnerable to bad advice and persuasive speakers as a monarch is to flatterers. And by flattering one another, assembly members take turns serving one another’s greed and ambition. Moreover, an assembly has many favorites, and far more relatives than any monarch. Besides, every favorite of a monarch can help his friends as well as harm his enemies. But persuasive speakers, the favorites of sovereign assemblies, have great power to harm but little power to save. For human nature is such that accusing requires less eloquence than defending. And condemnation looks more like justice than acquittal does.

Sixtly, that it is an inconvenience in Monarchie, that the Soveraigntie may descend upon an Infant, or one that cannot discerne between Good and Evill: and consisteth in this, that the use of his Power, must be in the hand of another Man, or of some Assembly of men, which are to governe by his right, and in his name; as Curators, and Protectors of his Person, and Authority. But to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of the Soveraign Power, into the hand of a Man, or an Assembly of men; is to say that all Government is more Inconvenient, than Confusion, and Civill Warre. And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must arise from the Contention of those, that for an office of so great honour, and profit, may become Competitors. To make it appear, that this inconvenience, proceedeth not from that forme of Government we call Monarchy, we are to consider, that the precedent Monarch, hath appointed who shall have the Tuition of his Infant Successor, either expressely by Testament, or tacitly, by not controlling the Custome in that case received: And then such inconvenience (if it happen) is to be attributed, not to the Monarchy, but to the Ambition, and Injustice of the Subjects; which in all kinds of Government, where the people are not well instructed in their Duty, and the Rights of Soveraignty, is the same. Or else the precedent Monarch, hath not at all taken order for such Tuition; And then the Law of Nature hath provided this sufficient rule, That the Tuition shall be in him, that hath by Nature most interest in the preservation of the Authority of the Infant, and to whom least benefit can accrue by his death, or diminution. For seeing every man by nature seeketh his own benefit, and promotion; to put an Infant into the power of those, that can promote themselves by his destruction, or dammage, is not Tuition, but Trechery. So that sufficient provision being taken, against all just quarrell, about the Government under a Child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the publique Peace, it is not to be attributed to the forme of Monarchy, but to the ambition of Subjects, and ignorance of their Duty. On the other side, there is no great Common-wealth, the Soveraignty whereof is in a great Assembly, which is not, as to consultations of Peace, and Warre, and making of Lawes, in the same condition, as if the Government were in a Child. For as a Child wants the judgement to dissent from counsell given him, and is thereby necessitated to take the advise of them, or him, to whom he is committed: So an Assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the counsell of the major part, be it good, or bad. And as a Child has need of a Tutor, or Protector, to preserve his Person, and Authority: So also (in great Common-wealths,) the Soveraign Assembly, in all great dangers and troubles, have need of Custodes Libertatis; that is of Dictators, or Protectors of their Authoritie; which are as much as Temporary Monarchs; to whom for a time, they may commit the entire exercise of their Power; and have (at the end of that time) been oftner deprived thereof, than Infant Kings, by their Protectors, Regents, or any other Tutors.

Sixth, an objection to monarchy is that sovereignty may pass to a child or someone unable to distinguish good from evil. The difficulty is that another person, or an assembly, must exercise the ruler’s power. These guardians and protectors of the ruler’s person and authority must govern by his right and in his name. But calling this arrangement a disadvantage amounts to saying that all government is worse than disorder and civil war. So any danger claimed must come from rivalry among those competing for an office of such great honor and profit. To show that this difficulty does not arise from monarchy itself, we must consider two possibilities. The previous monarch may have appointed a guardian for his young successor. He may have done so explicitly in his will, or implicitly by leaving the established custom unchanged. In that case, any difficulty must be blamed not on monarchy, but on the subjects’ ambition and injustice. Such ambition and injustice are the same under all forms of government where people lack proper instruction. The instruction they lack concerns their duty and the rights of sovereign power. Alternatively, the previous monarch may have made no arrangements at all for the child’s guardianship. In that case, the law of nature supplies this sufficient rule: the guardian must have the greatest natural interest in preserving the child’s authority. The guardian must also stand to gain the least from the child’s death or loss of power. For everyone naturally seeks personal benefit and advancement. Placing a child under someone who can advance by destroying or harming him is not guardianship, but treachery. Sufficient provision has therefore been made against all legitimate disputes about government under a child. If any conflict then disturbs the public peace, monarchy is not to blame. The blame lies with the subjects’ ambition and ignorance of their duty. On the other hand, consider any large commonwealth whose sovereign power belongs to a large assembly. In deliberating on peace and war, and in making laws, every such commonwealth is like a government under a child. A child lacks the judgment to reject advice and must therefore follow whoever has charge of him. Similarly, an assembly lacks the freedom to reject the majority’s advice, whether good or bad. And just as a child needs a guardian or protector to preserve his person and authority, so does a sovereign assembly. In large commonwealths, such assemblies need Custodes Libertatis in all times of great danger and trouble. These are dictators, or protectors of the assemblies’ authority, who amount to temporary monarchs. Assemblies may entrust the full exercise of their power to these protectors for a time. At the end of that time, assemblies have more often lost their power to such protectors than infant kings have. Infant kings have less often been deprived of power by their protectors, regents, or other guardians.

Though the Kinds of Soveraigntie be, as I have now shewn, but three; that is to say, Monarchie, where one Man has it; or Democracie, where the generall Assembly of Subjects hath it; or Aristocracie, where it is in an Assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished from the rest: Yet he that shall consider the particular Common-wealthes that have been, and are in the world, will not perhaps easily reduce them to three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other Formes, arising from these mingled together. As for example, Elective Kingdomes; where Kings have the Soveraigne Power put into their hands for a time; of Kingdomes, wherein the King hath a power limited: which Governments, are nevertheless by most Writers called Monarchie. Likewise if a Popular, or Aristocraticall Common-wealth, subdue an Enemies Countrie, and govern the same, by a President, Procurator, or other Magistrate; this may seeme perhaps at first sight, to be a Democraticall, or Aristocraticall Government. But it is not so. For Elective Kings, are not Soveraignes, but Ministers of the Soveraigne; nor limited Kings Soveraignes, but Ministers of them that have the Soveraigne Power: nor are those Provinces which are in subjection to a Democracie, or Aristocracie of another Common-wealth, Democratically, or Aristocratically governed, but Monarchically.

As I have now shown, there are only three kinds of sovereignty. In a monarchy, one man holds sovereign power. In a democracy, the general assembly of subjects holds sovereign power. In an aristocracy, an assembly of certain people holds sovereign power. These people are appointed or otherwise distinguished from the rest. Yet anyone considering the particular commonwealths, past and present, may not easily fit them into these three kinds. This difficulty may lead someone to think there are other forms that combine these three. Consider, for example, elective kingdoms, where kings receive sovereign power for a time, or kingdoms where the king’s power is limited. Most writers nevertheless call these governments monarchies. Likewise, suppose a democratic or aristocratic commonwealth conquers an enemy’s country and governs through a president, procurator, or other magistrate. At first glance, the conquered country’s government may perhaps seem democratic or aristocratic. But that is not so. For elected kings are not sovereigns, but officials serving the sovereign. Nor are kings with limited powers sovereigns. They are officials serving those who hold sovereign power. Nor are provinces subject to another commonwealth’s democracy or aristocracy governed democratically or aristocratically. Instead, those provinces are governed monarchically.

And first, concerning an Elective King, whose power is limited to his life, as it is in many places of Christendome at this day; or to certaine Yeares or Moneths, as the Dictators power amongst the Romans; If he have Right to appoint his Successor, he is no more Elective but Hereditary. But if he have no Power to elect his Successor, then there is some other Man, or Assembly known, which after his decease may elect a new, or else the Common-wealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and returneth to the condition of Warre. If it be known who have the power to give the Soveraigntie after his death, it is known also that the Soveraigntie was in them before: For none have right to give that which they have not right to possesse, and keep to themselves, if they think good. But if there be none that can give the Soveraigntie, after the decease of him that was first elected; then has he power, nay he is obliged by the Law of Nature, to provide, by establishing his Successor, to keep those that had trusted him with the Government, from relapsing into the miserable condition of Civill warre. And consequently he was, when elected, a Soveraign absolute.

First, consider an elected king whose power lasts only for his lifetime, as in many parts of Christendom today. Or his power may last for a fixed number of years or months, like the Roman Dictators’ power. If he has the right to appoint his successor, his monarchy is no longer elective but hereditary. But if he has no power to choose his successor, some other known person or assembly must choose a new king after his death. Otherwise, the commonwealth dies and dissolves with him, returning to a state of war. If we know who can grant sovereignty after his death, we also know that sovereignty already belonged to those people. For no one has the right to give something without also having the right to possess it. They must also have the right to keep it for themselves if they choose. But suppose no one can grant sovereignty after the first elected ruler dies. Then that ruler has the power to appoint his successor. Indeed, the law of nature requires him to do so. By appointing a successor, he must protect those who entrusted him with government from falling back into miserable civil war. Consequently, he was an absolute sovereign from the moment he was elected.

Secondly, that King whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour, is not supreme; that is to say not Soveraign. The Soveraignty therefore was alwaies in that Assembly which had the Right to Limit him; and by consequence the government not Monarchy, but either Democracy, or Aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the Kings had a priviledge to lead their Armies; but the Soveraignty was in the Ephori.

Secondly, a King whose power is limited is not above the person or people empowered to limit his power. And a King who is not above them is not supreme, meaning he is not sovereign. Sovereignty therefore always belonged to the Assembly with the right to limit the King’s power. Consequently, the government was not a monarchy, but either a democracy or an aristocracy. This was the case in ancient Sparta, where the Kings had the privilege of leading their armies. But sovereignty belonged to the Ephori.

Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman People, governed the land of Judea (for example) by a President; yet was not Judea therefore a Democracy; because they were not governed by any Assembly, into which, any of them, had right to enter; nor by an Aristocracy; because they were not governed by any Assembly, into which, any man could enter by their Election: but they were governed by one Person, which though as to the people of Rome was an Assembly of the people, or Democracy; yet as to the people of Judea, which had no right at all of participating in the government, was a Monarch. For though where the people are governed by an Assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the government is called a Democracy, or Aristocracy; yet when they are governed by an Assembly, not of their own choosing, ’tis a Monarchy; not of One man, over another man; but of one people, over another people.

Thirdly, the Roman People once governed the land of Judea, for example, through a governor. Yet Judea was not therefore a Democracy. The people of Judea were not governed by an assembly that any of them had a right to join. Nor was Judea an Aristocracy, because no one could join the governing assembly through election by the people of Judea. Instead, the people of Judea were governed by a single Person. To the people of Rome, that Person was an assembly of the people, or a Democracy. But to the people of Judea, who had no right at all to participate in government, that Person was a Monarch. For when people are governed by an assembly they have chosen from among themselves, the government is called a Democracy or Aristocracy. But when people are governed by an assembly they have not chosen, the government is a Monarchy. It is not the rule of one man over another, but of one people over another.

Of all these Formes of Government, the matter being mortall, so that not onely Monarchs, but also whole Assemblies dy, it is necessary for the conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for an Artificiall Man, so there be order also taken, for an Artificiall Eternity of life; without which, men that are governed by an Assembly, should return into the condition of Warre in every age; and they that are governed by One man, as soon as their Governour dyeth. This Artificiall Eternity, is that which men call the Right of Succession.

In all these forms of government, the people who make up the government are mortal. Not only monarchs but also whole assemblies die. So, to preserve peace, provision must be made for an Artificial Eternity of life, just as for an Artificial Man. Without this provision, people governed by an assembly would return to a state of war in every generation. People governed by one man would return to war as soon as their ruler died. This Artificial Eternity is what people call the Right of Succession.

There is no perfect forme of Government, where the disposing of the Succession is not in the present Soveraign. For if it be in any other particular Man, or private Assembly, it is in a person subject, and may be assumed by the Soveraign at his pleasure; and consequently the Right is in himselfe. And if it be in no particular man, but left to a new choyce; then is the Common-wealth dissolved; and the Right is in him that can get it; contrary to the intention of them that did institute the Common-wealth, for their perpetuall, and not temporary security.

No form of government is complete unless the current sovereign has the right to decide the succession. For if that right belongs to another individual or a private assembly, the holder is subject to the sovereign. The sovereign may take over that right at will, so the right ultimately belongs to the sovereign. But if no particular person holds that right, and succession is left to a new election, the commonwealth is dissolved. The right then belongs to whoever can seize power. This goes against the intention of those who established the commonwealth for their permanent security, not merely temporary security.

In a Democracy, the whole Assembly cannot faile, unlesse the Multitude that are to be governed faile. And therefore questions of the right of Succession, have in that forme of Government no place at all.

In a democracy, the entire assembly cannot cease to exist unless the people to be governed cease to exist. So questions about the right of succession have no place at all in this form of government.

In an Aristocracy, when any of the Assembly dyeth, the election of another into his room belongeth to the Assembly, as the Soveraign, to whom belongeth the choosing of all Counsellours, and Officers. For that which the Representative doth, as Actor, every one of the Subjects doth, as Author. And though the Soveraign assembly, may give Power to others, to elect new men, for supply of their Court; yet it is still by their Authority, that the Election is made; and by the same it may (when the publique shall require it) be recalled.

In an aristocracy, when a member of the assembly dies, the assembly has the right to elect a replacement. The assembly is the sovereign and has the right to choose all advisers and officials. For whatever the representative does as the actor, every subject does as the author. Although the sovereign assembly may empower others to elect new members to fill its vacancies, the election still rests on the assembly’s authority. By that same authority, the assembly may withdraw this power when the public interest requires it.

The Present Monarch Hath Right To Dispose Of The Succession The greatest difficultie about the right of Succession, is in Monarchy: And the difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not manifest who is to appoint the Successor; nor many times, who it is whom he hath appointed. For in both these cases, there is required a more exact ratiocination, than every man is accustomed to use. As to the question, who shall appoint the Successor, of a Monarch that hath the Soveraign Authority; that is to say, (for Elective Kings and Princes have not the Soveraign Power in propriety, but in use only,) we are to consider, that either he that is in possession, has right to dispose of the Succession, or else that right is again in the dissolved Multitude. For the death of him that hath the Soveraign power in propriety, leaves the Multitude without any Soveraign at all; that is, without any Representative in whom they should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at all: And therefore they are incapable of Election of any new Monarch; every man having equall right to submit himselfe to such as he thinks best able to protect him, or if he can, protect himselfe by his owne sword; which is a returne to Confusion, and to the condition of a War of every man against every man, contrary to the end for which Monarchy had its first Institution. Therfore it is manifest, that by the Institution of Monarchy, the disposing of the Successor, is alwaies left to the Judgment and Will of the present Possessor.

The Present Monarch Has the Right to Choose the Successor The greatest difficulty concerning the right of succession arises in monarchy. At first glance, it is not clear who should appoint the successor. Often, it is also unclear whom that person has appointed. Both questions require more careful reasoning than everyone is accustomed to using. First, who should appoint the successor to a monarch who holds sovereign authority? Elected kings and princes do not possess sovereign power in their own right, but only exercise it. We must consider two possibilities. Either the reigning monarch has the right to decide the succession, or that right returns to the people as a disbanded multitude. For when someone who possesses sovereign power in his own right dies, the people are left without any sovereign. They have no representative to unite them and enable them to act together. They therefore cannot elect a new monarch. Every person has an equal right to submit to whoever he thinks can best protect him. Or, if he can, he may protect himself with his own sword. This means a return to disorder and a war of every person against every other person. Such a return defeats the purpose for which monarchy was first established. Therefore, establishing a monarchy clearly means always leaving the choice of successor to the reigning monarch’s judgment and will.

And for the question (which may arise sometimes) who it is that the Monarch in possession, hath designed to the succession and inheritance of his power; it is determined by his expresse Words, and Testament; or by other tacite signes sufficient.

The question may sometimes arise: whom has the reigning monarch chosen to succeed him and inherit his power? The answer is determined by the monarch’s explicit words and will, or by other sufficient unspoken signs.

By expresse Words, or Testament, when it is declared by him in his life time, viva voce, or by Writing; as the first Emperours of Rome declared who should be their Heires. For the word Heire does not of it selfe imply the Children, or nearest Kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man shall any way declare, he would have to succeed him in his Estate. If therefore a Monarch declare expresly, that such a man shall be his Heire, either by Word or Writing, then is that man immediately after the decease of his Predecessor, Invested in the right of being Monarch.

Through an explicit statement or a will, a monarch can name his successor during his lifetime, either orally or in writing. The first Emperors of Rome named their heirs in this way. For the word heir does not by itself mean a man's children or closest relatives. Instead, an heir is anyone a man declares, in any way, should succeed him in his estate. So if a monarch explicitly names someone as his heir, either orally or in writing, that person gains the right to rule as monarch immediately upon his predecessor's death.

But where Testament, and expresse Words are wanting, other naturall signes of the Will are to be followed: whereof the one is Custome. And therefore where the Custome is, that the next of Kindred absolutely succeedeth, there also the next of Kindred hath right to the Succession; for that, if the will of him that was in posession had been otherwise, he might easily have declared the same in his life time. And likewise where the Custome is, that the next of the Male Kindred succeedeth, there also the right of Succession is in the next of the Kindred Male, for the same reason. And so it is if the Custome were to advance the Female. For whatsoever Custome a man may by a word controule, and does not, it is a naturall signe he would have that Custome stand.

But when there is no will or explicit statement, other natural signs of a person's wishes must be followed. One such sign is custom. So where custom gives the nearest relative an unconditional right to succeed, the nearest relative has that right. For if the previous holder had wished otherwise, he could easily have said so during his lifetime. Likewise, where custom gives succession to the nearest male relative, that relative has the right to succeed, for the same reason. The same applies if custom gives preference to a female relative. For whenever a man can override a custom with a word but does not, his silence naturally shows his wishes. He wants that custom to remain in force.

But where neither Custome, nor Testament hath preceded, there it is to be understood, First, that a Monarchs will is, that the government remain Monarchicall; because he hath approved that government in himselfe. Secondly, that a Child of his own, Male, or Female, be preferred before any other; because men are presumed to be more enclined by nature, to advance their own children, than the children of other men; and of their own, rather a Male than a Female; because men, are naturally fitter than women, for actions of labour and danger. Thirdly, where his own Issue faileth, rather a Brother than a stranger; and so still the neerer in bloud, rather than the more remote, because it is alwayes presumed that the neerer of kin, is the neerer in affection; and ’tis evident that a man receives alwayes, by reflexion, the most honour from the greatnesse of his neerest kindred.

But where neither custom nor a will has established succession, the following must be understood. First, the monarch wishes the government to remain a monarchy, because he has approved that form of government by ruling himself. Second, he wishes his own child, male or female, to be preferred over anyone else. For men are presumed naturally more inclined to advance their own children than the children of others. Among their own children, men are presumed to prefer a male over a female. This is because men are naturally better suited than women to tasks involving hard work and danger. Third, where the monarch has no descendants, he wishes a brother to be preferred over a stranger. Likewise, closer blood relatives are to be preferred over more distant relatives. This is because closer relatives are always presumed to be closer in affection. And clearly, a man always gains the most reflected honor from the greatness of his closest relatives.

But if it be lawfull for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by words of Contract, or Testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience: for he may sell, or give his Right of governing to a stranger; which, because strangers (that is, men not used to live under the same government, not speaking the same language) do commonly undervalue one another, may turn to the oppression of his Subjects; which is indeed a great inconvenience; but it proceedeth not necessarily from the subjection to a strangers government, but from the unskilfulnesse of the Governours, ignorant of the true rules of Politiques. And therefore the Romans when they had subdued many Nations, to make their Government digestible, were wont to take away that grievance, as much as they thought necessary, by giving sometimes to whole Nations, and sometimes to Principall men of every Nation they conquered, not onely the Privileges, but also the Name of Romans; and took many of them into the Senate, and Offices of charge, even in the Roman City. And this was it our most wise King, King James, aymed at, in endeavouring the Union of his two Realms of England and Scotland. Which if he could have obtained, had in all likelihood prevented the Civill warres, which make both those Kingdomes at this present, miserable. It is not therefore any injury to the people, for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by Will; though by the fault of many Princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient. Of the lawfulnesse of it, this also is an argument, that whatsoever inconvenience can arrive by giving a Kingdome to a stranger, may arrive also by so marrying with strangers, as the Right of Succession may descend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawfull.

But if a monarch may lawfully determine the succession by contract or will, people may perhaps raise a serious objection. He may sell or give his right to govern to a foreigner. Foreigners are people unaccustomed to living under the same government and who do not speak the same language. Because such people commonly undervalue one another, foreign rule may lead to the oppression of the monarch’s subjects. Such oppression is indeed a serious problem. But oppression does not necessarily result from being subject to a foreign government. Rather, it results from rulers’ lack of skill and ignorance of the true principles of government. So when the Romans conquered many nations, they sought to make their rule acceptable by reducing this resentment. They did so as much as they thought necessary. Sometimes they granted whole nations both the privileges and the name of Romans. Sometimes they granted these to leading men in each conquered nation. They also brought many of these men into the Senate and positions of responsibility, even in the city of Rome. This was the aim of our most wise king, King James, in seeking to unite England and Scotland. If he had achieved this union, it would in all likelihood have prevented the civil wars. Those wars now make both kingdoms miserable. Therefore, a monarch does not wrong the people by determining the succession through a will. This remains true though, through the fault of many princes, the practice has sometimes caused problems. Another argument supports its lawfulness. Whatever problems may arise from giving a kingdom to a foreigner may also arise from marrying foreigners. Such marriages may allow the right of succession to pass to foreigners. Yet everyone considers such marriages lawful.