Commonwealth: Causes, Formation, and Definition

The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observation of these Lawes of Nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.

People naturally love freedom and power over others. Yet they accept the restraints of life in a commonwealth to protect themselves and live more contentedly. Their ultimate purpose is to escape the miserable condition of war. As already shown, war necessarily follows from people's natural passions when no visible power exists to keep them in awe. Such a power must use fear of punishment to make people keep their agreements and obey the laws of nature. These are the laws set out in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters.

For the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in summe) Doing To Others, As Wee Would Be Done To,) if themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have lived by small Families, to robbe and spoyle one another, has been a Trade, and so farre from being reputed against the Law of Nature, that the greater spoyles they gained, the greater was their honour; and men observed no other Lawes therein, but the Lawes of Honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry. And as small Familyes did then; so now do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families (for their own security) enlarge their Dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and fear of Invasion, or assistance that may be given to Invaders, endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open force, and secret arts, for want of other Caution, justly; and are remembred for it in after ages with honour.

The laws of nature include justice, fairness, humility, mercy, and, in short, treating others as we would want to be treated. By themselves, without fear of some power to enforce them, these laws run against our natural passions. Those passions drive us toward favoritism, pride, revenge, and the like. And agreements without the sword are merely words, with no power to keep anyone safe. Therefore, despite the laws of nature, everyone will and may lawfully rely on their own strength and cunning for protection against everyone else. This applies if no power has been established, or if that power is not strong enough to keep us safe. A person has fulfilled the laws of nature by being willing to follow them whenever doing so is safe. Wherever people have lived in small families, robbing and plundering one another has been an occupation. Far from being considered against the law of nature, the greater the plunder, the greater the honor. In these raids, people followed only the laws of honor. These required avoiding cruelty by sparing people's lives and leaving them their farming tools. Just as small families acted then, cities and kingdoms act now, since they are only larger families. For their own security, they expand their territories on every pretext of danger, feared invasion, or possible aid to invaders. They try as hard as they can to conquer or weaken their neighbors through open force and secret schemes. With no other means of protection, they act justly in doing so. And later generations remember them with honor.

Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives them this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the Victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an Invasion. The Multitude sufficient to confide in for our Security, is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the Enemy we feare; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the Enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of warre, as to move him to attempt.

Nor does a small group of men gain this security simply by joining together. In small groups, a few extra men on either side can provide enough strength to secure victory. So this advantage encourages invasion. The number of people needed for our security is not fixed. Instead, it depends on the strength of the enemy we fear. Our numbers are sufficient when the enemy’s advantage is not so clear and decisive that it encourages him to attack.

And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgements, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a Common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another; and reduce their strength by mutuall opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily, not onely subdued by a very few that agree together; but also when there is no common enemy, they make warre upon each other, for their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of Justice, and other Lawes of Nature, without a common Power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all Man-kind to do the same; and then there neither would be nor need to be any Civill Government, or Common-wealth at all; because there would be Peace without subjection.

However large a crowd may be, its members may still act according to their individual judgments and desires. If they do, they can expect no defense or protection against a common enemy or against one another’s attacks. For they disagree about how best to use their strength, so they hinder rather than help one another. By opposing one another, they reduce their combined strength to nothing. As a result, even a very small number of people who act together can easily defeat them. And when there is no common enemy, they fight one another for their individual interests. For suppose we could expect a large crowd to agree to follow justice and other laws of nature. Suppose they could do so without a common power to keep them all in fear. We might just as well expect all humanity to do the same. Then there would be no civil government or commonwealth, nor any need for one, because peace would exist without submission.

Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one judgement, for a limited time; as in one Battell, or one Warre. For though they obtain a Victory by their unanimous endeavour against a forraign enemy; yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a Warre amongst themselves.

People want security that lasts their whole lives. So being governed and directed by a single judgment for a limited time is not enough. Such a period might be a single battle or a single war. For even if people defeat a foreign enemy through united effort, their unity cannot last under certain conditions. They may no longer have a common enemy. Or one group may see someone as an enemy while another sees that person as a friend. In either case, their conflicting interests must break their union apart, and they must fall back into war among themselves.

It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants, live sociably one with another, (which are therefore by Aristotle numbred amongst Politicall creatures;) and yet have no other direction, than their particular judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signifie to another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why Man-kind cannot do the same. To which I answer,

It is true that certain living creatures, such as bees and ants, live together socially. (For this reason, Aristotle counts them among political creatures.) Yet these creatures are guided only by their individual judgments and desires. Nor do they have speech to tell one another what they think would serve the common good. So someone may perhaps wish to know why human beings cannot do the same. To this I answer:

First, that men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, Envy and Hatred, and finally Warre; but amongst these not so.

First, men constantly compete for honor and status, while these creatures do not. As a result, competition among men leads to envy and hatred, and finally war. But this does not happen among these creatures.

Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not from the Private; and being by nature enclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose Joy consisteth in comparing himselfe with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.

Secondly, among these creatures, the common good is no different from the private good. Their natural pursuit of their own good therefore benefits them all. But humans find joy in comparing themselves with others, so they can enjoy only what sets them above others.

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason, do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their common businesse: whereas amongst men, there are very many, that thinke themselves wiser, and abler to govern the Publique, better than the rest; and these strive to reforme and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into Distraction and Civill warre.

Thirdly, unlike humans, these creatures cannot reason. So they neither see nor think they see any fault in how their shared affairs are managed. But among humans, very many think themselves wiser and better able to govern the public than others. These people strive to reform and change things, some one way, others another. In doing so, they throw public affairs into disorder and civil war.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in making knowne to one another their desires, and other affections; yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that which is Good, in the likenesse of Evill; and Evill, in the likenesse of Good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatnesse of Good and Evill; discontenting men, and troubling their Peace at their pleasure.

Fourth, although these creatures use their voices to communicate their desires and other feelings, they lack skill with words. Some people use this skill to make good seem evil and evil seem good. They can also make good and evil seem greater or smaller than they are. In this way, they can make people dissatisfied and disturb their peace whenever they please.

Fiftly, irrationall creatures cannot distinguish betweene Injury, and Dammage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellowes: whereas Man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his Wisdome, and controule the Actions of them that governe the Common-wealth.

Fifth, creatures without reason cannot distinguish between being wronged and being harmed. So, as long as they are comfortable, they take no offense at their fellows. But people are most troublesome when they are most at ease. For that is when they love to show off their wisdom and criticize the actions of those governing the commonwealth.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is Naturall; that of men, is by Covenant only, which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit.

Finally, these creatures agree by nature. Humans agree only through a covenant, which is artificial. So it is no surprise if something beyond a covenant is needed to make human agreement stable and lasting. What is needed is a common power to keep people in fear and direct their actions toward the common good.

The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and every one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgment. This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, “I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner.” This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled to forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad.

There is only one way to establish a common power capable of defending people against foreign invasion and one another’s wrongdoing. This power must keep them secure enough to support themselves through their own work and the earth’s produce, and live contentedly. To establish such a power, they must give all their power and strength to one man or one assembly of men. By majority vote, this man or assembly can bring all their wills together into one will. In other words, they must appoint one man or assembly to represent them. Everyone must accept and acknowledge responsibility for whatever their representative does, or causes to be done, concerning common peace and safety. In these matters, everyone must submit their will to their representative’s will, and their judgment to their representative’s judgment. This is more than consent or agreement. It is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, created by everyone’s covenant with everyone else. It is as if each person said to every other person: “I authorize this man or assembly to govern me, and give up my right to govern myself. I do so on this condition: you must give up your right to the same authority and likewise authorize all its actions.” Once this is done, the multitude united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH, or CIVITAS in Latin. This is the birth of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that Mortal God. Under the Immortal God, we owe our peace and defense to this Mortal God. Every individual in the Commonwealth has given this representative authority. Through that authority, the representative has the use of all the power and strength entrusted to him. The terror inspired by such power enables him to direct everyone’s will toward peace at home and mutual aid against enemies abroad.

And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to define it,) is “One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence.”

And in him lies the essence of the Commonwealth. To define the Commonwealth, it is “One person whose actions many people have each authorized through mutual agreements with one another. They do so to let him use the strength and resources of them all as he thinks best. The purpose is their peace and common defense.”

And he that carryeth this Person, as called SOVERAIGNE, and said to have Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.

And the one who represents this person is called the SOVEREIGN and is said to have sovereign power. Everyone else is his SUBJECT.

The attaining to this Soveraigne Power, is by two wayes. One, by Naturall force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse, or by Warre subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This later, may be called a Politicall Common-wealth, or Common-wealth by Institution; and the former, a Common-wealth by Acquisition. And first, I shall speak of a Common-wealth by Institution.

Sovereign power is gained in two ways. One is through natural force. For example, a man makes his children submit themselves and their children to his rule because he can destroy them if they refuse. Or he conquers his enemies in war and spares their lives on condition that they submit to his will. The other way is when people agree among themselves to submit voluntarily to a man or an assembly of men. They do so because they trust that man or assembly to protect them against all others. This second kind may be called a Political Commonwealth, or Commonwealth by Institution. The first is called a Commonwealth by Acquisition. I will begin with a Commonwealth by Institution.