Other Laws of Nature

From that law of Nature, by which we are obliged to transferre to another, such Rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of Mankind, there followeth a Third; which is this, That Men Performe Their Covenants Made: without which, Covenants are in vain, and but Empty words; and the Right of all men to all things remaining, wee are still in the condition of Warre.

The law of nature requires us to transfer to others any rights that, if kept, would prevent peace among humankind. From this law follows a third: people must keep the agreements they make. Without people keeping their agreements, those agreements are useless, nothing but empty words. And with everyone still having a right to everything, we remain in a state of war.

And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall of JUSTICE. For where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is Unjust: And the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than The Not Performance Of Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is Just.

This law of nature is the source and origin of JUSTICE. For where no covenant has been made, no right has been transferred, and everyone has a right to everything. Consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, breaking that covenant is unjust. And INJUSTICE means nothing other than failing to fulfill a covenant. And whatever is not unjust is just.

Justice And Propriety Begin With The Constitution of Common-wealth But because Covenants of mutuall trust, where there is a feare of not performance on either part, (as hath been said in the former Chapter,) are invalid; though the Originall of Justice be the making of Covenants; yet Injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such feare be taken away; which while men are in the naturall condition of Warre, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, there must be some coercive Power, to compell men equally to the performance of their Covenants, by the terrour of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant; and to make good that Propriety, which by mutuall Contract men acquire, in recompence of the universall Right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a Common-wealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of Justice in the Schooles: For they say, that “Justice is the constant Will of giving to every man his own.” And therefore where there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there is no Injustice; and where there is no coerceive Power erected, that is, where there is no Common-wealth, there is no Propriety; all men having Right to all things: Therefore where there is no Common-wealth, there nothing is Unjust. So that the nature of Justice, consisteth in keeping of valid Covenants: but the Validity of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to compell men to keep them: And then it is also that Propriety begins.

Justice and Property Begin with the Establishment of a Commonwealth But agreements based on mutual trust are invalid when either side fears the other will not fulfill them. This was explained in the previous chapter. Although justice begins with making agreements, no actual injustice can exist until the cause of such fear is removed. That fear cannot be removed while people remain in the natural state of war. Therefore, before the terms just and unjust can apply, there must be a power capable of enforcing agreements. This power must compel everyone equally to keep their agreements through fear of punishment. The punishment must be greater than the benefit they expect from breaking their agreement. This power must also secure the property people acquire by mutual agreement in return for surrendering their right to everything. No such power exists before a commonwealth is established. The standard definition of justice taught in the schools also leads to this conclusion. For the schools say that “Justice is the constant will to give everyone what is their own.” Therefore, where nothing belongs to anyone, meaning there is no property, there is no injustice. And where no enforcing power has been established, meaning there is no commonwealth, there is no property. Everyone has a right to everything. Therefore, where there is no commonwealth, nothing is unjust. So justice consists in keeping valid agreements. But agreements become valid only when a civil power is established with enough strength to compel people to keep them. And property also begins only then.

The Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice; and sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleaging, that every mans conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto; and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not keep Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit. He does not therein deny, that there be Covenants; and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may be called Injustice, and the observance of them Justice: but he questioneth, whether Injustice, taking away the feare of God, (for the same Foole hath said in his heart there is no God,) may not sometimes stand with that Reason, which dictateth to every man his own good; and particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a man in a condition, to neglect not onely the dispraise, and revilings, but also the power of other men. The Kingdome of God is gotten by violence; but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence? were it against Reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by it? and if it be not against Reason, it is not against Justice; or else Justice is not to be approved for good. From such reasoning as this, Succesfull wickednesse hath obtained the Name of Vertue; and some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of Faith; yet have allowed it, when it is for the getting of a Kingdome. And the Heathen that believed, that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter, believed neverthelesse the same Jupiter to be the avenger of Injustice: Somewhat like to a piece of Law in Cokes Commentaries on Litleton; where he sayes, If the right Heire of the Crown be attainted of Treason; yet the Crown shall descend to him, and Eo Instante the Atteynder be voyd; From which instances a man will be very prone to inferre; that when the Heire apparent of a Kingdome, shall kill him that is in possession, though his father; you may call it Injustice, or by what other name you will; yet it can never be against Reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most Reasonable, that conduce most to their ends. This specious reasoning is nevertheless false.

The Fool has said in his heart that there is no such thing as justice, and sometimes aloud as well. He seriously argues that each person is responsible for his own survival and contentment. So why should anyone not do whatever he thinks will help him achieve those goals? Therefore, making or refusing to make covenants, and keeping or breaking them, cannot be against reason when doing so benefits him. He does not deny that covenants exist, or that people sometimes break them and sometimes keep them. Nor does he deny that breaking covenants may be called injustice, and keeping them justice. But he questions whether injustice may sometimes agree with the reason that tells everyone to pursue his own good. He sets aside the fear of God, since the same Fool has said in his heart that there is no God. His question applies particularly when injustice brings benefits that put someone beyond other people's power, criticism, and insults. The Kingdom of God is gained by violence. But what if the Kingdom could be gained by unjust violence? Would gaining the Kingdom that way be against reason, if doing so could not possibly bring harm? And if gaining the Kingdom that way is not against reason, neither is it against justice. Otherwise, justice should not be regarded as good. Reasoning like this has earned successful wickedness the name of virtue. Some people have condemned breaking faith in every other situation, yet allowed it when done to gain a kingdom. And the pagans who believed that Jupiter overthrew his father Saturn nevertheless believed that the same Jupiter punished injustice. This is somewhat like a point of law in Coke's Commentaries on Littleton. Coke says that even if the rightful heir to the Crown is attainted of treason, the Crown will still pass to him. At that very instant, the attainder, the legal judgment against him, becomes void. These examples readily tempt a person to draw the following conclusion. Suppose the heir apparent to a kingdom kills the person who holds the throne, even if that person is his father. You may call the killing injustice, or whatever else you please, yet it can never be against reason. For all people's voluntary actions aim at their own benefit. And the most reasonable actions are those that do most to achieve their goals. This seemingly convincing reasoning is nevertheless false.

For the question is not of promises mutuall, where there is no security of performance on either side; as when there is no Civill Power erected over the parties promising; for such promises are no Covenants: But either where one of the parties has performed already; or where there is a Power to make him performe; there is the question whether it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other to performe, or not. And I say it is not against reason. For the manifestation whereof, we are to consider; First, that when a man doth a thing, which notwithstanding any thing can be foreseen, and reckoned on, tendeth to his own destruction, howsoever some accident which he could not expect, arriving may turne it to his benefit; yet such events do not make it reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that in a condition of Warre, wherein every man to every man, for want of a common Power to keep them all in awe, is an Enemy, there is no man can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himselfe from destruction, without the help of Confederates; where every one expects the same defence by the Confederation, that any one else does: and therefore he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single Power. He therefore that breaketh his Covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any Society, that unite themselves for Peace and defence, but by the errour of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be retayned in it, without seeing the danger of their errour; which errours a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security; and therefore if he be left, or cast out of Society, he perisheth; and if he live in Society, it is by the errours of other men, which he could not foresee, nor reckon upon; and consequently against the reason of his preservation; and so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction, forbear him onely out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.

For the question is not about mutual promises when neither side has any guarantee that the other will perform. This happens when no civil authority has been established over the people making the promises. Such promises are not covenants. Instead, the question concerns cases where one party has already performed, or an authority can compel performance. The question is whether performing is against reason, meaning against the other party’s interest. And I say that performing is not against reason. To explain why, we must consider two things. First, a man may do something that, by everything he can foresee and calculate, leads to his own destruction. Some unexpected accident may nevertheless turn his action to his advantage. But such events do not make his action reasonable or wise. Second, consider a state of war, where everyone is everyone else’s enemy. This happens because there is no common authority to keep everyone in fear of its power. In such a state, no man can hope to escape destruction through his own strength or intelligence without allies. Everyone expects the alliance to provide the same protection for himself as for anyone else. Therefore, anyone who declares that deceiving his helpers is reasonable can reasonably expect protection only from his own strength. A man who breaks his covenant thereby declares that he thinks breaking it can be reasonable. No society united for peace and defense can accept him unless its members make a mistake. Nor, once accepted, can he remain without the members recognizing the danger of their mistake. A man cannot reasonably count on such mistakes to keep him safe. Therefore, if he is left outside society or expelled from it, he perishes. If he lives in society, he does so through other people’s mistakes, which he could neither foresee nor count on. Consequently, his conduct goes against the reasoning needed to preserve his life. Thus, everyone who does not contribute to his destruction spares him only through ignorance of their own interests.

As for the Instance of gaining the secure and perpetuall felicity of Heaven, by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way imaginable; and that is not breaking, but keeping of Covenant.

The example of gaining the secure and eternal happiness of Heaven by any means is pointless. For there is only one imaginable way: not breaking a covenant, but keeping it.

And for the other Instance of attaining Soveraignty by Rebellion; it is manifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably be expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so, others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason. Justice therefore, that is to say, Keeping of Covenant, is a Rule of Reason, by which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our life; and consequently a Law of Nature.

As for the other example, gaining sovereignty through rebellion, the point is clear. Although rebellion may succeed, success cannot reasonably be expected. Rather, the opposite is more likely. And because gaining sovereignty this way teaches others to do the same, attempting rebellion goes against reason. Justice, therefore, means keeping agreements and is a rule of reason. By this rule, we are forbidden to do anything destructive to our lives. Consequently, justice is a law of nature.

There be some that proceed further; and will not have the Law of Nature, to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life on earth; but to the attaining of an eternall felicity after death; to which they think the breach of Covenant may conduce; and consequently be just and reasonable; (such are they that think it a work of merit to kill, or depose, or rebell against, the Soveraigne Power constituted over them by their own consent.) But because there is no naturall knowledge of mans estate after death; much lesse of the reward that is then to be given to breach of Faith; but onely a beliefe grounded upon other mens saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally; Breach of Faith cannot be called a Precept of Reason, or Nature.

Some people go further. They reject the idea that the law of nature consists of rules that help preserve human life on earth. Instead, they say these rules aim at achieving eternal happiness after death. They think breaking an agreement may help achieve that happiness, and may therefore be just and reasonable. (Such people think they earn spiritual merit by killing, overthrowing, or rebelling against the sovereign power established by their own consent.) But we have no natural knowledge of the human condition after death. Much less do we have natural knowledge of any reward then given for breaking faith. There is only belief based on what others say. These others claim supernatural knowledge, or claim to know people who knew people who knew others with supernatural knowledge. So breaking faith cannot be called a rule of reason or nature.

Others, that allow for a Law of Nature, the keeping of Faith, do neverthelesse make exception of certain persons; as Heretiques, and such as use not to performe their Covenant to others: And this also is against reason. For if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge our Covenant made; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindred the making of it.

Others accept that keeping promises is a law of nature, but still make exceptions for certain people. These include heretics and people who do not keep their agreements with others. These exceptions also go against reason. For if someone’s fault is enough to release us from an agreement, that same fault should reasonably have prevented us from making the agreement.

The names of Just, and Unjust, when they are attributed to Men, signifie one thing; and when they are attributed to Actions, another. When they are attributed to Men, they signifie Conformity, or Inconformity of Manners, to Reason. But when they are attributed to Actions, they signifie the Conformity, or Inconformity to Reason, not of Manners, or manner of life, but of particular Actions. A Just man therefore, is he that taketh all the care he can, that his Actions may be all Just: and an Unjust man, is he that neglecteth it. And such men are more often in our Language stiled by the names of Righteous, and Unrighteous; then Just, and Unjust; though the meaning be the same. Therefore a Righteous man, does not lose that Title, by one, or a few unjust Actions, that proceed from sudden Passion, or mistake of Things, or Persons: nor does an Unrighteous man, lose his character, for such Actions, as he does, of forbeares to do, for feare: because his Will is not framed by the Justice, but by the apparant benefit of what he is to do. That which gives to humane Actions the relish of Justice, is a certain Noblenesse or Gallantnesse of courage, (rarely found,) by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of promise. This Justice of the Manners, is that which is meant, where Justice is called a Vertue; and Injustice a Vice.

The words just and unjust mean one thing when applied to people and another when applied to actions. When applied to people, they describe whether a person’s conduct agrees with reason. But when applied to actions, they describe whether particular actions agree with reason, not a person’s conduct or way of life. A just person therefore takes every possible care to make all his actions just. An unjust person neglects that care. In our language, such people are more often called righteous and unrighteous than just and unjust, though the meaning is the same. Therefore, a righteous person does not lose that title through one or a few unjust actions. Those actions may arise from sudden passion or a misunderstanding of things or people. Nor does an unrighteous person lose his character because of actions he performs or avoids out of fear. His will is guided not by justice, but by the apparent benefit of what he is about to do. What gives human actions the quality of justice is a certain nobility or greatness of spirit, rarely found. A person with that spirit scorns relying on fraud or broken promises for satisfaction in life. This justice of character is what we mean when we call justice a virtue and injustice a vice.

But the Justice of Actions denominates men, not Just, but Guiltlesse; and the Injustice of the same, (which is also called Injury,) gives them but the name of Guilty.

But justice in people's actions earns them the label of guiltless, not just. Injustice in their actions is also called injury and earns them only the label of guilty.

Again, the Injustice of Manners, is the disposition, or aptitude to do Injurie; and is Injustice before it proceed to Act; and without supposing any individuall person injured. But the Injustice of an Action, (that is to say Injury,) supposeth an individuall person Injured; namely him, to whom the Covenant was made: And therefore many times the injury is received by one man, when the dammage redoundeth to another. As when The Master commandeth his servant to give mony to a stranger; if it be not done, the Injury is done to the Master, whom he had before Covenanted to obey; but the dammage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no Obligation; and therefore could not Injure him. And so also in Common-wealths, private men may remit to one another their debts; but not robberies or other violences, whereby they are endammaged; because the detaining of Debt, is an Injury to themselves; but Robbery and Violence, are Injuries to the Person of the Common-wealth.

Again, injustice of character is a disposition or readiness to wrong others. It is injustice even before anyone acts, and without any particular person being wronged. But an unjust action (that is, a wrongful act) assumes that a particular person has been wronged. That person is the one to whom a promise was made in a covenant. So one person often suffers the wrong, while another suffers the harm. For example, a master orders his servant to give money to a stranger. If the servant does not obey, the servant wrongs the master, whom he had previously agreed by covenant to obey. But the stranger suffers the harm. The servant had no obligation to the stranger and therefore could not wrong him. Likewise, in commonwealths, private individuals may forgive debts owed to them by one another. But they may not pardon robberies or other acts of violence that harm them. This is because withholding payment of a debt wrongs the creditor. But robbery and violence are wrongs against the commonwealth itself.

Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own Will signified to the doer, is no Injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed away his originall right to do what he please, by some Antecedent Covenant, there is no breach of Covenant; and therefore no Injury done him. And if he have; then his Will to have it done being signified, is a release of that Covenant; and so again there is no Injury done him.

Whatever is done to a person is no wrong against him if he has told the doer he wants it done. For if the doer has not given up his original right to do as he pleases through an earlier agreement, no agreement is broken. So no wrong is done to the person. And if the doer has given up that right, the person's stated wish to have the act done releases the doer from that agreement. So again, no wrong is done to the person.

Justice of Actions, is by Writers divided into Commutative, and Distributive; and the former they say consisteth in proportion Arithmeticall; the later in proportion Geometricall. Commutative therefore, they place in the equality of value of the things contracted for; And Distributive, in the distribution of equall benefit, to men of equall merit. As if it were Injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or to give more to a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the Appetite of the Contractors: and therefore the just value, is that which they be contented to give. And Merit (besides that which is by Covenant, where the performance on one part, meriteth the performance of the other part, and falls under Justice Commutative, not Distributive,) is not due by Justice; but is rewarded of Grace onely. And therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is not right. To speak properly, Commutative Justice, is the Justice of a Contractor; that is, a Performance of Covenant, in Buying, and Selling; Hiring, and Letting to Hire; Lending, and Borrowing; Exchanging, Bartering, and other acts of Contract.

Writers divide justice in actions into commutative and distributive justice. They say the first rests on arithmetic proportion, and the second on geometric proportion. They therefore define commutative justice as equality in the value of things exchanged under a contract. They define distributive justice as giving equal benefits to people of equal merit. As if selling for more than we paid were unjust, or giving someone more than he deserves. The value of all things exchanged under a contract is measured by the desires of those making the contract. So the just value is whatever they are willing to give. And merit does not entitle anyone to a reward as a matter of justice, except where a covenant establishes merit. Under a covenant, one side's performance earns the other side's performance. Such merit falls under commutative justice, not distributive justice. Apart from this exception, merit is rewarded only as a freely given favor. So this distinction, as usually explained, is not correct. Properly speaking, commutative justice is justice on the part of someone making a contract. It means fulfilling a covenant in buying and selling, hiring and renting out, lending and borrowing, exchanging, bartering, and other contractual dealings.

And Distributive Justice, the Justice of an Arbitrator; that is to say, the act of defining what is Just. Wherein, (being trusted by them that make him Arbitrator,) if he performe his Trust, he is said to distribute to every man his own: and his is indeed Just Distribution, and may be called (though improperly) Distributive Justice; but more properly Equity; which also is a Law of Nature, as shall be shewn in due place.

And distributive justice is the justice of an arbitrator, meaning the act of deciding what is just. Those who appoint an arbitrator place their trust in him. If he fulfills that trust, he is said to give each person what is rightfully theirs. His decision is indeed a just distribution and may be called distributive justice, though that term is not quite accurate. More properly, it is called equity. Equity is also a law of nature, as will be shown in the appropriate place.

As Justice dependeth on Antecedent Covenant; so does Gratitude depend on Antecedent Grace; that is to say, Antecedent Free-gift: and is the fourth Law of Nature; which may be conceived in this Forme, “That a man which receiveth Benefit from another of meer Grace, Endeavour that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will.” For no man giveth, but with intention of Good to himselfe; because Gift is Voluntary; and of all Voluntary Acts, the Object is to every man his own Good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of mutuall help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of War; which is contrary to the first and Fundamentall Law of Nature, which commandeth men to Seek Peace. The breach of this Law, is called Ingratitude; and hath the same relation to Grace, that Injustice hath to Obligation by Covenant.

Just as justice depends on a prior agreement, gratitude depends on a prior act of generosity, meaning a freely given gift. Gratitude is the fourth Law of Nature, which may be expressed as follows: “Anyone who freely receives a benefit from another should try to give the giver no reasonable cause to regret that goodwill.” For no one gives without intending some good for himself. This is because giving is voluntary, and every person’s aim in all voluntary actions is his own good. If people see that their aim will be frustrated, benevolence and trust will never begin. Consequently, neither will mutual help or reconciliation between people. People must therefore remain in a state of war. That state is contrary to the first and fundamental Law of Nature, which commands people to seek peace. Breaking this law is called ingratitude. Ingratitude bears the same relation to generosity as injustice does to an obligation created by an agreement.

A fifth Law of Nature, is COMPLEASANCE; that is to say, “That every man strive to accommodate himselfe to the rest.” For the understanding whereof, we may consider, that there is in mens aptnesse to Society; a diversity of Nature, rising from their diversity of Affections; not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an Aedifice. For as that stone which by the asperity, and irregularity of Figure, takes more room from others, than it selfe fills; and for the hardnesse, cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome: so also, a man that by asperity of Nature, will strive to retain those things which to himselfe are superfluous, and to others necessary; and for the stubbornness of his Passions, cannot be corrected, is to be left, or cast out of Society, as combersome thereunto. For seeing every man, not onely by Right, but also by necessity of Nature, is supposed to endeavour all he can, to obtain that which is necessary for his conservation; He that shall oppose himselfe against it, for things superfluous, is guilty of the warre that thereupon is to follow; and therefore doth that, which is contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature, which commandeth To Seek Peace. The observers of this Law, may be called SOCIABLE, (the Latines call them Commodi;) The contrary, Stubborn, Insociable, Froward, Intractable.

A fifth law of nature is COOPERATIVENESS. That is to say, “Everyone should strive to adapt to others.” To understand this law, consider how people differ in their fitness for society because their passions differ. These differences resemble those among stones brought together to construct a building. A rough, irregular stone takes more space away from other stones than it fills itself. If the stone is too hard to be easily smoothed, it obstructs the building. So the builders throw it away as useless and troublesome. The same applies to someone whose harsh nature makes him cling to things he does not need but others do. If his stubborn passions prevent him from being corrected, he should be left outside society or expelled as a burden. For everyone is presumed to do all he can to obtain whatever he needs to survive. He does so not only by right, but also by natural necessity. Anyone who obstructs another person's survival for the sake of things he does not need is responsible for the resulting war. He therefore acts against the fundamental law of nature, which commands us To Seek Peace. Those who observe this law may be called SOCIABLE (the Latins call them Commodi). Those who act against it may be called stubborn, unsociable, difficult, and unmanageable.

A sixth Law of Nature is this, “That upon caution of the Future time, a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire it.” For PARDON, is nothing but granting of Peace; which though granted to them that persevere in their hostility, be not Peace, but Feare; yet not granted to them that give caution of the Future time, is signe of an aversion to Peace; and therefore contrary to the Law of Nature.

A sixth Law of Nature is this: “A person ought to forgive past offenses when the offenders repent and ask for forgiveness, provided they offer assurances of future conduct.” For PARDON is simply the granting of peace. Although granting peace to those who remain hostile is not peace but fear, refusing peace to those who offer assurances of future conduct shows an unwillingness to make peace. Such refusal is therefore contrary to the Law of Nature.

A seventh is, “That in Revenges, (that is, retribution of evil for evil,) Men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the greatnesse of the good to follow.” Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other designe, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this Law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth Pardon, upon security of the Future Time. Besides, Revenge without respect to the Example, and profit to come, is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end; (for the End is alwayes somewhat to Come;) and glorying to no end, is vain-glory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason, tendeth to the introduction of Warre; which is against the Law of Nature; and is commonly stiled by the name of Cruelty.

A seventh law is, “When taking revenge (that is, repaying harm with harm), people must not consider how great the past harm was. Instead, they must consider how great the future good will be.” This law forbids punishment for any purpose other than reforming the offender or guiding others. For this law follows from the previous one, which commands forgiveness when future safety is assured. Besides, revenge that disregards its example to others and its future benefit is merely triumphing or glorying in another’s suffering. Such revenge serves no purpose, because a purpose always concerns something yet to come. And glorying without a purpose is empty pride, contrary to reason. Harming others without reason tends to bring about war, which violates the law of nature. Such harm is commonly called cruelty.

And because all signes of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight; insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be revenged; we may in the eighth place, for a Law of Nature set down this Precept, “That no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare Hatred, or Contempt of another.” The breach of which Law, is commonly called Contumely.

All signs of hatred or contempt provoke people to fight. Indeed, most people would rather risk their lives than go without revenge. Because of this, we may state an eighth law of nature: “No one should express hatred or contempt for another through actions, words, facial expressions, or gestures.” Breaking this law is commonly called Contumely, or insulting behavior.

The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of meer Nature; where, (as has been shewn before,) all men are equall. The inequallity that now is, has been introduced by the Lawes civill. I know that Aristotle in the first booke of his Politiques, for a foundation of his doctrine, maketh men by Nature, some more worthy to Command, meaning the wiser sort (such as he thought himselfe to be for his Philosophy;) others to Serve, (meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not Philosophers as he;) as if Master and Servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of Wit; which is not only against reason; but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish, that had not rather governe themselves, than be governed by others: Nor when the wise in their own conceit, contend by force, with them who distrust their owne wisdome, do they alwaies, or often, or almost at any time, get the Victory. If Nature therefore have made men equall, that equalitie is to be acknowledged; or if Nature have made men unequall; yet because men that think themselves equall, will not enter into conditions of Peace, but upon Equall termes, such equalitie must be admitted. And therefore for the ninth Law of Nature, I put this, “That every man acknowledge other for his Equall by Nature.” The breach of this Precept is Pride.

The question of who is the better man has no place in the state of nature. In that state, as shown before, all men are equal. The inequality that now exists was introduced by civil laws. I know that Aristotle makes a claim about natural inequality as the foundation of his teaching in his Politiques, Book One. He says some men are naturally more worthy to command, meaning the wiser sort. He counted himself among the wiser sort because of his philosophy. Others, he says, are naturally suited to serve. He means those with strong bodies who were not philosophers like him. He writes as if differences in intelligence, rather than human agreement, established the relationship between master and servant. His claim goes against both reason and experience. For very few people are so foolish that they would not rather govern themselves than be governed by others. Nor do those who think themselves wise always win when they fight those who doubt their own wisdom. They do not win often, or even almost ever. So if nature has made men equal, that equality must be acknowledged. Or if nature has made men unequal, equality must still be accepted. For men who consider themselves equal will enter into peace only on equal terms. And therefore I state the ninth law of nature as follows: “Everyone must acknowledge every other person as his equal by nature.” Breaking this rule is pride.

On this law, dependeth another, “That at the entrance into conditions of Peace, no man require to reserve to himselfe any Right, which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest.” As it is necessary for all men that seek peace, to lay down certaine Rights of Nature; that is to say, not to have libertie to do all they list: so is it necessarie for mans life, to retaine some; as right to governe their owne bodies; enjoy aire, water, motion, waies to go from place to place; and all things else without which a man cannot live, or not live well. If in this case, at the making of Peace, men require for themselves, that which they would not have to be granted to others, they do contrary to the precedent law, that commandeth the acknowledgement of naturall equalitie, and therefore also against the law of Nature. The observers of this law, are those we call Modest, and the breakers Arrogant Men. The Greeks call the violation of this law pleonexia; that is, a desire of more than their share.

Another law depends on this one: “When agreeing on terms of peace, no one should demand to keep any right unless they are willing for everyone else to keep it too.” All who seek peace must give up certain rights of nature, meaning the freedom to do whatever they please. But people must also keep some rights in order to live. These include the right to control their own bodies and to enjoy air, water, movement, and routes between places. They also include everything else without which a person cannot live, or cannot live well. If people negotiating peace demand something for themselves that they would deny others, they violate the preceding law. That law requires recognition of natural equality, so they also violate the law of nature. We call those who obey this law modest, and those who break it arrogant. The Greeks call the violation of this law pleonexia, meaning a desire for more than one's share.

Also “If a man be trusted to judge between man and man,” it is a precept of the Law of Nature, “that he deale Equally between them.” For without that, the Controversies of men cannot be determined but by Warre. He therefore that is partiall in judgment, doth what in him lies, to deterre men from the use of Judges, and Arbitrators; and consequently, (against the fundamentall Lawe of Nature) is the cause of Warre.

Also, “If a man is trusted to judge between two people,” the Law of Nature requires “that he treat them equally.” Without fair treatment, disputes between people can only be settled by war. Anyone who judges unfairly therefore does his part to discourage people from using judges and arbitrators. As a result, he becomes a cause of war, contrary to the fundamental Law of Nature.

The observance of this law, from the equall distribution to each man, of that which in reason belongeth to him, is called EQUITY, and (as I have sayd before) distributive justice: the violation, Acception Of Persons, Prosopolepsia.

Following this law means giving each person what reasonably belongs to them, without favoring anyone. This is called EQUITY. As I said before, it is also called distributive justice. Breaking this law is called favoritism, or Prosopolepsia.

And from this followeth another law, “That such things as cannot be divided, be enjoyed in Common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the thing permit, without Stint; otherwise Proportionably to the number of them that have Right.” For otherwise the distribution is Unequall, and contrary to Equitie.

And from this follows another law: “Things that cannot be divided should be shared, if possible. If there is enough, everyone with a right to them should have unlimited use. Otherwise, the amount each person receives should reflect the number of people entitled to a share.” Otherwise, the distribution is unequal and unfair.

But some things there be, that can neither be divided, nor enjoyed in common. Then, The Law of Nature, which prescribeth Equity, requireth, “That the Entire Right; or else, (making the use alternate,) the First Possession, be determined by Lot.” For equall distribution, is of the Law of Nature; and other means of equall distribution cannot be imagined.

But some things cannot be divided or shared. In such cases, the Law of Nature, which requires fairness, demands: “The full right must be decided by drawing lots. Or, if people take turns using the thing, drawing lots must decide who uses it first.” For equal distribution is required by the Law of Nature, and no other means of equal distribution can be imagined.

Of Lots there be two sorts, Arbitrary, and Naturall. Arbitrary, is that which is agreed on by the Competitors; Naturall, is either Primogeniture, (which the Greek calls Kleronomia, which signifies, Given by Lot;) or First Seisure.

There are two kinds of allocation by lot: agreed and natural. An agreed lot is one the competitors agree on. One natural kind is primogeniture, the right of the firstborn. The Greeks call primogeniture Kleronomia, meaning given by lot. The other natural kind is taking possession first.

And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor divided, ought to be adjudged to the First Possessor; and is some cases to the First-Borne, as acquired by Lot.

Therefore, things that cannot be shared or divided should be awarded to whoever first possessed them. In some cases, such things should go to the firstborn, as property acquired by drawing lots.

It is also a Law of Nature, “That all men that mediate Peace, be allowed safe Conduct.” For the Law that commandeth Peace, as the End, commandeth Intercession, as the Means; and to Intercession the Means is safe Conduct.

It is also a law of nature “that all who mediate peace must be granted safe passage.” For the law that requires peace as the goal also requires mediation as the means. And mediation requires safe passage.

And because, though men be never so willing to observe these Lawes, there may neverthelesse arise questions concerning a mans action; First, whether it were done, or not done; Secondly (if done) whether against the Law, or not against the Law; the former whereof, is called a question Of Fact; the later a question Of Right; therefore unlesse the parties to the question, Covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as farre from Peace as ever. This other, to whose Sentence they submit, is called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is of the Law of Nature, “That they that are at controversie, submit their Right to the judgement of an Arbitrator.”

Even if people are entirely willing to obey these laws, questions may still arise about someone’s actions. First, did the person perform the action or not? Second, if the person did, was the action against the law or not? The first is called a question of fact. The second is called a question of right. Because these questions may arise, the parties must mutually agree to accept another person’s judgment. Unless they do, they remain as far from peace as ever. The person whose judgment they agree to accept is called an ARBITRATOR. Therefore, it is a law of nature “that people in a dispute submit their rights to an arbitrator’s judgment.”

And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit, no man is a fit Arbitrator in his own cause: and if he were never so fit; yet Equity allowing to each party equall benefit, if one be admitted to be Judge, the other is to be admitted also; & so the controversie, that is, the cause of War, remains, against the Law of Nature.

Since everyone is presumed to act only for their own benefit, no one is fit to arbitrate their own case. Even if someone were perfectly fit, fairness requires that both parties receive equal treatment. So if one party is allowed to judge, the other must also be allowed to judge. The dispute, and therefore the cause of war, remains, contrary to the law of nature.

For the same reason no man in any Cause ought to be received for Arbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently ariseth out of the victory of one party, than of the other: for he hath taken (though an unavoydable bribe, yet) a bribe; and no man can be obliged to trust him. And thus also the controversie, and the condition of War remaineth, contrary to the Law of Nature.

For the same reason, no one should be accepted as an arbitrator in a dispute under the following condition. He clearly stands to gain more profit, honor, or pleasure from one side’s victory than from the other’s. For he has accepted a bribe, even if the bribe is unavoidable, and no one can be required to trust him. So the dispute and the state of war continue, contrary to the Law of Nature.

And in a controversie of Fact, the Judge being to give no more credit to one, than to the other, (if there be no other Arguments) must give credit to a third; or to a third and fourth; or more: For else the question is undecided, and left to force, contrary to the Law of Nature.

And in a dispute over facts, the judge must give both sides equal weight if there are no other arguments. The judge must then rely on a third person, or a third and fourth, or more. Otherwise, the question remains undecided and is left to force, contrary to the Law of Nature.

These are the Lawes of Nature, dictating Peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes; and which onely concern the doctrine of Civill Society. There be other things tending to the destruction of particular men; as Drunkenness, and all other parts of Intemperance; which may therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the Law of Nature hath forbidden; but are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place.

These are the laws of nature that call for peace as a means of preserving people living in groups. These laws concern only the principles of civil society. Other things tend to destroy individuals, such as drunkenness and all other forms of excess. Such things may therefore also be counted among what the law of nature forbids. But they need not be mentioned here and are not relevant enough to this discussion.

And though this may seem too subtile a deduction of the Lawes of Nature, to be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busie in getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave all men unexcusable, they have been contracted into one easie sum, intelligible even to the meanest capacity; and that is, “Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe;” which sheweth him, that he has no more to do in learning the Lawes of Nature, but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own, they seem too heavy, to put them into the other part of the ballance, and his own into their place, that his own passions, and selfe-love, may adde nothing to the weight; and then there is none of these Lawes of Nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable.

This reasoning about the Laws of Nature may seem too subtle for everyone to grasp. Most people are too busy getting food, and the rest are too careless to understand. Yet, to leave no one with an excuse, these laws have been reduced to one simple rule. Even those with the least understanding can grasp it: “Do not do to others what you would not want done to yourself.” This rule shows that learning the Laws of Nature requires only one thing. When you weigh other people’s actions against your own and find theirs too heavy, switch their places on the scales. Put their actions where yours were, and yours where theirs were. This way, your own passions and self-love will add nothing to the weight. Then every one of these Laws of Nature will seem very reasonable to you.

But In Effect Then Onely When There Is Security The Lawes of Nature oblige In Foro Interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place: but In Foro Externo; that is, to the putting them in act, not alwayes. For he that should be modest, and tractable, and performe all he promises, in such time, and place, where no man els should do so, should but make himselfe a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruine, contrary to the ground of all Lawes of Nature, which tend to Natures preservation. And again, he that shall observe the same Lawes towards him, observes them not himselfe, seeketh not Peace, but War; & consequently the destruction of his Nature by Violence.

But the laws of nature take effect only when there is security. These laws bind us in conscience, meaning we must desire to see them followed. But they do not always bind us to act on them. For suppose someone were modest, cooperative, and kept every promise where and when no one else did so. He would only make himself prey to others and bring about his own certain ruin. Such conduct goes against the basis of all laws of nature, which aim to preserve life. And again, whoever follows these same laws toward him, but does not follow them himself, seeks not peace but war. Consequently, he seeks the violent destruction of his own life.

And whatsoever Lawes bind In Foro Interno, may be broken, not onely by a fact contrary to the Law but also by a fact according to it, in case a man think it contrary. For though his Action in this case, be according to the Law; which where the Obligation is In Foro Interno, is a breach.

And any laws that bind the conscience (In Foro Interno) may be broken not only by actions against those laws. They may also be broken by actions that follow those laws, if a person believes he is acting against them. For although his action follows the law, he still violates the law when the obligation binds his conscience.

The Lawes of Nature are Immutable and Eternall, For Injustice, Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawfull. For it can never be that Warre shall preserve life, and Peace destroy it.

The laws of nature are unchanging and eternal. For injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, unfairness, favoritism, and similar wrongs can never be made lawful. For war can never preserve life while peace destroys it.

The same Lawes, because they oblige onely to a desire, and endeavour, I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easie to be observed. For in that they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the Law, is Just.

These same laws are easy to follow because they require only a desire and an effort to obey them. By effort, I mean a sincere and constant effort. Since the laws require nothing more than effort, anyone who tries to obey them fulfills them. And anyone who fulfills the law is just.

And the Science of them, is the true and onely Moral Philosophy. For Morall Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what is Good, and Evill, in the conversation, and Society of mankind. Good, and Evill, are names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions; which in different tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different: And divers men, differ not onely in their Judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the tast, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagreeable to Reason, in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himselfe; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth Good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth Evil: From whence arise Disputes, Controversies, and at last War. And therefore so long as man is in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of War,) as private Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill: and consequently all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way, or means of Peace, which (as I have shewed before) are Justice, Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, Morall Vertues; and their contrarie Vices, Evill. Now the science of Vertue and Vice, is Morall Philosophie; and therfore the true Doctrine of the Lawes of Nature, is the true Morall Philosophie. But the Writers of Morall Philosophie, though they acknowledge the same Vertues and Vices; Yet not seeing wherein consisted their Goodnesse; nor that they come to be praised, as the meanes of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living; place them in a mediocrity of passions: as if not the Cause, but the Degree of daring, made Fortitude; or not the Cause, but the Quantity of a gift, made Liberality.

The science of these things is the true and only moral philosophy. For moral philosophy is simply the science of good and evil in human dealings and society. Good and evil are names for our desires and aversions. These differ according to people's temperaments, customs, and teachings. People differ in judging what is pleasant or unpleasant to taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight. They also differ in judging what agrees or conflicts with reason in everyday actions. Even the same person judges differently at different times. At one time, someone praises something and calls it good. At another time, that same person condemns it and calls it evil. These differences lead to disputes, controversies, and finally war. Therefore, as long as people remain in the state of nature, each person's desires set the standard for good and evil. This state of nature is a state of war. Consequently, everyone agrees that peace is good, and therefore the ways or means of achieving peace are also good. As I have shown before, these are justice, gratitude, modesty, fairness, mercy, and the other laws of nature. These are moral virtues, and their opposite vices are evil. Now, the science of virtue and vice is moral philosophy. Therefore, the true teaching of the laws of nature is the true moral philosophy. But writers on moral philosophy, though they recognize the same virtues and vices, do not see what makes virtues good. Nor do they see that virtues are praised as means of living peacefully, sociably, and comfortably. Instead, these writers locate virtue in a middle ground between extremes of passion. They write as if courage depended not on the cause, but on the degree of daring. Or as if generosity depended not on the reason for giving, but on the size of the gift.

These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes; but improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas Law, properly is the word of him, that by right hath command over others. But yet if we consider the same Theoremes, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called Lawes.

People commonly call these dictates of reason laws, but this is not strictly correct. For these dictates are merely conclusions or theorems about what helps people preserve and defend themselves. A law, properly speaking, is the word of someone who has the right to command others. But if we consider these same theorems as given in the word of God, then they are properly called laws. For God has the right to command all things.