Persons, Authors, and Things Represented

A Person What

What Is a Person?

A PERSON, is he “whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction.”

A PERSON is someone “whose words or actions are regarded either as their own or as representing another person or thing. In the second case, those words or actions are attributed to that person or thing, either truly or by fiction.”

When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall Person: And when they are considered as representing the words and actions of an other, then is he a Feigned or Artificiall person.

When words and actions are considered his own, he is called a natural person. When they are considered to represent another person’s words and actions, he is called a feigned or artificial person.

The word Person is latine: instead whereof the Greeks have Prosopon, which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the Disguise, or Outward Appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and somtimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any Representer of speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an other; and he that acteth another, is said to beare his Person, or act in his name; (in which sence Cicero useth it where he saies, “Unus Sustineo Tres Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis, I beare three Persons; my own, my Adversaries, and the Judges;”) and is called in diverse occasions, diversly; as a Representer, or Representative, a Lieutenant, a Vicar, an Attorney, a Deputy, a Procurator, an Actor, and the like.

The word Person is Latin. The Greeks instead use Prosopon, meaning the face. In Latin, Persona means a person’s disguise or outward appearance as portrayed on stage. Sometimes Persona refers more specifically to the part covering the face, such as a mask or visor. From the stage, the word came to mean anyone representing speech and action, in courts as well as theaters. So a Person is the same as an Actor, both on stage and in everyday dealings. To personate is to act or represent oneself or someone else. Someone representing another is said to bear that person’s role or act in that person’s name. (Cicero uses the word in this sense when he says, “Unus Sustineo Tres Personas: Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis. I bear three Persons: my own, my opponent’s, and the judge’s.”) Such a person has different titles on different occasions: a representer, representative, lieutenant, vicar, attorney, deputy, procurator, actor, and similar names.

Of Persons Artificiall, some have their words and actions Owned by those whom they represent. And then the Person is the Actor; and he that owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR: In which case the Actor acteth by Authority. For that which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an Owner, and in latine Dominus, in Greeke Kurios; speaking of Actions, is called Author. And as the Right of possession, is called Dominion; so the Right of doing any Action, is called AUTHORITY. So that by Authority, is alwayes understood a Right of doing any act: and Done By Authority, done by Commission, or Licence from him whose right it is.

Some artificial persons have their words and actions accepted as their own by the people they represent. In such cases, the representative is the actor. The person who accepts the actor’s words and actions as their own is the AUTHOR. In this case, the actor acts by authority. For someone called an owner when we speak of goods and possessions is called an author when we speak of actions. The Latin word for owner is Dominus, and the Greek word is Kurios. Just as the right of possession is called dominion, the right to perform any action is called AUTHORITY. So authority always means a right to perform an act. An act done by authority is done with permission or a commission from the person who holds that right.

From hence it followeth, that when the Actor maketh a Covenant by Authority, he bindeth thereby the Author, no lesse than if he had made it himselfe; and no lesse subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same. And therfore all that hath been said formerly, (Chap. 14) of the nature of Covenants between man and man in their naturall capacity, is true also when they are made by their Actors, Representers, or Procurators, that have authority from them, so far-forth as is in their Commission, but no farther.

It follows that when an Actor makes a covenant with authority, the covenant binds the Author who granted that authority. The Author is bound just as fully as if he had made the covenant himself. The Author is also just as fully subject to all its consequences. So everything said earlier (Chapter 14) about covenants between people acting for themselves also applies to covenants made by their authorized Actors, Representatives, or Agents. But this applies only within the limits of the authority granted to those representatives, and no further.

And therefore he that maketh a Covenant with the Actor, or Representer, not knowing the Authority he hath, doth it at his own perill. For no man is obliged by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor consequently by a Covenant made against, or beside the Authority he gave.

Therefore, anyone who makes an agreement with an actor, or representative, without knowing the representative’s authority does so at their own risk. For no one is bound by an agreement they did not authorize. So no one is bound by an agreement that goes against or beyond the authority they granted.

When the Actor doth any thing against the Law of Nature by command of the Author, if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him, not he, but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature: for though the Action be against the Law of Nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily; to refuse to do it, is against the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth breach of Covenant.

When the Actor acts against the Law of Nature at the Author’s command, the following applies. If an earlier covenant binds the Actor to obey, the Author, not the Actor, breaks the Law of Nature. For although the action violates the Law of Nature, the action belongs to the Author, not the Actor. On the contrary, refusing to obey violates the Law of Nature, which forbids breaking a covenant.

And he that maketh a Covenant with the Author, by mediation of the Actor, not knowing what Authority he hath, but onely takes his word; in case such Authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged: For the Covenant made with the Author, is not valid, without his Counter-assurance. But if he that so Covenanteth, knew before hand he was to expect no other assurance, than the Actors word; then is the Covenant valid; because the Actor in this case maketh himselfe the Author. And therefore, as when the Authority is evident, the Covenant obligeth the Author, not the Actor; so when the Authority is feigned, it obligeth the Actor onely; there being no Author but himselfe.

Someone may make an agreement with an Author through an Actor acting on the Author’s behalf. The person may not know the Actor’s authority and simply take the Actor’s word. If that authority is not shown when requested, the person is no longer bound by the agreement. For an agreement with the Author is not valid without the Author’s confirmation. But suppose the person knew beforehand to expect no assurance beyond the Actor’s word. Then the agreement is valid, because in this case the Actor makes himself the Author. So, when the Actor’s authority is clear, the agreement binds the Author, not the Actor. But when the authority is invented, the agreement binds only the Actor, because there is no Author except the Actor himself.

There are few things, that are uncapable of being represented by Fiction. Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may be Personated by a Rector, Master, or Overseer. But things Inanimate, cannot be Authors, nor therefore give Authority to their Actors: Yet the Actors may have Authority to procure their maintenance, given them by those that are Owners, or Governours of those things. And therefore, such things cannot be Personated, before there be some state of Civill Government.

Few things cannot be represented by imagining them as persons. Inanimate things, such as a church, a hospital, or a bridge, may be represented by a rector, master, or overseer. But inanimate things cannot be authors of actions, so they cannot give authority to their representatives. Yet representatives may receive authority to arrange for the upkeep of these things from their owners or governors. Therefore, such things cannot be represented before some form of civil government exists.

Likewise Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason, may be Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors (during that time) of any action done by them, longer then (when they shall recover the use of Reason) they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet during the Folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give Authority to the Guardian. But this again has no place but in a State Civill, because before such estate, there is no Dominion of Persons.

Likewise, children, people with intellectual disabilities, and mentally ill people who cannot reason may be represented by guardians or caretakers. But during that time, they cannot be considered responsible for their representatives’ actions unless they later regain reason and judge those actions reasonable. Yet while they cannot reason, whoever has the right to govern them may give authority to the guardian. But again, such authority is possible only in a civil state, because before a civil state exists, no one has dominion over persons.

An Idol, or meer Figment of the brain, may be Personated; as were the Gods of the Heathen; which by such Officers as the State appointed, were Personated, and held Possessions, and other Goods, and Rights, which men from time to time dedicated, and consecrated unto them. But idols cannot be Authors: for a Idol is nothing. The Authority proceeded from the State: and therefore before introduction of Civill Government, the Gods of the Heathen could not be Personated.

An idol, or mere invention of the mind, can be represented, as the pagan gods were. Officials appointed by the state represented these gods. The gods held property, other goods, and rights that people dedicated and consecrated to them from time to time. But idols cannot authorize anyone to act on their behalf, because an idol is nothing. The authority came from the state. Therefore, before civil government was established, the pagan gods could not be represented.

The true God may be Personated. As he was; first, by Moses; who governed the Israelites, (that were not his, but Gods people,) not in his own name, with Hoc Dicit Moses; but in Gods Name, with Hoc Dicit Dominus. Secondly, by the son of man, his own Son our Blessed Saviour Jesus Christ, that came to reduce the Jewes, and induce all Nations into the Kingdome of his Father; not as of himselfe, but as sent from his Father. And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking, and working in the Apostles: which Holy Ghost, was a Comforter that came not of himselfe; but was sent, and proceeded from them both.

The true God may be represented by another person. First, he was represented by Moses, who governed the Israelites. They were not Moses’ people, but God’s people. Moses spoke not in his own name, saying “Thus says Moses,” but in God’s name, saying “Thus says the Lord.” Second, God was represented by the Son of Man, his own Son, our Blessed Saviour Jesus Christ. He came to bring the Jews back into his Father’s kingdom and bring all nations into it. He came not on his own authority, but as one sent by his Father. Third, God was represented by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking and working through the Apostles. The Holy Ghost was a Comforter who did not come on his own. Rather, he was sent by both the Father and the Son, and proceeded from both.

A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but one Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude.

A group of people becomes one person when represented by one man or one person, provided every individual consents. For what makes the group one person is the unity of the representative, not the unity of those represented. And the representative acts as that person, and only one person. A group cannot be understood as a single entity in any other way.

And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many; they cannot be understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing their Representative faith, or doth in their name; Every man giving their common Representer, Authority from himselfe in particular; and owning all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how farre he shall represent them, none of them owneth more, than they gave him commission to Act.

And because a multitude is naturally many people, not one, its members cannot be understood as a single author. Instead, they are many authors of everything their representative says or does in their name. Each person individually gives authority to their common representative. If they give him unlimited authority, each person accepts all the representative’s actions as their own. But if they limit what he may represent them in, and how far his authority extends, the same limits apply. No one accepts as their own any action beyond what they authorized him to do.

And if the Representative consist of many men, the voyce of the greater number, must be considered as the voyce of them all. For if the lesser number pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative, and the greater in the Negative, there will be Negatives more than enough to destroy the Affirmatives; and thereby the excesse of Negatives, standing uncontradicted, are the onely voyce the Representative hath.

And if the representative consists of many people, the majority’s voice must be treated as the voice of them all. For example, if the minority votes yes and the majority votes no, there are more than enough noes to cancel out the yeses. So the remaining noes, with no yeses left to oppose them, are the representative’s only voice.

And a Representative of even number, especially when the number is not great, whereby the contradictory voyces are oftentimes equall, is therefore oftentimes mute, and uncapable of Action. Yet in some cases contradictory voyces equall in number, may determine a question; as in condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemne not, do absolve; but not on the contrary condemne, in that they absolve not. For when a Cause is heard; not to condemne, is to absolve; but on the contrary, to say that not absolving, is condemning, is not true. The like it is in a deliberation of executing presently, or deferring till another time; For when the voyces are equall, the not decreeing Execution, is a decree of Dilation.

And a representative body with an even number of members often cannot reach a decision or act. This is because opposing votes are often equal, especially when the number of members is small. Yet in some cases, equal numbers of opposing votes may settle a question. For example, in deciding whether to convict or acquit, a tied vote acquits because it does not convict. But a tied vote does not convict simply because it does not acquit. For when a case is heard, not to convict is to acquit. But the reverse is not true: not to acquit is not to convict. The same applies when deciding whether to carry out an action immediately or postpone it. For when the votes are equal, failing to order immediate action amounts to a decision to delay.

Or if the number be odde, as three, or more, (men, or assemblies;) whereof every one has by a Negative Voice, authority to take away the effect of all the Affirmative Voices of the rest, This number is no Representative; because by the diversity of Opinions, and Interests of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute Person, and unapt, as for may things else, so for the government of a Multitude, especially in time of Warre.

Or suppose there is an odd number, three or more, of men or assemblies. Suppose each has the power to veto all the others’ votes in favor. Such a group is no representative. Because people differ in their opinions and interests, the group often becomes a silent person, unable to speak or act. This often happens in matters of the greatest importance. The group is therefore unfit for many tasks, including governing a multitude, especially in wartime.

Of Authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have before defined to be him, that owneth the Action of another simply. The second is he, that owneth an Action, or Covenant of another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a certain time. And these Authors conditionall, are generally called SURETYES, in Latine Fidejussores, and Sponsores; and particularly for Debt, Praedes; and for Appearance before a Judge, or Magistrate, Vades.

There are two kinds of authors. The first is an author without qualification, as I defined earlier: someone who unconditionally accepts responsibility for another person’s action. The second accepts responsibility for another person’s action or agreement on a condition. Such an author promises to carry it out if the other person fails to do so by a certain time. These conditional authors are generally called SURETIES, or in Latin, Fidejussores and Sponsores. Specifically, those who guarantee debts are called Praedes, and those who guarantee appearances before a judge or magistrate, Vades.