The First and Second Natural Laws and Contracts

The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.

The RIGHT OF NATURE, commonly called Jus Naturale by writers, is each man's freedom to use his own power as he wishes. The purpose of this freedom is to preserve his own nature, that is, his own life. Consequently, he is free to do anything he judges, through his own reason, to be the best means of preserving his life.

By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of externall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft take away part of a mans power to do what hee would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgement, and reason shall dictate to him.

LIBERTY, in the proper sense of the word, means the absence of external obstacles. These obstacles may often reduce a person's power to do what he wants. But they cannot prevent him from using his remaining power as his judgment and reason direct.

A LAW OF NATURE, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound Jus, and Lex, Right and Law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

A LAW OF NATURE (Lex Naturalis) is a command or general rule discovered through reason. It forbids a person to do anything that destroys his life or removes the means of preserving his life. It also forbids him to neglect whatever he thinks would best preserve his life. For although writers on this subject often confuse Jus and Lex, Right and Law, these terms should be distinguished. RIGHT means the freedom to act or not to act. LAW, by contrast, requires a person either to act or to refrain from acting. So Law and Right differ as much as Obligation and Liberty. Obligation and Liberty cannot coexist in the same matter.

And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the precedent Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body. And therefore, as long as this naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he be,) of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live.

As explained in the previous chapter, the human condition is a war of everyone against everyone else. In this condition, everyone is guided by his own reason. And anything a person can use may help him preserve his life against his enemies. It follows that in such a condition, every person has a right to everything, even to another person’s body. Therefore, as long as this natural right of everyone to everything lasts, no one can be sure of living out the lifespan nature ordinarily allows. This is true no matter how strong or wise a person may be.

And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, “That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre.” The first branch, of which Rule, containeth the first, and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, “To seek Peace, and follow it.” The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, “By all means we can, to defend our selves.”

So reason gives us this general rule: “Everyone ought to seek peace as long as he has hope of obtaining it. When he cannot obtain peace, he may seek and use all the aids and advantages of war.” The first part of this rule contains the first and fundamental Law of Nature: “Seek peace and pursue it.” The second part sums up the Right of Nature: “Defend ourselves by every means we can.”

From this Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour Peace, is derived this second Law; “That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe.” For as long as every man holdeth this Right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of Warre. But if other men will not lay down their Right, as well as he; then there is no Reason for any one, to devest himselfe of his: For that were to expose himselfe to Prey, (which no man is bound to) rather than to dispose himselfe to Peace. This is that Law of the Gospell; “Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them.” And that Law of all men, “Quod tibi feiri non vis, alteri ne feceris.”

From the fundamental Law of Nature, which commands people to seek peace, comes this second law: “A person should be willing, when others are willing too, to give up the right to everything. He should do so as far as he thinks necessary for peace and his own defense. He should accept only as much freedom to act against others as he would allow others to exercise against him.” For as long as everyone keeps the right to do anything they please, everyone remains in a state of war. But if others will not give up their right as well, no one has reason to surrender his own. For surrendering that right would leave him open to being preyed upon, rather than prepare him for peace. No one is obliged to leave himself open to being preyed upon. This is the law of the Gospel: “Whatever you want others to do to you, do to them.” And it is the law of all people: “Do not do to others what you do not want done to you.”

To Lay Downe a mans Right to any thing, is to Devest himselfe of the Liberty, of hindring another of the benefit of his own Right to the same. For he that renounceth, or passeth away his Right, giveth not to any other man a Right which he had not before; because there is nothing to which every man had not Right by Nature: but onely standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his own originall Right, without hindrance from him; not without hindrance from another. So that the effect which redoundeth to one man, by another mans defect of Right, is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own Right originall.

To give up a right to anything is to give up the freedom to obstruct someone else’s exercise of that same right. A man who renounces or transfers his right does not give another man a right he did not already have. This is because every man has a natural right to everything. He only steps aside so the other man can exercise his original right without interference from him. But others may still interfere. So when one man gives up his right, another man gains only a reduction in obstacles to exercising his original right.

Right is layd aside, either by simply Renouncing it; or by Transferring it to another. By Simply RENOUNCING; when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. By TRANSFERRING; when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person, or persons. And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his Right; then is he said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such Right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he Ought, and it his DUTY, not to make voyd that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being Sine Jure; the Right being before renounced, or transferred. So that Injury, or Injustice, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the disputations of Scholers is called Absurdity. For as it is there called an Absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the Beginning: so in the world, it is called Injustice, and Injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply Renounceth, or Transferreth his Right, is a Declaration, or Signification, by some voluntary and sufficient signe, or signes, that he doth so Renounce, or Transferre; or hath so Renounced, or Transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And these Signes are either Words onely, or Actions onely; or (as it happeneth most often) both Words and Actions. And the same are the BONDS, by which men are bound, and obliged: Bonds, that have their strength, not from their own Nature, (for nothing is more easily broken then a mans word,) but from Feare of some evill consequence upon the rupture.

A person gives up a right either by simply renouncing it or by transferring it to someone else. He simply RENOUNCES a right when he does not care who benefits from his giving it up. He TRANSFERS a right when he intends a particular person or group of people to benefit. When a man gives up his right in either way, he is said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND. He must not prevent those to whom he has transferred or relinquished the right from benefiting from it. He ought not to undo his own voluntary act, and respecting that act is his DUTY. Preventing others from benefiting is INJUSTICE and INJURY, because he acts without a right. He has already renounced or transferred that right. So injury, or injustice, in the world's disputes is somewhat like what scholars call absurdity in their debates. In those debates, contradicting a position one defended at the beginning is called absurdity. Similarly, in the world, voluntarily undoing what one voluntarily did at the beginning is called injustice and injury. A man renounces or transfers his right by declaring or indicating his decision through some voluntary and sufficient sign or signs. These signs communicate that he renounces or transfers the right, or has already done so, to someone who accepts it. These signs may be words alone, actions alone, or, as happens most often, both words and actions. These are the BONDS that bind people and place them under an obligation. Such bonds get their strength not from their own nature, but from fear of some harmful consequence of breaking them. For nothing is more easily broken than a man's word.

Whensoever a man Transferreth his Right, or Renounceth it; it is either in consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to himselfe; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good To Himselfe. And therefore there be some Rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signes, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to ayme thereby, at any Good to himselfe. The same may be sayd of Wounds, and Chayns, and Imprisonment; both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience; as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not. And lastly the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring or Right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a mans person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by words, or other signes, seem to despoyle himselfe of the End, for which those signes were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.

Whenever a man transfers or gives up a right, he does so for one of two reasons. Either he receives some right in return, or he hopes to gain some other benefit. For giving up a right is a voluntary act, and every man's voluntary actions aim at some good for himself. Therefore, no words or other signs can be understood to mean that a man has abandoned or transferred certain rights. First, a man cannot give up the right to resist those who attack him by force to kill him. For he cannot be understood to seek any good for himself by giving up that right. The same can be said of wounds, chains, and imprisonment. For submitting to such treatment brings no benefit, unlike allowing someone else to be wounded or imprisoned. Also, when a man sees others using violence against him, he cannot tell whether they intend to kill him. Finally, the sole purpose of giving up or transferring rights is a man's personal safety. The aim is to protect his life and the means of preserving it without making life a burden. Therefore, suppose a man's words or other signs seem to deprive him of the very goal those signs served. He should not be understood to have meant or wanted that result. Rather, he did not know how those words and actions would be interpreted.

The mutuall transferring of Right, is that which men call CONTRACT.

The exchange of rights between people is what we call a CONTRACT.

There is difference, between transferring of Right to the Thing; and transferring, or tradition, that is, delivery of the Thing it selfe. For the Thing may be delivered together with the Translation of the Right; as in buying and selling with ready mony; or exchange of goods, or lands: and it may be delivered some time after.

Transferring the right to something is different from handing over the thing itself. The thing may be delivered at the same time as the right is transferred. This happens when buying and selling with immediate payment, or when exchanging goods or land. Or the thing may be delivered later.

Again, one of the Contractors, may deliver the Thing contracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time after, and in the mean time be trusted; and then the Contract on his part, is called PACT, or COVENANT: Or both parts may contract now, to performe hereafter: in which cases, he that is to performe in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called Keeping Of Promise, or Faith; and the fayling of performance (if it be voluntary) Violation Of Faith.

Again, one party to a contract may deliver what they have agreed to provide. They may leave the other party to perform their part at a fixed later time, trusting them until then. In that case, the contract on that party’s side is called a PACT or COVENANT. Or both parties may agree now to perform their parts later. In these cases, the party who must perform later is trusted to do so. Their performance is called Keeping a Promise, or Faith. Their failure to perform, if voluntary, is called Violation of Faith.

When the transferring of Right, is not mutuall; but one of the parties transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from another, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of Charity, or Magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion; or in hope of reward in heaven; This is not Contract, but GIFT, FREEGIFT, GRACE: which words signifie one and the same thing.

When a transfer of rights is not mutual, one party gives in the hope of gaining something else. The giver may hope for friendship or service from another person or from that person’s friends. Or the giver may hope to gain a reputation for charity or generosity. Or the giver may hope to relieve the pain of compassion, or receive a reward in heaven. Such a transfer is not a contract, but a GIFT, FREE GIFT, or GRACE. These words all mean the same thing.

Signes of Contract, are either Expresse, or By Inference. Expresse, are words spoken with understanding of what they signifie; And such words are either of the time Present, or Past; as, I Give, I Grant, I Have Given, I Have Granted, I Will That This Be Yours: Or of the future; as, I Will Give, I Will Grant; which words of the future, are called Promise.

Signs of a contract are either explicit or inferred. Explicit signs are words spoken with an understanding of their meaning. These words may refer to the present or past: I give, I grant, I have given, I have granted, I want this to be yours. Or they may refer to the future: I will give, I will grant. These statements about the future are called promises.

Signes by Inference, are sometimes the consequence of Words; sometimes the consequence of Silence; sometimes the consequence of Actions; sometimes the consequence of Forbearing an Action: and generally a signe by Inference, of any Contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the will of the Contractor.

Signs can sometimes be inferred from words and sometimes from silence. Signs can also sometimes be inferred from actions and sometimes from refraining from action. In general, an inferred sign of any contract is anything that sufficiently shows the contracting party’s intent.

Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise, are an insufficient signe of a Free-gift and therefore not obligatory. For if they be of the time to Come, as, To Morrow I Will Give, they are a signe I have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not transferred, but remaineth till I transferre it by some other Act. But if the words be of the time Present, or Past, as, “I have given, or do give to be delivered to morrow,” then is my to morrows Right given away to day; and that by the vertue of the words, though there were no other argument of my will. And there is a great difference in the signification of these words, Volos Hoc Tuum Esse Cras, and Cros Dabo; that is between “I will that this be thine to morrow,” and, “I will give it to thee to morrow:” For the word I Will, in the former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will Present; but in the later, it signifies a promise of an act of the will to Come: and therefore the former words, being of the Present, transferre a future right; the later, that be of the Future, transferre nothing. But if there be other signes of the Will to transferre a Right, besides Words; then, though the gift be Free, yet may the Right be understood to passe by words of the future: as if a man propound a Prize to him that comes first to the end of a race, The gift is Free; and though the words be of the Future, yet the Right passeth: for if he would not have his words so be understood, he should not have let them runne.

Words alone, if they refer to the future and contain only a promise, do not sufficiently establish a free gift. Such words therefore create no obligation. For words about the future, such as Tomorrow I Will Give, show that I have not given anything yet. Consequently, my right has not been transferred. My right remains mine until I transfer it through some other act. But the case differs if the words refer to the present or past. An example is, “I have given, or do give, for delivery tomorrow.” Then I give away today the right I would have tomorrow. The words themselves accomplish this, even without any other evidence of my intention. There is a great difference between Volos Hoc Tuum Esse Cras and Cros Dabo. That is the difference between “I intend this to be yours tomorrow,” and “I will give it to you tomorrow.” In the first expression, I intend describes a present act of will. But in the second, I will promises a future act of will. Therefore, the first words, referring to the present, transfer a future right. The second words, referring to the future, transfer nothing. But suppose there are signs besides words of an intention to transfer a right. Then, even if the gift is freely given, words about the future may be understood to transfer the right. For example, a man may offer a prize to whoever first reaches the end of a race. The gift is freely given. Yet although the words refer to the future, the right passes. For if he did not want his words understood that way, he should not have let the runners race.

Signes Of Contract Are Words Both Of The Past, Present, and Future In Contracts, the right passeth, not onely where the words are of the time Present, or Past; but also where they are of the Future; because all Contract is mutuall translation, or change of Right; and therefore he that promiseth onely, because he hath already received the benefit for which he promiseth, is to be understood as if he intended the Right should passe: for unlesse he had been content to have his words so understood, the other would not have performed his part first. And for that cause, in buying, and selling, and other acts of Contract, A Promise is equivalent to a Covenant; and therefore obligatory.

Signs of Contract Include Words About the Past, Present, and Future. In contracts, rights pass not only through words about the present or past, but also through words about the future. This is because all contracts involve a mutual transfer or exchange of rights. So someone who merely promises, having already received the benefit in return, must be understood as intending to transfer rights. For unless the person making the promise had agreed to this meaning, the other party would not have acted first. For this reason, in buying, selling, and other contractual dealings, a promise is equivalent to a covenant and therefore binding.

He that performeth first in the case of a Contract, is said to MERIT that which he is to receive by the performance of the other; and he hath it as Due. Also when a Prize is propounded to many, which is to be given to him onely that winneth; or mony is thrown amongst many, to be enjoyed by them that catch it; though this be a Free Gift; yet so to Win, or so to Catch, is to Merit, and to have it as DUE. For the Right is transferred in the Propounding of the Prize, and in throwing down the mony; though it be not determined to whom, but by the Event of the contention. But there is between these two sorts of Merit, this difference, that In Contract, I Merit by vertue of my own power, and the Contractors need; but in this case of Free Gift, I am enabled to Merit onely by the benignity of the Giver; In Contract, I merit at The Contractors hand that hee should depart with his right; In this case of gift, I Merit not that the giver should part with his right; but that when he has parted with it, it should be mine, rather than anothers. And this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of the Schooles, between Meritum Congrui, and Meritum Condigni. For God Almighty, having promised Paradise to those men (hoodwinkt with carnall desires,) that can walk through this world according to the Precepts, and Limits prescribed by him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall Merit Paradise Ex Congruo. But because no man can demand a right to it, by his own Righteousnesse, or any other power in himselfe, but by the Free Grace of God onely; they say, no man can Merit Paradise Ex Condigno. This I say, I think is the meaning of that distinction; but because Disputers do not agree upon the signification of their own termes of Art, longer than it serves their turn; I will not affirme any thing of their meaning: onely this I say; when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be contended for, he that winneth Meriteth, and may claime the Prize as Due.

Whoever performs their part of a contract first is said to MERIT what they will receive when the other party performs. They are entitled to it as something Due. The same applies when a prize is offered to many people, to be given only to the winner. Or money may be thrown among many people, to belong to whoever catches it. Although the prize or money is a Free Gift, winning or catching it means meriting it and having it as DUE. For the right to the prize or money is transferred when the prize is offered or the money is thrown. But who receives that right is settled only by the outcome of the competition. There is, however, a difference between these two kinds of merit. In a contract, I merit something through my own ability and the other party’s need. But with a free gift, I can merit something only through the giver’s generosity. In a contract, I merit the other party’s surrender of their right. With a gift, I do not merit the giver’s surrender of their right. Rather, once the giver has surrendered that right, I merit having the gift instead of someone else. I think this is the meaning of the Scholastics’ distinction between Meritum Congrui and Meritum Condigni. God Almighty has promised Paradise to those who can live in this world according to his prescribed rules and limits. These people are blindfolded by bodily desires. The Scholastics say that whoever lives according to those rules will merit Paradise Ex Congruo. But no one can claim a right to Paradise through their own righteousness or any other power within themselves. That right comes only through God’s free grace. For this reason, the Scholastics say that no one can merit Paradise Ex Condigno. This, I say, is what I think the distinction means. But those who argue do not agree on the meanings of their own technical terms any longer than suits their purposes. So I will not make any firm claim about what they mean. I say only this: suppose a gift is offered without a named recipient, as a prize to compete for. Whoever wins merits the prize and may claim it as Due.

If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties performe presently, but trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of Warre of every man against every man,) upon any reasonable suspition, it is Voyd; But if there be a common Power set over them bothe, with right and force sufficient to compell performance; it is not Voyd. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the feare of some coerceive Power; which in the condition of meer Nature, where all men are equall, and judges of the justnesse of their own fears cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he which performeth first, does but betray himselfe to his enemy; contrary to the Right (he can never abandon) of defending his life, and means of living.

Suppose two people make a covenant in which neither acts immediately, but each trusts the other to act later. In the state of nature, a state of war of everyone against everyone, any reasonable suspicion makes the covenant void. But suppose a common power stands over both, with the authority and strength to force them to keep their promises. Then the covenant is not void. For whoever acts first has no assurance that the other will act afterward. This is because words alone are too weak to restrain human ambition, greed, anger, and other passions. Words need the backing of fear of some power that can force people to obey. But no such power can possibly be assumed to exist in the state of nature. There, all people are equal, and each judges whether their own fears are justified. Therefore, whoever acts first only hands himself over to his enemy. Doing so violates his right to defend his life and his means of living, a right he can never surrender.

But in a civill estate, where there is a Power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the Covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do.

But in a civil society, an authority is established to restrain people who would otherwise break their promises. In such a society, that fear is no longer reasonable. So whoever must act first under the agreement is obliged to do so.

The cause of Feare, which maketh such a Covenant invalid, must be alwayes something arising after the Covenant made; as some new fact, or other signe of the Will not to performe; else it cannot make the Covenant Voyd. For that which could not hinder a man from promising, ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing.

The cause of any fear that makes such an agreement invalid must always arise after the agreement is made. For example, some new fact or other sign may show an intention not to carry out the agreement. Otherwise, the fear cannot make the agreement invalid. For a fear that did not stop someone from making a promise should not excuse them from keeping it.

He that transferreth any Right, transferreth the Means of enjoying it, as farre as lyeth in his power. As he that selleth Land, is understood to transferre the Herbage, and whatsoever growes upon it; Nor can he that sells a Mill turn away the Stream that drives it. And they that give to a man The Right of government in Soveraignty, are understood to give him the right of levying mony to maintain Souldiers; and of appointing Magistrates for the administration of Justice.

Anyone who transfers a right also transfers the means of exercising that right, as far as they can. For example, someone selling land is understood to transfer the grass and everything else growing on the land. Nor can someone selling a mill divert the stream that powers the mill. Likewise, those who give a man the right to rule as sovereign are understood to grant him certain rights. These include collecting money to maintain soldiers and appointing magistrates to administer justice.

To make Covenant with bruit Beasts, is impossible; because not understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any translation of Right; nor can translate any Right to another; and without mutuall acceptation, there is no Covenant.

Making a covenant with animals is impossible because animals do not understand our speech. They therefore cannot understand or accept any transfer of rights, nor can they transfer any rights to others. Without acceptance by both sides, there is no covenant.

To make Covenant with God, is impossible, but by Mediation of such as God speaketh to, either by Revelation supernaturall, or by his Lieutenants that govern under him, and in his Name; For otherwise we know not whether our Covenants be accepted, or not. And therefore they that Vow any thing contrary to any law of Nature, Vow in vain; as being a thing unjust to pay such Vow. And if it be a thing commanded by the Law of Nature, it is not the Vow, but the Law that binds them.

Making a covenant with God is impossible except through those God speaks to. He speaks either through supernatural revelation or through his representatives who govern under him and in his name. Otherwise, we cannot know whether God accepts our covenants. Therefore, anyone who vows to do something contrary to any law of nature makes that vow in vain. Fulfilling such a vow would be unjust. And if the action is commanded by the law of nature, the law binds them, not the vow.

The matter, or subject of a Covenant, is alwayes something that falleth under deliberation; (For to Covenant, is an act of the Will; that is to say an act, and the last act, of deliberation;) and is therefore alwayes understood to be something to come; and which is judged Possible for him that Covenanteth, to performe.

The subject of a covenant is always something a person can deliberate about. (For making a covenant is an act of will, the final act of deliberation.) So a covenant is always understood to concern something in the future that the person making it considers possible to perform.

And therefore, to promise that which is known to be Impossible, is no Covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was thought possible, the Covenant is valid, and bindeth, (though not to the thing it selfe,) yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to the unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible; for to more no man can be obliged.

Therefore, promising something known to be impossible does not create a covenant. But if something thought possible later proves impossible, the covenant remains valid and binding. Although the person is no longer bound to do the thing itself, they must provide its equivalent value. Or, if even that is impossible, they must make a sincere effort to do as much as possible. For no one can be obliged to do more.

Men are freed of their Covenants two wayes; by Performing; or by being Forgiven. For Performance, is the naturall end of obligation; and Forgivenesse, the restitution of liberty; as being a retransferring of that Right, in which the obligation consisted.

People are released from their agreements in two ways: by fulfilling them or by being forgiven. Fulfilling an agreement is the natural end of an obligation. Forgiveness restores freedom because it returns the right whose transfer created the obligation.

Covenants entred into by fear, in the condition of meer Nature, are obligatory. For example, if I Covenant to pay a ransome, or service for my life, to an enemy; I am bound by it. For it is a Contract, wherein one receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive mony, or service for it; and consequently, where no other Law (as in the condition, of meer Nature) forbiddeth the performance, the Covenant is valid. Therefore Prisoners of warre, if trusted with the payment of their Ransome, are obliged to pay it; And if a weaker Prince, make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for feare; he is bound to keep it; unlesse (as hath been sayd before) there ariseth some new, and just cause of feare, to renew the war. And even in Common-wealths, if I be forced to redeem my selfe from a Theefe by promising him mony, I am bound to pay it, till the Civill Law discharge me. For whatsoever I may lawfully do without Obligation, the same I may lawfully Covenant to do through feare: and what I lawfully Covenant, I cannot lawfully break.

Agreements made out of fear in the state of nature are binding. For example, suppose I promise an enemy a ransom or service in exchange for my life. I am bound by that promise. For this is a contract: one person receives the benefit of life, and the other is to receive money or service in return. So, where no other law forbids carrying out the agreement, the agreement is valid. This is the case in the state of nature. Therefore, prisoners of war who are trusted to pay their ransom are obliged to pay. And if a weaker ruler makes an unfavorable peace with a stronger ruler out of fear, the weaker ruler must keep that peace. As stated before, the exception is if some new and just cause for fear arises that justifies renewing the war. Even in an organized state, suppose I am forced to secure my release from a thief by promising him money. I am bound to pay until civil law releases me from that obligation. For whatever I may lawfully do without being obliged, I may also lawfully agree to do out of fear. And I cannot lawfully break an agreement I have lawfully made.

A former Covenant, makes voyd a later. For a man that hath passed away his Right to one man to day, hath it not to passe to morrow to another: and therefore the later promise passeth no Right, but is null.

An earlier covenant makes a later one invalid. For a man who transfers his right to someone today no longer has that right to transfer to someone else tomorrow. So the later promise transfers no right and is invalid.

A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes voyd. For (as I have shewed before) no man can transferre, or lay down his Right to save himselfe from Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment, (the avoyding whereof is the onely End of laying down any Right,) and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no Covenant transferreth any right; nor is obliging. For though a man may Covenant thus, “Unlesse I do so, or so, kill me;” he cannot Covenant thus “Unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me.” For man by nature chooseth the lesser evill, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead Criminals to Execution, and Prison, with armed men, notwithstanding that such Criminals have consented to the Law, by which they are condemned.

An agreement not to defend myself against force with force is always void. For, as I have shown before, no one can transfer or give up the right to protect himself from death, injury, and imprisonment. Avoiding these harms is the only purpose of giving up any right. So a promise not to resist force transfers no right in any agreement and is not binding. For although a man may agree, “Unless I do such and such, kill me,” he cannot agree, “Unless I do such and such, I will not resist you when you come to kill me.” For people naturally choose the lesser evil, the risk of death while resisting, over the greater evil, certain and immediate death without resistance. And everyone acknowledges this truth by using armed guards to take criminals to execution and prison. They do so even though those criminals have consented to the law under which they are condemned.

A Covenant to accuse ones Selfe, without assurance of pardon, is likewise invalide. For in the condition of Nature, where every man is Judge, there is no place for Accusation: and in the Civill State, the Accusation is followed with Punishment; which being Force, a man is not obliged not to resist. The same is also true, of the Accusation of those, by whose Condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a Father, Wife, or Benefactor. For the Testimony of such an Accuser, if it be not willingly given, is praesumed to be corrupted by Nature; and therefore not to be received: and where a mans Testimony is not to be credited, his not bound to give it. Also Accusations upon Torture, are not to be reputed as Testimonies. For Torture is to be used but as means of conjecture, and light, in the further examination, and search of truth; and what is in that case confessed, tendeth to the ease of him that is Tortured; not to the informing of the Torturers: and therefore ought not to have the credit of a sufficient Testimony: for whether he deliver himselfe by true, or false Accusation, he does it by the Right of preserving his own life.

An agreement to accuse yourself without assurance of a pardon is also invalid. For in the state of nature, where everyone is their own judge, there is no place for accusation. And in civil society, accusation is followed by punishment. Since punishment is an act of force, no one is obliged to refrain from resisting it. The same applies to accusing people whose condemnation would bring misery upon you, such as a father, wife, or benefactor. For unless such an accusation is made willingly, human nature is presumed to make the accuser’s testimony unreliable. Therefore, the testimony should not be accepted. And when someone’s testimony cannot be trusted, they are not bound to give it. Accusations made under torture should not count as testimony either. For torture should serve only to provide clues and guidance for further investigation and the search for truth. Whatever a person confesses under torture is meant to relieve their suffering, not to inform the torturers. Therefore, such a confession should not be accepted as sufficient testimony. For whether someone escapes torture by making a true or false accusation, they exercise their right to preserve their life.

The force of Words, being (as I have formerly noted) too weak to hold men to the performance of their Covenants; there are in mans nature, but two imaginable helps to strengthen it. And those are either a Feare of the consequence of breaking their word; or a Glory, or Pride in appearing not to need to breake it. This later is a Generosity too rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of Wealth, Command, or sensuall Pleasure; which are the greatest part of Mankind. The Passion to be reckoned upon, is Fear; whereof there be two very generall Objects: one, the Power of Spirits Invisible; the other, the Power of those men they shall therein Offend. Of these two, though the former be the greater Power, yet the feare of the later is commonly the greater Feare. The Feare of the former is in every man, his own Religion: which hath place in the nature of man before Civill Society. The later hath not so; at least not place enough, to keep men to their promises; because in the condition of meer Nature, the inequality of Power is not discerned, but by the event of Battell. So that before the time of Civill Society, or in the interruption thereof by Warre, there is nothing can strengthen a Covenant of Peace agreed on, against the temptations of Avarice, Ambition, Lust, or other strong desire, but the feare of that Invisible Power, which they every one Worship as God; and Feare as a Revenger of their perfidy. All therefore that can be done between two men not subject to Civill Power, is to put one another to swear by the God he feareth: Which Swearing or OATH, is a Forme Of Speech, Added To A Promise; By Which He That Promiseth, Signifieth, That Unlesse He Performe, He Renounceth The Mercy Of His God, Or Calleth To Him For Vengeance On Himselfe. Such was the Heathen Forme, “Let Jupiter kill me else, as I kill this Beast.” So is our Forme, “I shall do thus, and thus, so help me God.” And this, with the Rites and Ceremonies, which every one useth in his own Religion, that the feare of breaking faith might be the greater.

Words alone are too weak to make people keep their agreements, as I noted earlier. Only two things in human nature can possibly give words greater force. One is fear of the consequences of breaking a promise. The other is pride in appearing not to need to break it. Such nobility of spirit is too rare to rely on, especially among people pursuing wealth, power, or sensual pleasure. These people make up most of humanity. The emotion we can count on is fear. Fear has two very common objects: the power of invisible spirits and the power of people offended by broken promises. Although invisible spirits have greater power, people commonly fear other people more. Each person's fear of invisible powers is their own religion. This fear exists in human nature before civil society. Fear of other people does not, at least not strongly enough to make people keep their promises. For in the state of nature, differences in power become clear only through the outcome of battle. So, before civil society exists, or when war interrupts it, only fear of invisible power can strengthen an agreed peace covenant. Only this fear can protect the agreement against the temptations of greed, ambition, lust, or other strong desires. Each person worships this invisible power as God and fears it as an avenger of broken promises. Therefore, two people who are not subject to civil authority can do only one thing. Each must require the other to swear by the God they fear. Swearing, or an OATH, is a form of words added to a promise. Through these words, the person promising declares that, unless they keep the promise, they renounce their God's mercy. Or they call on their God to take vengeance on them. Such was the pagan formula: “Let Jupiter kill me if I fail, just as I kill this animal.” Our own formula is: “I will do such and such, so help me God.” These oaths are accompanied by the rites and ceremonies each person uses in their own religion. The purpose is to increase the fear of breaking faith.

By this it appears, that an Oath taken according to any other Forme, or Rite, then his, that sweareth, is in vain; and no Oath: And there is no Swearing by any thing which the Swearer thinks not God. For though men have sometimes used to swear by their Kings, for feare, or flattery; yet they would have it thereby understood, they attributed to them Divine honour. And that Swearing unnecessarily by God, is but prophaning of his name: and Swearing by other things, as men do in common discourse, is not Swearing, but an impious Custome, gotten by too much vehemence of talking.

From this, it follows that an oath is useless unless its form or ritual matches the swearer’s own. It is no oath at all. Nor can anyone swear by something the swearer does not believe to be God. Although people have sometimes sworn by their kings out of fear or flattery, they meant to give those kings divine honor. Swearing by God unnecessarily only dishonors his name. And swearing by other things, as people do in everyday conversation, is not truly swearing. It is an impious habit acquired through overly forceful speech.

It appears also, that the Oath addes nothing to the Obligation. For a Covenant, if lawfull, binds in the sight of God, without the Oath, as much as with it; if unlawfull, bindeth not at all; though it be confirmed with an Oath.

It also appears that an oath adds nothing to the obligation. For a lawful agreement is just as binding in God’s sight without an oath as with one. An unlawful agreement is not binding at all, even if confirmed by an oath.