Intellectual Strengths and Their Opposing Weaknesses

Vertue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equally in all men, nothing would be prized. And by Vertues INTELLECTUALL, are always understood such abilityes of the mind, as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a Good Witte; though the same word Witte, be used also, to distinguish one certain ability from the rest.

Virtue, in any subject, means a quality valued for its excellence compared with others. Virtue therefore depends on comparison. For if everyone had all qualities equally, nothing would be prized. Intellectual virtues are always understood as mental abilities that people praise, value, and wish to possess themselves. These abilities are commonly called good wit, although “wit” is also used to distinguish one particular ability from the others.

These Vertues are of two sorts; Naturall, and Acquired. By Naturall, I mean not, that which a man hath from his Birth: for that is nothing else but Sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute Beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst Vertues. But I mean, that Witte, which is gotten by Use onely, and Experience; without Method, Culture, or Instruction. This NATURALL WITTE, consisteth principally in two things; Celerity Of Imagining, (that is, swift succession of one thought to another;) and Steddy Direction to some approved end. On the Contrary a slow Imagination, maketh that Defect, or fault of the mind, which is commonly called DULNESSE, Stupidity, and sometimes by other names that signifie slownesse of motion, or difficulty to be moved.

These virtues are of two kinds: natural and acquired. By natural, I do not mean what a person has from birth, for that is nothing but sensory perception. In sensory perception, people differ so little from one another and from animals that it cannot count as a virtue. Instead, I mean the intelligence gained through practice and experience alone, without method, cultivation, or instruction. This NATURAL INTELLIGENCE consists mainly of two things: quick thinking and steady focus on a goal judged worthwhile. Quick thinking means a rapid flow from one thought to another. By contrast, slow thinking produces the mental defect or fault commonly called DULLNESS or stupidity. Sometimes this defect has other names suggesting slow movement or difficulty being moved.

And this difference of quicknesse, is caused by the difference of mens passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and therefore some mens thoughts run one way, some another: and are held to, and observe differently the things that passe through their imagination. And whereas in his succession of mens thoughts, there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be Like One Another, or in what they be Unlike, or What They Serve For, or How They Serve To Such A Purpose; Those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are sayd to have a Good Wit; by which, in this occasion, is meant a Good Fancy. But they that observe their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called Distinguishing, and Discerning, and Judging between thing and thing; in case, such discerning be not easie, are said to have a Good Judgement: and particularly in matter of conversation and businesse; wherein, times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this Vertue is called DISCRETION. The former, that is, Fancy, without the help of Judgement, is not commended as a Vertue: but the later which is Judgement, and Discretion, is commended for it selfe, without the help of Fancy. Besides the Discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary to a good Fancy, there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their End; that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done; he that hath this Vertue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that will please, not onely by illustration of his discourse, and adorning it with new and apt metaphors; but also, by the rarity or their invention. But without Steddinesse, and Direction to some End, a great Fancy is one kind of Madnesse; such as they have, that entring into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose, by every thing that comes in their thought, into so many, and so long digressions, and parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves: Which kind of folly, I know no particular name for: but the cause of it is, sometimes want of experience; whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare, which doth not so to others: sometimes Pusillanimity; by which that seems great to him, which other men think a trifle: and whatsoever is new, or great, and therefore thought fit to be told, withdrawes a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse.

This difference in mental quickness comes from differences in people’s passions. Some love or dislike one thing, and others another. So their thoughts follow different paths. Different things passing through their imaginations hold their attention, and they notice different features of those things. As people’s thoughts follow one another, there are only four things to notice about their subjects: how they are alike, how they differ, what they are useful for, and how they serve a particular purpose. People who notice similarities rarely observed by others are said to have a good wit. Here, that means a good imagination. But people who notice differences are said to have good judgment, if those differences are not easy to discern. Noticing differences is called distinguishing, discerning, or judging between one thing and another. In particular, conversation and business require people to distinguish between times, places, and persons. In these matters, this quality is called DISCRETION. Imagination without the help of judgment is not praised as a virtue. But judgment and discretion are praised for their own sake, without the help of imagination. A good imagination requires discretion about times, places, and persons. It also requires people to direct their thoughts frequently toward their purpose, meaning some use they can make of them. With these requirements met, a person with a good imagination will readily find pleasing comparisons. These comparisons please by clarifying what the person says and enriching it with fresh, fitting metaphors. They also please because they are rarely thought of. But without steadiness and direction toward some purpose, a powerful imagination is a kind of madness. People with this madness begin discussing something, but every thought that occurs pulls them away from their purpose. Their digressions and asides become so numerous and lengthy that they completely lose their way. I know no particular name for this kind of folly. But its cause is sometimes a lack of experience. Because of that inexperience, something seems new and rare to a person when it does not seem so to others. Sometimes the cause is timidity, which makes something seem important to a person when others consider it trivial. Whatever seems new or important, and therefore worth telling, gradually draws a person away from the intended course of discussion.

In a good Poem, whether it be Epique, or Dramatique; as also in Sonnets, Epigrams, and other Pieces, both Judgement and Fancy are required: But the Fancy must be more eminent; because they please for the Extravagancy; but ought not to displease by Indiscretion.

A good poem, whether epic or dramatic, requires both judgment and imagination. So do sonnets, epigrams, and other works. But imagination must stand out more, because these works please through their flights of fancy. Yet they should not displease through poor judgment.

In a good History, the Judgement must be eminent; because the goodnesse consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choyse of the actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but onely in adorning the stile.

A good history must show outstanding judgment because its quality depends on its organization, accuracy, and choice of events. These events must be the most useful to know about. Imagination has no place except in making the writing more elegant.

In Orations of Prayse, and in Invectives, the Fancy is praedominant; because the designe is not truth, but to Honour or Dishonour; which is done by noble, or by vile comparisons. The Judgement does but suggest what circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable.

In speeches of praise and in bitter attacks, imagination dominates because the aim is not truth, but honor or dishonor. Speakers achieve this aim through noble or degrading comparisons. Judgment merely suggests what circumstances make an action worthy of praise or blame.

In Hortatives, and Pleadings, as Truth, or Disguise serveth best to the Designe in hand; so is the Judgement, or the Fancy most required.

In persuasive speeches and legal arguments, judgment or imagination is most needed, depending on whether truth or deception best serves the purpose at hand.

In Demonstration, in Councell, and all rigourous search of Truth, Judgement does all; except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of Fancy. But for Metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they openly professe deceipt; to admit them into Councell, or Reasoning, were manifest folly.

In proofs, advice, and all rigorous searches for truth, judgment does all the work. Sometimes, however, understanding needs help from a fitting comparison. Imagination is useful to that extent. But metaphors are completely excluded from these activities. Because metaphors openly claim to deceive, allowing them into advice or reasoning would be obvious foolishness.

And in any Discourse whatsoever, if the defect of Discretion be apparent, how extravagant soever the Fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a signe of want of wit; and so will it never when the Discretion is manifest, though the Fancy be never so ordinary.

In any discussion, an obvious lack of judgment will be taken as a sign of a lack of intelligence. This holds no matter how remarkable the imagination is. But when good judgment is clear, the discussion will never suggest a lack of intelligence, however ordinary the imagination.

The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane, clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verball discourse cannot do, farther than the Judgement shall approve of the Time, Place, and Persons. An Anatomist, or a Physitian may speak, or write his judgement of unclean things; because it is not to please, but profit: but for another man to write his extravagant, and pleasant fancies of the same, is as if a man, from being tumbled into the dirt, should come and present himselfe before good company. And ’tis the want of Discretion that makes the difference. Again, in profest remissnesse of mind, and familiar company, a man may play with the sounds, and aequivocal significations of words; and that many times with encounters of extraordinary Fancy: but in a Sermon, or in publique, or before persons unknown, or whom we ought to reverence, there is no Gingling of words that will not be accounted folly: and the difference is onely in the want of Discretion. So that where Wit is wanting, it is not Fancy that is wanting, but Discretion. Judgement therefore without Fancy is Wit, but Fancy without Judgement not.

A person's private thoughts range over all things: sacred and profane, clean and obscene, serious and light. These thoughts carry no shame or blame. But speech cannot range so freely unless judgment finds the time, place, and company appropriate. An anatomist or physician may speak or write about unclean things, because the purpose is to help, not to entertain. But suppose another person writes wild and amusing fantasies about the same things. Such a writer is like someone who has been rolled in dirt and then presents himself before respectable company. The difference lies in a lack of discretion. Again, when openly relaxing among friends, a person may play with the sounds and double meanings of words. Such wordplay may often show extraordinary imagination. But in a sermon, in public, or before strangers or people we should respect, all such wordplay is considered foolish. Here too, the difference lies only in a lack of discretion. So where wit is lacking, imagination is not what is missing. Discretion is. Judgment without imagination therefore counts as wit, but imagination without judgment does not.

When the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, running over a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that designe; or what designe they may conduce into; if his observations be such as are not easie, or usuall, This wit of his is called PRUDENCE; and dependeth on much Experience, and Memory of the like things, and their consequences heretofore. In which there is not so much difference of Men, as there is in their Fancies and Judgements; Because the Experience of men equall in age, is not much unequall, as to the quantity; but lyes in different occasions; every one having his private designes. To govern well a family, and a kingdome, are not different degrees of Prudence; but different sorts of businesse; no more then to draw a picture in little, or as great, or greater then the life, are different degrees of Art. A plain husband-man is more Prudent in affaires of his own house, then a Privy Counseller in the affaires of another man.

When a man has a goal in mind, his thoughts range over many things. He notices how those things serve his goal, or what other goals they might serve. If his observations are unusual or not easily made, his mental ability is called PRUDENCE. Prudence depends on extensive experience and on remembering similar things and their past consequences. People differ less in prudence than in imagination and judgment. This is because people of the same age have roughly equal amounts of experience. But their experience comes from different situations, since everyone has personal goals. Managing a household well and governing a kingdom well do not require different degrees of prudence. They are simply different kinds of work. Likewise, painting a miniature, a life-size picture, or a larger-than-life picture does not involve different degrees of artistic skill. An ordinary farmer is more prudent in his own household affairs than a privy councillor is in another man's affairs.

To Prudence, if you adde the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such as usually are prompted to men by Feare, or Want; you have that Crooked Wisdome, which is called CRAFT; which is a signe of Pusillanimity. For Magnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And that which the Latines Call Versutia, (translated into English, Shifting,) and is a putting off of a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into a greater, as when a man robbs one to pay another, is but a shorter sighted Craft, called Versutia, from Versura, which signifies taking mony at usurie, for the present payment of interest.

If you add unjust or dishonest methods to prudence, you get the twisted wisdom called CRAFT. Fear or need usually drives people to use such methods. Craft is a sign of cowardice. For greatness of spirit means rejecting unjust or dishonest help as beneath you. The Latins call one kind of craft Versutia, translated into English as Shifting. Shifting means escaping a present danger or difficulty by taking on a greater one. An example is robbing one person to pay another. Shifting is merely a more shortsighted form of craft. The name Versutia comes from Versura, meaning borrowing money at interest to pay interest currently due.

As for Acquired Wit, (I mean acquired by method and instruction,) there is none but Reason; which is grounded on the right use of Speech; and produceth the Sciences. But of Reason and Science, I have already spoken in the fifth and sixth Chapters.

As for acquired intelligence, I mean intelligence gained through method and instruction. Reason is the only kind. Reason rests on the correct use of language and gives rise to the sciences. But I have already discussed reason and science in the fifth and sixth chapters.

The causes of this difference of Witts, are in the Passions: and the difference of Passions, proceedeth partly from the different Constitution of the body, and partly from different Education. For if the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of Sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no lesse difference of men in their Sight, Hearing, or other Senses, than in their Fancies, and Discretions. It proceeds therefore from the Passions; which are different, not onely from the difference of mens complexions; but also from their difference of customes, and education.

Differences in mental abilities arise from the passions. Differences in passions come partly from differences in bodily constitution and partly from differences in education. For suppose differences in mental abilities came from the condition of the brain and the sense organs, external or internal. Then people would differ as much in sight, hearing, and other senses as in imagination and judgment. Differences in mental abilities therefore come from the passions. These passions differ not only because people's bodily constitutions differ, but also because their habits and education differ.

The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are principally, the more or lesse Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge, and of Honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but severall sorts of Power.

The passions that most cause differences in intellect are stronger or weaker desires for power, wealth, knowledge, and honor. All these desires may be reduced to the first, the desire for power. For wealth, knowledge, and honor are simply different kinds of power.

And therefore, a man who has no great Passion for any of these things; but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may be so farre a good man, as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a great Fancy, or much Judgement. For the Thoughts, are to the Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things Desired: All Stedinesse of the minds motion, and all quicknesse of the same, proceeding from thence. For as to have no Desire, is to be Dead: so to have weak Passions, is Dulnesse; and to have Passions indifferently for every thing, GIDDINESSE, and Distraction; and to have stronger, and more vehement Passions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call MADNESSE.

Therefore, a man with no strong passion for any of these things is, as people say, indifferent. Though he may be a good man in the sense that he gives no offense, his abilities are necessarily limited. He cannot possibly have either a powerful imagination or much judgment. For thoughts serve desires as scouts and spies, going out to find the way to what we desire. All steadiness and quickness of the mind’s activity come from desires. For just as having no desire is being dead, having weak passions is dullness. Having passions for everything equally is GIDDINESS and distraction. And having stronger, more intense passions for anything than people ordinarily show is what people call MADNESS.

Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the Passions themselves. Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant Passion, proceedeth from the evill constitution of the organs of the Body, or harme done them; and sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the Organs, is caused by the vehemence, or long continuance of the Passion. But in both cases the Madnesse is of one and the same nature.

There are almost as many kinds of madness as there are passions themselves. Sometimes an unusually intense and excessive passion comes from unhealthy or damaged bodily organs. At other times, the passion’s intensity or long duration causes damage and poor health in the organs. But in both cases, the madness is of the same nature.

The Passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madnesse, is either great Vaine-Glory; which is commonly called Pride, and Selfe-Conceipt; or great Dejection of mind.

The emotion whose intensity or duration causes madness takes one of two forms. One is extreme vanity, commonly called pride and self-conceit. The other is deep despair.

Pride, subjecteth a man to Anger, the excesse whereof, is the Madnesse called RAGE, and FURY. And thus it comes to passe that excessive desire of Revenge, when it becomes habituall, hurteth the organs, and becomes Rage: That excessive love, with jealousie, becomes also Rage: Excessive opinion of a mans own selfe, for divine inspiration, for wisdome, learning, forme, and the like, becomes Distraction, and Giddinesse: the same, joyned with Envy, Rage: Vehement opinion of the truth of any thing, contradicted by others, Rage.

Pride makes a person prone to anger. Excessive anger is the madness called RAGE and FURY. Thus, an excessive desire for revenge, when it becomes habitual, damages the bodily organs and turns into rage. Excessive love combined with jealousy also turns into rage. An inflated opinion of one's own divine inspiration, wisdom, learning, beauty, or similar qualities leads to mental disturbance and confusion. That inflated opinion, combined with envy, leads to rage. So does a fiercely held belief in the truth of something when others contradict it.

Dejection, subjects a man to causelesse fears; which is a Madnesse commonly called MELANCHOLY, apparent also in divers manners; as in haunting of solitudes, and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in fearing some one, some another particular thing. In summe, all Passions that produce strange and unusuall behaviour, are called by the generall name of Madnesse. But of the severall kinds of Madnesse, he that would take the paines, might enrowle a legion. And if the Excesses be madnesse, there is no doubt but the Passions themselves, when they tend to Evill, are degrees of the same.

Dejection exposes a person to groundless fears. This is a kind of madness commonly called MELANCHOLY, which also shows itself in various ways. These include frequenting lonely places and graves, behaving superstitiously, and fearing particular things, some people one thing, others another. In short, all emotions that produce strange and unusual behavior go by the general name of madness. But anyone willing to take the trouble could list a legion of different kinds of madness. And if excessive emotions are madness, then undoubtedly the emotions themselves, when tending toward evil, are degrees of madness.

(For example,) Though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of an opinion of being inspired, be not visible alwayes in one man, by any very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such Passion; yet when many of them conspire together, the Rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what argument of Madnesse can there be greater, than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat lesse than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their lifetime before, they have been protected, and secured from injury. And if this be Madnesse in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For as in the middest of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of the water next him; yet he is well assured, that part contributes as much, to the Roaring of the Sea, as any other part, of the same quantity: so also, thought wee perceive no great unquietnesse, in one, or two men; yet we may be well assured, that their singular Passions, are parts of the Seditious roaring of a troubled Nation. And if there were nothing else that bewrayed their madnesse; yet that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves, is argument enough. If some man in Bedlam should entertaine you with sober discourse; and you desire in taking leave, to know what he were, that you might another time requite his civility; and he should tell you, he were God the Father; I think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his Madnesse.

(For example,) people who believe they are divinely inspired do not always show their folly through wildly irrational actions. Yet when many of them join together, the rage of the whole crowd is clear enough. For what greater sign of madness could there be than shouting at, striking, and throwing stones at our best friends? Yet even these attacks fall somewhat short of what such a crowd will do. For they will shout at, fight against, and destroy those who have protected them from harm throughout their lives. And if such behavior is madness in the crowd, it is madness in each individual too. Consider someone out at sea. Although he hears no sound from the water nearest him, he knows that water contributes to the sea’s roar. Its contribution is as great as any other equal amount of water. In the same way, although we see no great unrest in one or two people, we can be equally sure of their contribution. Their individual passions form part of the rebellious roar of a troubled nation. And even if nothing else revealed their madness, their very claim to divine inspiration would be evidence enough. Suppose a man in Bedlam were to speak sensibly with you. As you leave, you ask who he is, so you can return his courtesy another time. Suppose he then tells you he is God the Father. I think you need not wait for any wildly irrational action as evidence of his madness.

This opinion of Inspiration, called commonly, Private Spirit, begins very often, from some lucky finding of an Errour generally held by others; and not knowing, or not remembring, by what conduct of reason, they came to so singular a truth, (as they think it, though it be many times an untruth they light on,) they presently admire themselves; as being in the speciall grace of God Almighty, who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally, by his Spirit.

Belief in inspiration, commonly called Private Spirit, very often begins with a lucky discovery of an error others generally accept. Those who make this discovery do not know or remember the reasoning that led them to such an unusual truth. At least, they think it is a truth, though what they stumble upon is often false. So they immediately admire themselves, believing they enjoy the special favor of God Almighty. They believe he has revealed this truth to them supernaturally through his Spirit.

Again, that Madnesse is nothing else, but too much appearing Passion, may be gathered out of the effects of Wine, which are the same with those of the evill disposition of the organs. For the variety of behaviour in men that have drunk too much, is the same with that of Mad-men: some of them Raging, others Loving, others laughing, all extravagantly, but according to their severall domineering Passions: For the effect of the wine, does but remove Dissimulation; and take from them the sight of the deformity of their Passions. For, (I believe) the most sober men, when they walk alone without care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the vanity and Extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publiquely seen: which is a confession, that Passions unguided, are for the most part meere Madnesse.

Again, the effects of wine suggest that madness is nothing more than passion showing itself too strongly. Wine has the same effects as a disorder of the organs. For people who have drunk too much behave in the same varied ways as mad people. Some rage, others become loving, and others laugh. All go to extremes, but each follows their own dominant passions. For wine merely removes their ability to hide their feelings and blinds them to the ugliness of their passions. For I believe even the most sober people would not want their foolish and extravagant thoughts publicly exposed. I mean the thoughts they have when walking alone, free from worries and with nothing to occupy their minds. Their unwillingness amounts to an admission that unguided passions are, for the most part, nothing but madness.

The opinions of the world, both in antient and later ages, concerning the cause of madnesse, have been two. Some, deriving them from the Passions; some, from Daemons, or Spirits, either good, or bad, which they thought might enter into a man, possesse him, and move his organs is such strange, and uncouth manner, as mad-men use to do. The former sort therefore, called such men, Mad-men: but the Later, called them sometimes Daemoniacks, (that is, possessed with spirits;) sometimes Energumeni, (that is agitated, or moved with spirits;) and now in Italy they are called not onely Pazzi, Mad-men; but also Spiritati, men possest.

Both in ancient and in more recent times, people have held two views about the cause of madness. Some traced madness to the passions. Others traced it to demons or spirits, either good or bad. These people thought spirits could enter a person, possess him, and move his body in strange and unfamiliar ways, as madmen do. Those who held the first view therefore called such people madmen. But those who held the second view sometimes called them Daemoniacks (people possessed by spirits). Sometimes they called them Energumeni (people stirred or moved by spirits). And now in Italy, such people are called not only Pazzi, meaning madmen, but also Spiritati, meaning possessed people.

There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a City of the Greeks, at the acting of the Tragedy of Andromeda, upon an extream hot day: whereupon, a great many of the spectators falling into Fevers, had this accident from the heat, and from The Tragedy together, that they did nothing but pronounce Iambiques, with the names of Perseus and Andromeda; which together with the Fever, was cured, by the comming on of Winter: And this madnesse was thought to proceed from the Passion imprinted by the Tragedy. Likewise there raigned a fit of madnesse in another Graecian city, which seized onely the young Maidens; and caused many of them to hang themselves. This was by most then thought an act of the Divel. But one that suspected, that contempt of life in them, might proceed from some Passion of the mind, and supposing they did not contemne also their honour, gave counsell to the Magistrates, to strip such as so hang’d themselves, and let them hang out naked. This the story sayes cured that madnesse. But on the other side, the same Graecians, did often ascribe madnesse, to the operation of the Eumenides, or Furyes; and sometimes of Ceres, Phoebus, and other Gods: so much did men attribute to Phantasmes, as to think them aereal living bodies; and generally to call them Spirits. And as the Romans in this, held the same opinion with the Greeks: so also did the Jewes; For they calle mad-men Prophets, or (according as they thought the spirits good or bad) Daemoniacks; and some of them called both Prophets, and Daemoniacks, mad-men; and some called the same man both Daemoniack, and mad-man. But for the Gentiles, ’tis no wonder; because Diseases, and Health; Vices, and Vertues; and many naturall accidents, were with them termed, and worshipped as Daemons. So that a man was to understand by Daemon, as well (sometimes) an Ague, as a Divell. But for the Jewes to have such opinion, is somewhat strange. For neither Moses, nor Abraham pretended to Prophecy by possession of a Spirit; but from the voyce of God; or by a Vision or Dream: Nor is there any thing in his Law, Morall, or Ceremoniall, by which they were taught, there was any such Enthusiasme; or any Possession. When God is sayd, (Numb. 11. 25.) to take from the Spirit that was in Moses, and give it to the 70. Elders, the Spirit of God (taking it for the substance of God) is not divided. The Scriptures by the Spirit of God in man, mean a mans spirit, enclined to Godlinesse. And where it is said (Exod. 28. 3.) “Whom I have filled with the Spirit of wisdome to make garments for Aaron,” is not meant a spirit put into them, that can make garments; but the wisdome of their own spirits in that kind of work. In the like sense, the spirit of man, when it produceth unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit; and so other spirits, though not alwayes, yet as often as the vertue or vice so stiled, is extraordinary, and Eminent. Neither did the other Prophets of the old Testament pretend Enthusiasme; or, that God spake in them; but to them by Voyce, Vision, or Dream; and the Burthen Of The Lord was not Possession, but Command. How then could the Jewes fall into this opinion of possession? I can imagine no reason, but that which is common to all men; namely, the want of curiosity to search naturall causes; and their placing Felicity, in the acquisition of the grosse pleasures of the Senses, and the things that most immediately conduce thereto. For they that see any strange, and unusuall ability, or defect in a mans mind; unlesse they see withall, from what cause it may probably proceed, can hardly think it naturall; and if not naturall, they must needs thinke it supernaturall; and then what can it be, but that either God, or the Divell is in him? And hence it came to passe, when our Saviour (Mark 3.21.) was compassed about with the multitude, those of the house doubted he was mad, and went out to hold him: but the Scribes said he had Belzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out divels; as if the greater mad-man had awed the lesser. And that (John 10. 20.) some said, “He hath a Divell, and is mad;” whereas others holding him for a Prophet, sayd, “These are not the words of one that hath a Divell.” So in the old Testament he that came to anoynt Jehu, (2 Kings 9.11.) was a Prophet; but some of the company asked Jehu, “What came that mad-man for?” So that in summe, it is manifest, that whosoever behaved himselfe in extraordinary manner, was thought by the Jewes to be possessed either with a good, or evill spirit; except by the Sadduces, who erred so farre on the other hand, as not to believe there were at all any spirits, (which is very neere to direct Atheisme;) and thereby perhaps the more provoked others, to terme such men Daemoniacks, rather than mad-men.

Once, a large crowd gathered in Abdera, a Greek city, to watch the tragedy of Andromeda on an extremely hot day. Many spectators developed fevers. The heat and the tragedy together had a strange effect on them. They did nothing but recite iambic verses containing the names of Perseus and Andromeda. The coming of winter cured both the fever and this behavior. People thought this madness came from the emotions stirred by the tragedy. Likewise, an outbreak of madness struck another Greek city, affecting only young unmarried women. It caused many of them to hang themselves. Most people then thought this was the Devil’s work. But one person suspected that their contempt for life might come from some emotion in their minds. He also supposed that they did not hold their honor in contempt. So he advised the magistrates to strip those who hanged themselves and leave their bodies hanging naked. According to the story, this cured the madness. Yet these same Greeks often attributed madness to the work of the Eumenides, or Furies. Sometimes they attributed it to Ceres, Phoebus, and other gods. People credited phantoms with so much that they thought these were living bodies made of air. They generally called them spirits. The Romans shared this Greek opinion, and so did the Jews. The Jews called mad people prophets or, depending on whether they thought the spirits good or bad, people possessed by demons. Some called both prophets and people possessed by demons mad. Others called the same person both possessed and mad. Such beliefs among the Gentiles are no surprise. They gave the name Daemons to diseases and health, vices and virtues, and many natural occurrences, and worshipped them. So the word Daemon could sometimes mean a fever as well as a devil. But it is somewhat strange that the Jews held this opinion. Neither Moses nor Abraham claimed to prophesy through possession by a spirit. Instead, they claimed to hear God’s voice or receive a vision or dream. Nor did anything in God’s moral or ceremonial law teach them that such divine inspiration or possession existed. God is said to have taken some of the spirit in Moses and given it to the seventy elders (Numbers 11:25). But the Spirit of God, if understood as God’s substance, cannot be divided. By the Spirit of God in a person, Scripture means that person’s own spirit inclined toward godliness. Exodus 28:3 says, “Whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom to make garments for Aaron.” This does not mean that a spirit capable of making clothes was put into them. It means the skill of their own minds in that kind of work. In the same sense, a person’s spirit is ordinarily called an unclean spirit when it produces unclean actions. Other spirits receive similar names, though not always, whenever the virtue or vice described is extraordinary and outstanding. Nor did the other Old Testament prophets claim divine possession, or claim that God spoke within them. They claimed that God spoke to them through a voice, vision, or dream. And the Burden of the Lord meant a command, not possession. How, then, could the Jews have adopted this belief in possession? I can imagine no reason except one common to all humanity. People lack the curiosity to investigate natural causes. They also place happiness in gaining crude pleasures of the senses and whatever most directly helps them gain those pleasures. People may see some strange and unusual ability or defect in someone’s mind. Unless they also see its probable cause, they can hardly believe it is natural. And if it is not natural, they must think it supernatural. What else, then, can explain it except that God or the Devil is in that person? This explains what happened when the crowd surrounded our Savior (Mark 3:21). Those of his household suspected he was mad and went out to restrain him. But the Scribes said he had Beelzebub, and that through Beelzebub he cast out devils. It was as if the greater madman had frightened the lesser ones into submission. Similarly, some said, “He has a devil, and is mad” (John 10:20). Others, who considered him a prophet, said, “These are not the words of someone who has a devil.” Likewise, in the Old Testament, the man who came to anoint Jehu was a prophet (2 Kings 9:11). But some of those present asked Jehu, “What did that madman come for?” In short, the Jews clearly thought anyone who behaved unusually was possessed by either a good or an evil spirit. The exception was the Sadducees. They went so far in the opposite direction that they denied the existence of any spirits at all. This comes very close to outright atheism. Perhaps their denial also encouraged others to call such people possessed by demons rather than mad.

But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they were possest; and not as if they were mad. To which I can give no other kind of answer, but that which is given to those that urge the Scripture in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the Earth. The Scripture was written to shew unto men the kingdome of God; and to prepare their mindes to become his obedient subjects; leaving the world, and the Philosophy thereof, to the disputation of men, for the exercising of their naturall Reason. Whether the Earths, or Suns motion make the day, and night; or whether the Exorbitant actions of men, proceed from Passion, or from the Divell, (so we worship him not) it is all one, as to our obedience, and subjection to God Almighty; which is the thing for which the Scripture was written. As for that our Saviour speaketh to the disease, as to a person; it is the usuall phrase of all that cure by words onely, as Christ did, (and Inchanters pretend to do, whether they speak to a Divel or not.) For is not Christ also said (Math. 8.26.) to have rebuked the winds? Is not he said also (Luk. 4. 39.) to rebuke a Fever? Yet this does not argue that a Fever is a Divel. And whereas many of these Divels are said to confesse Christ; it is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that those mad-men confessed him. And whereas our Saviour (Math. 12. 43.) speaketh of an unclean Spirit, that having gone out of a man, wandreth through dry places, seeking rest, and finding none; and returning into the same man, with seven other spirits worse than himselfe; It is manifestly a Parable, alluding to a man, that after a little endeavour to quit his lusts, is vanquished by the strength of them; and becomes seven times worse than he was. So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that requireth a beliefe, that Daemoniacks were any other thing but Mad-men.

But why, then, does our Saviour treat these people as if they were possessed, rather than mentally ill? I can give only the answer given to those who similarly use Scripture against the idea that the Earth moves. Scripture was written to show people the kingdom of God and prepare their minds to become his obedient subjects. It leaves the world and its philosophy for people to debate, exercising their natural reason. Does the motion of the Earth or the Sun cause day and night? Do people’s extreme actions come from passion or from the Devil? Neither question makes any difference to our obedience and submission to God Almighty, provided we do not worship the Devil. That obedience and submission are the purpose for which Scripture was written. As for our Saviour addressing a disease as a person, everyone who heals by words alone uses such language. Christ healed by words alone, and enchanters claim to do so, whether they address a Devil or not. Is Christ not also said to have rebuked the winds (Matthew 8:26)? Is he not also said to have rebuked a fever (Luke 4:39)? Yet rebuking a fever does not show that a fever is a Devil. And although many of these Devils are said to acknowledge Christ, those passages need mean only that the mentally ill acknowledged him. Our Saviour also speaks of an unclean Spirit that leaves a man (Matthew 12:43). The Spirit wanders through dry places, seeking rest and finding none. Then the Spirit returns to the same man with seven other spirits worse than himself. This is clearly a parable about a man who makes a small effort to give up his sinful desires. But those desires overpower him, and he becomes seven times worse than before. So I see nothing at all in Scripture requiring us to believe that people called possessed were anything but mentally ill.

There is yet another fault in the Discourses of some men; which may also be numbred amongst the sorts of Madnesse; namely, that abuse of words, whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the Name of Absurdity. And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have in them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote; by others, from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to none but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the Schoole-men; or in questions of abstruse Philosophy. The common sort of men seldome speak Insignificantly, and are therefore, by those other Egregious persons counted Idiots. But to be assured their words are without any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some Examples; which if any man require, let him take a Schoole-man into his hands, and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point; as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ; Transubstantiation; Free-will. &c. into any of the moderne tongues, so as to make the same intelligible; or into any tolerable Latine, such as they were acquainted withall, that lived when the Latine tongue was Vulgar. What is the meaning of these words. “The first cause does not necessarily inflow any thing into the second, by force of the Essential subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to worke?” They are the Translation of the Title of the sixth chapter of Suarez first Booke, Of The Concourse, Motion, And Help Of God. When men write whole volumes of such stuffe, are they not Mad, or intend to make others so? And particularly, in the question of Transubstantiation; where after certain words spoken, they that say, the White-nesse, Round-nesse, Magni-tude, Quali-ty, Corruptibili-ty, all which are incorporeall, &c. go out of the Wafer, into the Body of our blessed Saviour, do they not make those Nesses, Tudes and Ties, to be so many spirits possessing his body? For by Spirits, they mean alwayes things, that being incorporeall, are neverthelesse moveable from one place to another. So that this kind of Absurdity, may rightly be numbred amongst the many sorts of Madnesse; and all the time that guided by clear Thoughts of their worldly lust, they forbear disputing, or writing thus, but Lucide Intervals. And thus much of the Vertues and Defects Intellectuall.

There is another fault in some men’s arguments that may also count as a kind of madness. It is the misuse of words I discussed in the fifth chapter under the name of Absurdity. This happens when men put words together that have no meaning at all. Some do this because they misunderstand words they have learned and repeat them by rote. Others deliberately use obscure language to deceive. This fault occurs only among those who discuss incomprehensible matters, like the Scholastics, or questions of obscure philosophy. Ordinary people seldom speak meaninglessly. For that reason, those other distinguished gentlemen consider them idiots. But examples would be needed to establish that their words correspond to nothing in their minds. Anyone wanting examples should pick up a Scholastic’s book. Let him try translating any chapter on a difficult subject into a modern language so that it makes sense. Such subjects include the Trinity, the Deity, the nature of Christ, Transubstantiation, Free Will, and so on. Or let him try translating it into acceptable Latin, such as people knew when Latin was an everyday language. What do these words mean? “The first cause does not necessarily impart anything to the second because of the essential subordination of secondary causes, through which it may help the second cause to act.” This is a translation of the title of chapter six in Suarez’s first book, Of the Concourse, Motion, and Help of God. When men write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or trying to make others mad? Consider, in particular, the question of Transubstantiation. Some say that, after certain words are spoken, whiteness, roundness, size, quality, corruptibility, and so on leave the wafer. All these things, they say, are incorporeal, yet pass into the body of our blessed Saviour. Do these men not turn those “nesses,” “tudes,” and “ties” into so many spirits possessing his body? For by spirits they always mean things that have no bodies but can nevertheless move from place to place. So this kind of Absurdity may rightly count among the many kinds of madness. And whenever these men stop arguing or writing this way, guided by clear thoughts about their worldly desires, those are merely lucid intervals. So much for intellectual virtues and defects.