The Endings or Conclusions of Reasoning

Of all Discourse, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last an End, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of Discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.

All reasoning driven by a desire for knowledge eventually ends, either by finding that knowledge or by giving up. And wherever the chain of reasoning is interrupted, the reasoning ends for the time being.

If the Discourse be meerly Mentall, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chayn of a mans Discourse, you leave him in a Praesumption of It Will Be, or, It Will Not Be; or it Has Been, or, Has Not Been. All which is Opinion. And that which is alternate Appetite, in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil, the same is alternate Opinion in the Enquiry of the truth of Past, and Future. And as the last Appetite in Deliberation is called the Will, so the last Opinion in search of the truth of Past, and Future, is called the JUDGEMENT, or Resolute and Final Sentence of him that Discourseth. And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate, in the question of Good or Bad is called Deliberation; so the whole chain of Opinions alternate, in the question of True, or False is called DOUBT.

If reasoning takes place entirely in the mind, thoughts alternate between something happening and not happening, or having happened and not having happened. So wherever you interrupt a person's chain of reasoning, you leave that person with an assumption. Something will happen or will not happen, or something has happened or has not happened. All these assumptions are opinions. When considering good and evil, desires alternate. In the same way, when investigating the truth about the past and future, opinions alternate. And just as the final desire in deliberation is called the will, the final opinion in that investigation is called JUDGEMENT. This judgement is the firm and final conclusion of the person reasoning. And just as the whole chain of alternating desires about good or bad is called deliberation, the whole chain of alternating opinions about truth or falsehood is called DOUBT.

No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall. No man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That is; if This has been, That has been; if This shall be, That shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.

No reasoning can lead to absolute knowledge of facts, past or future. For knowledge of facts begins with sense perception and afterward exists as memory. Knowledge of consequences, which I earlier called science, is not absolute but conditional. No one can know through reasoning that something exists, has existed, or will exist. Such knowledge would be absolute. Reasoning can establish only conditions: if this exists, that exists. If this has existed, that has existed. If this will exist, that will exist. Such knowledge is conditional. And the consequence is not a connection between one thing and another. Rather, it is a connection between one name for a thing and another name for the same thing.

And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into general Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogismes, the end or last sum is called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called Science. But if the first ground of such Discourse be not Definitions, or if the Definitions be not rightly joyned together into Syllogismes, then the End or Conclusion is again OPINION, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senslesse words, without possibility of being understood. When two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third, it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill act, for any man to speak against his Conscience; or to corrupt or force another so to do: Insomuch that the plea of Conscience, has been always hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is Rhetorically said that the Conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently in love with their own new opinions, (though never so absurd,) and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of Conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most but that they think so.

Therefore, when reasoning is expressed in words, it begins with definitions of words. It then connects those definitions into general statements, and combines those statements into syllogisms, or logical arguments. The final result is called the conclusion. The thought expressed by that conclusion is conditional knowledge, or knowledge of what follows from words. Such knowledge is commonly called science. But suppose the reasoning does not begin with definitions, or the definitions are not properly combined into syllogisms. Then the result or conclusion is again OPINION, namely, an opinion that something said is true. Sometimes, though, the words used are absurd and meaningless, making them impossible to understand. When two or more people know the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS of it together. This means that they share knowledge of the fact. Because people with such shared knowledge are the best witnesses to one another’s actions, or a third person’s, certain duties follow. It has always been considered, and always will be, very wrong to speak against one’s conscience. It is equally wrong to bribe or force another person to do so. For this reason, appeals to conscience have always received very careful attention. Later, people used the same word metaphorically for knowledge of their own secret actions and thoughts. Hence the rhetorical saying that conscience is a thousand witnesses. Finally, people became passionately attached to their own new opinions, however absurd, and stubbornly determined to defend them. They gave those opinions, too, the respected name of conscience, as if changing or speaking against them were wrong. They thus claim to know their opinions are true, when they know, at most, only that they think so.

When a mans Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called Opinion; Or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the Person; And the Resolution is called BELEEFE, and FAITH: Faith, In the man; Beleefe, both Of the man, and Of the truth of what he sayes. So then in Beleefe are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his vertue. To Have Faith In, or Trust To, or Beleeve A Man, signifie the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: But to Beleeve What Is Said, signifieth onely an opinion of the truth of the saying. But wee are to observe that this Phrase, I Beleeve In; as also the Latine, Credo In; and the Greek, Pisteno Eis, are never used but in the writings of Divines. In stead of them, in other writings are put, I Beleeve Him; I Have Faith In Him; I Rely On Him: and in Latin, Credo Illi; Fido Illi: and in Greek, Pisteno Anto: and that this singularity of the Ecclesiastical use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian Faith.

When a person’s reasoning does not begin with definitions, it begins either with some other thought of their own or with someone else’s statement. In the first case, the reasoning is still called opinion. In the second, the person doubts neither the speaker’s ability to know the truth nor their honesty in not deceiving. The reasoning then concerns the speaker more than the subject. And the conclusion is called BELIEF and FAITH. Faith is in the person. Belief concerns both the person and the truth of what they say. So belief contains two opinions: one about the person’s statement, the other about their character. To have faith in someone, trust someone, or believe someone all mean the same thing: to consider that person truthful. But to believe what is said means only to consider the statement true. But we should note that the phrase I believe in appears only in theologians’ writings. The same is true of the Latin Credo In and the Greek Pisteno Eis. Other writings use I believe him, I have faith in him, or I rely on him instead. In Latin, they use Credo Illi or Fido Illi, and in Greek, Pisteno Anto. This distinctive religious use of the phrase has caused many disputes about the proper object of Christian faith.

But by Beleeving In, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust in the Person; but Confession and acknowledgement of the Doctrine. For not onely Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold all for truth they heare him say, whether they understand it, or not; which is all the Faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever: But they do not all believe the Doctrine of the Creed.

But believing in someone, as used in the Creed, does not mean trusting that person. It means openly accepting and acknowledging the doctrine. For not only Christians but all kinds of people believe in God in this sense: They accept as true everything they hear him say, whether they understand it or not. Such belief is all the faith and trust anyone can possibly have in any person. But not everyone believes the doctrine of the Creed.

From whence we may inferre, that when wee believe any saying whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing it selfe, or from the principles of naturall Reason, but from the Authority, and good opinion wee have, of him that hath sayd it; then is the speaker, or person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our Faith; and the Honour done in Believing, is done to him onely. And consequently, when wee Believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himselfe, our Beleefe, Faith, and Trust is in the Church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. And they that believe that which a Prophet relates unto them in the name of God, take the word of the Prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust, and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true, or a false Prophet. And so it is also with all other History. For if I should not believe all that is written By Historians, of the glorious acts of Alexander, or Caesar; I do not think the Ghost of Alexander, or Caesar, had any just cause to be offended; or any body else, but the Historian. If Livy say the Gods made once a Cow speak, and we believe it not; wee distrust not God therein, but Livy. So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, than what is drawn from authority of men onely, and their writings; whether they be sent from God or not, is Faith in men onely.

From this we may draw a conclusion about believing any statement to be true. Suppose our belief rests neither on evidence from the subject itself nor on the principles of natural reason. Instead, we believe because of the speaker’s authority and our good opinion of the speaker. Then the speaker, whose word we accept and whom we trust, is the object of our faith. The honor we give by believing goes to the speaker alone. Consequently, suppose we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, without receiving any direct revelation from God himself. Then our belief, faith, and trust are in the Church. We accept the Church’s word and rest content with it. Likewise, those who believe what a Prophet tells them in God’s name accept the Prophet’s word and honor him. They trust and believe the Prophet about the truth of his account, whether he is a true or false Prophet. The same applies to all other history. Suppose I did not believe everything Historians have written about the glorious deeds of Alexander or Caesar. I do not think the ghost of Alexander or Caesar would have any just cause to take offense. Nor would anyone else except the Historian. If Livy says the Gods once made a cow speak, and we do not believe him, we distrust Livy, not God. So the conclusion is clear. Whatever we believe solely on the authority of people and their writings is faith in people alone. This holds whether those people are sent by God or not.