Passions: Inner Origins of Voluntary Movement and Their Expression

There be in Animals, two sorts of Motions peculiar to them: One called Vitall; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through their whole life; such as are the Course of the Bloud, the Pulse, the Breathing, the Concoctions, Nutrition, Excretion, &c; to which Motions there needs no help of Imagination: The other in Animal Motion, otherwise called Voluntary Motion; as to Go, to Speak, to Move any of our limbes, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That Sense, is Motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans body, caused by the action of the things we See, Heare, &c.; And that Fancy is but the Reliques of the same Motion, remaining after Sense, has been already sayd in the first and second Chapters. And because Going, Speaking, and the like Voluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of Whither, Which Way, and What; it is evident, that the Imagination is the first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion. And although unstudied men, doe not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in, is (for the shortnesse of it) insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that such Motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over that. These small beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR.

Animals have two kinds of motion peculiar to them. One is called vital motion. It begins when an animal is conceived and continues without interruption throughout its life. Examples include blood circulation, the pulse, breathing, digestion, nutrition, excretion, and so on. These motions need no help from imagination. The other is animal motion, also called voluntary motion. Examples include walking, speaking, and moving any of our limbs in a way first imagined in our minds. As explained in the first and second chapters, sensation is motion in the organs and inner parts of the human body. This motion is caused by the action of things we see, hear, and so on. Imagination is simply what remains of that same motion after sensation ends. Walking, speaking, and similar voluntary motions always depend on a previous thought of where, which way, and what. Because of this dependence, imagination is clearly the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion. People without training may think no motion occurs when the moving thing is invisible. They may also think no motion occurs when the distance moved is too short to perceive. But these limits do not prevent such motions from occurring. However short a distance may be, anything moving over a greater distance that includes it must first cross that shorter distance. These small beginnings of motion occur within the human body before appearing as walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions. They are commonly called ENDEAVOUR.

This Endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called APPETITE, or DESIRE; the later, being the generall name; and the other, oftentimes restrayned to signifie the Desire of Food, namely Hunger and Thirst. And when the Endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called AVERSION. These words Appetite, and Aversion we have from the Latines; and they both of them signifie the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are orme and aphorme. For nature it selfe does often presse upon men those truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond Nature, they stumble at. For the Schooles find in meere Appetite to go, or move, no actuall Motion at all: but because some Motion they must acknowledge, they call it Metaphoricall Motion; which is but an absurd speech; for though Words may be called metaphoricall; Bodies, and Motions cannot.

When this effort is directed toward something that causes it, we call the effort APPETITE or DESIRE. Desire is the general term. Appetite is often limited to the desire for food, namely hunger and thirst. When the effort is directed away from something, we generally call the effort AVERSION. The words appetite and aversion come from Latin. Both signify motion, one of approaching, the other of withdrawing. The Greek words for the same things, orme and aphorme, have the same meanings. For nature itself often presses truths upon people that they later stumble over when looking for something beyond nature. For the Schools find no actual motion at all in the mere desire to walk or move. But because they must acknowledge some motion, they call it metaphorical motion. This is simply an absurd expression. For although words may be metaphorical, bodies and motions cannot be.

That which men Desire, they are also sayd to LOVE; and to HATE those things, for which they have Aversion. So that Desire, and Love, are the same thing; save that by Desire, we alwayes signifie the Absence of the object; by Love, most commonly the Presence of the same. So also by Aversion, we signifie the Absence; and by Hate, the Presence of the Object.

People are said to love what they desire, and to hate what they feel an aversion to. So desire and love are the same thing, except for one distinction. Desire always refers to the absence of the desired thing. Love most often refers to the presence of the loved thing. Similarly, aversion refers to the absence of the thing we avoid, and hate to its presence.

Of Appetites, and Aversions, some are born with men; as Appetite of food, Appetite of excretion, and exoneration, (which may also and more properly be called Aversions, from somewhat they feele in their Bodies;) and some other Appetites, not many. The rest, which are Appetites of particular things, proceed from Experience, and triall of their effects upon themselves, or other men. For of things wee know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further Desire, than to tast and try. But Aversion wee have for things, not onely which we know have hurt us; but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.

Some desires and aversions are inborn, such as the desire for food and the urge to empty the bowels and bladder. (These urges may more properly be called aversions to something people feel in their bodies.) A few other desires are also inborn. The rest, desires for particular things, come from experience and testing their effects on ourselves or other people. For we can desire things we know nothing about, or do not believe exist, only to taste and try them. But we feel aversion not only to things we know have harmed us. We also feel aversion to things we do not know will harm us or not.

Those things which we neither Desire, nor Hate, we are said to Contemne: CONTEMPT being nothing els but an immobility, or contumacy of the Heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the Heart is already moved otherwise, by either more potent objects; or from want of experience of them.

We are said to have contempt for things we neither desire nor hate. CONTEMPT is simply the heart’s lack of response, or stubborn resistance, to the influence of certain things. This happens because stronger objects already move the heart in another direction, or because we lack experience of those things.

And because the constitution of a mans Body, is in continuall mutation; it is impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in him the same Appetites, and aversions: much lesse can all men consent, in the Desire of almost any one and the same Object.

A person's body is constantly changing. So the same things cannot always produce the same desires and dislikes in that person. Still less can all people share a desire for almost any single thing.

But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, evill; And of his contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good, evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the Person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-wealth,) From the Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.

But whatever a person wants or desires is what he, for his part, calls good. Whatever he hates or feels averse to, he calls evil. Whatever he treats with contempt, he calls worthless and unimportant. For the words good, evil, and contemptible always depend on the person using them. Nothing is good, evil, or contemptible in itself or in any absolute sense. Nor can any shared standard of good and evil be drawn from the nature of the objects themselves. Instead, where there is no commonwealth, the standard comes from the individual. In a commonwealth, the standard comes from the person who represents the commonwealth. Or the standard comes from an arbitrator or judge whom people who disagree appoint by mutual consent. They make that arbitrator’s or judge’s decision their standard of good and evil.

The Latine Tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of Good and Evill; but are not precisely the same; And those are Pulchrum and Turpe. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some apparent signes promiseth Good; and the later, that, which promiseth evill. But in our Tongue we have not so generall names to expresse them by. But for Pulchrum, we say in some things, Fayre; in other Beautifull, or Handsome, or Gallant, or Honourable, or Comely, or Amiable; and for Turpe, Foule, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require; All which words, in their proper places signifie nothing els, but the Mine, or Countenance, that promiseth Good and evill. So that of Good there be three kinds; Good in the Promise, that is Pulchrum; Good in Effect, as the end desired, which is called Jucundum, Delightfull; and Good as the Means, which is called Utile, Profitable; and as many of evill: For evill, in Promise, is that they call Turpe; evill in Effect, and End, is Molestum, Unpleasant, Troublesome; and evill in the Means, Inutile, Unprofitable, Hurtfull.

Latin has two words whose meanings come close to good and evil, but are not exactly the same. These words are Pulchrum and Turpe. Pulchrum means something whose visible signs promise good. Turpe means something whose visible signs promise evil. But English has no equally broad words to express these meanings. For Pulchrum, we sometimes say fair, and sometimes beautiful, handsome, gallant, honourable, graceful, or lovable. For Turpe, we say foul, deformed, ugly, base, disgusting, and similar words, depending on the subject. All these words, used in their proper contexts, mean only an appearance that promises good or evil. So there are three kinds of good. Good in promise is Pulchrum. Good in its effect, as the desired end, is called Jucundum, or delightful. Good as a means is called Utile, or useful. There are just as many kinds of evil. Evil in promise is called Turpe. Evil in its effect and as an end is Molestum, or unpleasant and troublesome. Evil as a means is Inutile, or useless and harmful.

As, in Sense, that which is really within us, is (As I have sayd before) onely Motion, caused by the action of externall objects, but in apparence; to the Sight, Light and Colour; to the Eare, Sound; to the Nostrill, Odour, &c: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the Eyes, Eares, and other organs to the Heart; the real effect there is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite, or Aversion, to, or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that wee either call DELIGHT, or TROUBLE OF MIND.

In sensation, as I have said before, what actually happens within us is only motion caused by external objects. But this motion appears to our senses as light and color to the eyes, sound to the ears, smell to the nostrils, and so on. Similarly, when the same object's action continues from the eyes, ears, and other sense organs to the heart, the actual effect there is only motion or an impulse to move. This motion or impulse consists of appetite toward, or aversion away from, the object causing it. But the appearance or sensation of this motion is what we call DELIGHT or TROUBLE OF MIND.

This Motion, which is called Appetite, and for the apparence of it Delight, and Pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of Vitall motion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused Delight, were not improperly called Jucunda, (A Juvando,) from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, Molesta, Offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion vitall.

This motion is called appetite, and its felt expression is called delight or pleasure. It seems to strengthen and support the body's vital motion. So things that caused delight were fittingly called Jucunda (from A Juvando, meaning helping or strengthening). By contrast, things that hindered and disturbed vital motion were called Molesta, meaning troublesome or offensive.

Pleasure therefore, (or Delight,) is the apparence, or sense of Good; and Molestation or Displeasure, the apparence, or sense of evill. And consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied with some Delight more or lesse; and all Hatred, and Aversion, with more or lesse Displeasure and Offence.

Pleasure (or delight), therefore, is the appearance or sense of good. Distress or displeasure is the appearance or sense of evil. So all appetite, desire, and love come with some degree of delight, more or less. And all hatred and aversion come with more or less displeasure and discomfort.

Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object Present; And those may be called Pleasures Of Sense, (The word Sensuall, as it is used by those onely that condemn them, having no place till there be Lawes.) Of this kind are all Onerations and Exonerations of the body; as also all that is pleasant, in the Sight, Hearing, Smell, Tast, Or Touch; Others arise from the Expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the End, or Consequence of things; whether those things in the Sense Please or Displease: And these are Pleasures Of The Mind of him that draweth those consequences; and are generally called JOY. In the like manner, Displeasures, are some in the Sense, and called PAYNE; others, in the Expectation of consequences, and are called GRIEFE.

Some pleasures, or delights, arise from sensing an object that is present. These may be called pleasures of sense. (The word sensual, used only by those who condemn these pleasures, has no place until laws exist.) These pleasures include all filling and emptying of the body. They also include everything pleasant in sight, hearing, smell, taste, or touch. Other pleasures arise from expectations formed by foreseeing the outcome or consequences of things. These things may themselves be pleasant or unpleasant to the senses. Such pleasures belong to the mind of the person who foresees those consequences, and are generally called JOY. Similarly, some forms of displeasure arise through the senses and are called PAIN. Others arise from expecting consequences and are called GRIEF.

These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate, Joy, and griefe, have their names for divers considerations diversified. As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversly called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the Alteration or succession it selfe.

These simple passions, called appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief, have different names for different reasons. First, when one passion follows another, the names depend on how likely people think they are to get what they desire. Second, the names depend on the object loved or hated. Third, the names depend on considering several passions together. Fourth, the names depend on the change or sequence of passions itself.

Hope— For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.

Hope: Desire combined with the belief that you can get what you want is called HOPE.

Despaire— The same, without such opinion, DESPAIRE.

Despair: The same feeling, without that belief, is DESPAIR.

Feare— Aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the object, FEARE.

Fear: Aversion to something, combined with the belief that it may cause harm, is FEAR.

Courage— The same, with hope of avoyding that Hurt by resistance, COURAGE.

Courage: The same feeling, with hope of avoiding that harm by resisting, is COURAGE.

Anger— Sudden Courage, ANGER.

Anger: Sudden courage is ANGER.

Confidence— Constant Hope, CONFIDENCE of our selves.

Confidence: Steady hope is CONFIDENCE in ourselves.

Diffidence— Constant Despayre, DIFFIDENCE of our selves.

Self-doubt: Constant despair is a lack of confidence in ourselves.

Indignation— Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be done by Injury, INDIGNATION.

Indignation: Anger at serious harm done to someone else, when we believe the harm was unjust, is INDIGNATION.

Benevolence— Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.

Benevolence: The desire for another person’s good is called BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, or CHARITY. If directed toward humanity in general, this desire is called GOOD NATURE.

Covetousnesse— Desire of Riches, COVETOUSNESSE: a name used alwayes in signification of blame; because men contending for them, are displeased with one anothers attaining them; though the desire in it selfe, be to be blamed, or allowed, according to the means by which those Riches are sought.

Covetousness: The desire for wealth is called COVETOUSNESS, a word always used to express blame. This is because people competing for wealth resent one another’s success in gaining it. Yet the desire itself deserves blame or approval depending on the means used to seek wealth.

Ambition— Desire of Office, or precedence, AMBITION: a name used also in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.

Ambition: The desire for public office or higher rank is called AMBITION. The word is also used negatively, for the reason mentioned earlier.

Pusillanimity— Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends; And fear of things that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.

Pusillanimity: Wanting things that do little to advance our goals, and fearing things that do little to hinder us, is PUSILLANIMITY.

Magnanimity— Contempt of little helps, and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY.

Magnanimity: Disdain for small advantages and obstacles is MAGNANIMITY.

Valour— Magnanimity, in danger of Death, or Wounds, VALOUR, FORTITUDE.

Valour: Greatness of spirit in the face of death or injury is called VALOUR or FORTITUDE.

Liberality— Magnanimity in the use of Riches, LIBERALITY

Generosity: Greatness of spirit in the use of wealth is GENEROSITY.

Miserablenesse— Pusillanimity, in the same WRETCHEDNESSE, MISERABLENESSE; or PARSIMONY; as it is liked or disliked.

Miserliness: In the same matter, lack of courage is called WRETCHEDNESS, MISERLINESS, or THRIFT. The name depends on whether this lack of courage is liked or disliked.

Kindnesse— Love of Persons for society, KINDNESSE.

Kindness: Love of people for their company is KINDNESS.

Naturall Lust— Love of Persons for Pleasing the sense onely, NATURAL LUST.

Natural Lust: Love of people solely for the pleasure of the senses is NATURAL LUST.

Luxury— Love of the same, acquired from Rumination, that is Imagination of Pleasure past, LUXURY.

Lust: Love of the same thing, developed by dwelling on memories of past pleasure, is LUST.

The Passion Of Love; Jealousie— Love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the love is not mutuall, JEALOUSIE.

The Passion of Love, Jealousy: Loving one person exclusively, with the desire to be loved exclusively in return, is THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same love, with fear that the love is not returned, is JEALOUSY.

Revengefulnesse— Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact of his own, REVENGEFULNESSE.

Revengefulness: The desire to hurt another person to make that person condemn something they have done is REVENGEFULNESS.

Curiosity— Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no living creature but Man; so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his Reason; but also by this singular Passion from other Animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by praedominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a Lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnall Pleasure.

Curiosity: The desire to know why and how is CURIOSITY, found in no living creature but humans. So humans differ from other animals not only in reason, but also in this unique passion. In other animals, hunger and other sensory pleasures dominate, leaving no concern for knowing causes. The desire to know causes is a lust of the mind. Its lasting delight in continually and tirelessly gaining knowledge surpasses the brief intensity of any bodily pleasure.

Religion Superstition; True Religion— Feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, superstition. And when the power imagined is truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.

Religion, Superstition, True Religion: Fear of an invisible power, invented by the mind or imagined from publicly approved stories, is RELIGION. When the stories are not publicly approved, such fear is superstition. And when the imagined power really is as we imagine it, such fear is TRUE RELIGION.

Panique Terrour— Feare, without the apprehension of why, or what, PANIQUE TERROR; called so from the fables that make Pan the author of them; whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example; every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this Passion happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.

Panic Terror: Fear without knowing why you are afraid, or what you fear, is called PANIC TERROR. The name comes from fables that describe Pan as the cause of such fears. In truth, the first person to feel such fear always has some idea of its cause. The rest, however, run away by example, each assuming that someone else knows why. Therefore, this emotion occurs only in a crowd or a large gathering of people.

Admiration— Joy, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper to man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.

Admiration: Joy at encountering something new is called ADMIRATION. Admiration is unique to humans because it sparks a desire to know the cause of something new.

Glory Vaine-glory— Joy, arising from imagination of a man’s own power and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING: which, if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with Confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others, or onely supposed by himselfe, for delight in the consequences of it, is called VAINE-GLORY: which name is properly given; because a well-grounded Confidence begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly called Vaine.

Glory, Vainglory: The joy a person feels from imagining his own power and ability is called GLORYING. If this joy is based on his experience of his own past actions, it is the same as confidence. But if this joy is based on others’ flattery, it is called VAINGLORY. The same applies if he merely imagines his power for the pleasure of imagining what that power could bring. Vainglory is an appropriate name, because well-founded confidence leads a person to make an attempt. But merely imagining power does not lead to action, and so is rightly called vain.

Dejection— Griefe, from opinion of want of power, is called dejection of mind.

Dejection: Sadness caused by believing you lack power is called dejection of mind.

The Vaine-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in ourselves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by the Histories or Fictions of Gallant Persons; and is corrected often times by Age, and Employment.

Vanity consists in pretending or imagining we have abilities we know we lack. This vanity is most common among young men, and histories or fictional stories about heroic people feed it. Age and practical work often correct this vanity.

Sudden Glory Laughter— Sudden glory, is the passion which maketh those Grimaces called LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much Laughter at the defects of others is a signe of Pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper workes is, to help and free others from scorn; and compare themselves onely with the most able.

Sudden Glory and Laughter: Sudden glory is the feeling that produces the facial movements called LAUGHTER. It comes either from some sudden action of our own that pleases us, or from noticing some flaw in another. By comparing ourselves with that person, we suddenly admire ourselves. This feeling occurs most in people who know they have very few abilities. They are forced to maintain their self-esteem by noticing other people's imperfections. So laughing often at others' faults is a sign of small-mindedness. For one characteristic task of great minds is to help others and free them from scorn. Great minds compare themselves only with the most capable.

Sudden Dejection Weeping— On the contrary, Sudden Dejection is the passion that causeth WEEPING; and is caused by such accidents, as suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power: and they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall, such as are Women, and Children. Therefore, some Weep for the loss of Friends; Others for their unkindnesse; others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation. But in all cases, both Laughter and Weeping, are sudden motions; Custome taking them both away. For no man Laughs at old jests; or Weeps for an old calamity.

Sudden Dejection and Weeping: In contrast, sudden dejection is the emotion that causes WEEPING. It is caused by events that suddenly destroy a strong hope or some support for a person's power. Those who rely mainly on outside help, such as women and children, are most prone to sudden dejection. So some weep at the loss of friends, others at their friends' unkindness. Others weep when reconciliation suddenly cuts short their thoughts of revenge. But in all cases, both laughter and weeping are sudden reactions. Familiarity removes both. For no one laughs at old jokes or weeps over an old misfortune.

Shame Blushing— Griefe, for the discovery of some defect of ability is SHAME, or the passion that discovereth itself in BLUSHING; and consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men, is a signe of the love of good reputation; and commendable: in old men it is a signe of the same; but because it comes too late, not commendable.

Shame and Blushing: Distress at having some lack of ability exposed is SHAME, the emotion that shows itself in BLUSHING. Shame consists in recognizing something dishonorable. In young men, shame shows a desire for a good reputation and is praiseworthy. In old men, shame shows the same desire, but because it comes too late, it is not praiseworthy.

Impudence— The Contempt of good reputation is called IMPUDENCE.

Impudence: Disregard for a good reputation is called IMPUDENCE.

Pitty— Griefe, for the calamity of another is PITTY; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe; and therefore is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present time a FELLOW-FEELING: and therefore for Calamity arriving from great wickedness, the best men have the least Pitty; and for the same Calamity, those have least Pitty, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.

Pity: Grief over another person’s misfortune is PITY. It arises from imagining that a similar misfortune may happen to oneself. Pity is therefore also called COMPASSION, or, in the language of our time, FELLOW-FEELING. For this reason, the best people feel the least pity for misfortune caused by great wickedness. And for any given misfortune, those who think themselves least likely to suffer the same feel the least pity.

Cruelty— Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which men call CRUELTY; proceeding from Security of their own fortune. For, that any man should take pleasure in other mens’ great harmes, without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.

Cruelty: Contempt for others’ suffering, or little awareness of it, is what people call CRUELTY. Cruelty comes from feeling secure in one’s own good fortune. For I cannot imagine anyone taking pleasure in others’ great suffering without some other purpose of their own.

Emulation Envy— Griefe, for the success of a Competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joyned with Endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called EMULATION: but joyned with Endeavour to supplant or hinder a Competitor, ENVIE.

Emulation and Envy: We feel distress at a competitor’s success in wealth, honor, or some other good. If that distress leads us to develop our abilities to equal or surpass the competitor, it is called EMULATION. But if that distress leads us to try to displace or hinder the competitor, it is called ENVY.

Deliberation— When in the mind of man, Appetites and Aversions, Hopes and Feares, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good and evill consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an Appetite to it, sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to be able to do it; sometimes Despaire, or Feare to attempt it; the whole sum of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Feares, continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION.

Deliberation: Desires and aversions, hopes and fears about the same thing can arise in a person’s mind in turn. The various good and bad consequences of taking or not taking a proposed action come to mind one after another. So sometimes we want to take the action, and sometimes we want to avoid it. Sometimes we hope we can do it, and sometimes we despair or fear trying. This whole sequence of desires, aversions, hopes, and fears continues until the action is done or considered impossible. We call this whole process DELIBERATION.

Therefore of things past, there is no Deliberation; because manifestly impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so; because men know, or think such Deliberation vaine. But of things impossible, which we think possible, we may Deliberate; not knowing it is in vain. And it is called DELIBERATION; because it is a putting an end to the Liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own Appetite, or Aversion.

Therefore, we do not deliberate about the past, because the past clearly cannot be changed. Nor do we deliberate about things we know or believe to be impossible. This is because we know or believe such deliberation is pointless. But we may deliberate about impossible things we believe are possible, not knowing that our deliberation is pointless. And the process is called DELIBERATION because it ends our freedom to act or refrain from acting as we please. Before deliberating, we had that freedom to follow our desires or aversions.

This alternate succession of Appetites, Aversions, Hopes and Feares is no less in other living Creatures than in Man; and therefore Beasts also Deliberate.

Desires, aversions, hopes, and fears alternate just as much in other living creatures as in humans. So animals also deliberate.

Every Deliberation is then sayd to End when that whereof they Deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then wee retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our Appetite, or Aversion.

Deliberation, then, ends when the action being considered is either carried out or thought impossible. Until then, we remain free to act or not act, according to our desires or aversions.

In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call the WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing. And Beasts that have Deliberation must necessarily also have Will. The Definition of the Will, given commonly by the Schooles, that it is a Rationall Appetite, is not good. For if it were, then could there be no Voluntary Act against Reason. For a Voluntary Act is that, which proceedeth from the Will, and no other. But if in stead of a Rationall Appetite, we shall say an Appetite resulting from a precedent Deliberation, then the Definition is the same that I have given here. Will, therefore, Is The Last Appetite In Deliberating. And though we say in common Discourse, a man had a Will once to do a thing, that neverthelesse he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an Inclination, which makes no Action Voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the last Inclination, or Appetite. For if the intervenient Appetites make any action Voluntary, then by the same reason all intervenient Aversions should make the same action Involuntary; and so one and the same action should be both Voluntary & Involuntary.

When we deliberate, the final desire or aversion immediately preceding an action, or the decision not to act, is what we call the WILL. It is the act of willing, not the ability to will. And animals that deliberate must necessarily also have a will. The usual definition given by the Schools, that the will is a rational desire, is not sound. For if it were, no voluntary act could go against reason. A voluntary act is one that comes from the will, and no other act is voluntary. But suppose we replace “a rational desire” with “a desire resulting from prior deliberation.” Then the definition is the same as the one I have given here. Will, therefore, is the last desire in deliberation. In everyday speech, we say someone once had a will to do something but nevertheless refrained from doing it. Yet, strictly speaking, that earlier desire is only an inclination, which makes no action voluntary. For the action depends not on that earlier inclination, but on the final inclination or desire. If desires arising during deliberation made an action voluntary, then, by the same reasoning, all aversions arising during deliberation would make that same action involuntary. And so one and the same action would be both voluntary and involuntary.

By this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have their beginning from Covetousness, Ambition, Lust, or other Appetites to the thing propounded; but also those that have their beginning from Aversion, or Feare of those consequences that follow the omission, are Voluntary Actions.

Therefore, actions driven by greed, ambition, lust, or other desires for the thing proposed are voluntary. But actions driven by aversion to, or fear of, the consequences of not acting are also voluntary.

The formes of Speech by which the Passions are expressed, are partly the same, and partly different from those, by which we express our Thoughts. And first generally all Passions may be expressed Indicatively; as, I Love, I Feare, I Joy, I Deliberate, I Will, I Command: but some of them have particular expressions by themselves, which nevertheless are not affirmations, unless it be when they serve to make other inferences, besides that of the Passion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed Subjunctively; which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with their consequences; as, If This Be Done, Then This Will Follow; and differs not from the language of Reasoning, save that Reasoning is in generall words, but Deliberation for the most part is of Particulars. The language of Desire, and Aversion, is Imperative; as, Do This, Forbear That; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbear, is Command; otherwise Prayer; or els Counsell. The language of Vaine-Glory, of Indignation, Pitty and Revengefulness, Optative: but of the Desire to know, there is a peculiar expression called Interrogative; as, What Is It, When Shall It, How Is It Done, and Why So? Other language of the Passions I find none: for Cursing, Swearing, Reviling, and the like, do not signifie as Speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.

The forms of speech used to express emotions are partly the same as those used to express thoughts, and partly different. First, all emotions may generally be expressed as statements: I love, I fear, I rejoice, I deliberate, I will, I command. But some emotions have particular expressions of their own. These expressions are not assertions unless they support conclusions beyond the emotion they come from. Deliberation is expressed conditionally, in language suited to stating possibilities and their consequences: If this is done, then this will follow. Deliberation differs from reasoning only in this respect: reasoning uses general terms, but deliberation mostly concerns particular cases. The language of desire and aversion takes the form of instructions: Do this, avoid that. When the person addressed is obliged to act or refrain from acting, such language is a command. Otherwise, it is a plea or advice. The language of vanity, indignation, pity, and vengefulness takes the form of wishes. But the desire to know has a special form of expression, called a question: What is it? When will it happen? How is it done? Why is it so? I find no other language of the emotions. For cursing, swearing, insults, and the like convey meaning not as speech, but as actions of a tongue accustomed to them.

These forms of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary significations of our Passions: but certain signes they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such Passions or not. The best signes of Passions present, are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to have.

These forms of speech, I say, are expressions or deliberate signs of our emotions. But they are not reliable signs, because people may use them whether or not they feel those emotions. The best signs of someone’s current emotions are facial expressions, body movements, actions, and goals we otherwise know the person has.

And because in Deliberation the Appetites and Aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we Deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldome any man is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the Good in those consequences be greater than the evill, the whole chain is that which Writers call Apparent or Seeming Good. And contrarily, when the evill exceedeth the good, the whole is Apparent or Seeming Evill: so that he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best himself; and is able, when he will, to give the best counsel unto others.

When we deliberate, our desires and aversions arise from anticipating the good and bad consequences of the action we are considering. So judging the action’s good or bad effects depends on foreseeing a long chain of consequences. Very seldom can anyone see to the end of that chain. But if the good outweighs the bad in the consequences someone can foresee, writers call the whole chain Apparent or Seeming Good. Conversely, when the bad outweighs the good, the whole chain is Apparent or Seeming Evil. So whoever, through experience or reason, foresees consequences most broadly and reliably deliberates best for himself. He can also give others the best advice whenever he chooses.

Continual Successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call FELICITY; I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life itself is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Feare, no more than without Sense. What kind of Felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joys, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of School-men, Beatifical Vision, is unintelligible.

Continual success in getting what a person desires from time to time, or continually prospering, is what people call FELICITY. I mean happiness in this life. For there is no such thing as lasting peace of mind while we live here. This is because life itself is nothing but motion. Life can no more exist without desire or fear than without sensation. What kind of happiness God has prepared for those who devoutly honor him, we will know only when we experience it. For those joys are now as impossible to comprehend as the scholars’ term Beatifical Vision is impossible to understand.

The form of speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the Goodnesse of anything is PRAISE. That whereby they signifie the power and greatness of anything is MAGNIFYING. And that whereby they signifie the opinion they have of a man’s felicity is by the Greeks called Makarismos, for which we have no name in our tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose to have been said of the passions.

Speech that expresses people’s opinion of the goodness of something is PRAISE. Speech that expresses the power and greatness of something is MAGNIFYING. The Greeks call speech expressing people’s opinion of a person’s happiness Makarismos. We have no word for this in English. And for the present purpose, enough has been said about the passions.