Reason and Science

When a man Reasoneth, hee does nothing els but conceive a summe totall, from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, from Substraction of one summe from another: which (if it be done by Words,) is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part. And though in some things, (as in numbers,) besides Adding and Substracting, men name other operations, as Multiplying and Dividing; yet they are the same; for Multiplication, is but Addition together of things equall; and Division, but Substracting of one thing, as often as we can. These operations are not incident to Numbers onely, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. For as Arithmeticians teach to adde and substract in Numbers; so the Geometricians teach the same in Lines, Figures (solid and superficiall,) Angles, Proportions, Times, degrees of Swiftnesse, Force, Power, and the like; The Logicians teach the same in Consequences Of Words; adding together Two Names, to make an Affirmation; and Two Affirmations, to make a syllogisme; and Many syllogismes to make a Demonstration; and from the Summe, or Conclusion of a syllogisme, they substract one Proposition, to finde the other. Writers of Politiques, adde together Pactions, to find mens Duties; and Lawyers, Lawes and Facts, to find what is Right and Wrong in the actions of private men. In summe, in what matter soever there is place for Addition and Substraction, there also is place for Reason; and where these have no place, there Reason has nothing at all to do.

When a person reasons, they do nothing more than calculate a total by adding parts together. Or they calculate a remainder by subtracting one sum from another. If reasoning is done in words, it means tracing how the names of all the parts lead to the name of the whole. Or it means tracing how the names of the whole and one part lead to the name of the other part. In some fields, such as numbers, people name other operations besides addition and subtraction, such as multiplication and division. Yet these operations are the same. Multiplication is simply adding equal things together. Division is simply subtracting one thing as many times as we can. These operations apply not only to numbers, but to all kinds of things that can be added together or subtracted. Just as arithmetic teachers teach addition and subtraction with numbers, geometry teachers teach the same operations with other things. These include lines, shapes (solid and flat), angles, proportions, times, degrees of speed, force, power, and the like. Logicians teach the same operations with the logical consequences of words. They add two names together to make a statement, and two statements to make a syllogism. They add many syllogisms together to make a demonstration. From the sum, or conclusion, of a syllogism, they subtract one proposition to find the other. Political writers add agreements together to find people's duties. Lawyers add laws and facts together to find what is right and wrong in private individuals' actions. In short, wherever addition and subtraction have a place, reason also has a place. Where addition and subtraction have no place, reason has nothing at all to do.

Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,) what that is, which is meant by this word Reason, when wee reckon it amongst the Faculties of the mind. For Reason, in this sense, is nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Substracting) of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the Marking and Signifying of our thoughts; I say Marking them, when we reckon by our selves; and Signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to other men.

From all this, we may define, or determine, what Reason means when we count it among the mind’s abilities. For Reason, in this sense, is nothing but calculation (that is, adding and subtracting). We calculate the consequences of agreed general terms used to record and communicate our thoughts. I say we record our thoughts when we calculate by ourselves. We communicate our thoughts when we demonstrate our calculations to others or show that those calculations are correct.

And as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Professors themselves may often erre, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of Reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may deceive themselves, and inferre false Conclusions; Not but that Reason it selfe is always Right Reason, as well as Arithmetique is a certain and infallible art: But no one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any one number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And therfore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever: And when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand right Reason for judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other mens reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right Reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying their want of right Reason, by the claym they lay to it.

In arithmetic, untrained people are bound to make mistakes, and even experts may often calculate incorrectly. So too, in any other kind of reasoning, even the most capable, attentive, and experienced people may deceive themselves. They may draw false conclusions. This does not mean that reason itself is anything but right reason, just as arithmetic is certain and infallible. But neither one person’s reasoning nor the reasoning of any number of people establishes certainty. A calculation is no more correct simply because many people have unanimously approved it. Therefore, when people dispute a calculation, they must agree to accept some arbitrator’s or judge’s reasoning as right reason. Both parties must agree to abide by that person’s decision. Otherwise, their dispute must either lead to blows or remain unresolved, because nature has appointed no standard of right reason. The same holds for every kind of debate. Some people think themselves wiser than everyone else and loudly demand that right reason should judge. Yet they want decisions based on no one’s reasoning but their own. Such behavior is as intolerable in society as changing the trump suit during a card game. Once trump has been revealed, these players would make whichever suit they hold most cards in trump whenever convenient. People do exactly the same when they demand that each passion, as it takes control, should count as right reason. And they demand this in their own disputes. By claiming right reason for themselves, they reveal their lack of it.

The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled significations of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last Conclusion, without a certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations, on which it was grounded, and inferred. As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the summs of all the bills of expence, into one sum; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account; nor what it is he payes for; he advantages himselfe no more, than if he allowed the account in grosse, trusting to every of the accountants skill and honesty; so also in Reasoning of all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of Authors, and doth not fetch them from the first Items in every Reckoning, (which are the significations of names settled by definitions), loses his labour; and does not know any thing; but onely beleeveth.

The purpose of reason is not merely to establish one or a few conclusions far removed from basic definitions and agreed meanings. Instead, reasoning must begin with those definitions and meanings, then move from one conclusion to another. For no final conclusion can be certain unless every statement affirming or denying something behind that conclusion is also certain. Consider the head of a household checking the accounts by adding up the totals of all the expense bills. Suppose he does not check how the people submitting each bill calculated its total, or what he is paying for. Then he gains no more than if he accepted the whole account without checking, trusting each accountant’s skill and honesty. The same holds for reasoning about everything else. Anyone who accepts conclusions on the authority of writers, without tracing each calculation back to its first entries, wastes his effort. Those first entries are the meanings of words established by definitions. Such a person knows nothing, but only believes.

When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in particular things, (as when upon the sight of any one thing, wee conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it;) if that which he thought likely to follow, followes not; or that which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called ERROR; to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we Reason in Words of generall signification, and fall upon a generall inference which is false; though it be commonly called Error, it is indeed an ABSURDITY, or senseless Speech. For Error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past, or not to come; yet there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a generall assertion, unlesse it be a true one, the possibility of it is unconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call Absurd, insignificant, and Non-sense. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a Round Quadrangle; or Accidents Of Bread In Cheese; or Immaterial Substances; or of A Free Subject; A Free Will; or any Free, but free from being hindred by opposition, I should not say he were in an Errour; but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, Absurd.

A person can reason without words when dealing with particular things. (For example, seeing something, we may guess what probably came before it or what will probably follow.) If the expected event does not follow, or the supposed earlier event never happened, we call this ERROR. Even the wisest people are subject to such errors. But when we reason using words with general meanings and reach a false general conclusion, the case is different. Although people commonly call this Error, it is really an ABSURDITY, or meaningless speech. For Error is simply a mistaken belief that something happened or will happen. Although the event did not happen or will not happen, no impossibility could be detected in it. But when we make a general statement, unless the statement is true, we cannot conceive of its being possible. And words that convey nothing to us but their sound are what we call Absurd, meaningless, and Nonsense. So suppose someone spoke to me of a Round Quadrangle, or the Accidents Of Bread In Cheese. Or suppose he spoke of Immaterial Substances, A Free Subject, or A Free Will. Or suppose he called anything Free in any sense other than freedom from being hindered by opposition. I would not say he was in Error. Instead, I would say his words had no meaning. That is, they were Absurd.

I have said before, (in the second chapter,) that a Man did excell all other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing whatsoever, he was apt to enquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do with it. And now I adde this other degree of the same excellence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he findes to generall Rules, called Theoremes, or Aphorismes; that is, he can Reason, or reckon, not onely in number; but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or substracted from another.

I said earlier (in the second chapter) that humans surpass all other animals in one ability. Whenever a person thinks of anything, they tend to ask what follows from it and what effects they can produce with it. Now I add a further aspect of this superiority. Through words, humans can turn the consequences they discover into general rules, called theorems or aphorisms. In other words, humans can reason, or calculate, not only with numbers, but with anything that allows addition or subtraction.

But this priviledge, is allayed by another; and that is, by the priviledge of Absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man onely. And of men, those are of all most subject to it, that professe Philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero sayth of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of Philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the Definitions, or Explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used onely in Geometry; whose Conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.

But this privilege is offset by another: the privilege of absurdity. No living creature is subject to absurdity except humans. And among humans, those who profess philosophy are the most prone to absurdity. For Cicero was quite right when he said somewhere that nothing is too absurd to appear in philosophers’ books. And the reason is clear. Not one of these philosophers begins reasoning by defining or explaining the terms they will use. Only Geometry has used this method, and as a result, its conclusions have become indisputable.

The first cause of Absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of Method; in that they begin not their Ratiocination from Definitions; that is, from settled significations of their words: as if they could cast account, without knowing the value of the numerall words, One, Two, and Three.

I attribute the first cause of absurd conclusions to a lack of method. People do not begin their reasoning with definitions, that is, with fixed meanings for their words. It is as if they could do arithmetic without knowing the values of the number words one, two, and three.

And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations, (which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;) these considerations being diversly named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion, and unfit connexion of their names into assertions. And therefore

All bodies are considered in different ways when we reason about them. (I mentioned these ways in the previous chapter.) These different ways of considering bodies have different names. So confusing these names and combining them improperly in statements leads to various absurdities. And therefore

The second cause of Absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names of Bodies, to Accidents; or of Accidents, to Bodies; As they do, that say, Faith Is Infused, or Inspired; when nothing can be Powred, or Breathed into any thing, but body; and that, Extension is Body; that Phantasmes are Spirits, &c.

I attribute the second cause of absurd claims to giving the names of bodies to properties, or properties to bodies. Some people do this when they say faith is poured or breathed into someone. Yet nothing but a body can be poured or breathed into anything. Others say that extension, or occupying space, is a body, or that mental images are spirits, and so on.

The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the Accidents of Bodies Without Us, to the Accidents of our Own Bodies; as they do that say, the Colour Is In The Body; The Sound Is In The Ayre, &c.

I attribute the third to applying names for properties of external bodies to properties of our own bodies. For example, people say colour is in the body, sound is in the air, and so on.

The fourth, to the giving of the names of Bodies, to Names, or Speeches; as they do that say, that There Be Things Universall; that A Living Creature Is Genus, or A Generall Thing, &c.

The fourth is applying names for physical bodies to names or statements. People do this when they say universal things exist, or that a living creature is a genus or general thing, etc.

The fifth, to the giving of the names of Accidents, to Names and Speeches; as they do that say, The Nature Of A Thing Is In Its Definition; A Mans Command Is His Will; and the like.

The fifth is assigning names for properties to names and statements. Examples include saying that a thing’s nature is in its definition, or that a man’s command is his will.

The sixth, to the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall figures, in stead of words proper. For though it be lawfull to say, (for example) in common speech, The Way Goeth, Or Leadeth Hither, Or Thither, The Proverb Sayes This Or That (whereas wayes cannot go, nor Proverbs speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted.

The sixth comes from using metaphors, figures of speech, and other rhetorical devices instead of words with their precise meanings. For example, in everyday speech, we may say a road goes or leads here or there. We may also say a proverb says one thing or another (though roads cannot go anywhere, nor can proverbs speak). But in reasoning and searching for truth, such expressions must not be allowed.

The seventh, to names that signifie nothing; but are taken up, and learned by rote from the Schooles, as Hypostatical, Transubstantiate, Consubstantiate, Eternal-now, and the like canting of Schoole-men.

The seventh concerns terms that mean nothing but are picked up and memorized from the schools. Examples include Hypostatical, Transubstantiate, Consubstantiate, Eternal-now, and similar empty jargon from scholastic thinkers.

To him that can avoyd these things, it is not easie to fall into any absurdity, unlesse it be by the length of an account; wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to mistake in Geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him?

Anyone who can avoid these things is unlikely to reach an absurd conclusion, unless the reasoning is long. In a long chain of reasoning, they may perhaps forget what came before. For all people naturally reason alike, and reason well when they start from sound principles. For who is so stupid as to make a mistake in Geometry and persist when someone points out the error?

By this it appears that Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, borne with us; nor gotten by Experience onely; as Prudence is; but attayned by Industry; first in apt imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly Method in proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, to Assertions made by Connexion of one of them to another; and so to syllogismes, which are the Connexions of one Assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE. And whereas Sense and Memory are but knowledge of Fact, which is a thing past, and irrevocable; Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance of one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something els when we will, or the like, another time; Because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into our power, wee see how to make it produce the like effects.

From this, we can see that reason is not something we are born with, unlike sense and memory. Nor does reason come from experience alone, as prudence does. Instead, reason is gained through deliberate effort. First, we must assign suitable names. Second, we must learn an orderly method of proceeding from names, the basic elements, to statements that connect names. We then proceed to syllogisms, which connect one statement to another. We continue until we know all the consequences of the names relevant to the subject at hand. This knowledge is what people call SCIENCE. Sense and memory give us only knowledge of facts, of things that have happened and cannot be undone. Science, however, gives us knowledge of consequences and of how one fact depends on another. Through this knowledge, what we can do now teaches us how to do something else whenever we choose. It also teaches us how to do something similar another time. For when we see how something happens, we understand its causes and how those causes work. Then, when similar causes come within our control, we know how to use them to produce similar effects.

Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till they have attained the use of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures, for the possibility apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come. And the most part of men, though they have the use of Reasoning a little way, as in numbring to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in common life; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience, quicknesse of memory, and inclinations to severall ends; but specially according to good or evill fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for Science, or certain rules of their actions, they are so farre from it, that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought Conjuring: but for other Sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings, and some progresse in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by the women, that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.

Children therefore have no reason at all until they learn to speak. But children are called rational creatures because they clearly have the potential to reason in the future. Most people can reason to a limited extent, as in counting up to a certain number. Yet reasoning is of little use to them in everyday life. In everyday life, some guide themselves better and others worse, depending on their experience, memory, and different aims. But above all, their conduct depends on good or bad luck and one another’s mistakes. As for science, or reliable rules for their actions, most people are so far from possessing it that they do not even know what it is. People have thought geometry was sorcery. But with other sciences, people must learn the basics and make some progress to see how scientific knowledge develops. Without that learning, people are like children who have no idea how babies are conceived and born. Women persuade these children that their brothers and sisters were not born, but found in the garden.

But yet they that have no Science, are in better, and nobler condition with their naturall Prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd generall rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so farre out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary.

Yet people without scientific knowledge are better off, and in a nobler position, when guided by their natural practical judgment. They fare better than those who adopt false and absurd general rules through faulty reasoning or trust in faulty thinkers. For ignorance of causes and rules does not lead people as far astray as relying on false rules does. Nor does ignorance mislead them as badly as mistaking what causes the opposite result for what will achieve their aims.

To conclude, The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; Reason is the Pace; Encrease of Science, the Way; and the Benefit of man-kind, the End. And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words, are like Ignes Fatui; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt.

To conclude, clear words are the light of the human mind, but precise definitions must first remove all ambiguity. Reason sets the pace. The growth of knowledge is the path, and humanity’s benefit is the goal. By contrast, metaphors and meaningless or ambiguous words are like misleading lights. Reasoning with such words means wandering among countless absurdities. The result is conflict and rebellion, or contempt.

As, much Experience, is Prudence; so, is much Science, Sapience. For though wee usually have one name of Wisedome for them both; yet the Latines did always distinguish between Prudentia and Sapientia, ascribing the former to Experience, the later to Science. But to make their difference appeare more cleerly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent naturall use, and dexterity in handling his armes; and another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired Science, of where he can offend, or be offended by his adversarie, in every possible posture, or guard: The ability of the former, would be to the ability of the later, as Prudence to Sapience; both usefull; but the later infallible. But they that trusting onely to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that trusting to the false rules of the master of fence, ventures praesumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills, or disgraces him.

Just as extensive experience gives us prudence, extensive scientific knowledge gives us wisdom. Although we usually call both wisdom, the Latins always distinguished between Prudentia and Sapientia. They attributed the former to experience and the latter to scientific knowledge. But to make the difference clearer, imagine a man with excellent natural skill and dexterity in handling his weapons. Now imagine another who has added scientific knowledge to that skill. He knows where he can strike his opponent or be struck, in every possible stance or guard. The first man's ability compares to the second man's as prudence compares to wisdom. Both are useful, but the latter is infallible. But people who trust only the authority of books follow the blind blindly. They are like a man who trusts a fencing master's false rules and rashly takes on an opponent. That opponent either kills or disgraces him.

The signes of Science, are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain. Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing, can teach the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another: Uncertain, when onely some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he sayes they must. Signes of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the successe, is impossible. But in any businesse, whereof a man has not infallible Science to proceed by; to forsake his own natural judgement, and be guided by generall sentences read in Authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a signe of folly, and generally scorned by the name of Pedantry. And even of those men themselves, that in Councells of the Common-wealth, love to shew their reading of Politiques and History, very few do it in their domestique affaires, where their particular interest is concerned; having Prudence enough for their private affaires: but in publique they study more the reputation of their owne wit, than the successe of anothers businesse.

Some signs of scientific knowledge are certain and infallible. Others are uncertain. The signs are certain when someone claiming such knowledge can teach it, clearly demonstrating its truth to another person. The signs are uncertain when only particular events support the claim, often turning out as the person says they must. All signs of practical wisdom are uncertain. Experience cannot reveal, nor memory retain, every circumstance that may change an outcome. But suppose someone lacks infallible scientific knowledge to guide them in some matter. Abandoning their own natural judgment to follow general statements from books, subject to many exceptions, is a sign of foolishness. Such behavior is generally mocked as pedantry. Even among those who like displaying their reading in politics and history in councils of government, very few do so at home. There, their own interests are at stake, and they have enough practical wisdom to manage their private affairs. But in public, they care more about their reputation for intelligence than about the success of someone else’s business.