Speech

The Invention of Printing, though ingenious, compared with the invention of Letters, is no great matter. But who was the first that found the use of Letters, is not known. He that first brought them into Greece, men say was Cadmus, the sonne of Agenor, King of Phaenicia. A profitable Invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of the Earth; and with all difficult, as proceeding from a watchfull observation of the divers motions of the Tongue, Palat, Lips, and other organs of Speech; whereby to make as many differences of characters, to remember them. But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of Speech, consisting of Names or Apellations, and their Connexion; whereby men register their Thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another for mutuall utility and conversation; without which, there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves. The first author of Speech was GOD himselfe, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight; For the Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to adde more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion; and to joyn them in such manner by degrees, as to make himselfe understood; and so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for; though not so copious, as an Orator or Philosopher has need of. For I do not find any thing in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence can be gathered, that Adam was taught the names of all Figures, Numbers, Measures, Colours, Sounds, Fancies, Relations; much less the names of Words and Speech, as Generall, Speciall, Affirmative, Negative, Interrogative, Optative, Infinitive, all which are usefull; and least of all, of Entity, Intentionality, Quiddity, and other significant words of the School.

Printing is an ingenious invention, but compared with the invention of letters, it is no great achievement. No one knows who first discovered how to use letters. People say Cadmus, the son of Agenor, King of Phaenicia, first brought letters to Greece. Letters are useful for preserving the memory of the past and connecting people scattered across distant regions of the Earth. Inventing letters was also difficult. It required careful observation of the different movements of the tongue, palate, lips, and other organs of speech. Distinct written characters could then represent those movements and help people remember them. But the noblest and most useful invention of all was speech, consisting of names and their combinations. Through speech, people record their thoughts, recall past thoughts, and communicate them to one another for mutual benefit and conversation. Without speech, people would have had no state, society, agreement, or peace, any more than lions, bears, and wolves do. The first creator of speech was GOD himself. He taught Adam how to name the creatures he brought before Adam's eyes. Scripture tells us no more about the matter. But that instruction was enough to guide Adam in adding names as his experience and use of creatures required. Adam could also gradually learn to combine names so that others could understand him. So, over time, he could acquire as much language as he found useful. His language would not, however, be as extensive as an orator or philosopher needs. For I find nothing in Scripture stating or implying that Adam was taught the names of all the following: shapes, numbers, measures, colours, sounds, imagined things, and relations. Still less does Scripture say he learned terms describing words and speech: general, specific, affirmative, negative, interrogative, optative, and infinitive. All these terms are useful. Least of all does Scripture say he learned Entity, Intentionality, Quiddity, and other meaningful terms of scholastic philosophy.

But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity, was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God, every man was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language. And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts of the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need (the mother of all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time grew every where more copious.

But all the language developed and expanded by Adam and his descendants was lost again at the tower of Babel. There, God punished every man for his rebellion by making him forget his former language. As a result, they were forced to scatter to different parts of the world. The different languages spoken today must therefore have developed gradually among them, as need taught them. Need is the mother of all inventions. Over time, these languages grew richer everywhere.

The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse, into Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words; and that for two commodities; whereof one is, the Registring of the Consequences of our Thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they were marked by. So that the first use of names, is to serve for Markes, or Notes of remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words, to signifie (by their connexion and order,) one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, feare, or have any other passion for, and for this use they are called Signes. Speciall uses of Speech are these; First, to Register, what by cogitation, wee find to be the cause of any thing, present or past; and what we find things present or past may produce, or effect: which in summe, is acquiring of Arts. Secondly, to shew to others that knowledge which we have attained; which is, to Counsell, and Teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills, and purposes, that we may have the mutuall help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight our selves, and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.

The general purpose of speech is to turn our mental reasoning into words, or our train of thoughts into a train of words. This serves two purposes. One is to record the conclusions of our thoughts. These conclusions can slip from memory, forcing us to work them out again. But we can recall them through the words we used to mark them. So the first use of names is to serve as marks, or reminders. The other purpose arises when people use the same words to communicate with one another. Through the arrangement and order of words, people express what they understand or think about each subject. They also express what they desire, fear, or feel any other emotion about. Words used for this purpose are called signs. Speech has these specific uses. First, speech records what we discover through thought about the causes of anything, present or past. Speech also records what we discover that present or past things may produce or bring about. In short, this is how we acquire practical skills. Second, speech lets us share the knowledge we have gained, so we can advise and teach one another. Third, speech makes our wishes and purposes known to others, so we can help one another. Fourth, speech lets us please and delight ourselves and others by harmlessly playing with words for pleasure or decoration.

To these Uses, there are also foure correspondent Abuses. First, when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of their words; by which they register for their conceptions, that which they never conceived; and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of Speech, to grieve him with the tongue, unlesse it be one whom wee are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.

These uses also have four corresponding abuses. First, people record their thoughts wrongly because they keep changing the meanings of their words. As a result, they record ideas they never actually had, and so deceive themselves. Second, people use words metaphorically, giving them meanings other than those the words were intended to have. In doing so, they deceive others. Third, people use words to declare intentions they do not really have. Fourth, people use words to hurt one another. Nature has armed living creatures with ways to hurt an enemy: some with teeth, some with horns, some with hands. So using the tongue to hurt an enemy is an abuse of speech, unless we are responsible for governing that person. In that case, the purpose is not to hurt, but to correct and improve.

The manner how Speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of Names, and the Connexion of them.

Speech helps us remember how causes and effects follow one another by assigning names and connecting those names.

Of Names, some are Proper, and singular to one onely thing; as Peter, John, This Man, This Tree: and some are Common to many things; as Man, Horse, Tree; every of which though but one Name, is nevertheless the name of divers particular things; in respect of all which together, it is called an Universall; there being nothing in the world Universall but Names; for the things named, are every one of them Individual and Singular.

Some names are proper names and refer to only one thing, such as Peter, John, this man, this tree. Other names apply to many things, such as man, horse, tree. Although each is just one name, it names many particular things. When used to refer to all those things together, the name is called a universal. Nothing in the world is universal except names, because every thing named is individual and distinct.

One Universall name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in some quality, or other accident: And whereas a Proper Name bringeth to mind one thing onely; Universals recall any one of those many.

A universal name is given to many things because they share some quality or other characteristic. A proper name brings only one thing to mind, while a universal name recalls any one of those many things.

And of Names Universall, some are of more, and some of lesse extent; the larger comprehending the lesse large: and some again of equall extent, comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the Name Body is of larger signification than the word Man, and conprehendeth it; and the names Man and Rationall, are of equall extent, comprehending mutually one another. But here wee must take notice, that by a Name is not alwayes understood, as in Grammar, one onely word; but sometimes by circumlocution many words together. For all these words, Hee That In His Actions Observeth The Lawes Of His Country, make but one Name, equivalent to this one word, Just.

Some universal names have a broader scope than others. The broader names include the narrower ones. Other names have equal scope, each including the other. For example, the name Body has a broader meaning than Man and includes Man. The names Man and Rational have equal scope, each including the other. But we must note that a name does not always mean a single word, as it does in grammar. Sometimes several words together form one name by expressing something in a longer way. For example, all the words He Who Follows His Country’s Laws in His Actions form just one name. That name is equivalent to the single word Just.

By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of Appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of Speech at all, (such, as is born and remains perfectly deafe and dumb,) if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, (such as are the corners of a square figure,) he may by meditation compare and find, that the three angles of that triangle, are equall to those two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be shewn him different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be equall to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes, that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle; but onely to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three; and that that was all, for which he named it a Triangle; will boldly conclude Universally, that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever; and register his invention in these generall termes, Every Triangle Hath Its Three Angles Equall To Two Right Angles. And thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registred and remembred, as a Universall rule; and discharges our mentall reckoning, of time and place; and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first; and makes that which was found true Here, and Now, to be true in All Times and Places.

By assigning names, some with broader meanings and some with narrower ones, we change how we reason. Instead of tracing the consequences of things imagined in our minds, we trace the consequences of names. For example, consider a man who has no use of speech at all, having been born completely deaf and unable to speak. Suppose he places a triangle before his eyes, with two right angles beside it, like the corners of a square. By thinking and comparing, he may find that the triangle’s three angles equal those two right angles. But suppose he is shown another triangle with a different shape. Without working through the problem again, he cannot know whether its three angles also equal those two right angles. But someone who uses words can observe why the angles are equal in this way. The equality does not depend on the sides’ length or any other particular feature of his triangle. It depends only on the sides being straight and the angles being three in number. Those features alone were why he called the figure a triangle. He will therefore confidently reach a universal conclusion: this equality of angles holds for all triangles whatsoever. He will record his discovery in these general terms: Every triangle has three angles whose sum equals two right angles. In this way, a result found in one particular case is recorded and remembered as a universal rule. This frees our mental calculations from the limits of time and place. It saves us all the mental work except the first effort. And it makes what was found true here and now true at all times and places.

But the use of words in registring our thoughts, is in nothing so evident as in Numbering. A naturall foole that could never learn by heart the order of numerall words, as One, Two, and Three, may observe every stroak of the Clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one; but can never know what houre it strikes. And it seems, there was a time when those names of number were not in use; and men were fayn to apply their fingers of one or both hands, to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence it proceeded, that now our numerall words are but ten, in any Nation, and in some but five, and then they begin again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himselfe, and not know when he has done: Much lesse will he be able to add, and substract, and performe all other operations of Arithmetique. So that without words, there is no possibility of reckoning of Numbers; much lesse of Magnitudes, of Swiftnesse, of Force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or well-being of man-kind.

But nowhere is the use of words to record our thoughts clearer than in counting. A person with an intellectual disability might never learn the sequence of number words, such as one, two, and three. Such a person may notice every stroke of the clock and nod at each, or say one, one, one. But that person can never know what hour the clock is striking. And it seems there was a time when these number words were not used. People had to match the fingers of one or both hands to the things they wanted to count. This seems to explain why every nation now has only ten basic number words, and some have only five. After those words, the sequence begins again. And someone who can count to ten will get confused if he recites the numbers out of order. He will not know when he has finished. Much less will he be able to add, subtract, or perform all the other operations of arithmetic. So without words, there is no possibility of calculating numbers. Still less can we calculate size, speed, force, and other things whose calculation is necessary for humanity’s survival or well-being.

When two Names are joyned together into a Consequence, or Affirmation; as thus, A Man Is A Living Creature; or thus, If He Be A Man, He Is A Living Creature, If the later name Living Creature, signifie all that the former name Man signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence is True; otherwise False. For True and False are attributes of Speech, not of things. And where Speech in not, there is neither Truth nor Falshood. Errour there may be, as when wee expect that which shall not be; or suspect what has not been: but in neither case can a man be charged with Untruth.

Two names can be joined into a statement or an inference, such as: A man is a living creature. Or: If he is a man, he is a living creature. If the second name, living creature, includes everything the first name, man, includes, then the statement or inference is true. Otherwise, it is false. For true and false are properties of speech, not of things. Where there is no speech, there is neither truth nor falsehood. There may be error, as when we expect something that will not happen, or suspect something that has not happened. But in neither case can a person be accused of saying something untrue.

Seeing then that Truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise Truth, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or els he will find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the more he struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry, (which is the onely Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind,) men begin at settling the significations of their words; which settling of significations, they call Definitions; and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.

Truth, then, consists in arranging words correctly in our statements. Anyone seeking precise truth must remember what each word he uses stands for and place each word accordingly. Otherwise, he will become tangled in words, like a bird caught on twigs coated with sticky lime. The more the bird struggles, the more lime sticks to it. For this reason, in Geometry, people begin by fixing the meanings of their words. Geometry is the only science God has so far been pleased to grant mankind. People call these fixed meanings Definitions and put them at the beginning of their reasoning.

By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true Knowledge, to examine the Definitions of former Authors; and either to correct them, where they are negligently set down; or to make them himselfe. For the errours of Definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in which lyes the foundation of their errours. From whence it happens, that they which trust to books, do as they that cast up many little summs into a greater, without considering whether those little summes were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the errour visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to cleere themselves; but spend time in fluttering over their bookes; as birds that entring by the chimney, and finding themselves inclosed in a chamber, flitter at the false light of a glasse window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in. So that in the right Definition of Names, lyes the first use of Speech; which is the Acquisition of Science: And in wrong, or no Definitions’ lyes the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senslesse Tenets; which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true Science are above it. For between true Science, and erroneous Doctrines, Ignorance is in the middle. Naturall sense and imagination, are not subject to absurdity. Nature it selfe cannot erre: and as men abound in copiousnesse of language; so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it possible without Letters for any man to become either excellently wise, or (unless his memory be hurt by disease, or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For words are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the mony of fooles, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.

This shows why anyone seeking true knowledge must examine the definitions used by earlier authors. They must either correct carelessly written definitions or make their own. Errors in definitions multiply as reasoning proceeds. These errors lead people into absurd conclusions they eventually recognize. But they cannot escape those conclusions without reasoning again from the beginning, where their errors began. People who trust books therefore resemble someone adding many small sums into a larger total without checking the smaller sums. At last, they see the error, but they do not question their starting assumptions. So they cannot see how to put things right. Instead, they spend their time fluttering through their books. They are like birds that enter through a chimney and find themselves trapped in a room. The birds flutter at the deceptive light of a glass window, lacking the sense to consider how they came in. So the first use of language, gaining scientific knowledge, rests on defining words correctly. The first abuse of language lies in wrong definitions or no definitions at all. From this abuse come all false and senseless beliefs. Such beliefs make people who learn from the authority of books, rather than their own reflection, worse off than the ignorant. They fall as far below the ignorant as people with true scientific knowledge rise above them. For ignorance stands between true scientific knowledge and mistaken doctrines. Natural sensation and imagination are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot make mistakes. As people gain a richer command of language, they become wiser or madder than ordinary people. Without reading and writing, no one can become either exceptionally wise or exceptionally foolish. The exception is someone whose memory is damaged by disease or by a defect in the body's organs. For wise people use words as counting tokens, merely to reason with. But fools treat words as money, valuing them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas. Any other learned authority will do, even though he is only a man.

Subject To Names, is whatsoever can enter into, or be considered in an account; and be added one to another to make a summe; or substracted one from another, and leave a remainder. The Latines called Accounts of mony Rationes, and accounting, Ratiocinatio: and that which we in bills or books of account call Items, they called Nomina; that is, Names: and thence it seems to proceed, that they extended the word Ratio, to the faculty of Reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word Logos, for both Speech and Reason; not that they thought there was no Speech without Reason; but no Reasoning without Speech: And the act of reasoning they called syllogisme; which signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another. And because the same things may enter into account for divers accidents; their names are (to shew that diversity) diversly wrested, and diversified. This diversity of names may be reduced to foure generall heads.

Anything that can enter into, or be considered in, a calculation can be given a name. Such things can be added together to make a sum, or subtracted from one another to leave a remainder. The Latins called accounts of money Rationes, and accounting Ratiocinatio. What we call Items in bills or account books, the Latins called Nomina, meaning Names. From this usage, it seems, the Latins extended the word Ratio to the ability to calculate in all other matters. The Greeks have just one word, Logos, for both Speech and Reason. This was not because the Greeks thought there could be no speech without reason, but because reasoning required speech. The Greeks called the act of reasoning syllogisme, meaning adding up the consequences of one statement in relation to another. And because the same things may enter a calculation under different attributes, their names take different forms to show those differences. These differences in names can be grouped under four general headings.

First, a thing may enter into account for Matter, or Body; as Living, Sensible, Rationall, Hot, Cold, Moved, Quiet; with all which names the word Matter, or Body is understood; all such, being names of Matter.

First, a thing may be considered as matter or body: living, capable of sensation, rational, hot, cold, moving, or still. With all these terms, the word matter or body is understood. All these terms name matter.

Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident or quality, which we conceive to be in it; as for Being Moved, for Being So Long, for Being Hot, &c; and then, of the name of the thing it selfe, by a little change or wresting, wee make a name for that accident, which we consider; and for Living put into account Life; for Moved, Motion; for Hot, Heat; for Long, Length, and the like. And all such Names, are the names of the accidents and properties, by which one Matter, and Body is distinguished from another. These are called Names Abstract; Because Severed (not from Matter, but) from the account of Matter.

Secondly, a thing may be considered in terms of some feature or quality we think it has. Examples include being in motion, being a certain length, or being hot. We then slightly change or adapt the thing’s name to name the feature we are considering. Thus, for living we use life, for moved, motion, for hot, heat, and for long, length, and so on. All such names refer to the features and properties that distinguish one material thing or body from another. These are called abstract names because they are separated from the consideration of matter, not from matter itself.

Thirdly, we bring into account, the Properties of our own bodies, whereby we make such distinction: as when any thing is Seen by us, we reckon not the thing it selfe; but the Sight, the Colour, the Idea of it in the fancy: and when any thing is Heard, wee reckon it not; but the Hearing, or Sound onely, which is our fancy or conception of it by the Eare: and such are names of fancies.

Thirdly, we take into account the properties of our own bodies by which we make such distinctions. For example, when we see something, we count not the thing itself, but its appearance, colour, or image in our imagination. And when we hear something, we count not the thing itself, but only the hearing or sound. That sound is our mental impression or conception of the thing through the ear. Such terms are names for mental impressions.

Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to Names themselves, and to Speeches: For, Generall, Universall, Speciall, Oequivocall, are names of Names. And Affirmation, Interrogation, Commandement, Narration, Syllogisme, Sermon, Oration, and many other such, are names of Speeches.

Fourth, we take into account, consider, and name words themselves, as well as statements and other forms of speech. For general, universal, specific, and ambiguous are names for types of words. And affirmation, question, command, narrative, syllogism, sermon, oration, and many similar terms are names for forms of speech.

And this is all the variety of Names Positive; which are put to mark somewhat which is in Nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as Bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies, the Properties that are, or may be feigned to be; or Words and Speech.

And these are all the kinds of Positive Names. They identify something that exists in nature or may be imagined by the human mind. Such names refer to bodies that exist or may be conceived to exist. They also refer to properties of bodies that exist or may be imagined to exist, or to words and speech.

There be also other Names, called Negative; which are notes to signifie that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words Nothing, No Man, Infinite, Indocible, Three Want Foure, and the like; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning; and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not names of any thing; because they make us refuse to admit of Names not rightly used.

There are also other names, called negative names. These indicate that a word is not the name of the thing being discussed. Examples include nothing, no man, infinite, unteachable, three minus four, and similar expressions. Nevertheless, these expressions are useful in reasoning or correcting our reasoning. They also remind us of our past thoughts, though they are not names of anything. This is because they make us reject names that are wrongly used.

All other names, are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts. One, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by Definition; whereof there have been aboundance coyned by Schoole-men, and pusled Philosophers.

All other names are just meaningless sounds, and fall into two kinds. The first kind consists of new names whose meanings have not yet been defined. Scholastic scholars and confused philosophers have coined a great many of these names.

Another, when men make a name of two Names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an Incorporeall Body, or (which is all one) an Incorporeall Substance, and a great number more. For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signifie nothing at all. For example if it be a false affirmation to say A Quadrangle Is Round, the word Round Quadrangle signifies nothing; but is a meere sound. So likewise if it be false, to say that vertue can be powred, or blown up and down; the words In-powred Vertue, In-blown Vertue, are as absurd and insignificant, as a Round Quadrangle. And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senselesse and insignificant word, that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldome hears our Saviour called by the name of Parole, but by the name of Verbe often; yet Verbe and Parole differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French.

Another case is when people combine two terms whose meanings contradict each other. Examples include an incorporeal body or, meaning the same thing, an incorporeal substance, and many more. For whenever a statement is false, combining its two terms into one produces a term that means nothing at all. For example, if saying a quadrangle is round is false, then round quadrangle means nothing. It is merely a sound. Likewise, if saying that virtue can be poured in or blown about is false, the same applies. The terms poured-in virtue and blown-in virtue are as absurd and meaningless as a round quadrangle. And so you will hardly find a senseless, meaningless word that is not made from Latin or Greek terms. A Frenchman seldom hears our Saviour called Parole, but often hears him called Verbe. Yet Verbe and Parole differ only in that one is Latin and the other French.

When a man upon the hearing of any Speech, hath those thoughts which the words of that Speech, and their connexion, were ordained and constituted to signifie; Then he is said to understand it; Understanding being nothing els, but conception caused by Speech. And therefore if Speech be peculiar to man (as for ought I know it is,) then is Understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false affirmations, in case they be universall, there can be no Understanding; though many think they understand, then, when they do but repeat the words softly, or con them in their mind.

When someone hears speech and has the thoughts its words and their arrangement were intended to convey, that person understands it. Understanding is nothing more than an idea formed by speech. So if speech is unique to humans (as far as I know, it is), understanding is unique to humans too. Therefore, absurd and false statements cannot be understood if they are universal claims. Yet many people think they understand such statements when they merely repeat the words quietly or rehearse them in their minds.

What kinds of Speeches signifie the Appetites, Aversions, and Passions of mans mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken of the Passions.

I will discuss the kinds of speech that express people's desires, aversions, and passions. I will explain the use and misuse of these kinds of speech after I have discussed the passions.

The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please, and displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men, of Inconstant signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signifie our conceptions; and all our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoyd different naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning, a man bust take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of Vertues, and Vices; For one man calleth Wisdome, what another calleth Feare; and one Cruelty, what another Justice; one Prodigality, what another Magnanimity; one Gravity, what another Stupidity, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes of speech: but these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the other do not.

Words for things that affect us, meaning things that please or displease us, have shifting meanings in everyday speech. This is because the same thing does not affect everyone alike, or even the same person at all times. All words are chosen to express our ideas, and all our feelings are themselves ideas. So when we think differently about the same things, we can hardly avoid giving those things different names. Although the nature of what we think about remains the same, our responses differ. Differences in our physical makeup and preconceived opinions color everything with our different emotions. Therefore, when reasoning, we must be careful with words. Besides expressing what we imagine about a thing’s nature, words also reveal the speaker’s nature, disposition, and interests. Words for virtues and vices are examples. One person calls wisdom what another calls fear. One calls cruelty what another calls justice. One calls extravagance what another calls generosity of spirit. One calls seriousness what another calls stupidity, and so on. Therefore, such words can never provide a sound basis for reasoning. Neither can metaphors and other figures of speech. But figures of speech are less dangerous because they openly acknowledge their shifting meanings, while words for virtues and vices do not.