Book 7

Next we must take a different point to start from,¹ and observe that of what is to be avoided in respect of moral character there are three forms; Vice, Imperfect Self-Control, and Brutishness. Of the two former it is plain what the contraries are, for we call the one Virtue, the other Self-Control; and as answering to Brutishness it will be most suitable to assign Superhuman, i.e. heroical and godlike Virtue, as, in Homer, Priam says of Hector “that he was very excellent, nor was he like the offspring of mortal man, but of a god.” and so, if, as is commonly said, men are raised to the position of gods by reason of very high excellence in Virtue, the state opposed to the Brutish will plainly be of this nature: because as brutes are not virtuous or vicious so neither are gods; but the state of these is something more precious than Virtue, of the former something different in kind from Vice.

Next we must start from a different point,¹ and note three forms of moral character to avoid: Vice, Imperfect Self-Control, and Brutishness. The opposites of the first two are clear: we call them Virtue and Self-Control, respectively. The most suitable opposite of Brutishness is Superhuman Virtue, meaning heroic and godlike Virtue. In Homer, Priam says of Hector “that he was outstanding, and was not like the child of a mortal man, but of a god.” And so, if, as people commonly say, men become gods through exceptionally great Virtue, the opposite of Brutishness will clearly be godlike. For just as beasts are neither virtuous nor vicious, neither are gods. But the gods’ condition is more precious than Virtue, while the condition of beasts differs in kind from Vice.

And as, on the one hand, it is a rare thing for a man to be godlike (a term the Lacedæmonians are accustomed to use when they admire a man exceedingly; σεῖος ἀνὴρ they call him), so the brutish man is rare; the character is found most among barbarians, and some cases of it are caused by disease or maiming; also such men as exceed in vice all ordinary measures we therefore designate by this opprobrious term. Well, we must in a subsequent place make some mention of this disposition, and Vice has been spoken of before: for the present we must speak of Imperfect Self-Control and its kindred faults of Softness and Luxury, on the one hand, and of Self-Control and Endurance on the other; since we are to conceive of them, not as being the same states exactly as Virtue and Vice respectively, nor again as differing in kind.

A godlike man is rare. The Lacedæmonians use this term when they greatly admire a man, calling him σεῖος ἀνὴρ. Just as a godlike man is rare, so too is a brutish man. This character is found most often among barbarians, and some cases are caused by disease or injury. We also use this insulting term for men whose vice exceeds all ordinary limits. We must discuss this character later, and we have already discussed Vice. For now, we must discuss Imperfect Self-Control and its related faults, Softness and Luxury, on one side. On the other side, we must discuss Self-Control and Endurance. We should not regard these states as exactly the same as Vice and Virtue, respectively. Nor should we regard them as different in kind.

And we should adopt the same course as before, i.e. state the phenomena, and, after raising and discussing difficulties which suggest themselves, then exhibit, if possible, all the opinions afloat respecting these affections of the moral character; or, if not all, the greater part and the most important: for we may consider we have illustrated the matter sufficiently when the difficulties have been solved, and such theories as are most approved are left as a residuum.

We should follow the same approach as before. First, we should set out what we observe, then raise and discuss the difficulties that arise. Next, we should, if possible, present all the current opinions about these states of moral character. If not all, we should present most of them, including the most important. For we may consider the subject sufficiently explained when the difficulties are resolved and the most widely accepted theories remain.

The chief points may be thus enumerated. It is thought,

The main points can be listed as follows. People think,

I. That Self-Control and Endurance belong to the class of things good and praiseworthy, while Imperfect Self-Control and Softness belong to that of things low and blameworthy.

I. Self-control and endurance are good and praiseworthy. But weak self-control and lack of endurance are base and blameworthy.

II. That the man of Self-Control is identical with the man who is apt to abide by his resolution, and the man of Imperfect Self-Control with him who is apt to depart from his resolution.

II. A man with self-control is someone who tends to stick to his decisions. A man with imperfect self-control is someone who tends to abandon his decisions.

III. That the man of Imperfect Self-Control does things at the instigation of his passions, knowing them to be wrong, while the man of Self-Control, knowing his lusts to be wrong, refuses, by the influence of reason, to follow their suggestions.

III. A man with imperfect self-control acts on his passions, knowing his actions are wrong. But a man with self-control knows his desires are wrong and uses reason to resist those desires.

IV. That the man of Perfected Self-Mastery unites the qualities of Self-Control and Endurance, and some say that every one who unites these is a man of Perfect Self-Mastery, others do not.

IV. A man with Perfected Self-Mastery combines Self-Control and Endurance. Some say that everyone who combines these qualities has Perfect Self-Mastery, but others disagree.

V. Some confound the two characters of the man who has no Self-Control, and the man of Imperfect Self-Control, while others distinguish between them.

V. Some confuse the man who has no self-control with the man who has imperfect self-control. Others distinguish between the two.

VI. It is sometimes said that the man of Practical Wisdom cannot be a man of Imperfect Self-Control, sometimes that men who are Practically Wise and Clever are of Imperfect Self-Control.

VI. Some say that a man with practical wisdom cannot lack self-control. Others say that practically wise and clever men do lack self-control.

VII. Again, men are said to be of Imperfect Self-Control, not simply but with the addition of the thing wherein, as in respect of anger, of honour, and gain.

VII. Again, people are said to lack self-control, not in general, but in some specific area. Examples include anger, honour, and financial gain.

These then are pretty well the common statements.

These, then, are more or less the commonly held views.

Now a man may raise a question as to the nature of the right conception in violation of which a man fails of Self-Control.

Now someone may ask: What is the correct understanding a person acts against when failing to exercise self-control?

That he can so fail when knowing in the strict sense what is right some say is impossible: for it is a strange thing, as Socrates thought, that while Knowledge is present in his mind something else should master him and drag him about like a slave. Socrates in fact contended generally against the theory, maintaining there is no such state as that of Imperfect Self-Control, for that no one acts contrary to what is best conceiving it to be best but by reason of ignorance what is best.

Some say he cannot fail in this way while knowing in the strict sense what is right. For, as Socrates thought, it is strange that something else could overpower him while Knowledge is present in his mind. How could something else drag him around like a slave? Socrates in fact argued against the theory as a whole, insisting that Imperfect Self-Control does not exist. For no one acts against what is best while recognizing it as best. Instead, people act against what is best because they do not know what is best.

With all due respect to Socrates, his account of the matter is at variance with plain facts, and we must enquire with respect to the affection, if it be caused by ignorance what is the nature of the ignorance: for that the man so failing does not suppose his acts to be right before he is under the influence of passion is quite plain.²

With all due respect to Socrates, his explanation conflicts with the plain facts. And if this state is caused by ignorance, we must ask what kind of ignorance is involved. For clearly, before passion takes hold, the man who fails in this way does not think his actions are right.²

There are people who partly agree with Socrates and partly not: that nothing can be stronger than Knowledge they agree, but that no man acts in contravention of his conviction of what is better they do not agree; and so they say that it is not Knowledge, but only Opinion, which the man in question has and yet yields to the instigation of his pleasures.

Some people agree with Socrates on one point but disagree on another. They agree that nothing can be stronger than knowledge. But they reject his claim that no one acts against their conviction about what is better. So they say that a person who gives in to the pull of pleasure has only opinion, not knowledge.

But then, if it is Opinion and not Knowledge, that is it the opposing conception be not strong but only mild (as in the case of real doubt), the not abiding by it in the face of strong lusts would be excusable: but wickedness is not excusable, nor is anything which deserves blame.

But suppose it is opinion rather than knowledge, and the opposing belief is weak rather than firm (as in genuine doubt). Then failing to follow that belief in the face of strong desires would be excusable. But wickedness is not excusable, nor is anything that deserves blame.

Well then, is it Practical Wisdom which in this case offers opposition: for that is the strongest principle? The supposition is absurd, for we shall have the same man uniting Practical Wisdom and Imperfect Self-Control, and surely no single person would maintain that it is consistent with the character of Practical Wisdom to do voluntarily what is very wrong; and besides we have shown before that the very mark of a man of this character is aptitude to act, as distinguished from mere knowledge of what is right; because he is a man conversant with particular details, and possessed of all the other virtues.

Well then, is Practical Wisdom what opposes it in this case, since Practical Wisdom is the strongest principle? The idea is absurd. It would mean that the same person has both Practical Wisdom and Imperfect Self-Control. Surely no one would claim that someone with Practical Wisdom could willingly do something very wrong. Besides, we have already shown that such a person is distinguished by an ability to act rightly. Merely knowing what is right is not enough. This is because a person with Practical Wisdom understands the details of particular situations and possesses all the other virtues.

Again, if the having strong and bad lusts is necessary to the idea of the man of Self-Control, this character cannot be identical with the man of Perfected Self-Mastery, because the having strong desires or bad ones does not enter into the idea of this latter character: and yet the man of Self-Control must have such: for suppose them good; then the moral state which should hinder a man from following their suggestions must be bad, and so Self-Control would not be in all cases good: suppose them on the other hand to be weak and not wrong, it would be nothing grand; nor anything great, supposing them to be wrong and weak.

Again, suppose strong and bad desires are necessary to the character of a man of Self-Control. Then he cannot be the same as a man of Perfected Self-Mastery. For strong or bad desires are not part of the character of a man of Perfected Self-Mastery. Yet the man of Self-Control must have such desires. For suppose his desires were good. Then a state of character that prevented him from following those desires would be bad. So Self-Control would not be good in all cases. Suppose, on the other hand, his desires were weak and not wrong. Resisting those desires would be nothing impressive. Nor would resisting his desires be anything great if they were wrong but weak.

Again, if Self-Control makes a man apt to abide by all opinions without exception, it may be bad, as suppose the case of a false opinion: and if Imperfect Self-Control makes a man apt to depart from all without exception, we shall have cases where it will be good; take that of Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles, for instance: he is to be praised for not abiding by what he was persuaded to by Ulysses, because he was pained at being guilty of falsehood.

Again, if Self-Control makes a man stick to all opinions without exception, Self-Control may be bad. Consider a false opinion, for example. And if Imperfect Self-Control makes a man abandon all opinions without exception, Imperfect Self-Control will sometimes be good. Take Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles, for instance. He deserves praise for not sticking to what Ulysses had persuaded him to do, because lying caused him distress.

Or again, false sophistical reasoning presents a difficulty: for because men wish to prove paradoxes that they may be counted clever when they succeed, the reasoning that has been used becomes a difficulty: for the intellect is fettered; a man being unwilling to abide by the conclusion because it does not please his judgment, but unable to advance because he cannot disentangle the web of sophistical reasoning.

Or again, misleading reasoning creates a difficulty. People want to prove paradoxes so that others will think them clever if they succeed. Because of this aim, the reasoning they use becomes an obstacle, trapping the mind. A person refuses to accept the conclusion because it goes against his judgment. But he cannot move forward because he cannot untangle the web of misleading reasoning.

Or again, it is conceivable on this supposition that folly joined with Imperfect Self-Control may turn out, in a given case, goodness: for by reason of his imperfection of self-control a man acts in a way which contradicts his notions; now his notion is that what is really good is bad and ought not to be done; and so he will eventually do what is good and not what is bad.

Or again, on this assumption, foolishness combined with weak self-control may lead to goodness in a particular case. Because a man lacks self-control, he acts against his beliefs. Now, he believes that what is actually good is bad and should not be done. So he will end up doing what is good rather than what is bad.

Again, on the same supposition, the man who acting on conviction pursues and chooses things because they are pleasant must be thought a better man than he who does so not by reason of a quasi-rational conviction but of Imperfect Self-Control: because he is more open to cure by reason of the possibility of his receiving a contrary conviction. But to the man of Imperfect Self-Control would apply the proverb, “when water chokes, what should a man drink then?” for had he never been convinced at all in respect of what he does,³ then by a conviction in a contrary direction he might have stopped in his course; but now though he has had convictions he notwithstanding acts against them.

Again, on the same assumption, consider the man who pursues and chooses pleasant things because he believes he should. He must be considered better than the man who does so from Imperfect Self-Control, rather than a seemingly rational belief. For the first man is more open to correction, because he might be persuaded to believe the opposite. But the proverb applies to the man with Imperfect Self-Control: “when water chokes, what should a man drink then?” For if he had never held a conviction about his actions,³ an opposing conviction might have stopped him. But as things stand, although he has held convictions, he acts against them anyway.

Again, if any and every thing is the object-matter of Imperfect and Perfect Self-Control, who is the man of Imperfect Self-Control simply? because no one unites all cases of it, and we commonly say that some men are so simply, not adding any particular thing in which they are so.

Again, if imperfect and perfect self-control can concern anything at all, who lacks self-control without qualification? The question arises because no one lacks self-control in every area. Yet we commonly say that some people lack self-control without specifying any particular area.

Well, the difficulties raised are pretty near such as I have described them, and of these theories we must remove some and leave others as established; because the solving of a difficulty is a positive act of establishing something as true.

Well, the difficulties raised are more or less as I have described them. We must reject some of these theories and accept others as established. This is because resolving a difficulty is a positive step toward establishing something as true.

Now we must examine first whether men of Imperfect Self-Control act with a knowledge of what is right or not: next, if with such knowledge, in what sense; and next what are we to assume is the object-matter of the man of Imperfect Self-Control, and of the man of Self-Control; I mean, whether pleasure and pain of all kinds or certain definite ones; and as to Self-Control and Endurance, whether these are designations of the same character or different. And in like manner we must go into all questions which are connected with the present.

First, we must examine whether people with imperfect self-control act knowing what is right. If they do, we must ask in what sense they have that knowledge. Next, we must consider what imperfect self-control and self-control concern. Do they concern pleasure and pain of all kinds, or only certain kinds? We must also ask whether self-control and endurance describe the same character or different characters. In the same way, we must examine all questions connected with the present discussion.

But the real starting point of the enquiry is, whether the two characters of Self-Control and Imperfect Self-Control are distinguished by their object-matter, or their respective relations to it. I mean, whether the man of Imperfect Self-Control is such simply by virtue of having such and such object-matter; or not, but by virtue of his being related to it in such and such a way, or by virtue of both: next, whether Self-Control and Imperfect Self-Control are unlimited in their object-matter: because he who is designated without any addition a man of Imperfect Self-Control is not unlimited in his object-matter, but has exactly the same as the man who has lost all Self-Control: nor is he so designated because of his relation to this object-matter merely (for then his character would be identical with that just mentioned, loss of all Self-Control), but because of his relation to it being such and such. For the man who has lost all Self-Control is led on with deliberate moral choice, holding that it is his line to pursue pleasure as it rises: while the man of Imperfect Self-Control does not think that he ought to pursue it, but does pursue it all the same.

But the real starting point of the inquiry is this question: what distinguishes Self-Control from Imperfect Self-Control? Is the difference in what they concern, or in how each person responds to those things? Does a man have Imperfect Self-Control simply because his desires concern certain things? Or is it because of how he responds to those things, or because of both? Next, do Self-Control and Imperfect Self-Control extend to every kind of object? A man described simply as having Imperfect Self-Control does not lack control over every kind of object. His desires concern exactly the same things as those of a man who has lost all Self-Control. Nor does his response to those things alone explain why he is called a man of Imperfect Self-Control. Otherwise, his character would be identical to that of the man who has lost all Self-Control. Rather, the name reflects the particular way he responds to those things. For the man who has lost all Self-Control acts from deliberate moral choice. He believes that pursuing pleasure whenever it arises is the course he should follow. But the man of Imperfect Self-Control does not think he ought to pursue pleasure, yet pursues pleasure all the same.

Now as to the notion that it is True Opinion and not Knowledge in contravention of which men fail in Self-Control, it makes no difference to the point in question, because some of those who hold Opinions have no doubt about them but suppose themselves to have accurate Knowledge; if then it is urged that men holding Opinions will be more likely than men who have Knowledge to act in contravention of their conceptions, as having but a moderate belief in them; we reply, Knowledge will not differ in this respect from Opinion: because some men believe their own Opinions no less firmly than others do their positive Knowledge: Heraclitus is a case in point.

Now consider the view that people lacking self-control act against true opinion rather than knowledge. The distinction makes no difference to the question at hand. Some people have no doubts about their opinions but believe they have accurate knowledge. Suppose, then, someone argues that people with opinions are more likely to act against their beliefs than people with knowledge. The reason offered is that people with opinions believe them only moderately. We reply that knowledge does not differ from opinion in this respect. Some people believe their own opinions just as firmly as others believe what they know for certain. Heraclitus is a case in point.

Rather the following is the account of it: the term knowing has two senses; both the man who does not use his Knowledge, and he who does, are said to know: there will be a difference between a man’s acting wrongly, who though possessed of Knowledge does not call it into operation, and his doing so who has it and actually exercises it: the latter is a strange case, but the mere having, if not exercising, presents no anomaly.

Rather, the explanation is this: the term knowing has two senses. Both someone who does not use his knowledge and someone who does are said to know. There is a difference between acting wrongly while having knowledge but not using it, and acting wrongly while actually using it. The second case is strange. But there is nothing strange about acting wrongly while having knowledge without using it.

Again, as there are two kinds of propositions affecting action,⁴ universal and particular, there is no reason why a man may not act against his Knowledge, having both propositions in his mind, using the universal but not the particular, for the particulars are the objects of moral action.

Again, there are two kinds of statements that guide action,⁴ general statements and statements about particular cases. So a person may act against his knowledge even while holding both kinds of statements in mind. He may apply the general statement but not the statement about the particular case. This is possible because moral action concerns particular cases.

There is a difference also in universal propositions;⁵ a universal proposition may relate partly to a man’s self and partly to the thing in question: take the following for instance; “dry food is good for every man,” this may have the two minor premisses, “this is a man,” and “so and so is dry food;” but whether a given substance is so and so a man either has not the Knowledge or does not exert it. According to these different senses there will be an immense difference, so that for a man to know in the one sense, and yet act wrongly, would be nothing strange, but in any of the other senses it would be a matter for wonder.

Universal statements also differ.⁵ A universal statement may concern partly the person and partly the thing in question. Take this example: “dry food is good for every man.” This statement may have two minor premises: “this is a man,” and “such and such is dry food.” But a man may either not know whether a particular substance is such and such, or not apply that knowledge. These different senses of knowing make an enormous difference. So it would be no surprise if a man were to know in one sense and still act wrongly. But if he knew in any of the other senses, his wrongdoing would be surprising.

Again, men may have Knowledge in a way different from any of those which have been now stated: for we constantly see a man’s state so differing by having and not using Knowledge, that he has it in a sense and also has not; when a man is asleep, for instance, or mad, or drunk: well, men under the actual operation of passion are in exactly similar conditions; for anger, lust, and some other such-like things, manifestly make changes even in the body, and in some they even cause madness; it is plain then that we must say the men of Imperfect Self-Control are in a state similar to these.

Again, people may have knowledge in a way different from any we have described so far. We constantly see people who have knowledge but do not use it. Their condition is so different that, in a sense, they both have knowledge and lack it. This happens, for example, when someone is asleep, mad, or drunk. People in the grip of passion are in exactly the same condition. For anger, lust, and other similar passions clearly cause changes even in the body. In some people, these passions even cause madness. So clearly, we must say that people with imperfect self-control are in a similar state.

And their saying what embodies Knowledge is no proof of their actually then exercising it, because they who are under the operation of these passions repeat demonstrations; or verses of Empedocles,⁶ just as children, when first learning, string words together, but as yet know nothing of their meaning, because they must grow into it, and this is a process requiring time: so that we must suppose these men who fail in Self-Control to say these moral sayings just as actors do.

And saying words that express knowledge does not prove that people are actually using that knowledge at the time. For people under the influence of these passions recite proofs or verses of Empedocles,⁶ just as children string words together when first learning. But the children do not yet understand the words, because understanding must develop, and that takes time. So we must suppose that people who lack self-control recite these moral sayings just as actors do.

Furthermore, a man may look at the account of the phænomenon in the following way, from an examination of the actual working of the mind: All action may be analysed into a syllogism, in which the one premiss is an universal maxim and the other concerns particulars of which Sense [moral or physical, as the case may be] is cognisant: now when one results from these two, it follows necessarily that, as far as theory goes the mind must assert the conclusion, and in practical propositions the man must act accordingly.

Furthermore, we may understand this phenomenon by examining how the mind actually works. All action can be analyzed as a syllogism, an argument based on two premises. One premise is a universal rule. The other concerns particular facts known through perception [moral or physical, as the case may be]. When a conclusion follows from these two premises, the mind must necessarily accept the conclusion in matters of theory. In practical matters, the person must necessarily act on the conclusion.

For instance, let the universal be, “All that is sweet should be tasted,” the particular, “This is sweet;” it follows necessarily that he who is able and is not hindered should not only draw, but put in practice, the conclusion “This is to be tasted.” When then there is in the mind one universal proposition forbidding to taste, and the other “All that is sweet is pleasant” with its minor “This is sweet” (which is the one that really works), and desire happens to be in the man, the first universal bids him avoid this but the desire leads him on to taste; for it has the power of moving the various organs: and so it results that he fails in Self-Control, in a certain sense under the influence of Reason and Opinion not contrary in itself to Reason but only accidentally so; because it is the desire that is contrary to Right Reason, but not the Opinion:⁷ and so for this reason brutes are not accounted of Imperfect Self-Control, because they have no power of conceiving universals but only of receiving and retaining particular impressions.

For example, take the general statement, “All that is sweet should be tasted,” and the particular statement, “This is sweet.” A person who is able to act and is not prevented must necessarily draw the conclusion “This is to be tasted.” The person must also act on that conclusion. Now suppose someone holds a general statement forbidding tasting something. Alongside it is another statement, “All that is sweet is pleasant,” with the particular statement “This is sweet.” This particular statement is the one that actually drives action. Suppose the person also feels desire. The first general statement tells him to avoid tasting, but desire leads him to taste. For desire has the power to move the various organs. So he fails in Self-Control, in a certain sense under the influence of Reason and Opinion. The Opinion is not itself contrary to Reason, but conflicts with Reason only incidentally. For desire, not the Opinion, is contrary to Right Reason:⁷ And so animals are not considered capable of Imperfect Self-Control. They cannot grasp general statements, but can only receive and retain particular impressions.

As to the manner in which the ignorance is removed and the man of Imperfect Self-Control recovers his Knowledge, the account is the same as with respect to him who is drunk or asleep, and is not peculiar to this affection, so physiologists⁸ are the right people to apply to. But whereas the minor premiss of every practical syllogism is an opinion on matter cognisable by Sense and determines the actions; he who is under the influence of passion either has not this, or so has it that his having does not amount to knowing but merely saying, as a man when drunk might repeat Empedocles’ verses; and because the minor term⁹ is neither universal, nor is thought to have the power of producing Knowledge in like manner as the universal term: and so the result which Socrates was seeking comes out, that is to say, the affection does not take place in the presence of that which is thought to be specially and properly Knowledge, nor is this dragged about by reason of the affection, but in the presence of that Knowledge which is conveyed by Sense.

How is ignorance removed, and how does the man with imperfect self-control regain his knowledge? The explanation is the same as for someone who is drunk or asleep. It is not specific to this condition, so physiologists⁸ are the right people to ask. But the minor premise of every practical syllogism is an opinion about something perceived by the senses. This premise determines the action. A person under the influence of passion either lacks this opinion or possesses it without truly knowing it. He merely says it, just as a drunk man might recite Empedocles’ verses. Moreover, the minor term⁹ is not universal. Nor is it thought to produce knowledge in the same way as the universal term. So the conclusion Socrates sought follows. Passion does not arise in the presence of what is considered knowledge in the strictest and fullest sense. Nor does passion drag this knowledge around. Instead, passion arises in the presence of knowledge gained through the senses.

Let this account then be accepted of the question respecting the failure in Self-Control, whether it is with Knowledge, and the manner in which such failure is possible or not, though a man possesses Knowledge.

Let us accept this account of whether someone can lack self-control while possessing knowledge. Let us also accept its explanation of how such failure is possible or impossible despite that knowledge.

The next question to be discussed is whether there is a character to be designated by the term “of Imperfect Self-Control” simply, or whether all who are so are to be accounted such, in respect of some particular thing; and, if there is such a character, what is his object-matter.

The next question is whether someone can be described as “of Imperfect Self-Control” without qualification. Or must all people who lack self-control be described that way only in relation to some particular thing? And if someone can lack self-control without qualification, what does that lack of control concern?

Now that pleasures and pains are the object-matter of men of Self-Control and of Endurance, and also of men of Imperfect Self-Control and Softness, is plain.

Clearly, pleasure and pain concern people with Self-Control and Endurance, as well as those with Imperfect Self-Control and Softness.

Further, things which produce pleasure are either necessary, or objects of choice in themselves but yet admitting of excess. All bodily things which produce pleasure are necessary; and I call such those which relate to food and other grosser appetities, in short such bodily things as we assumed were the Object-matter of absence of Self-Control and of Perfected Self-Mastery.

Further, things that produce pleasure are either necessary or worth choosing for their own sake, though they allow for excess. All bodily sources of pleasure are necessary. By these I mean pleasures related to food and other basic bodily appetites. In short, these are the bodily pleasures we identified as the subject of lacking self-control and having complete self-mastery.

The other class of objects are not necessary, but objects of choice in themselves: I mean, for instance, victory, honour, wealth, and such-like good or pleasant things. And those who are excessive in their liking for such things contrary to the principle of Right Reason which is in their own breasts we do not designate men of Imperfect Self-Control simply, but with the addition of the thing wherein, as in respect of money, or gain, or honour, or anger, and not simply; because we consider them as different characters and only having that title in right of a kind of resemblance (as when we add to a man’s name “conqueror in the Olympic games” the account of him as Man differs but little from the account of him as the Man who conquered in the Olympic games, but still it is different). And a proof of the real difference between these so designated with an addition and those simply so called is this, that Imperfect Self-Control is blamed, not as an error merely but also as being a vice, either wholly or partially; but none of these other cases is so blamed.

The other class consists of things that are not necessary but are worth choosing for their own sake. I mean, for example, victory, honour, wealth, and other such good or pleasant things. Some people desire these things excessively, against the principle of Right Reason within themselves. We do not simply call these people lacking in self-control. Instead, we specify the thing concerned, such as money, gain, honour, or anger. We make this distinction because we regard them as different kinds of people. They receive the same label only because of a certain resemblance. (Similarly, we may add “conqueror in the Olympic games” to a man’s name. Describing him as a man differs little from describing him as the man who conquered in the Olympic games. Still, the descriptions are different.) There is evidence of a real difference between these qualified cases and what we simply call lack of self-control. Lack of self-control is blamed not merely as an error, but also as a vice, either wholly or partly. But none of these other cases is blamed in that way.

But of those who have for their object-matter the bodily enjoyments, which we say are also the object-matter of the man of Perfected Self-Mastery and the man who has lost all Self-Control, he that pursues excessive pleasures and too much avoids¹⁰ things which are painful (as hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and everything connected with touch and taste), not from moral choice but in spite of his moral choice and intellectual conviction, is termed “a man of Imperfect Self-Control,” not with the addition of any particular object-matter as we do in respect of want of control of anger but simply.

But consider those concerned with bodily pleasures. As we have said, these pleasures also concern the man of Perfected Self-Mastery and the man who has lost all Self-Control. Someone may pursue excessive pleasures and go too far in avoiding¹⁰ painful things. These include hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and everything connected with touch and taste. He acts not from moral choice, but against his moral choice and reasoned conviction. Such a person is called “a man of Imperfect Self-Control,” without naming any particular object of his lack of control. We do specify an object when speaking of a lack of control over anger, but not in this case.

And a proof that the term is thus applied is that the kindred term “Soft” is used in respect of these enjoyments but not in respect of any of those others. And for this reason we put into the same rank the man of Imperfect Self-Control, the man who has lost it entirely, the man who has it, and the man of Perfected Self-Mastery; but not any of those other characters, because the former have for their object-matter the same pleasures and pains: but though they have the same object-matter, they are not related to it in the same way, but two of them act upon moral choice, two without it. And so we should say that man is more entirely given up to his passions who pursues excessive pleasures, and avoids moderate pains, being either not at all, or at least but little, urged by desire, than the man who does so because his desire is very strong: because we think what would the former be likely to do if he had the additional stimulus of youthful lust and violent pain consequent on the want of those pleasures which we have denominated necessary?

Proof that the term is used this way comes from the related term “Soft”. It applies to these pleasures, but not to any of the others. For this reason, we place four kinds of people in the same group: the person with Imperfect Self-Control, the person who has lost self-control entirely, the person with self-control, and the person with Perfected Self-Mastery. We do not include any of those other characters, because these four deal with the same pleasures and pains. But although they deal with the same pleasures and pains, they respond differently. Two act through deliberate moral choice, while two act without it. So consider someone who pursues excessive pleasures and avoids moderate pains, with little or no desire driving him. We would call him more completely ruled by his passions than someone who acts from very strong desire. For we ask ourselves what the first person would be likely to do if he faced further pressures. What if he also felt youthful lust and the intense pain of lacking the pleasures we have called necessary?

Well then, since of desires and pleasures there are some which are in kind honourable and good (because things pleasant are divisible, as we said before, into such as are naturally objects of choice, such as are naturally objects of avoidance, and such as are in themselves indifferent, money, gain, honour, victory, for instance); in respect of all such and those that are indifferent, men are blamed not merely¹¹ for being affected by or desiring or liking them, but for exceeding in any way in these feelings.

Well then, some desires and pleasures are honorable and good in themselves. This is because, as we said before, pleasant things fall into three groups. Some are naturally worth choosing, some are naturally worth avoiding, and some are neither good nor bad in themselves. Examples include money, gain, honor, and victory. With all these things, including those that are neither good nor bad, people are blamed not merely¹¹ for being affected by them, desiring them, or enjoying them. They are blamed for going too far in any of these feelings.

And so they are blamed, whosoever in spite of Reason are mastered by, that is pursue, any object, though in its nature noble and good; they, for instance, who are more earnest than they should be respecting honour, or their children or parents; not but what these are good objects and men are praised for being earnest about them: but still they admit of excess; for instance, if any one, as Niobe did, should fight even against the gods, or feel towards his father as Satyrus, who got therefrom the nickname of φιλοπάτωρ, because he was thought to be very foolish.

And so people are blamed when, against reason, they are overcome by the desire for something and pursue it. This holds even when what they pursue is noble and good in itself. Examples include people who care more than they should about honour, their children, or their parents. These are good things to care about, and people are praised for caring deeply about them. But even such concern can be excessive. For example, someone might fight even against the gods, as Niobe did. Or someone might feel about his father as Satyrus did. Satyrus earned the nickname φιλοπάτωρ because his devotion to his father was thought very foolish.

Now depravity there is none in regard of these things, for the reason assigned above, that each of them in itself is a thing naturally choice-worthy, yet the excesses in respect of them are wrong and matter for blame: and similarly there is no Imperfect Self-Control in respect of these things; that being not merely a thing that should be avoided but blameworthy.

There is no depravity concerning these things, for the reason given above. Each of these things is naturally worth choosing in itself, but excesses concerning them are wrong and deserve blame. Similarly, there is no Imperfect Self-Control concerning these things, since Imperfect Self-Control is not just something to avoid but deserves blame.

But because of the resemblance of the affection to the Imperfection of Self-Control the term is used with the addition in each case of the particular object-matter, just as men call a man a bad physician, or bad actor, whom they would not think of calling simply bad. As then in these cases we do not apply the term simply because each of the states is not a vice, but only like a vice in the way of analogy,¹² so it is plain that in respect of Imperfect Self-Control and Self-Control we must limit the names to those states which have the same object-matter as Perfected Self-Mastery and utter loss of Self-Control, and that we do apply it to the case of anger only in the way of resemblance: for which reason, with an addition, we designate a man of Imperfect Self-Control in respect of anger, as of honour or of gain.

But because this condition resembles Imperfection of Self-Control, we use the term with a qualification specifying its object. Similarly, people call someone a bad physician or a bad actor without considering him a bad person. In these cases, we do not call someone simply bad because these conditions are not vices. They only resemble vices by analogy.¹² So we must restrict the terms Imperfect Self-Control and Self-Control to states concerned with the same objects as Perfected Self-Mastery and utter loss of Self-Control. We apply these terms to anger only because of a resemblance. For this reason, we add a qualification when describing someone as having Imperfect Self-Control concerning anger, honour, or gain.

As there are some things naturally pleasant, and of these two kinds; those, namely, which are pleasant generally, and those which are so relatively to particular kinds of animals and men; so there are others which are not naturally pleasant but which come to be so in consequence either of maimings, or custom, or depraved natural tastes: and one may observe moral states similar to those we have been speaking of, having respectively these classes of things for their object-matter.

Some things are naturally pleasant, and these fall into two kinds. Some are pleasant in general, while others are pleasant to particular kinds of animals and people. Other things are not naturally pleasant but become pleasant through injury, habit, or corrupt natural tastes. We may observe moral states similar to those discussed earlier, each concerned with one of these classes of things.

I mean the Brutish, as in the case of the female who, they say, would rip up women with child and eat the foetus; or the tastes which are found among the savage tribes bordering on the Pontus, some liking raw flesh, and some being cannibals, and some lending one another their children to make feasts of; or what is said of Phalaris. These are instances of Brutish states, caused in some by disease or madness; take, for instance, the man who sacrificed and ate his mother, or him who devoured the liver of his fellow-servant. Instances again of those caused by disease or by custom, would be, plucking out of hair, or eating one’s nails, or eating coals and earth.¹³ Now wherever nature is really the cause no one would think of calling men of Imperfect Self-Control, ... nor, in like manner, such as are in a diseased state through custom.

I mean Brutish behavior, as in the woman who, people say, would cut open pregnant women and eat the fetus. Or consider the tastes found among the savage tribes bordering on the Pontus. Some like raw flesh, some eat human flesh, and some lend one another their children to feast on. Or consider what is said of Phalaris. These are examples of Brutish states, caused in some people by disease or madness. Take, for example, the man who sacrificed and ate his mother, or the man who ate his fellow servant’s liver. Other examples, caused by disease or habit, include pulling out hair, eating one’s nails, or eating coals and earth.¹³ Now, whenever nature is truly the cause, no one would describe such people as having Imperfect Self-Control, ... nor, likewise, people whose diseased state results from habit.

The having any of these inclinations is something foreign to what is denominated Vice, just as Brutishness is: and when a man has them his mastering them is not properly Self-Control, nor his being mastered by them Imperfection of Self-Control in the proper sense, but only in the way of resemblance; just as we may say a man of ungovernable wrath fails of Self-Control in respect of anger but not simply fails of Self-Control. For all excessive folly, cowardice, absence of Self-Control, or irritability, are either Brutish or morbid. The man, for instance, who is naturally afraid of all things, even if a mouse should stir, is cowardly after a Brutish sort; there was a man again who, by reason of disease, was afraid of a cat: and of the fools, they who are naturally destitute of Reason and live only by Sense are Brutish, as are some tribes of the far-off barbarians, while others who are so by reason of diseases, epileptic or frantic, are in morbid states.

Having any of these inclinations falls outside what we call vice, just as brutishness does. When a man has these inclinations, overcoming them is not self-control in the strict sense. Nor is giving in to them a lack of self-control in the strict sense. These states only resemble self-control and its absence. Similarly, we may say that a man with uncontrollable anger lacks self-control over anger, but not self-control generally. For all excessive foolishness, cowardice, lack of self-control, or irritability is either brutish or caused by illness. For example, a man naturally afraid of everything, even the movement of a mouse, is cowardly in a brutish way. Another man feared a cat because of an illness. Among foolish people, those who naturally lack reason and live only by their senses are brutish. Some tribes of distant barbarians are like this. Others lack reason because of illnesses, such as epilepsy or madness, and their condition is caused by illness.

So then, of these inclinations, a man may sometimes merely have one without yielding to it: I mean, suppose that Phalaris had restrained his unnatural desire to eat a child: or he may both have and yield to it. As then Vice when such as belongs to human nature is called Vice simply, while the other is so called with the addition of “brutish” or “morbid,” but not simply Vice, so manifestly there is Brutish and Morbid Imperfection of Self-Control, but that alone is entitled to the name without any qualification which is of the nature of utter absence of Self-Control, as it is found in Man.

So a man may sometimes have one of these desires without giving in to it. Suppose, for example, that Phalaris had restrained his unnatural desire to eat a child. Or a man may both have such a desire and give in to it. Vice that belongs to human nature is simply called vice. But vice of the other kind is called “brutish” or “morbid,” not simply vice. Likewise, there are clearly brutish and morbid forms of failure in self-control. But only the kind found in human beings, involving a complete lack of self-control, deserves the name without qualification.

It is plain then that the object-matter of Imperfect Self-Control and Self-Control is restricted to the same as that of utter absence of Self-Control and that of Perfected Self-Mastery, and that the rest is the object-matter of a different species so named metaphorically and not simply: we will now examine the position, “that Imperfect Self-Control in respect of Anger is less disgraceful than that in respect of Lusts.”

Clearly, then, Imperfect Self-Control and Self-Control concern the same things as utter absence of Self-Control and Perfected Self-Mastery. Other things belong to a different kind of self-control or lack of self-control. These names apply to that different kind only metaphorically, not in their strict sense. We will now examine the claim, “that Imperfect Self-Control in anger is less disgraceful than Imperfect Self-Control in lust.”

In the first place, it seems that Anger does in a way listen to Reason but mishears it; as quick servants who run out before they have heard the whole of what is said and then mistake the order; dogs, again, bark at the slightest stir, before they have seen whether it be friend or foe; just so Anger, by reason of its natural heat and quickness, listening to Reason, but without having heard the command of Reason, rushes to its revenge. That is to say, Reason or some impression on the mind shows there is insolence or contempt¹⁴ in the offender, and then Anger, reasoning as it were that one ought to fight against what is such, fires up immediately: whereas Lust, if Reason or Sense, as the case may be, merely says a thing is sweet, rushes to the enjoyment of it: and so Anger follows Reason in a manner, but Lust does not and is therefore more disgraceful: because he that cannot control his anger yields in a manner to Reason, but the other to his Lust and not to Reason at all.

First, it seems that Anger does listen to Reason in a way, but mishears it. Anger resembles eager servants who run off before hearing the whole instruction and then get the order wrong. Dogs, too, bark at the slightest noise before seeing whether someone is a friend or an enemy. Just so, Anger, naturally hot and quick, listens to Reason but rushes to revenge before hearing Reason’s command. That is, Reason or some impression in the mind suggests that the offender has shown insolence or contempt¹⁴. Then Anger immediately flares up, reasoning, as it were, that one ought to fight against such behavior. By contrast, if Reason or Sense, as the case may be, merely says something is pleasant, Lust rushes to enjoy it. So Anger follows Reason in a way, but Lust does not, and is therefore more disgraceful. This is because someone who cannot control his anger yields in a way to Reason. But someone who cannot control his Lust yields to Lust, not to Reason at all.

Again, a man is more excusable for following such desires as are natural, just as he is for following such Lusts as are common to all and to that degree in which they are common. Now Anger and irritability are more natural than Lusts when in excess and for objects not necessary. (This was the ground of the defence the man made who beat his father, “My father,” he said, “used to beat his, and his father his again, and this little fellow here,” pointing to his child, “will beat me when he is grown a man: it runs in the family.” And the father, as he was being dragged along, bid his son leave off beating him at the door, because he had himself been used to drag his father so far and no farther.)

Again, a man is more excusable for following natural desires. The same applies to desires shared by all, so long as he follows them only to the degree common to all. Now anger and irritability are more natural than excessive desires for things that are not necessary. (This was the defense offered by the man who beat his father. “My father,” he said, “used to beat his father, and his father did the same before him. And this little fellow here,” he said, pointing to his child, “will beat me when he grows up. It runs in the family.” And another father, as his son dragged him along, told his son to stop beating him at the door. For he himself had dragged his own father that far and no farther.)

Again, characters are less unjust in proportion as they involve less insidiousness. Now the Angry man is not insidious, nor is Anger, but quite open: but Lust is: as they say of Venus,

Again, the less deceitful a person's character is, the less unjust it is. Now an angry person is not deceitful, and neither is Anger. Both are quite open. But Lust is deceitful, as people say of Venus,

Or Homer of the girdle called the Cestus,

Or Homer on the belt called the Cestus,

And so since this kind of Imperfect Self-Control is more unjust, it is also more disgraceful than that in respect of Anger, and is simply Imperfect Self-Control, and Vice in a certain sense.

So this kind of Imperfect Self-Control is more unjust than the kind involving Anger. It is therefore also more disgraceful. It is Imperfect Self-Control without qualification and, in a certain sense, Vice.

Again, no man feels pain in being insolent, but every one who acts through Anger does act with pain; and he who acts insolently does it with pleasure. If then those things are most unjust with which we have most right to be angry, then Imperfect Self-Control, arising from Lust, is more so than that arising from Anger: because in Anger there is no insolence.¹⁵

Again, no one feels pain when acting insolently, but everyone who acts out of anger acts with pain. And anyone who acts insolently takes pleasure in doing so. Suppose, then, that the most unjust acts are those we have the most right to be angry about. If so, lack of self-control caused by lust is more unjust than lack of self-control caused by anger. This is because anger involves no insolence.¹⁵

Well then, it is clear that Imperfect Self-Control in respect of Lusts is more disgraceful than that in respect of Anger, and that the object-matter of Self-Control, and the Imperfection of it, are bodily Lusts and pleasures; but of these last we must take into account the differences; for, as was said at the commencement, some are proper to the human race and natural both in kind and degree, others Brutish, and others caused by maimings and diseases.

Clearly, then, failing to control desire is more disgraceful than failing to control anger. Self-control and failures of self-control concern bodily desires and pleasures. But we must distinguish between different kinds of bodily desires and pleasures. As we said at the start, some are natural to humans in both kind and degree. Others are beastlike, and others result from injuries and diseases.

Now the first of these only are the object-matter of Perfected Self-Mastery and utter absence of Self-Control; and therefore we never attribute either of these states to Brutes (except metaphorically, and whenever any one kind of animal differs entirely from another in insolence, mischievousness, or voracity), because they have not moral choice or process of deliberation, but are quite different from that kind of creature just as are madmen from other men.

Only the first of these concern Perfected Self-Mastery and the complete lack of Self-Control. So we never attribute either state to animals, except metaphorically. We use the metaphor when one kind of animal differs entirely from another in aggression, mischief, or greed for food. This is because animals have neither moral choice nor the ability to deliberate. Instead, animals differ from creatures with these abilities just as people who are insane differ from other people.

Brutishness is not so low in the scale as Vice, yet it is to be regarded with more fear: because it is not that the highest principle has been corrupted, as in the human creature, but the subject has it not at all.

Brutishness is not as morally bad as vice, but it should be feared more. This is because a brutish being’s highest principle is not corrupted, as it is in a vicious human being. Instead, a brutish being lacks that principle entirely.

It is much the same, therefore, as if one should compare an inanimate with an animate being, which were the worse: for the badness of that which has no principle of origination is always less harmful; now Intellect is a principle of origination. A similar case would be the comparing injustice and an unjust man together: for in different ways each is the worst: a bad man would produce ten thousand times as much harm as a bad brute.

So the comparison is much like asking whether a lifeless thing or a living being is worse. For badness is always less harmful in something that cannot initiate action. Now Intellect is a source of action. Comparing injustice with an unjust person would be similar, since each is the worst in a different way. A bad person would cause ten thousand times as much harm as a bad animal.

Now with respect to the pleasures and pains which come to a man through Touch and Taste, and the desiring or avoiding such (which we determined before to constitute the object-matter of the states of utter absence of Self-Control and Perfected Self-Mastery), one may be so disposed as to yield to temptations to which most men would be superior, or to be superior to those to which most men would yield: in respect of pleasures, these characters will be respectively the man of Imperfect Self-Control, and the man of Self-Control; and, in respect of pains, the man of Softness and the man of Endurance: but the moral state of most men is something between the two, even though they lean somewhat to the worse characters.

Now consider the pleasures and pains that come through touch and taste, and the desire to seek or avoid them. As we established earlier, these concern utter lack of self-control and complete self-mastery. A person may give in to temptations most people would resist, or resist temptations most people would give in to. With pleasures, the first person lacks self-control, while the second has self-control. With pains, the first person is soft, while the second shows endurance. But most people’s moral character falls somewhere between these extremes, though they lean somewhat toward the worse traits.

Again, since of the pleasures indicated some are necessary and some are not, others are so to a certain degree but not the excess or defect of them, and similarly also of Lusts and pains, the man who pursues the excess of pleasant things, or such as are in themselves excess, or from moral choice, for their own sake, and not for anything else which is to result from them, is a man utterly void of Self-Control: for he must be incapable of remorse, and so incurable, because he that has not remorse is incurable. (He that has too little love of pleasure is the opposite character, and the man of Perfected Self-Mastery the mean character.) He is of a similar character who avoids the bodily pains, not because he cannot, but because he chooses not to, withstand them.

Again, some of the pleasures mentioned are necessary, and some are not. Others are necessary up to a point, but not in excess or deficiency. The same applies to desires and pains. A man may pursue pleasures to excess, pursue pleasures that are themselves excessive, or pursue them by deliberate choice. If he pursues them for their own sake, and not for any further result, he is utterly without Self-Control. For he must be incapable of remorse, and therefore beyond cure, because anyone incapable of remorse is beyond cure. (The man who cares too little for pleasure is the opposite character. The man of Perfected Self-Mastery stands between the two extremes.) A man who avoids bodily pains has a similar character if his reason is not that he cannot endure them. Rather, he chooses not to endure them.

But of the characters who go wrong without choosing so to do, the one is led on by reason of pleasure, the other because he avoids the pain it would cost him to deny his lust; and so they are different the one from the other. Now every one would pronounce a man worse for doing something base without any impulse of desire, or with a very slight one, than for doing the same from the impulse of a very strong desire; for striking a man when not angry than if he did so in wrath: because one naturally says, “What would he have done had he been under the influence of passion?” (and on this ground, by the bye, the man utterly void of Self-Control is worse than he who has it imperfectly). However, of the two characters which have been mentioned,¹⁶ [as included in that of utter absence of Self-Control], the one is rather Softness, the other properly the man of no Self-Control.

But among those who go wrong without choosing to, one is driven by pleasure. The other avoids the pain of resisting his desire. So the two differ. Now everyone would judge a man more harshly for doing something shameful with little or no desire driving him. They would judge him less harshly for the same act if driven by a very strong desire. Likewise, everyone would judge a man more harshly for striking someone when calm than when angry. For one naturally says, “What would he have done if he had been overcome by passion?” (Incidentally, this is why a man utterly lacking Self-Control is worse than one whose Self-Control is imperfect.) However, of the two characters just mentioned,¹⁶ [as forms of a complete lack of Self-Control], one shows Softness. The other is properly described as a man without Self-Control.

Furthermore, to the character of Imperfect Self-Control is opposed that of Self-Control, and to that of Softness that of Endurance: because Endurance consists in continued resistance but Self-Control in actual mastery, and continued resistance and actual mastery are as different as not being conquered is from conquering; and so Self-Control is more choice-worthy than Endurance.

Furthermore, Self-Control is the opposite of Imperfect Self-Control, and Endurance is the opposite of Softness. This is because Endurance means continuing to resist, while Self-Control means actually gaining mastery. Continuing to resist differs from gaining mastery just as not being defeated differs from winning. So Self-Control is more worth choosing than Endurance.

Again, he who fails when exposed to those temptations against which the common run of men hold out, and are well able to do so, is Soft and Luxurious (Luxury being a kind of Softness): the kind of man, I mean, to let his robe drag in the dirt to avoid the trouble of lifting it, and who, aping the sick man, does not however suppose himself wretched though he is like a wretched man. So it is too with respect to Self-Control and the Imperfection of it: if a man yields to pleasures or pains which are violent and excessive it is no matter for wonder, but rather for allowance if he made what resistance he could (instances are, Philoctetes in Theodectes’ drama when wounded by the viper; or Cercyon in the Alope of Carcinus, or men who in trying to suppress laughter burst into a loud continuous fit of it, as happened, you remember, to Xenophantus), but it is a matter for wonder when a man yields to and cannot contend against those pleasures or pains which the common herd are able to resist; always supposing his failure not to be owing to natural constitution or disease, I mean, as the Scythian kings are constitutionally Soft, or the natural difference between the sexes.

Again, someone is soft and self-indulgent if he gives in to temptations most people resist and can easily withstand. Self-indulgence is a kind of softness. I mean the sort of man who lets his robe drag in the dirt rather than bother lifting it. He acts like a sick man, yet does not consider himself miserable, though he resembles someone who is miserable. The same applies to self-control and the lack of it. If someone gives in to intense and excessive pleasures or pains, his failure is not surprising. Rather, he deserves understanding if he resisted as much as he could. Examples include Philoctetes in Theodectes’ drama, when wounded by the viper, and Cercyon in the Alope of Carcinus. Another example is someone who tries to suppress laughter but bursts into a prolonged fit of loud laughter. As you remember, this happened to Xenophantus. But it is surprising when someone gives in to pleasures or pains most people can resist and cannot fight them. This assumes his failure is not due to his natural constitution or to disease. I mean cases such as the Scythian kings, who are soft by constitution, or the natural difference between the sexes.

Again, the man who is a slave to amusement is commonly thought to be destitute of Self-Control, but he really is Soft; because amusement is an act of relaxing, being an act of resting, and the character in question is one of those who exceed due bounds in respect of this.

Again, a man who is a slave to amusement is commonly thought to lack self-control. But he is actually soft, because amusement is a form of relaxation, and relaxation is a form of rest. Such a man is among those who go too far in seeking rest.

Moreover of Imperfect Self-Control there are two forms, Precipitancy and Weakness: those who have it in the latter form though they have made resolutions do not abide by them by reason of passion; the others are led by passion because they have never formed any resolutions at all: while there are some who, like those who by tickling themselves beforehand get rid of ticklishness, having felt and seen beforehand the approach of temptation, and roused up themselves and their resolution, yield not to passion; whether the temptation be somewhat pleasant or somewhat painful. The Precipitate form of Imperfect Self-Control they are most liable to who are constitutionally of a sharp or melancholy temperament: because the one by reason of the swiftness, the other by reason of the violence, of their passions, do not wait for Reason, because they are disposed to follow whatever notion is impressed upon their minds.

Moreover, imperfect self-control has two forms: rashness and weakness. Those with the second form make resolutions but fail to keep them because of their passions. Those with the first form are led by passion because they have made no resolutions at all. Some people, however, prepare themselves by recognizing and feeling temptation approaching, then stirring themselves and strengthening their resolve. They are like people who tickle themselves beforehand to make themselves less ticklish. These prepared people do not yield to passion, whether the temptation involves something pleasant or something painful. People with naturally quick-tempered or melancholy dispositions are most prone to the rash form of imperfect self-control. The quick-tempered do not wait for reason because their passions move so swiftly. The melancholy do not wait because their passions are so intense. Both are inclined to follow whatever idea takes hold of their minds.

Again, the man utterly destitute of Self-Control, as was observed before, is not given to remorse: for it is part of his character that he abides by his moral choice: but the man of Imperfect Self-Control is almost made up of remorse: and so the case is not as we determined it before, but the former is incurable and the latter may be cured: for depravity is like chronic diseases, dropsy and consumption for instance, but Imperfect Self-Control is like acute disorders: the former being a continuous evil, the latter not so. And, in fact, Imperfect Self-Control and Confirmed Vice are different in kind: the latter being imperceptible to its victim, the former not so.¹⁷

Again, as noted before, the man entirely without Self-Control feels no remorse. Sticking to his moral choice is part of his character. But the man with Imperfect Self-Control is almost consumed by remorse. So the situation differs from our earlier conclusion: the first man is incurable, but the second can be cured. Depravity resembles chronic diseases, such as dropsy and consumption, while Imperfect Self-Control resembles acute illnesses. Depravity is an ongoing evil, while Imperfect Self-Control is not. In fact, Imperfect Self-Control and Confirmed Vice differ in kind. A person with Confirmed Vice does not recognize his condition, but a person with Imperfect Self-Control does.¹⁷

But, of the different forms of Imperfect Self-Control, those are better who are carried off their feet by a sudden access of temptation than they who have Reason but do not abide by it; these last being overcome by passion less in degree, and not wholly without premeditation as are the others: for the man of Imperfect Self-Control is like those who are soon intoxicated and by little wine and less than the common run of men.

But among people with imperfect self-control, those swept away by sudden temptation are better than those who reason but ignore their conclusions. For those who ignore their reasoning give in to weaker passions. And unlike those swept away by temptation, they do not act entirely without forethought. For a person with imperfect self-control is like someone who gets drunk quickly on little wine, less than most people need.

Well then, that Imperfection of Self-Control is not Confirmed Viciousness is plain: and yet perhaps it is such in a way, because in one sense it is contrary to moral choice and in another the result of it:¹⁸ at all events, in respect of the actions, the case is much like what Demodocus said of the Miletians. “The people of Miletus are not fools, but they do just the kind of things that fools do;” and so they of Imperfect Self-Control are not unjust, but they do unjust acts.

Clearly, then, a lack of self-control is not settled vice. Yet perhaps it is, in a way. In one sense it goes against moral choice, and in another it results from moral choice:¹⁸ at any rate, the actions resemble what Demodocus said about the Miletians. “The people of Miletus are not fools, but they do just the kinds of things fools do.” Likewise, people who lack self-control are not unjust, but they do unjust things.

But to resume. Since the man of Imperfect Self-Control is of such a character as to follow bodily pleasures in excess and in defiance of Right Reason, without acting on any deliberate conviction, whereas the man utterly destitute of Self-Control does act upon a conviction which rests on his natural inclination to follow after these pleasures; the former may be easily persuaded to a different course, but the latter not: for Virtue and Vice respectively preserve and corrupt the moral principle; now the motive is the principle or starting point in moral actions, just as axioms and postulates are in mathematics: and neither in morals nor mathematics is it Reason which is apt to teach the principle; but Excellence, either natural or acquired by custom, in holding right notions with respect to the principle. He who does this in morals is the man of Perfected Self-Mastery, and the contrary character is the man utterly destitute of Self-Control.

But let us return to the point. A man of Imperfect Self-Control pursues bodily pleasures excessively and against Right Reason, without acting on any deliberate conviction. By contrast, a man utterly without Self-Control acts on a conviction rooted in his natural inclination to pursue these pleasures. So the first man may easily be persuaded to change his course, but the second cannot. For Virtue preserves the moral principle, while Vice corrupts it. The motive is the principle or starting point of moral action, just as axioms and postulates are in mathematics. Neither in morality nor in mathematics does Reason teach the starting principle. Rather, Excellence, whether natural or developed through habit, gives us correct beliefs about that principle. In moral matters, the person who holds these correct beliefs is the man of Perfected Self-Mastery. His opposite is the man utterly without Self-Control.

Again, there is a character liable to be taken off his feet in defiance of Right Reason because of passion; whom passion so far masters as to prevent his acting in accordance with Right Reason, but not so far as to make him be convinced that it is his proper line to follow after such pleasures without limit: this character is the man of Imperfect Self- Control, better than he who is utterly destitute of it, and not a bad man simply and without qualification: because in him the highest and best part, i.e. principle, is preserved: and there is another character opposed to him who is apt to abide by his resolutions, and not to depart from them; at all events, not at the instigation of passion.

Again, some people can be carried away by passion despite Right Reason. Passion overcomes such a person enough to stop him from acting according to Right Reason. But passion does not convince him that he ought to pursue such pleasures without limit. This is the man of Imperfect Self-Control. He is better than someone who has no self-control at all, and he is not bad without qualification. This is because his highest and best part, his guiding principle, remains intact. Opposed to him is another kind of person, who tends to keep his resolutions and not abandon them. At least, he does not abandon them at the urging of passion.

It is evident then from all this, that Self-Control is a good state and the Imperfection of it a bad one.

All this makes it clear that self-control is a good state, and a lack of self-control is a bad one.

Next comes the question, whether a man is a man of Self-Control for abiding by his conclusions and moral choice be they of what kind they may, or only by the right one; or again, a man of Imperfect Self-Control for not abiding by his conclusions and moral choice be they of whatever kind; or, to put the case we did before, is he such for not abiding by false conclusions and wrong moral choice?

Next comes this question: does a man show Self-Control by sticking to his conclusions and moral choice, whatever their kind? Or must he stick only to the right conclusions and moral choice? Again, does a man show Imperfect Self-Control by failing to stick to his conclusions and moral choice, whatever their kind? Or, to return to our earlier question, does he show Imperfect Self-Control by abandoning false conclusions and wrong moral choice?

Is not this the truth, that incidentally it is by conclusions and moral choice of any kind that the one character abides and the other does not, but per se true conclusions and right moral choice:¹⁹ to explain what is meant by incidentally, and per se; suppose a man chooses or pursues this thing for the sake of that, he is said to pursue and choose that per se, but this only incidentally. For the term per se we use commonly the word “simply,” and so, in a way, it is opinion of any kind soever by which the two characters respectively abide or not, but he is “simply” entitled to the designations who abides or not by the true opinion.

Isn't this true: incidentally, one character sticks to conclusions and moral choices of any kind, while the other does not? But per se, one sticks to true conclusions and right moral choices, while the other does not.¹⁹ To explain what incidentally and per se mean, suppose someone chooses or pursues one thing for the sake of another. We say he pursues and chooses the goal per se, but the means only incidentally. Instead of per se, we commonly use the word “simply.” So, in a way, the two characters respectively stick to, or fail to stick to, opinions of any kind. But someone “simply” deserves these descriptions when he sticks to, or fails to stick to, a true opinion.

There are also people, who have a trick of abiding by their, own opinions, who are commonly called Positive, as they who are hard to be persuaded, and whose convictions are not easily changed: now these people bear some resemblance to the character of Self-Control, just as the prodigal to the liberal or the rash man to the brave, but they are different in many points. The man of Self-Control does not change by reason of passion and lust, yet when occasion so requires he will be easy of persuasion: but the Positive man changes not at the call of Reason, though many of this class take up certain desires and are led by their pleasures. Among the class of Positive are the Opinionated, the Ignorant, and the Bearish: the first, from the motives of pleasure and pain: I mean, they have the pleasurable feeling of a kind of victory in not having their convictions changed, and they are pained when their decrees, so to speak, are reversed: so that, in fact, they rather resemble the man of Imperfect Self-Control than the man of Self-Control.

Some people habitually cling to their own opinions. They are commonly called Positive, meaning they are hard to persuade and slow to change their convictions. These people somewhat resemble a person with Self-Control, just as a wasteful spender resembles a generous person. The resemblance is also like that of a reckless person to a brave person. But they differ in many ways. A person with Self-Control does not change his mind because of passion or desire. Yet when the situation calls for it, he is easy to persuade. But a Positive person does not change his mind in response to reason. Still, many Positive people embrace certain desires and let their pleasures guide them. The Positive include the Opinionated, the Ignorant, and the Bearish, or ill-tempered. The Opinionated cling to their views because of pleasure and pain. I mean that they enjoy a kind of victory when their convictions remain unchanged. They feel pain when their decrees, so to speak, are overturned. So they actually resemble a person with Imperfect Self-Control more than a person with Self-Control.

Again, there are some who depart from their resolutions not by reason of any Imperfection of Self-Control; take, for instance, Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles. Here certainly pleasure was the motive of his departure from his resolution, but then it was one of a noble sort: for to be truthful was noble in his eyes and he had been persuaded by Ulysses to lie.

Again, some people abandon their decisions without showing any lack of self-control. Take Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles. Pleasure certainly motivated him to abandon his decision, but his pleasure was noble. For he considered telling the truth noble, and Ulysses had persuaded him to lie.

So it is not every one who acts from the motive of pleasure who is utterly destitute of Self-Control or base or of Imperfect Self-Control, only he who acts from the impulse of a base pleasure.

So not everyone motivated by pleasure completely lacks self-control, is morally bad, or has imperfect self-control. Only someone driven by a morally bad pleasure fits these descriptions.

Moreover as there is a character who takes less pleasure than he ought in bodily enjoyments, and he also fails to abide by the conclusion of his Reason,²⁰ the man of Self-Control is the mean between him and the man of Imperfect Self-Control: that is to say, the latter fails to abide by them because of somewhat too much, the former because of somewhat too little; while the man of Self-Control abides by them, and never changes by reason of anything else than such conclusions.

Moreover, some people take less pleasure than they should in bodily enjoyments. They too fail to follow the conclusions of their Reason.²⁰ The man of Self-Control falls between such a person and the man of Imperfect Self-Control. The man of Imperfect Self-Control fails to follow these conclusions because he takes somewhat too much pleasure in bodily enjoyments. The person who takes too little pleasure fails to follow these conclusions because he takes somewhat too little. But the man of Self-Control follows these conclusions and never changes for any reason other than such conclusions.

Now of course since Self-Control is good both the contrary States must be bad, as indeed they plainly are: but because the one of them is seen in few persons, and but rarely in them, Self-Control comes to be viewed as if opposed only to the Imperfection of it, just as Perfected Self-Mastery is thought to be opposed only to utter want of Self-Control.

Of course, since Self-Control is good, both opposing states must be bad, as they plainly are. But one of these states appears in few people, and only rarely even in those people. Because of this rarity, Self-Control comes to be seen as if opposed only to imperfect Self-Control. In the same way, Perfected Self-Mastery is thought to be opposed only to a complete lack of Self-Control.

Again, as many terms are used in the way of similitude, so people have come to talk of the Self-Control of the man of Perfected Self-Mastery in the way of similitude: for the man of Self-Control and the man of Perfected Self-Mastery have this in common, that they do nothing against Right Reason on the impulse of bodily pleasures, but then the former has bad desires, the latter not; and the latter is so constituted as not even to feel pleasure contrary to his Reason, the former feels but does not yield to it.

Again, many terms are used by analogy. In the same way, people speak of Self-Control in a man of Perfected Self-Mastery. For a man of Self-Control and a man of Perfected Self-Mastery share one trait. Neither acts against Right Reason under the influence of bodily pleasures. But the man of Self-Control has bad desires, while the man of Perfected Self-Mastery does not. The man of Perfected Self-Mastery is so disposed that he feels no pleasure contrary to his Reason. The man of Self-Control feels such pleasure but does not give in to it.

Like again are the man of Imperfect Self-Control and he who is utterly destitute of it, though in reality distinct: both follow bodily pleasures, but the latter under a notion that it is the proper line for him to take, his former without any such notion.

Similarly, the man with imperfect self-control resembles the man with none at all, though they are actually different. Both pursue bodily pleasures. But the man with no self-control believes pursuing these pleasures is right for him. The man with imperfect self-control has no such belief.

And it is not possible for the same man to be at once a man of Practical Wisdom and of Imperfect Self-Control: because the character of Practical Wisdom includes, as we showed before, goodness of moral character. And again, it is not knowledge merely, but aptitude for action, which constitutes Practical Wisdom: and of this aptitude the man of Imperfect Self-Control is destitute. But there is no reason why the Clever man should not be of Imperfect Self-Control: and the reason why some men are occasionally thought to be men of Practical Wisdom, and yet of Imperfect Self-Control, is this, that Cleverness differs from Practical Wisdom in the way I stated in a former book, and is very near it so far as the intellectual element is concerned but differs in respect of the moral choice.

A man cannot have both Practical Wisdom and Imperfect Self-Control. This is because Practical Wisdom includes moral goodness, as we showed earlier. Moreover, Practical Wisdom requires not just knowledge but also the ability to act. A man with Imperfect Self-Control lacks this ability. But there is no reason why a Clever man cannot have Imperfect Self-Control. This explains why some men are sometimes thought to have both Practical Wisdom and Imperfect Self-Control. Cleverness differs from Practical Wisdom in the way I described in an earlier book. Cleverness is very close to Practical Wisdom in its intellectual aspects, but differs in moral choice.

Nor is the man of Imperfect Self-Control like the man who both has and calls into exercise his knowledge, but like the man who, having it, is overpowered by sleep or wine. Again, he acts voluntarily (because he knows, in a certain sense, what he does and the result of it), but he is not a confirmed bad man, for his moral choice is good, so he is at all events only half bad. Nor is he unjust, because he does not act with deliberate intent: for of the two chief forms of the character, the one is not apt to abide by his deliberate resolutions, and the other, the man of constitutional strength of passion, is not apt to deliberate at all.

Nor is the man with imperfect self-control like someone who both possesses knowledge and puts that knowledge to use. Instead, he is like someone who possesses knowledge but is overcome by sleep or wine. Again, he acts voluntarily because, in a certain sense, he knows what he does and what will result. But he is not thoroughly bad, since his moral choice is good. So he is, at any rate, only half bad. Nor is he unjust, because he does not act with deliberate intent. For this character has two main forms. One tends not to stick to his deliberate decisions. The other, whose passions are naturally strong, tends not to deliberate at all.

So in fact the man of Imperfect Self-Control is like a community which makes all proper enactments, and has admirable laws, only does not act on them, verifying the scoff of Anaxandrides,

So in fact, a man with imperfect self-control is like a community that passes all the right measures and has excellent laws. But the community does not follow those laws, proving Anaxandrides’ mocking remark true,

whereas the bad man is like one which acts upon its laws, but then unfortunately they are bad ones.

By contrast, the bad man is like one that follows its laws. But unfortunately, those laws are bad.

Imperfection of Self-Control and Self-Control, after all, are above the average state of men; because he of the latter character is more true to his Reason, and the former less so, than is in the power of most men.

Both imperfect self-control and self-control, after all, go beyond the average human condition. This is because people with self-control follow their reason more faithfully than most people can. Those with imperfect self-control follow their reason less faithfully than most people can.

Again, of the two forms of Imperfect Self-Control that is more easily cured which they have who are constitutionally of strong passions, than that of those who form resolutions and break them; and they that are so through habituation than they that are so naturally; since of course custom is easier to change than nature, because the very resemblance of custom to nature is what constitutes the difficulty of changing it; as Evenus says,

Again, of the two forms of imperfect self-control, the form found in people with naturally strong passions is more easily cured. The form found in people who make resolutions and then break them is harder to cure. Also, imperfect self-control caused by habit is more easily cured than imperfect self-control caused by nature. This is because habit is easier to change than nature. Indeed, what makes habit hard to change is its resemblance to nature. As Evenus says,

We have now said then what Self-Control is, what Imperfection of Self-Control, what Endurance, and what Softness, and how these states are mutually related.

We have now explained self-control, lack of self-control, endurance, and softness. We have also explained how these states relate to one another.

To consider the subject of Pleasure and Pain falls within the province of the Social-Science Philosopher, since he it is who has to fix the Master-End which is to guide us in dominating any object absolutely evil or good.

The study of pleasure and pain belongs to the political philosopher. For he must define the ultimate goal that guides us in judging anything as absolutely bad or good.

But we may say more: an enquiry into their nature is absolutely necessary. First, because we maintained that Moral Virtue and Moral Vice are both concerned with Pains and Pleasures: next, because the greater part of mankind assert that Happiness must include Pleasure (which by the way accounts for the word they use, μακάριος; χαίρειν being the root of that word).

But we may go further: examining their nature is absolutely necessary. First, because we have argued that moral virtue and moral vice both concern pain and pleasure. Second, because most people claim that happiness must include pleasure. (This claim, incidentally, explains the word they use, μακάριος, whose root is χαίρειν.)

Now some hold that no one Pleasure is good, either in itself or as a matter of result, because Good and Pleasure are not identical. Others that some Pleasures are good but the greater number bad. There is yet a third view; granting that every Pleasure is good, still the Chief Good cannot possibly be Pleasure.

Some people hold that no pleasure is good, either in itself or in its results. Their reason is that goodness and pleasure are not the same. Others hold that some pleasures are good, but most are bad. There is also a third view: even if every pleasure is good, the highest good still cannot possibly be pleasure.

In support of the first opinion (that Pleasure is utterly not-good) it is urged that:

The following arguments support the first view (that pleasure is not good at all):

1. Every Pleasure is a sensible process towards a complete state; but no such process is akin to the end to be attained: e.g. no process of building to the completed house.

1. Every pleasure is a process we can feel that moves toward a complete state. But no such process is like its end result: for example, building a house is not like the finished house.

2. The man of Perfected Self-Mastery avoids Pleasures.

2. A man with complete self-control avoids pleasures.

3. The man of Practical Wisdom aims at avoiding Pain, not at attaining Pleasure.

3. A person with practical wisdom aims to avoid pain, not to gain pleasure.

4. Pleasures are an impediment to thought, and the more so the more keenly they are felt. An obvious instance will readily occur.

4. Pleasures get in the way of thought, and the more intense the pleasures, the greater the obstacle. An obvious example will readily come to mind.

5. Pleasure cannot be referred to any Art: and yet every good is the result of some Art.

5. Pleasure is not the product of any art or craft. Yet every good is the result of some art or craft.

6. Children and brutes pursue Pleasures.

6. Children and animals seek pleasure.

In support of the second (that not all Pleasures are good), That there are some base and matter of reproach, and some even hurtful: because some things that are pleasant produce disease.

The second claim (that not all pleasures are good) is supported by the fact that some pleasures are shameful and blameworthy. Some are even harmful, because some pleasant things cause disease.

In support of the third (that Pleasure is not the Chief Good), That it is not an End but a process towards creating an End.

The third claim (that pleasure is not the highest good) is supported by the following argument. Pleasure is not an end but a process that brings an end into being.

This is, I think, a fair account of current views on the matter.

I think this is a fair summary of current views on the subject.

But that the reasons alleged do not prove it either to be not-good or the Chief Good is plain from the following considerations.

But the reasons given do not prove that it is either not good or the Chief Good. The following considerations make this clear.

First. Good being either absolute or relative, of course the natures and states embodying it will be so too; therefore also the movements and the processes of creation. So, of those which are thought to be bad some will be bad absolutely, but relatively not bad, perhaps even choice-worthy; some not even choice-worthy relatively to any particular person, only at certain times or for a short time but not in themselves choice-worthy.

First. Good can be absolute or relative, so naturally the natures and states embodying good can be absolute or relative too. The same is therefore true of movements and processes of creation. So, among those considered bad, some will be bad absolutely but not in a relative sense, perhaps even worth choosing. Some are not worth choosing even for a particular person, except at certain times or for a short time. But they are not worth choosing in themselves.

Others again are not even Pleasures at all though they produce that impression on the mind: all such I mean as imply pain and whose purpose is cure; those of sick people, for instance.

Others are not pleasures at all, though they seem to be. I mean all those that involve pain and aim to cure, such as those experienced by sick people.

Next, since Good may be either an active working or a state, those [κινήσεις or γενέσεις] which tend to place us in our natural state are pleasant incidentally because of that tendency: but the active working is really in the desires excited in the remaining (sound) part of our state or nature: for there are Pleasures which have no connection with pain or desire: the acts of contemplative intellect, for instance, in which case there is no deficiency in the nature or state of him who performs the acts.

Next, since good may be either an activity or a state, movements or processes [κινήσεις or γενέσεις] that tend to restore our natural state are pleasant only incidentally. They are pleasant because of that tendency. But the actual activity lies in the desires stirred in the remaining (healthy) part of our state or nature. For some pleasures have no connection with pain or desire. Acts of intellectual contemplation, for example, involve no deficiency in the nature or state of the person performing them.

A proof of this is that the same pleasant thing does not produce the sensation of Pleasure when the natural state is being filled up or completed as when it is already in its normal condition: in this latter case what give the sensation are things pleasant per se, in the former even those things which are contrary. I mean, you find people taking pleasure in sharp or bitter things of which no one is naturally or in itself pleasant; of course not therefore the Pleasures arising from them, because it is obvious that as is the classification of pleasant things such must be that of the Pleasures arising from them.

Here is proof: the same pleasant thing produces different sensations of pleasure depending on our natural condition. The pleasure differs when our natural state is being restored or completed and when it is already normal. In the normal state, things pleasant in themselves produce pleasure. During restoration, even things contrary to what is naturally pleasant can produce pleasure. I mean that people take pleasure in sharp or bitter things, none of which is naturally pleasant in itself. So, of course, the pleasures arising from sharp or bitter things are not pleasant in themselves either. For clearly, pleasures must be classified in the same way as the pleasant things that produce them.

Next, it does not follow that there must be something else better than any given pleasure because (as some say) the End must be better than the process which creates it. For it is not true that all Pleasures are processes or even attended by any process, but (some are) active workings or even Ends: in fact they result not from our coming to be something but from our using our powers. Again, it is not true that the End is, in every case, distinct from the process: it is true only in the case of such processes as conduce to the perfecting of the natural state.

Next, some say that the goal must be better than the process that produces it. But this does not mean that something else must be better than any given pleasure. For not all pleasures are processes or even accompanied by a process. Some pleasures are activities or even goals in themselves. In fact, these pleasures come not from becoming something but from using our abilities. Again, the goal is not always separate from the process. The goal is separate only when the process helps bring our natural state to perfection.

For which reason it is wrong to say that Pleasure is “a sensible process of production.” For “process etc.” should be substituted “active working of the natural state,” for “sensible” “unimpeded.” The reason of its being thought to be a “process etc.” is that it is good in the highest sense: people confusing “active working” and “process,” whereas they really are distinct.

For this reason, it is wrong to call Pleasure “a perceptible process of production.” Replace “process of production” with “activity of the natural state,” and “perceptible” with “unimpeded.” Pleasure is thought to be a “process of production” because it is good in the highest sense. People confuse “activity” with “process,” but the two are distinct.

Next, as to the argument that there are bad Pleasures because some things which are pleasant are also hurtful to health, it is the same as saying that some healthful things are bad for “business.” In this sense, of course, both may be said to be bad, but then this does not make them out to be bad simpliciter: the exercise of the pure Intellect sometimes hurts a man’s health: but what hinders Practical Wisdom or any state whatever is, not the Pleasure peculiar to, but some Pleasure foreign to it: the Pleasures arising from the exercise of the pure Intellect or from learning only promote each.

Next, consider the argument that some Pleasures are bad because some pleasant things harm health. This is like saying that some healthy things are bad for “business.” In this sense, of course, both may be called bad. But neither is therefore bad in itself. Even exercising the pure Intellect sometimes harms a person’s health. But Practical Wisdom, or any other state, is hindered not by its own Pleasure, but by Pleasure foreign to it. The Pleasures of exercising the pure Intellect or of learning only help those activities.

Next. “No Pleasure is the work of any Art.” What else would you expect? No active working is the work of any Art, only the faculty of so working. Still the perfumer’s Art or the cook’s are thought to belong to Pleasure.

Next: “No pleasure is produced by any craft.” What else would you expect? No craft produces an activity, only the ability to perform that activity. Still, perfumery and cooking are thought to be crafts concerned with pleasure.

Next. “The man of Perfected Self-Mastery avoids Pleasures.” “The man of Practical Wisdom aims at escaping Pain rather than at attaining Pleasure.”

Next. “The man with complete self-control avoids pleasures.” “The man with practical wisdom aims to avoid pain rather than seek pleasure.”

“Children and brutes pursue Pleasures.”

“Children and animals seek pleasure.”

One answer will do for all.

One answer will cover all.

We have already said in what sense all Pleasures are good per se and in what sense not all are good: it is the latter class that brutes and children pursue, such as are accompanied by desire and pain, that is the bodily Pleasures (which answer to this description) and the excesses of them: in short, those in respect of which the man utterly destitute of Self-Control is thus utterly destitute. And it is the absence of the pain arising from these Pleasures that the man of Practical Wisdom aims at. It follows that these Pleasures are what the man of Perfected Self-Mastery avoids: for obviously he has Pleasures peculiarly his own.

We have already explained in what sense all pleasures are good in themselves, and in what sense not all are good. Animals and children pursue the latter kind, pleasures accompanied by desire and pain. These are bodily pleasures that fit this description, and excessive indulgence in them. In short, these are the pleasures over which a person entirely lacking Self-Control has no control. And a person with Practical Wisdom aims to be free from the pain arising from these pleasures. It follows that a person with Perfected Self-Mastery avoids these pleasures. For clearly, such a person has pleasures of his own.

Then again, it is allowed that Pain is an evil and a thing to be avoided partly as bad per se, partly as being a hindrance in some particular way. Now the contrary of that which is to be avoided, quâ it is to be avoided, i.e. evil, is good. Pleasure then must be a good.

Again, pain is accepted as an evil and something to avoid. Pain is partly bad in itself and partly bad because it gets in the way in some particular respect. Now, the opposite of something to be avoided, insofar as it should be avoided, that is, as evil, is good. Pleasure, then, must be a good.

The attempted answer of Speusippus, “that Pleasure may be opposed and yet not contrary to Pain, just as the greater portion of any magnitude is contrary to the less but only opposed to the exact half,” will not hold: for he cannot say that Pleasure is identical with evil of any kind.

Speusippus tries to answer: “Pleasure may be opposed to pain without being its contrary. Similarly, the larger portion of a quantity is contrary to the smaller portion, but only opposed to exactly half.” But this answer fails, because Speusippus cannot say that pleasure is identical with any kind of evil.

Again. Granting that some Pleasures are low, there is no reason why some particular Pleasure may not be very good, just as some particular Science may be although there are some which are low.

Again, even if some pleasures are base, there is no reason why a particular pleasure may not be very good. In the same way, a particular field of knowledge may be very good, although some fields are base.

Perhaps it even follows, since each state may have active working unimpeded, whether the active workings of all be Happiness or that of some one of them, that this active working, if it be unimpeded, must be choice-worthy: now Pleasure is exactly this. So that the Chief Good may be Pleasure of some kind, though most Pleasures be (let us assume) low per se.

Perhaps a further conclusion follows, since each state may function without obstruction. Happiness may consist in the activity of all these states or of just one of them. Either way, that activity must be worth choosing if nothing obstructs it. Now Pleasure is exactly this unobstructed activity. So the Chief Good may be some kind of Pleasure, though most Pleasures are (let us assume) low in themselves.

And for this reason all men think the happy life is pleasant, and interweave Pleasure with Happiness. Reasonably enough: because Happiness is perfect, but no impeded active working is perfect; and therefore the happy man needs as an addition the goods of the body and the goods external and fortune that in these points he may not be fettered. As for those who say that he who is being tortured on the wheel, or falls into great misfortunes is happy provided only he be good, they talk nonsense, whether they mean to do so or not. On the other hand, because fortune is needed as an addition, some hold good fortune to be identical with Happiness: which it is not, for even this in excess is a hindrance, and perhaps then has no right to be called good fortune since it is good only in so far as it contributes to Happiness.

For this reason, all people think a happy life is pleasant, and they link pleasure with happiness. This makes sense because happiness is complete, but no activity is complete when it is obstructed. So a happy person also needs bodily well-being, external goods, and good fortune to avoid being held back in these areas. Some say a person being tortured on the wheel or suffering great misfortunes is happy as long as he is good. Such people are talking nonsense, whether they mean to or not. On the other hand, because good fortune is also needed, some think good fortune is the same as happiness. But good fortune is not happiness, because even good fortune becomes an obstacle when there is too much of it. Perhaps such excess no longer deserves to be called good fortune, since fortune is good only insofar as it contributes to happiness.

The fact that all animals, brute and human alike, pursue Pleasure, is some presumption of its being in a sense the Chief Good;

All animals, both human and nonhuman, seek pleasure. This gives some reason to think pleasure is, in a sense, the highest good.

(“There must be something in what most folks say,”) only as one and the same nature or state neither is nor is thought to be the best, so neither do all pursue the same Pleasure, Pleasure nevertheless all do. Nay further, what they pursue is, perhaps, not what they think nor what they would say they pursue, but really one and the same: for in all there is some instinct above themselves. But the bodily Pleasures have received the name exclusively, because theirs is the most frequent form and that which is universally partaken of; and so, because to many these alone are known they believe them to be the only ones which exist.

(“There must be something in what most people say.”) But no single nature or state is best, or is thought to be best. Just as this is true, not everyone pursues the same pleasure, though everyone pursues pleasure. Indeed, perhaps people do not pursue what they think they pursue, or what they would say they pursue. Perhaps they really all pursue the same thing, for everyone has an instinct that reaches beyond themselves. But bodily pleasures alone have come to be called pleasures, because they are the most common and everyone shares in them. So, because many people know only bodily pleasures, they believe these are the only pleasures that exist.

It is plain too that, unless Pleasure and its active working be good, it will not be true that the happy man’s life embodies Pleasure: for why will he want it on the supposition that it is not good and that he can live even with Pain? because, assuming that Pleasure is not good, then Pain is neither evil nor good, and so why should he avoid it?

It is also clear that a happy man’s life cannot include Pleasure unless Pleasure and its activity are good. For why would he want Pleasure if Pleasure is not good and he can live even with Pain? Because if Pleasure is not good, Pain is neither bad nor good. So why should he avoid Pain?

Besides, the life of the good man is not more pleasurable than any other unless it be granted that his active workings are so too.

Besides, a good man's life is no more pleasant than anyone else's unless we agree that his activities are also more pleasant.

Some enquiry into the bodily Pleasures is also necessary for those who say that some Pleasures, to be sure, are highly choice-worthy (the good ones to wit), but not the bodily Pleasures; that is, those which are the object-matter of the man utterly destitute of Self-Control.

Some examination of bodily pleasures is also necessary for those who say that some pleasures are indeed highly desirable. They mean good pleasures, but not bodily pleasures. Bodily pleasures are the ones pursued by a person who completely lacks self-control.

If so, we ask, why are the contrary Pains bad? they cannot be (on their assumption) because the contrary of bad is good.

If so, we ask, why are the opposite pains bad? On their assumption, these pains cannot be bad, because the opposite of bad is good.

May we not say that the necessary bodily Pleasures are good in the sense in which that which is not-bad is good? or that they are good only up to a certain point? because such states or movements as cannot have too much of the better cannot have too much of Pleasure, but those which can of the former can also of the latter. Now the bodily Pleasures do admit of excess: in fact the low bad man is such because he pursues the excess of them instead of those which are necessary (meat, drink, and the objects of other animal appetites do give pleasure to all, but not in right manner or degree to all). But his relation to Pain is exactly the contrary: it is not excessive Pain, but Pain at all, that he avoids [which makes him to be in this way too a bad low man], because only in the case of him who pursues excessive Pleasure is Pain contrary to excessive Pleasure.

May we not say that necessary bodily pleasures are good in the sense that whatever is not bad is good? Or that bodily pleasures are good only up to a point? For states or activities that cannot have too much of what is better cannot have too much pleasure either. But states or activities that can have too much of what is better can also have too much pleasure. Now bodily pleasures do allow excess. Indeed, the base, bad man is bad because he pursues excessive bodily pleasures rather than necessary ones. (Food, drink, and the objects of other animal appetites give everyone pleasure, but not in the right way or degree.) But his attitude toward pain is exactly the opposite. He avoids not just excessive pain, but all pain [which also makes him a base, bad man in this respect]. For only to someone who pursues excessive pleasure is pain the opposite of excessive pleasure.

It is not enough however merely to state the truth, we should also show how the false view arises; because this strengthens conviction. I mean, when we have given a probable reason why that impresses people as true which really is not true, it gives them a stronger conviction of the truth. And so we must now explain why the bodily Pleasures appear to people to be more choice-worthy than any others.

However, simply stating the truth is not enough. We should also explain how the false view arises, because explaining its source strengthens belief in the truth. I mean, we should give a likely reason why people mistake a false view for the truth. Giving such a reason strengthens their belief in the truth. So we must now explain why bodily pleasures seem to people more worth choosing than any others.

The first obvious reason is, that bodily Pleasure drives out Pain; and because Pain is felt in excess men pursue Pleasure in excess, i.e. generally bodily Pleasure, under the notion of its being a remedy for that Pain. These remedies, moreover, come to be violent ones; which is the very reason they are pursued, since the impression they produce on the mind is owing to their being looked at side by side with their contrary.

The first obvious reason is that bodily pleasure drives out pain. Because people feel excessive pain, they pursue excessive pleasure, that is, usually bodily pleasure, as a remedy for that pain. These remedies also become intense, and their intensity is the very reason people pursue them. For the remedies make an impression on the mind because they are viewed alongside their opposite, pain.

And, as has been said before, there are the two following reasons why bodily Pleasure is thought to be not-good.

And, as noted earlier, bodily pleasure is thought not to be good for the following two reasons.

1. Some Pleasures of this class are actings of a low nature, whether congenital as in brutes, or acquired by custom as in low bad men.

1. Some pleasures of this kind express a base nature. Such a nature may be inborn, as in animals, or developed through habit, as in base, wicked people.

2. Others are in the nature of cures, cures that is of some deficiency; now of course it is better to have [the healthy state] originally than that it should accrue afterwards.

2. Others act as cures for some deficiency. Of course, having [the healthy state] from the start is better than gaining it later.

(But some Pleasures result when natural states are being perfected: these therefore are good as a matter of result.)

(But some pleasures arise as natural states are perfected. These pleasures are therefore good as a result.)

Again, the very fact of their being violent causes them to be pursued by such as can relish no others: such men in fact create violent thirsts for themselves (if harmless ones then we find no fault, if harmful then it is bad and low) because they have no other things to take pleasure in, and the neutral state is distasteful to some people constitutionally; for toil of some kind is inseparable from life, as physiologists testify, telling us that the acts of seeing or hearing are painful, only that we are used to the pain and do not find it out.

Again, the very intensity of these pleasures attracts people who cannot enjoy any others. Such people actually create intense cravings for themselves. If these cravings are harmless, we find no fault. If they are harmful, this is bad and base. They create these cravings because they have nothing else to enjoy. And some people, by nature, find a state of neither pleasure nor pain unpleasant. For some kind of strain is inseparable from life, as physiologists tell us. They say that seeing and hearing are painful. We are simply so used to the pain that we do not notice it.

Similarly in youth the constant growth produces a state much like that of vinous intoxication, and youth is pleasant. Again, men of the melancholic temperament constantly need some remedial process (because the body, from its temperament, is constantly being worried), and they are in a chronic state of violent desire. But Pleasure drives out Pain; not only such Pleasure as is directly contrary to Pain but even any Pleasure provided it be strong: and this is how men come to be utterly destitute of Self-Mastery, i.e. low and bad.

Similarly, constant growth in youth produces a state much like being drunk on wine, and youth is pleasant. Again, men with a melancholic temperament constantly need some form of relief. (Their physical constitution keeps their bodies constantly troubled.) And they are always in a state of intense desire. But pleasure drives out pain. This includes not only pleasure directly opposed to the pain, but any pleasure, provided the pleasure is strong. And this is how men come to lack self-control completely, that is, to be base and bad.

But those Pleasures which are unconnected with Pains do not admit of excess: i.e. such as belong to objects which are naturally pleasant and not merely as a matter of result: by the latter class I mean such as are remedial, and the reason why these are thought to be pleasant is that the cure results from the action in some way of that part of the constitution which remains sound. By “pleasant naturally” I mean such as put into action a nature which is pleasant.

But pleasures unconnected with pain cannot be excessive: that is, pleasures from things naturally pleasant, not merely pleasant as a result. By the latter kind, I mean pleasures that bring healing. These are thought pleasant because healing results from some activity of the part of the body that remains healthy. By “naturally pleasant” I mean things that activate a nature that is pleasant.

The reason why no one and the same thing is invariably pleasant is that our nature is, not simple, but complex, involving something different from itself (so far as we are corruptible beings). Suppose then that one part of this nature be doing something, this something is, to the other part, unnatural: but, if there be an equilibrium of the two natures, then whatever is being done is indifferent. It is obvious that if there be any whose nature is simple and not complex, to such a being the same course of acting will always be the most pleasurable.

No single thing is always pleasant because our nature is complex, not simple. Our nature includes something different from itself, since we are beings subject to decay. Suppose, then, that one part of our nature is doing something. That activity is unnatural for the other part. But if the two parts are in balance, whatever we are doing is neither pleasant nor unpleasant. Clearly, if any being has a simple rather than complex nature, the same activity will always be most pleasurable for that being.

For this reason it is that the Divinity feels Pleasure which is always one, i.e. simple: not motion merely but also motionlessness acts, and Pleasure resides rather in the absence than in the presence of motion.

For this reason, the Divinity experiences pleasure that is always one, that is, simple. Both motion and stillness involve activity, and pleasure lies more in the absence of motion than in its presence.

The reason why the Poet’s dictum “change is of all things most pleasant” is true, is “a baseness in our blood;” for as the bad man is easily changeable, bad must be also the nature that craves change, i.e. it is neither simple nor good.

The Poet’s saying, “change is of all things most pleasant,” is true because of “a moral flaw in our blood.” For just as a bad man changes easily, a nature that craves change must also be bad. That is, such a nature is neither simple nor good.

We have now said our say about Self-Control and its opposite; and about Pleasure and Pain. What each is, and how the one set is good the other bad. We have yet to speak of Friendship.

We have now discussed self-control and its opposite, as well as pleasure and pain. We have explained what each is, and how one set is good and the other bad. We still need to discuss friendship.